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L E C T U R E S  
I N  
D I V I N I T Y,

DELIVERED IN THE  
UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE,

BY  
✓  
JOHN HEY, D.D.

AS NORRISIAN PROFESSOR.



VOLUME THE THIRD.



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L E C T U R E S

I N

D I V I N I T Y, &c

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B O O K IV.

CONTINUATION OF ARTICLE VI.

SECT. XVI.

LET us then endeavour to put ourselves in the place of early Christians, and see how writings, circumstanced as these Catholic Epistles were, might be authentic, and yet not at once universally received.

1. First, take a *geographical* view of the countries, in which Christianity was professed in the fourth Century: examine the extent of the *Eastern* and *Western*<sup>a</sup> Church, and you will readily admit, that  
a writing

<sup>a</sup> In Bingham's *Antiquities*, Book 1x. we have ecclesiastical maps; particularly of the three Patriarchates, of Antioch, Alexandria, and Jerusalem; nor can it be difficult, in any book of Geography, to trace out the extent of the See of Rome, by the directions of ecclesiastical history, at any period: or that of any of the European Churches. Indeed Bingham might suffice for the present purpose.

a writing, which was to be separated by careful examination from a number of other writings, might reach some places a long time before it reached others. There might indeed accidentally be a communication between one place and another very distant from it, not affecting intermediate places; while there was no intercourse between two places very near;—but, in calculating the effect of distance, some kind of average might be taken, of communication, or intercourse. And then we might say, if a Bishop of Sardis is obliged to travel into the East, in order to inform himself of the several claims of various writings, how is an Epistle addressed to inhabitants of Judea to arrive, in its proper form and character, on the coasts of Spain or Italy?

2. We should consider what great obstructions and delays must arise from a want of a legal provision for *conveyance*, such as our Posts, Apparitors, &c. and we may add, from a want of the art of *printing*. Some writings used to be called indeed *εγκυκλιοι*, because they were to be sent *round*<sup>b</sup>; that is, after being copied by one Church, they were to be forwarded to another: but this would be slow work; and the copy would sometimes miss its way, or stop short, or be lost<sup>c</sup>. Then suppose it made a considerable progress, nay a great one; that would be nothing to the present question, which is only, why were not all our sacred writings at once *universal*? that they were always received in *many* places, cannot well be questioned.

3. *Gospels* must spread more than *Epistles*. No one could well go to teach Christianity any where, without

<sup>b</sup> See Du Cange, *εγκυκλια*, and *εγκυκλια γράμματα*, circular Letters.

<sup>c</sup> Lardner gives good reasons to think, that no Scriptures have been *finally* lost. See Vol. 6, last Chapter.

without having a Gospel with him. Epistles of any sort would have a more confined and local reference; so that the carrying of them to every place would not be wholly indispensable: still less needful would it be to carry round the Apocalypse.

4. Epistles to particular Churches would sooner be acknowledged by any individuals, and so afterwards universally, than Epistles to any converts that were dispersed. Suppose, for instance, any one to ask himself whether the first Epistle to the Corinthians was to be received; and, at the same time, whether he was to receive the Epistle of James:—he might be sure to find the former at a known *place*; and many witnesses ready to vouch for its genuineness: and this certainty would have weight even at a distance, nay, at *any* distance from Corinth: whereas the evidence of the latter would be more scattered and feeble.

5. Supposing the progress of a writing *once delayed*, or its reception disputed, then, if Christianity kept spreading, the longer any doubts continued, the greater difficulty would there be found in accomplishing the end we are speaking of. Not but the writing might go on continually gaining ground; but it would be longer in becoming *universal*.

6. The longer the reception of any writing was delayed, the more *spurious* works would it have to fight its way through.—Every one of our sacred pieces must have its claims set in opposition to the claims of a great many others: the more of these it has to contend with, the longer it must be in making its claims universally allowed: and such competitors would, for some time, increase and multiply.—At any time, the Protevangelium<sup>d</sup> of James

<sup>d</sup> See Jeremiah Jones, or Fabricius's codex Apocryphus, mentioned before, B. I. Chap. XII. Sect. IV.

James might retard the Epistle of James; but the more of such obstacles stood in the way, the greater would be the retardation.

7. One principal thing to help forwards a disputed Book or writing, would be *internal evidence*: but, though nothing works more surely, yet nothing works more slowly: common people will for a while swallow, or rather devour, great absurdities, though after a time they will be convinced by better judges: indeed internal evidence is only evidence to the best judges, at first.—The internal evidence of the Apocalypse must work very slowly indeed. Before the completion of some of the Prophecies which it contains, it must be received merely on the probability of its being written by St. John.

XVII. I look upon these observations to be historical; though their tendency is, to shew how the controverted pieces of the New Testament *might* be obstructed, even if really authentic. And I should hope, that such remarks might moreover tend to fix our thoughts on the growth of Christianity, and make it an interesting subject. They therefore open the subject to us, and *explain* its nature; and they may be called explanatory, as well as historical.—As the Article has no words about controverted Books, I shall offer no other *Explanation*.

XVIII. We come then to our *proof*:—which is only concerned with one proposition.

‘The seven controverted Books of the New Testament ought to be deemed *canonical*.’

We will prove this of these Books, first *collectively*, then *separately*.

XIX. *Collectively*. This has been already done in some measure. Their being acknowledged upon examination, after being confounded with a number of  
of



of other books, implies a good deal: a more severe trial than if they had met with a welcome reception on their first appearance. We might also conceive, that, had the time of their probation been shorter, this argument in their favour might have been less powerful. The want of credulity of the Fathers, in the matter now before us, like the want of belief in St. Thomas, is a very powerful confirmation of our faith.—And it must be a pleasing reflexion to any one under doubt about any of these books, to think, that its title had been examined carefully, by better judges than himself, when the materials for judging were much more attainable than at present.—Pursuing this thought, we ask how it happens, that all Christians are agreed on the subject of their authenticity? this is no ordinary phænomenon: when a point has once been disputed, it generally continues to be disputed: but, in this, there is no dissenting Church; nay, scarcely an hesitating individual.—To offer as a reason, that the authenticity of the books in question has been settled publicly, in a Council, is to say little. Those, who composed that Council, must have received conviction as private men.

I will now read to you some *Catalogues* of ancient times, from which it appears, when the controverted Books of our New Testament had been received amongst those always acknowledged as canonical.—And the Letter of *Melito*, Bishop of Sardis, to Onesimus, though only on the Old Testament, might give us a right feeling of the situation of Christians before the Canon was settled.—*Cyril's Catalogue*, and that of the Council of *Laodicea*, may be sufficient for the present. Those, who chuse to consult more catalogues, may find them in Lardner's Works, by his *Indexes*<sup>c</sup>; or in that Chapter

<sup>c</sup> Particularly Index v. under *Testament*.

Chapter of the Supplement to his Credibility, which treats of the *Order* of the Books of the New Testament<sup>f</sup>.—*Athanasius* and *Ruffinus* not only give their own opinion, but the evidence of writings now lost<sup>g</sup>.

xx. *Separately*. We begin with the Epistle to the *Hebrews*: there are two parts in each proof; we would both see, that the work in question is written by an *Apostle*, and that there are sufficient witnesses of its being sacred. That is, we would prove its being *genuine*<sup>h</sup>, and its being *authentic*. These two proofs may unite their force, but they are strictly independent of each other<sup>i</sup>.—If a writing is proved authentic, it is to be received, whoever wrote it; if an *Apostle* wrote it, it is to be received on his account<sup>k</sup>; and the evidence, that a writing is either genuine or authentic, may either be *internal*, or *external*.—During our separate proofs, the state of early Christians now described, as to their having a number of books claiming to be received as sacred, should be constantly kept in mind.

xxi. The Epistle to the Hebrews may be proved *authentic* by a number of credible witnesses. Barnabas<sup>l</sup>, Clemens Romanus, and Polycarp may  
be

<sup>f</sup> Chap. xxiii.

<sup>g</sup> Richardson's Canon, p. 39, 40; or Lardner, as above.

<sup>h</sup> *Genuine*, distinguished from *authentic*, B. I. Chap. xii. Sect. II.

<sup>i</sup> *Grotius* and *Le Clerc* think the Epistle to the Hebrews authentic, but not the work of St. Paul. *Dionysius* of Alexandria thought the Apocalypse sacred, and written by a John, but not the Evangelist.

<sup>k</sup> See Bishop Hallifax's quotation, p. 211, from Erasmus; though it belongs properly to the Apocalypse.

Lardner does not allow, that Barnabas *does* refer to Hebr. though he calls Moses a *Servant* (Heb. iii. 5.) and in the capacity of a servant opposes him to *Christ*. Barnabas does not indeed

be reckoned, as they shew, that the matter of it was familiar to them, though it is not their custom to *quote* formally. The force of this argument is best seen by looking into Lardner's Credibility, &c. There, in the account of *each* Father, it is easily found what Scriptures he quotes, or alludes to. And in his *Supplement*, the opinions of the Fathers with regard to each Epistle may be found collected. The Epistle to the Hebrews is *quoted* by Irenæus, Clemens Alexandrinus, Athanasius, and Cyril of Jerusalem; and with particular attention by Origen.—We may add the authority of the Councils of Laodicea (in 364, or about that time,) and *Carthage* (in 397, the third.)—These authorities do not go lower than the fourth century:—but such as are later are useful in shewing, that all disputes were at an end. However, I will only mention Theodoret, who told the Arians, that they ought to respect this Epistle, as one which had been <sup>m</sup> read as early as the Apostolic writings.—These witnesses seem sufficient. A student, who chose to attend particularly to this subject, might read that part of Lardner's Supplement to his Credibility, which is about this Epistle in particular<sup>n</sup>.

XXII. As the Epistle to the Hebrews is *anonymous*, we cannot perhaps be properly said to prove its *genuineness*; but we may prove, that it is written by an *Apostle*; which is all we have in view, in proving

deed at the same time call Christ a *Son*, but still the opposition strikes me: nor does any thing come near obviating it but the supposition, that Barnabas might originally have the same *ideas* with St. Paul. See Lard. Works, Vol. 2, p. 20.

<sup>m</sup> Theodoret begins his Preface to Hebr. with saying, that the Arians endeavoured to lessen its authority; but I have omitted relating an exact reference to the passage, from which this was taken. I may find it hereafter.

<sup>n</sup> Lardner's Works, Vol. 6, p. 381—415.

proving any Epistle to be genuine. We will now therefore offer some reasons for concluding, that it is written by *St. Paul*. Grotius and Le Clerc are of a different opinion; but, though they are learned men, we find ourselves obliged to differ from them sometimes.

*Compare* Heb. v. 12. with 1 Cor. iii. 2.—Heb. xii. 3. with Gal. vi. 9.—Heb. xiii. 16. with Phil. iv. 18.—And compare *conclusions*<sup>o</sup>.—Christ is called *Mediator* in the Epistle to the Hebrews three times, and twice in the Epistles always ascribed to St. Paul, and no where else in Scripture.—St. Paul makes use of allusions to the public *Games*; and such allusions are found in the Epistle to the Hebrews<sup>p</sup>.

2 Pet. iii. 15, 16, is often used to prove, that Paul wrote the Epistle to Hebrews. The argument takes for granted the authority of the second Epistle of Peter, but that is proved independently. The reasoning I take to be this: Peter writes to the same persons, that Paul had addressed in some Epistle of a singular nature: so strictly singular, that it might be contradistinguished to the rest of St. Paul's Epistles: or, what seems still stronger, to "*all his Epistles*," (ver. 16); now, how can this be solved so well, as by making the Epistle to the Hebrews to be one class, and the rest of his Epistles another?—Lardner<sup>q</sup> will not use this passage, because he supposes Paul to write to *Jewish* converts in Judea, and Peter to converts *in general*. But, on *this* supposition, Peter and Paul would address *some* of the same converts:—and it seems quite clear, from ver. 15, that they did write to some of the same persons, whoever they were.—

The

<sup>o</sup> Gibson gives more instances,—3d Past. Letter: see *Contents*.

<sup>p</sup> Compare Heb. xii. 1. with 1 Cor. ix. 24. and Phil. iii. 1, 4.

<sup>q</sup> Lardner's Works, Vol. 6, p. 404.

The “things *hard to be understood*,” seem to be in the Epistles to the Romans and Ephesians particularly; and the “*as also*” does seem to me to make one *class* of what went before, and another of what follows: and I cannot divide the writings of Paul so well into *two classes*, as by supposing the Epistle to the Hebrews singly to make one of them.

In Heb. xiii. 23. *Timothy* is spoken of in a manner like that of St. Paul;—and one can scarce conceive any person besides St. Paul to speak of him in such a manner.—Such is the *internal* evidence, that the Epistle to Hebrews is St. Paul’s: we may add as much *external* almost as we please.

This Epistle is *ascribed* to St. Paul by many of the ancients; whose names may be seen in Lardner<sup>r</sup>, and in Bishop Gibson’s third Pastoral Letter. All those, who reckon fourteen Epistles of Paul, ascribe that to the Hebrews to him. Origen *intended*<sup>s</sup> a proof, that Paul wrote it; whether he executed his intention or not, it shews his *opinion*: but Lardner thinks<sup>t</sup> he did execute it;—in his Homilies.

XXIII. Here we may rest our direct proof, though other arguments<sup>u</sup> are to be found—The *indirect* proof, in the present question, is very considerable: that is to say, answering *objections* opens the subject farther, and confirms our reasoning.

*Obj. 1.* If this Epistle had such good evidence for it as is here said, why was it not at first better *received* in the Christian world? In answer, we might first apply what has been said about the controverted pieces in general. And we may add, it was the less readily received on account of its being

<sup>r</sup> Lard. Vol. 6, p. 391, &c.

<sup>s</sup> See Lard. Works, Vol. 2, p. 472.

<sup>t</sup> Lard. Works, Vol. 2, p. 478.

<sup>u</sup> Richardson’s Canon, p. 40, and p. 41; note.

being *anonymous*. If you ask, why then *was* it anonymous? you swerve from the present business.—It seems to have been received wherever it was *known*, till writings grew too numerous. In the *Eastern Church*, that is, in its own country, or near it, there does not seem to have been any doubt about it. At one time, it had not reached the *Western Church*, or not all parts of it; but afterwards it did reach them *all*. The high things it contains concerning the *Son of God*, have made many depreciate it.—The Latins would probably think it too *Rabbinical* for them.—And certain severe passages relating to Apostacy, would *deter* some men, and make them wish to avoid it and keep clear of it, whether the Novatians had any concern in the affair, or not.

*Obj. 2.* If Paul was the author, why did he not put his *name*?—He might have good reasons unknown to us; and it would have been absurd for him to assign reasons why he did not own himself to be the author; that would have been owning himself to be so, in other words.—Then he was the Apostle of the *Gentiles*\*; and the Jews were much prejudiced † against him: perhaps as an Apostate. He wrote indeed to converts; but Christian converts could retain Jewish prejudices;—his reasoning with them shews, that he was obliged to turn their own arms against them, which is a sort of hostile treatment.—In this Epistle, he lowers the value of Judaism, making it only introductory and temporary; whereas many, even Christians, wanted to make it perpetual.

*Obj. 3.* If this Epistle was so well attested, how could some early *Fathers* be ignorant of St. Paul's being the Author? we reply;—Irenæus might not know

\* See Gibson; 3d Past. Letter.

† Acts xxi. 21, 28. Gibson, as before.

know the author, but he knew of the Epistle, and has quoted it. He was Bishop of *Lyons*; perhaps the Epistle might be less perfectly known in *France* than in *Judea*, so soon as the time of Irenæus.—Tertullian ascribed it to *Barnabas*; but he also was a Latin Father: it was no bad compliment, however, to the composition to ascribe an Epistle of Paul, to his companion and fellow-preacher; to give it to one, who, if he was not an Apostle in the highest sense, was as near to one as possible.

But any one, who happened to look at the *end* of this Epistle, might say, no one must conclude that Irenæus, &c. did not know it because they were Latin Fathers; for the Epistle was written from <sup>z</sup> *Italy*. Εγγραφη απο της Ιταλιας δια Τιμοθεου.—Suppose it *was*, when it once got into *Judea*, it might be as if it had been written in *Judea*.—But this subscription is of very doubtful authority<sup>a</sup>. It might be occasioned by “they of *Italy* salute you,” just before; but *ἐκ* απο της Ιταλιας might mean persons in *Judea*, or elsewhere, come hither from *Italy*<sup>b</sup>.—Then, it is not likely, that this Epistle was sent by Timothy; for the author says, he would come *with* Timothy, (Heb. xiii. 23.) if he came *soon*; sending implies separation; and, if Timothy

<sup>z</sup> In the Alex. MS, it is, from *Rome*.

<sup>a</sup> Notwithstanding the little credit of this subscription, Lardner is of opinion, that the Epistle was written from *Rome*; and there is a great weight of learning on the side of its coming from *Italy*. See Lard. Vol. 6, p. 413. I am not clear enough in the order of the incidents at present, to contend about the matter.—I may however adhere to what I say *first*, that it might be *unknown* at *Rome*, though written from a prison there.—Eusebius says, it was controverted, because not received by the Church at *Rome*.

<sup>b</sup> In Viger, 9. 1. 13. we have not only *ἐκ* απο της *Γαλατίας*, for *Stoics*, but *ἐκ* απο της *Κελτικῆς* for *Gauls*, *Galli*.—The word *αδελφοι*, added in MS *Veles*. Is not well supported, else it would take off the force of this phrase.

mothy delayed his journey, it is probable the Epistle would be sent by some other hand.—In the authorities, Clemens of Rome is mentioned as having known the Epistle: but he might know it on the return of travellers, who had visited their brethren in the East: or as a Bishop of a great city:—those in high authority have intelligence, which does not reach common people.

*Obj.* 4. Some have thought, that this Epistle could not be written by St. Paul, because the *style and manner* appeared unlike St. Paul's:—less vehemence, less digressive;—in better *Greek* than could be expected from St. Paul; and more politely expressed.—Yet we may say, in reply, the Epistle to the Hebrews is by no means deficient in spirit and energy; nor are St. Paul's other Epistles without instances of fine writing. Then, whatever made St. Paul conceal his *name*, would make him write with reserve and caution, if not attempt to make some alteration in his style and manner of writing. This would naturally give a polish and softness, and, by abating vehemence, would prevent digressions. As to the *Greek*, I shall content myself with giving you the hypothesis of *Lardner*<sup>d</sup>. “My conjecture,” says he, “is, that St. Paul dictated the Epistle in Hebrew, and another, who was a great master of the Greek language, immediately wrote down the Apostle's sentiments in his own elegant Greek. But who this assistant of the Apostle was, is altogether unknown<sup>e</sup>.”—Any person, who

<sup>e</sup> This was the opinion of *Origen*. See Lard. Vol. 2, p. 477.

<sup>d</sup> Lard. Works, Vol. 6, p. 410.

<sup>c</sup> On review, I cannot feel contented with this conjecture of Lardner's:—if it were well grounded, the Epistle in Greek would have the air of a *Translation*, contrary to what is quoted by him, Vol. 2, p. 477, and Vol. 4, p. 269.—St. Paul wrote many Epistles in Greek; would he have employed any one to write



who did not think himself a judge of the elegance of Greek, might perceive, that the language of the Epistle was more pure, clear and free from embarrassment than St. Paul's usually is:—it is above Barnabas, or Clement; what primitive Christian do we know of, except Paul, that it is *not* above?—With regard to the *matter* of the Epistle, good judges esteem that to be truly worthy of the Pupil of *Gamaliel*<sup>f</sup>.

XXIV. We come next to the Epistle of *James*. It is entitled *Ἰακώβου τοῦ Αποστόλου*, and addressed, according to Lardner's opinion, to the *twelve Tribes*, that is, to all descendants<sup>g</sup> of Jacob, probably, whether

write this for him? and, if he dictated at all, why in Hebrew, to one well skilled in Greek?—As he did not write in his own name, I can conceive him to have *thought* more about his *expressions* than in his other writings; and to have consulted some *friends* upon them: this would sufficiently alter his style.

<sup>f</sup> See Wotton's *Misna* from Simon: Postscript to Preface.

<sup>g</sup> Lardner is of this opinion; see Works, Vol. 6, p. 307. In a Sermon, I have said, it seemed to me, that St. James meant to correct the mistakes and faults of pious *Christians*, who had abused Christian doctrines, so as to evade the *moral* purposes of Christianity. I feel a reluctance to give up this opinion, though I wrote my Sermon in 1794, unmindful of this Lecture, written in 1790.—It seems to me a less difficulty to leave some *expressions* unaccounted for, (such as that about *vars*) than to suppose James to address persons so very dissimilar as Jews, (supposed fixed and determined in Judaism) and Christians; or to suppose him to say things so uninteresting as some parts of his Epistles would be to Jews.—I can conceive James to have had enlarged notions, and to have seen amongst Jews persons, who had all imaginable *degrees* of inclination to Christianity; and some moreover, who wanted to be *both* Jews and Christians at the same time. Nay, I can conceive him to consider *all* Jews in the light of future *converts*, probable or possible: or as those, whose true *interest* it was to become converts; but I cannot conceive him to address Jews, *as Jews*. He might, according to this, be unwilling to *limit* the number of those he addressed; but I think he addressed no one, whom he did not consider as standing in some relation to Christianity.—He might bear in  
mind

whether converted to Christianity or not.—It is a *Catholic* Epistle, as being addressed to no particular city, or settled Church. We are not to conclude, from its being called *Catholic*, that it was industriously and immediately circulated all over the Christian world; probably it *could* only be circulated within a moderate compass.

We will first give some reasons for believing it to be written by an *Apostle* of the name of *James*, and then produce some witnesses of its *authenticity*. In treating on the Epistle to the Hebrews, we took the opposite method; spoke of the authority before the Author; because, that Epistle being anonymous, it seemed best to give it a credit from testimony, before we proved it to be the composition of an *Apostle*.

xxv. 1. *James*, the Author of this Epistle, was an *Apostle* in the strictest sense<sup>h</sup>. It may seem more easy to prove this than it really is. The name of *James* occurs several times in Scripture, without any mention of Parents, or any other mark to distinguish one James from another. In primitive times, there was no need of any such mark; the context was sufficient. But we have James son of Zebedee, James son of Alphaeus, James the Less (*μικρος*)<sup>i</sup>, James the Lord's Brother, &c; and some of the ancients<sup>k</sup>, and the *Greeks* in modern times, have conceived, that James the son of Alphaeus and James the Less might be different persons. It will not suit our plan to enter very minutely into this

mind, that the Jews, who were imperfectly converted, might be *offended*, by any perversion of Christian doctrines to immoral purposes; and he might have such Jews in view; sensible that his Epistle would be read by many of them.

<sup>h</sup> Some account has been given of the four *Evangelists*, B. 1. Ch. XIII. Sect. IX.

<sup>i</sup> Mark xv. 40.

<sup>k</sup> See Lardner's Works, Vol. 6, p. 474, 475.

this matter. We may give some *data*, on which it may be solved. Any one, who wishes to examine it, must collect all the texts, in which *James* is mentioned, and compare them; also all those, in which the brethren of our Lord are mentioned; either all together (Matt. xiii. 55.) or separately.—If we divide the twelve Apostles into three quaternions, the order in which they occur is always the same: the first four are always, Peter (or Simon), Andrew, James son of Zebedee, and John. The second four are always, Philip, Bartholomew, Thomas, and Matthew (or Levi.) The third four are always, James son of Alphaeus (or of Cleophas), Simon the Canaanite (or Zelotes); Jude or Judas, (or Lebbeus surnamed Thaddeus), and Judas Iscariot.—The same person has different *names*, we see; but the Hebrew names might take sometimes a *Latin* turn, from the connexion of the Jews with the Romans; or sometimes a *Greek* turn, Greek being the general language: the inscription on the Cross was written in Hebrew, Greek, and Latin.

To the above may be added, that James, the Lord's brother, is called an Apostle by St. Paul, Gal. i. 19. But after all, we must content ourselves with taking the result of inquiries made at other times. There were, then, but *two*, probably, of the name of James; both reckoned in all the four<sup>1</sup> enumerations of the twelve *Apostles*. First, James the son of Zebedee and Salome<sup>m</sup>, called sometimes, though not in Scripture, *major*, or the elder; brother of John the Evangelist, who, with his brother John, and Peter, was present at the transfiguration, and during the agony of Christ in the Garden; who was one of those surnamed Boanerges,

<sup>1</sup> Matt. x. 2—4. Mark iii. 18. Luke 6. 15. Acts i. 13.

<sup>m</sup> *Salome* seems to have been the name of the mother of James major, and of the sister of James minor.

nerges, and a Martyr under Herod<sup>n</sup>.—Second, James the son of Alpheus, or the *less*, in opposition to the other James, who is always mentioned *first*, and was most eminent and most employed; brother of Jude, and of Simon Zelotes, or the Canaanite, called, for some reason, or in some respect, the *Brother* of our ° Lord; and by early Christians, though not in Scripture, James the *just*: brother also of *Joses*, who was *not* an Apostle: If our Epistle was written by *either* of these, it was written by an *Apostle*.—No one amongst the ancients, who had thought about it, denied, that it was written by *one James*, a man of very great *eminence* amongst the first Christians:—now, James the son of Zebedee suffered martyrdom too <sup>p</sup> *soon* to write it; it was therefore (if our conclusion concerning the number of James's is right) written by James the Son <sup>q</sup> of *Alpheus*. Indeed the things which are said of James, when no explanatory title is added, and after the death <sup>r</sup> of James the son of Zebedee, are sufficient to shew, that he *acted* in an Apostolic character; nay, in a character higher than the generality even of Apostles, after Christ's ascension. When Peter was released out of prison by the Angel, as soon as he got into an house, he gave this order<sup>s</sup>; “Go, shew these things unto *James*, and unto his brethren;”—as one would send to let a ruling Magistrate know any thing, and add, ‘and tell it also to the *other* persons concerned.’

James

<sup>n</sup> Acts xii. 2.

<sup>o</sup> As being Cousin; see Bp. Pearson on the Creed, concerning the perpetual Virginity of Mary, p. 175, Fol.

<sup>p</sup> A. D. 44.

<sup>q</sup> Our Church takes part of the Epistle of James for the proper Lesson for St. Philip and St. James, May 11th.—The festival of James major is July 25th.

<sup>r</sup> He suffered A. D. 44. Acts xv. is dated 51.

<sup>s</sup> Acts xii. 17.

James<sup>c</sup> seems to *preside* in making a speech on a difficult question, and what he dictates is put in execution.—James<sup>u</sup> presides at *Jerusalem*; the ancients have called him *Bishop* of Jerusalem. James is one of those, who reconcile<sup>x</sup> Paul and Barnabas. And his weight appears in the obedience of *Peter* to a commission deputed and sent<sup>y</sup> by him.—The word *Αποσολς* in the title, is in most manuscripts. And though the word *Apostle*, like other titles of honour, has got extended, yet the *twelve* seem to have been upon a different footing from the *seventy*, or any other disciples<sup>z</sup>.—It need scarce be mentioned, that the writer of the Epistle calls himself the *Servant*<sup>a</sup> of Christ, whereas he, whom we suppose to have written it, is called by St. Paul<sup>b</sup> and the Evangelists, his *Brother*. After the *Ascension* of Christ, James became his *Minister*, or *Servant*: he was never a strict or proper Brother, nor perhaps would he ever have called *himself* so; except it might be in boyhood. To the *Messias*, to the *Lord*, he was *Servant*; though he might be Brother to the Carpenter's Son.

What has now been said, with regard to St. James, will make us ready to accept the evidence of antiquity concerning the *genuineness* and *authenticity* of his Epistle. *Internal* evidence we can expect none, except the reasonableness and morality of the composition, considered with the discretion and

<sup>c</sup> Acts xv. 13.<sup>u</sup> Acts xxi. 18.<sup>x</sup> Gal. ii. 9.

<sup>y</sup> Gal. ii. 12.—Lardner, Vol. 2, p. 357, thinks, with Grotius and Beza, that Jews coming from *James*, means only coming from *Jerusalem*: but I hesitate:—Peter might be too familiar with Gentiles; the Jews from James might intimate this; Peter might grow more reserved to Gentiles than seemed to *himself* needful or right; and in that sense he might *dissemble*.

<sup>z</sup> Luke vi. 13. Christ called his *Disciples*, and distinguished the twelve “whom *also* he named *Apostles*.”

<sup>a</sup> James i. 1.<sup>b</sup> Gal. i. 19.

and amiable goodness of St. James's conduct.—His *character* is drawn by Lardner, Vol. 6, p. 473. Some Latin Fathers, who lived at a distance from Judea, do not speak as if they had been acquainted with this Epistle; as Tertullian, and Cyprian: Irenæus is thought by some to have known of it, at least in some degree<sup>c</sup>.—Origen says, in the part of his works which we have in Greek, that this Epistle is *ascribed* to James; but, in that part of his works, which were translated into Latin by Rufinus (if there has been no interpolation made by Rufinus), he speaks of it as the Epistle of “James Apostle and Brother of the Lord, and divine Scripture<sup>d</sup>.” If we found a MS so *inscribed* as our Epistle is, in any other case, we should not think of making much doubt about the author, except some particular difficulty occurred.—But I will not dwell more upon the *genuineness* of St. James's Epistle, as it is attested by most of the witnesses, who come next to be considered.

xxvi. Now we may call our witnesses to the *authenticity* of our Epistle. They are so numerous<sup>e</sup>, that I can only make a selection. The witnesses of authenticity will generally be witnesses of genuineness; conversely not so often. The earliest Fathers

<sup>c</sup> Clemens Alexandrinus occasions some difficulty. See Lardner's Works, Vol. 2, p 226. Lardner is very candid in not reckoning any of his passages to refer to James.—I do not see how to account for James's Epistle not having made its way to Alexandria before 194: but that might not be the case; Clem. Alex. might only *omit* James, or have no *occasion* to quote any passage from a writing rather *moral* than *doctrinal*; nay, one seemingly *avoiding* the mention of doctrines, except when endeavouring to prevent their being abused.

<sup>d</sup> See Lard. Vol. 2, p. 479.

<sup>e</sup> See Index to Lardner's Works, under St. James, his Epistle.—And the same might be done also with regard to *Hebrews*, &c.—consult also Gibson's third Pastoral Letter:—Richardson's Canon, p. 42.

thers seem to have known and acknowledged what we call the Epistle of James, as authentic: Clement of Rome and Hermas are to be consulted particularly: the Apostolic Fathers were more *moral* than some who came after them.—Origen has been already mentioned.—Eusebius and Jerom should be added; the former of whom says, that the Epistle was *known to most*<sup>f</sup>; and the latter, that gradually, in process of time, it obtained<sup>g</sup> authority; which accounts agree with what we have said about the manner of the circulation of the sacred writings. We are moreover told, that the Epistle of James was translated into Syriac with the first of Peter and the first of John.

The particular obstacle, by which this Epistle might be impeded on its first outset, seems well assigned by<sup>h</sup> Bishop Gibson. St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans was universally received, and this seemed to contradict it with respect to justification by faith. We may add, its being *moral* more than *doctrinal*: it seems frequently of use to observe, that the Fathers were more *Divines* than *Moralists*. Lardner also mentions as an obstacle, its being thought by some, that there were more than two James's (Lard. Vol. 4, p. 253.): this is also mentioned by Bishop Gibson. Martin Luther went farther when he rejected this Epistle, on account of what it contains with regard to faith, after it had been many centuries established<sup>i</sup> in the Canon.

Notwithstanding

<sup>f</sup> By the way, this is not said about the Epistle of James as distinguished from the other *αντιλεγόμενα*; it is said of them *all*, though James is specified first.

<sup>g</sup> Whitby. And in Gibson, p. 199, there is a second passage about Jerom stronger than the first. Bp. Gibson is not strong enough about Eusebius; *γνωριμων ὅμως τοις πολλοις*. L. 3. S. 25. See also Lardner, 4. 227.

<sup>h</sup> Third Pass. Letter, p. 199.

<sup>i</sup> See Bp. Hallifax, Ser. 7. p. 212. Jer. Jones 1. 10.

Notwithstanding this exception of some Antinomians, I shall venture to read you a passage, which Whitby quotes from Esthius, a celebrated Divine of Holland or Flanders, who lived till the year <sup>k</sup> 1613.—With this Bishop Gibson concludes his account; and I will conclude mine with Dr. Lardner's final opinion<sup>l</sup>.

XXVII. Our next object is the *second Epistle of Peter*: which Grotius thinks may have made *two* Epistles: the former containing the two first Chapters, the latter, the third Chapter. But, as this supposition has no support, and is formed only in order to support the notion, that this Epistle was written by *Simeon*, Bishop of Jerusalem, we may pass it over, and proceed to our proofs. Here we will first take *internal* evidence, then *external*, having, in the present case, something with which we can *compare* the composition in question.

*Peter*, mentioned in the *Gospels*, was unquestionably an *Apostle* in the highest sense. If this Epistle was written by *him*, that is enough. We must be allowed to go upon the supposition, that he wrote the *first* Epistle of Peter, as upon an axiom: and then we may produce reasons why this *second* Epistle was written by the author of the *first*.—The names *Simon*<sup>m</sup> *Peter* do not belong jointly to any other person. No other *Peter* could with propriety be called “an *Apostle of Christ*,” in any sense. The Author of this Epistle was present at our Lord's *Transfiguration*, as appears by Chap. i. 18.—He writes “this *second* Epistle” to the same persons with the first: (though this argument will not have weight with those, who suppose Peter to begin a *new* Epistle with what we commonly

<sup>k</sup> Bishop Gibson seems to refer to Jerom for this passage, p. 199, but there must be a false print.

<sup>l</sup> Lard. Works, Vol. 6, p. 505.

<sup>m</sup> 2 Pet. i. 1.



commonly call the third Chapter.)—In the second verse of the third Chapter, is a second claim to Apostleship: “the commandment of *us* the Apostles of the Lord and Saviour.”—If we take for granted the authority of the Epistle of *Jude*, we may prove that of the second of Peter from it; for Jude refers to the second of Peter;—I think I may say, no less than *fourteen* times. And, in the 17th verse, Jude puts Paul on the same footing with the writer of what we call the second Epistle of Peter; for they are the two, who speak of *mockers* or *scoffers* to come in the *last time*.—In John xxi. 18, 19, our Saviour foretels St. Peter’s *death*: in 2 Pet. i. 14. the writer says, “I must shortly put off this my tabernacle, even as our Lord Jesus Christ hath *shewed me*.”—St. Peter is said to have been crucified at Rome in Nero’s persecution<sup>o</sup>; a little while before the destruction of Jerusalem: he says, <sup>p</sup> in his first Epistle, “the end of all things is at hand.” John xxi. 18, 19, seems to imply a *violent* death.

Some reasoning has taken place about a supposed difference in regard to *style* between the first and second Epistle of Peter. But Blackwall thinks there is scarce any difference. It is not easy to *prove* any thing upon this point to *others*; each person must judge, or feel, for himself<sup>q</sup>.

The

<sup>n</sup> Compare 1 Tim. iv. 1. and 2 Tim. iii. 1. with 2 Pet. iii. 3. Yet I doubt whether Paul comes up quite to the idea of *scoffers* or *mockers*:—“*despisers* of those that are good,” 2 Tim. iii. 3. comes the nearest.

<sup>o</sup> See Lardner, Vol. 6, Chap. 18.

<sup>p</sup> 1 Pet. iv. 7.

<sup>q</sup> The second Chapter is lofty by containing insinuations against false teachers, and others, perhaps, pretending to take the lead in sanctity without being the best moral men: these insinuations must be the most decorous when made in allusions to writings deemed sacred: but such must *raise* the style: St. Paul uses the same kind of style about the Fornicator at Corinth.

The *general scope* of this Epistle seems to me such as might have been expected in a *second* Epistle.—Converts had used the privileges of Christianity (as some have done in all ages) as an *exemption* from moral obedience:—St. Paul's obscurity had forwarded this *error*. *James* was obliged to set himself about rectifying it; and so was St. Peter in a supplementary address. With this view compare "*elect*" 1 Pet. i. 2. with 2 Pet. i. 10. and read 2 Pet. i. 1, 3, 5—11; or even to 15.—ii. 10, &c. to the end; (all about persons, who presume upon their *Holiness* to be *vicious*;) Chap. iii. 11, to the end; particularly ver. 15 and 16 about St. Paul:—comparing that with James ii. 14, &c. There are indeed some things about false *teachers*, which might be occasioned by other circumstances; as also a presumption obviated, that, because the second coming of Christ had not happened already, as expected by some, it need not be feared at all.

On *the whole*, we must either own, that St. Peter wrote the Epistle before us, or say, that some person *forged* it, intending to *impose* upon the Christian Church. The latter supposition is scarcely admissible, because the Author must be a good and pious Christian; and such an one would not take pains to deceive. We have indeed spoken<sup>r</sup> of some, who were well-meaning, and yet did endeavour to recommend their writings and make them useful, by affixing a great name to them; but, in the present case, the writer must not only intend to recommend his Epistle, but actually to be believed to *be Peter's*, by all Christians.—Those, who think the marks sufficient, can receive the  
Epistle

<sup>r</sup> Salvian, &c. B. 1. Ch. XII. Sect. IV.

<sup>s</sup> Compare 1 Pet. iv. 7. with 2 Pet. iii. 4.—and 1 Pet. i. 9. with 2 Pet. i. 5.—and 1 Pet. i. 2. with 2 Pet. i. 10.—I could wish *more* of these comparisons to be made.

Epistle only as *Peter's*; if it is not that, it is not what it pretends to be.

XXVIII. Nevertheless, we may add any *external* testimony, for the *authenticity* of our Epistle. Or, if external testimony at the same time proves its *genuineness*, no confusion will ensue. Grotius was desirous<sup>c</sup> to have it pass for the work of *Simeon*, Bishop of Jerusalem, and successor to St. James; though without any warrant from antiquity.

Clemens Romanus makes repeated allusions to the second Epistle of Peter: Hermas seems to have known it: Justin Martyr may be produced as a witness:—Irenæus has one passage, at least, to our purpose; and one is as good as more, when sufficiently clear. Origen may be worth citing; and Firmilian, though his expression is ambiguous; it is, “Paul and Peter in their Epistles.” (Lard. Vol. 2. p. 548.)—I will only add, that, though these passages afford arguments *for* the authority of the Epistle, silence of authors does not prove equally against it. There is no doubt about the Epistles to the Thessalonians; yet I remember observing, in a pretty long course of reading, that I never met with any reference to either of them.

After the fourth century, no more doubt remained.

XXIX. We proceed, in the next place, to the second and third Epistles of *St. John*.—That these should be at first neglected as minute, does not seem wonderful; even Eusebius seems to speak of them with indifference<sup>u</sup>: yet afterwards, in the Council of *Laodicea*, *Ἰωάννης τρεῖς* are necessary to make up the *ἑπτὰ καθολικά*. And so long as they  
were

<sup>c</sup> Grotius in 2 Pet. Lardner, 6. 565.

<sup>u</sup> Euseb. Eccl. Hist. 3. 25. Also Origen; see Lardner's Works, Vol. 2, p. 467.

were considered as *private* letters to two individuals, they would be little attended to: whatever made them regarded as \* *catholic*, and called by that name, did probably occasion their being universally respected.—Some have understood the word *ἐκκλησία* (2 John i. 1.) to mean<sup>y</sup> a *Church*; but that does not appear consistent with what follows. If we understand the Letters, or Epistles, as intended to remedy *two evils* very common amongst Christians, though they were written with a view to two particular *instances* of those evils, they might soon be perceived to be *generally applicable*, and so come to be universally read, in private and public; and, in time, to be received as the injunctions of an Apostle.

In order to make the *first* of these two small Epistles seem natural and generally useful, we need only suppose, that some of the *Docetæ*<sup>z</sup> had attempted to infill their notions into the mind of a devout and respectable mistress of a family:—and that she had given them rather too much encouragement. In such a case, reproof was to be applied before the disorder had got to too great an height; it was also to be sweetened by pure and unaffected benevolence. Right reproof always allows the real good qualities of the person reproofed.

In order to make the *second* Epistle seem easy and intelligible, we need only suppose an opulent and hospitable convert, of the name of *Gaius*, to have been somewhat too attentive to a preacher, or minister, called *Diotrephes*, who, being of an  
ambitious

\* The second and third of John were always called *Catholic* Epistles; see before, Sect. xv.

<sup>y</sup> See the opinions collected in Lard. Vol. 6, Chap. 20, p. 593, &c.

<sup>z</sup> Art. II. Sect. IV. XXVIII.

ambitious and turbulent disposition, wished to assume some authority of *his own*, or to abuse such as was committed to him; and, as a means of succeeding, depreciated St. John, or, possibly, his first Epistle: the attention shewn to this aspiring minister may be supposed to have had the particular inconvenience of causing *Demetrius* to be neglected; a plain, modest, orderly preacher<sup>a</sup>.

In such a case, Gaius, or Caius, was to have the praise due to his hospitality; and beneficence was to be encouraged in general: the evil was to be complained of, and the offender reprovèd; but it need but be briefly stated; it need not be pressed, or exaggerated. Indeed the fault was properly in Diotrephes, not in Gaius; but Gaius was to be cautioned against giving it any encouragement.

The situations which I have *imagined* (for I speak not as determining any thing) were probably not unfrequent about the end of the first Century; and therefore the best means of obviating their inconveniencies might be made public, and be of general concern: this they would naturally be by degrees: and these Letters would be of *general use*, not only to those who ran into the same faults, but to those *Ministers* who had occasion to check and reprove them.—They both seem, at bottom, to intend *reproof* for some different sorts of *unsteadiness*: and probably the one for yielding to *Heresy*, and the other for yielding to *ambition*. But, as I have marked out the path, by which the Student may investigate the genuineness and authority of such writings, I will content myself with referring to *authors* before mentioned, Lardner, Richardson, Bishop Gibson, &c.

As

<sup>a</sup> Lardner, I see, thinks Demetrius may have carried the Letter;—he struck me as some way opposed to *Diotrephes*; and it still does. But, as a *fact*, at least, I may be allowed to mention what occurred to me on reading the Epistles.

As a thing peculiar to these two small Epistles, I may just mention, that John, by calling himself *the Elder*, made some imagine, that they were written by *John the Elder* or Presbyter, mentioned by Eusebius, and not by the *Evangelist*; but there is every reason to think, that St. John only gave himself this title on account of his *old age*, and in order to avoid assuming too much consequence. He wished to appear to the devout Matron, and the hospitable Gaius, rather in the light of an *elderly friend*, than in that of a person, who had authority to *dictate* and enjoin.

xxx. Nor, after the specimens already given, do I mean to be long upon the Epistle of *Jude*. The writer, by calling himself “Servant of Jesus Christ, and Brother of James,” must mean to be thought that person, who is always reckoned in the third quaternion of the twelve *Apostles*; and is called *Jude*, *Judas*, *Lebbeus*, and *Thaddeus*; and “*not Iscariot*”<sup>b</sup>.—An Epistle so subscribed must be taken as the composition of him who subscribes it, if we find no particular reason to the contrary. And there is a presumption against the idea, that a pious Christian would endeavour to *deceive*. This was before observed, with regard to the author of the latter Epistle of Peter, which Epistle Jude means to second.—We might here produce *evidence*; Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, and Origen are full in our favour:—nay, even Hermas might be adduced, if not Polycarp and Irenæus<sup>c</sup>.—But, as what difficulty there has been, has arisen from

<sup>b</sup> John xiv. 22.

<sup>c</sup> 1796. It appears, from Mr. Marsh’s Edition of Michaelis’s Introduction, that the latter gave up the authority of the Epistle of Jude. But I do not apprehend, that more will follow from this, than from Martin Luther’s giving up the Authority of the Epistle of James.

from the credit seemingly given in our Epistle to some *fabulous* stories, we may confine ourselves to that point.—1. Supposing the stories *not true*, but only *believed* to be true, there seems no reason why Jude might not allude or refer to them, in the way of an argumentum ad hominem. For so doing he would have had the highest authority. 2. Supposing them *true*, but conveyed down only by *tradition*, Jude had certainly as good a right to introduce them, as *Paul* to introduce *James* and *Jambres*<sup>d</sup>. But 3. we are told, it is possible that Jude might refer only to the *canonical* books of the Old Testament: and that what he says, which seems not to be contained in the Old Testament, might be *collected* from it, and expressed in his own manner, according to some allowed *modes* of speaking, interpreting, and applying.—The Hebrews used feigned speeches; so that one of them might give that which he, from circumstances, supposed *Enoch might* probably foretell, as if *Enoch had* foretold it<sup>e</sup>. The Rabbins, says *Grotius*, use to ascribe to *Angels* and great men that, which might probably be said by them.—Thus 2 *Pet.* ii. 7, 8, about *Lot*, is all supposed to be collected from the Book of Genesis.—However, it does not seem to be denied, that St. Jude may have made use of a *traditional Prophecy* of *Enoch*: or of an *Hebrew book* now lost. Though Jude 8, and 9, is fully thought by Lardner to be taken from the three first verses of the third Chapter of *Zechariah*.

If, however, we can defend the writer on the least favourable supposition, we shall have no need to apologize for him on any other. If Jude's mode of using Scripture, by putting speeches into the mouths of great personages, was known and used,

<sup>d</sup> 2 Tim. iii. 8.

<sup>e</sup> See Lardner's Works, Vol. 6, p. 619, &c.

used, it would not *deceive* the *Jews*, though it might disgust and perplex others: yet did not *Livy* do much the same?

Lardner, Vol. 6, thinks this Epistle was written to all Converts, Gentiles as well as Jews: to me the allusions to Jewish writings seem too frequent for this opinion.

xxxI. The last Book, of which we are to speak, is the *Apocalypse*—which was probably written by St. John the Evangelist, in the Island of Patmos, about the last year of Domitian's<sup>f</sup> reign, A. D. 96; though not published till St. John went from his banishment there, to *Ephesus*, some little time afterwards, where he presided.

The proof of the authority of this Book will be wholly a proof of its *genuineness*; or that it was written by St. John the Evangelist. Such is the nature of the Book, as to make it unlikely that it should be received on any other account. Indeed Dionysius<sup>g</sup> of Alexandria did hold, that it was written by *another* John, and in later times: Erasmus and Luther<sup>h</sup> have allowed the *authority*, and denied the *Author*; but Dionysius having had a particular end in view, and the two others being comparatively moderns, they need not be considered particularly by us.

The genuineness of the *Apocalypse* seems capable of a most full and complete proof: as may easily be seen by looking into Lardner's Chapter on this book, in his *Supplement*<sup>i</sup> to his *Credibility*.

I will

<sup>f</sup> This is not unquestioned: some have thought the *Apocalypse* was written before the year 70.—Some, at *different* times; and *collected*. Sir I. Newton, Michaelis, and Wettstein are all for the earlier date; but they go a good deal on the *style*; the arguments for the later date seem to me much the more forcible.

<sup>g</sup> See Lardner's account of him.

<sup>h</sup> See Bp. Hallifax's 7th Sermon, p. 211.

<sup>i</sup> Chap. 22.



I will only select a few arguments; some *internal*, others *external*.

*Internal* marks may be, the author's calling Christ the *Word*<sup>k</sup>;—and also the *Lamb*: his using the word *Amen*<sup>l</sup> four times;—and the phrase peculiar to St. John, of *overcoming* the world, or the wicked one; for being unmoved under trials<sup>m</sup>.—Lardner is most struck with this last mark.

A few *external* proofs, or a few witnesses may be adduced. Papias, Justin Martyr, Melito, and Irenæus, may be sufficient. And what they say cannot be collected more easily than by means of Lardner's credibility; either in the body of that work, or in the Supplement. Lardner<sup>n</sup> thinks *Irenæus's* testimony *alone* sufficient to establish the genuineness, and consequently the authority, of the Apocalypse.

Yet it must not be dissembled, that the witnesses cannot be traced down to the present times in an *uninterrupted* succession. The Apocalypse is not in the Canon of the Council of Laodicea, nor in the Catalogues of Cyril and others. Chrysostom takes no notice of it, in his voluminous works. What may this mean?—The case seems to be, that Caius a Presbyter, probably a Roman, and Dionysius Bishop of Alexandria, were determined, at all hazards, to overthrow the errors and expose the follies of those, who believed in a voluptuous *Millennium*; and, when that state seemed to be promised in the Apocalypse, they proceeded to lessen the authority<sup>o</sup> of that Book:—their arguments,

<sup>k</sup> Compare Rev. xix. 13. with John i. 1.—1 John i. 1.—also Rev. v. 6, 12. with John i. 36.

<sup>l</sup> Michaelis; see end of John; and of 1 John and 2 John.

<sup>m</sup> Compare Rev. ii. 7, &c.—iii. 21, &c.—xxi. 7. with John xvi. 33.—1 John ii. 13, 14.—iv. 4.—v. 4, 5.

<sup>n</sup> Works, Vol. 2, p. 170.

<sup>o</sup> Before, Sect. xv.

ments, together with the difficulties contained in the Book, seem to have been the real reasons why Christians began to doubt about it, even after its credit had been in a manner established. Its credit would be the more easily overthrown, at any time, as but *few copies*, comparatively, would be taken of it. And therefore few would be able to defend it. Nay, some doubts existed after it had been again established, in a very great measure, and these continued for a length of time: and before the *Reformation*, disputes being dropped, the Book had become neglected and almost <sup>p</sup> *forgotten*.

The times immediately preceding the reformation were times of ignorance; but, with regard to the more enlightened times of the fourth and fifth centuries, it has been said, that the Apocalypse was *received* in the *Western Church* before it was received in the *Eastern*, contrary to what we have said of things published in the East. This seems a misrepresentation:—Papias, Justin, Melito, were all of the Eastern Church: and Melito, Bishop of Sardis, a Church which was one of the *seven* that were addressed in the Book, also went farther into the *East* than Sardis in search of canonical books.—Go lower, we have little to say: but, on the whole, the truth seems to be, that, at first, the proofs, that St. John wrote the Apocalypse, were too strong to be resisted; that it made its way all over the Christian world: though Christians in general would always be *attached* to other sacred Books in a greater degree:—but that ere long, it not only occasioned perplexity, but gave rise to error, folly, dispute: it occasioned disgust; it was opposed, laid aside:—this more in some places than in others, according to particular circumstances; but in fact it was laid aside more in the *East* than  
in

<sup>p</sup> See Bp. Hallifax, 7th Sermon.

in the *West*: nevertheless, this probably was accidental; that is, it had nothing to do with any difference between the Eastern and Western Churches.

What is said<sup>a</sup> about the Council of <sup>r</sup> *Laodicea* seems reasonable; that they were selecting books for *public reading* to the people: the Apocalypse was not adapted to that use: and such is the judgment of the Church of England.

XXXII. Though we are speaking immediately of the *Authority* of the Apocalypse, yet its great obscurity makes one naturally say a word or two of its *meaning*. Many learned men have professed not to understand it: *Lardner* does<sup>s</sup> this with the greatest plainness and simplicity. *Calvin* seems to have done the same, and the learned *Scaliger* commends him for <sup>t</sup> it: “Sapuit Calvinus,” says he, “qui non scripsit in Apocalypsin.”—Yet Joseph Mede, Fellow of Christ’s College, who died about the middle of the <sup>u</sup> 17th Century, has made wonderful efforts to explain it. And, I suppose, has been the means of our now having so easy and pleasing a way laid open to some view of its contents, in the Sermons of Bishop Hurd and Bishop Hallifax, preached at the Lecture founded by Bishop Warburton\*. The general idea of the contents is, that it contains prophecies relating to the

<sup>a</sup> Richardson’s Canon, p. 15. Gibson, Lardner, as before: the words are, ὅσα δὲ βιβλία ἀναγινωσκεισθαι.

<sup>r</sup> Laodicea was one of the seven Churches addressed.

<sup>s</sup> Vol. 6, p. 635.

<sup>t</sup> *Whitby* was learned; but he declined commenting on the Revelation: he has left a Dissertation on the Millennium. He appears to have been a candid, conscientious, and industrious man: but I am not clear that he was a man of very great penetration, or critical sagacity. He died in 1726, aged 88.

<sup>u</sup> Joseph Mede is said to have refused the Provostship of Dublin, &c. he died in 1658: aged only 52.

\* B. I. Chap. xviii. Sect. xix.

the fortunes of the Christian Church, which history is continually interpreting and unfolding.—A short account may be found in Bishop *Percy's* Key to the New Testament.

XXXIII. Having now gone through the *four parts* of our Article, it seems proper to take some notice of one expression in it; “of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church;” especially as we have been just now speaking of controverted Books.

Probably, when these words were used, nothing more was thought of than the *Old Testament*. For the last sentence, or paragraph, about the *New*, begins as if nothing had been said about it before.—And one’s *idea*, in reading the Article, is, ‘we receive all the Books of the Old Testament, which have been always, in a manner, received;—but as to those, which the *Romanists* receive, though the ancients speak doubtfully of them, we wish them to be read publicly, as having a good moral tendency, but we cannot allow them to have authority in settling *Doctrines*: so far, we think of nothing but the *Old Testament*:—after this, of nothing but the *New*. The *New Testament* we receive as the *Romanists* do.’—The words, “and *new*,” have the air of an *insertion*, by way of *correction*.—Indeed they had better be omitted. The whole phrase, “of whose authority was never any doubt in the Church,” is only *incidental*; a kind of *Epithet*, meaning *uncontroverted*:—and, if it was not strictly proper, it need not occasion scruple, so long as it did not affect the declarations, strictly so called, of our Article: it does not imply, that *we* receive one book more or less.

If any one did not find this sufficient to make him easy, when he used the expression in question, recollecting

recollecting the *αντιλεγόμενα*, he might consider farther;

1. That an Article is to be interpreted by the *occasion*<sup>z</sup>, on which it was made: ours was made with a view to the Church of *Rome*; and they have never doubted the authority of those Books of the New Testament, which were once controverted.

2. It cannot perhaps be said properly, that the *Church* ever doubted of the Authority of the Epistle to the Hebrews, &c.—individuals have doubted, but no act of the Church ever proclaimed them doubtful. The Council of Laodicea omitted the Apocalypse; but that has been accounted for: and that Council was formed only by Deputies from the Provinces of *Asia Minor*.

3. Those persons may properly be said never to have *doubted*, who never had opportunity of getting good information. Whatever time elapsed, in any case, before Christians got sufficient evidence of the authority of any Book, during that time they are not to be considered as *doubting*; and, if they never doubted *after* they got such evidence, they never properly doubted at all. If a man believed the genuineness of *Rowley's* Poems, as soon as the proofs of it were digested in his mind, he might be said never to have *doubted* of it; and, if that were the case with all men, it might properly be said, that their genuineness had never been questioned.—What *time* should be allowed for sufficient evidence to pervade the whole Christian world, so that we might say, if the controverted books were received in that time, they were never properly doubted, it may be difficult to settle precisely, at this distance of time;—but, in settling it as well as we are able, we must take into our  
minds

<sup>z</sup> Book III. Chap. IX.

minds all those *obstacles*, which have before been described<sup>a</sup>.

XXXIV. We may come now to what we have called the *Application* of our Article.—We may keep up the idea of its consisting of the same parts as before<sup>b</sup>; though little need be said on any of them.

As to *assenting*; a person, who mentioned what passed in his mind when he gave his assent, might perhaps say something of the following sort;

‘It is in vain to dispute, except we settle some *common principles* with our adversaries. As therefore the *Romanists* exalt the authority of their *Church*, and of *Traditions* in general, we must declare, that we only allow the authority of *Scripture*: though we grant, that whatever is fairly *deduced* from Scripture, has scriptural authority.—But, as different ideas have been annexed to the word *Scripture*, it seems best to *specify* what writings we comprize under that term. We receive no Books, which the *Romanists* reject; but some, which they hold to be canonical, we consider only as *improving*; and these we agree to *read* publicly, in imitation of early Christians, and in compliance with the wishes of those, who may have been brought up to revere and esteem them.’

‘We hold the same Books of the *New Testament* to be authentic, which the *Romanists* do.’

As to *mutual concessions*, it does not appear how a dispute concerning first or fundamental *principles* admits of any compromise.

And lastly, with regard to *Improvements*, those belonging to this Article are improvements in studying Scripture, and in settling the provinces of written and unwritten authority:—new proofs of the genuineness and authority of any sacred books, would

<sup>a</sup> Sect. XVI.

<sup>b</sup> Art. I. Sect. IX.

would also come under the present class of improvements: as would any new lights with regard to the ancient Jewish Books, which we commonly call the *Apocrypha*.

The short rule for improving our knowledge of Scripture is, to get, as nearly as possible, into the place of those, whom it was most immediately intended to suit: to give ourselves their ideas and feelings. It is these, which must enable us to limit and apply expressions, such as, from the imperfection of human language, are too general and extensive to be taken literally. — In order to get into the situation of others, and learn their ideas and feelings, we must acquaint ourselves with the history of their customs and opinions; and with all the objects, natural \* and artificial, which most usually engaged their attention. — Fresh travels, undertaken by good antiquaries, naturalists, artists, with due encouragement, might continually promote this purpose.

And, when we could not investigate immediately the ideas and feelings of those, for whom Scripture was first intended, we might find them out, in some degree, by their *effects*; which are to be understood by means of Ecclesiastical History.

\* See Book I. Chap. x. and xi.

## ARTICLE VII.

## OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.

THE Old Testament is not contrary to the New; for both in the Old and New Testament, everlasting life is offered to Mankind by Christ, who is the only Mediator between God and Man, being both God and Man. Wherefore they are not to be heard, which feign, that the old Fathers did look only for transitory promises. Although the Law given from God by Moses, as touching Ceremonies and Rites, do not bind Christian men, nor the civil precepts thereof ought of necessity to be received in any common-wealth; yet notwithstanding, no Christian man whatsoever is free from the obedience of the Commandments which are called Moral.

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1. Under the preceding Article, the authority of the Books of the Old Testament appeared; but it is natural to ask, do they oblige *Christians*? It was to *Jews* that they were addressed.—To answer this question properly, requires such an extensive knowledge of circumstances, and so much judgment in allowing for different situations, that it has occasioned disputes in a variety of ways.

In order to lead to some conception of these disputes, we may ask ourselves the five following questions.

1. By whom has it been said, that the Old Testament is *contrary* to the New?

2. By



2. By whom has it been said, that “the Old Fathers did look only for transitory promises?”

3. Have any Christians ever affirmed, that “the Law given from God by Moses, as touching ceremonies and rites,” does “bind Christian men?”—or, that the *ceremonial* law of the Jews is obligatory upon Christians?

4. Have any ever affirmed, that the *civil* and *political* law of Moses is binding upon Christians?

5. Have any considered Christians as free from the *moral* part of the Mosaic Law?

II. That the Old Testament is *contrary* to the New, has been affirmed.—We have already seen instances in the *Manicheans*<sup>a</sup>, and the followers of *Marcion*<sup>b</sup>. We may add the *Catharists*<sup>c</sup> of the twelfth Century, who imitated the Manicheans.—The nature of this will scarcely be conceived without a few *instances*, which I will therefore read to you from Augustin’s work against *Adimantus*, the Manichean<sup>d</sup> writer<sup>e</sup>.

But let us come nearer the time of the *Reformation*<sup>f</sup>. When we do that, we get amongst low and *illiterate Sects*. Before we say any thing of them separately, let us offer a general remark.

Low and illiterate Sects interpret Scripture without regard to the *circumstances* of those, for whom it was most immediately intended; for it is learning, which lets us into those circumstances<sup>g</sup>.—Now whenever any ancient writing is so interpreted, it must

<sup>a</sup> Append. to B. I. Sect. III.

<sup>b</sup> Ib. Sect. XIX.

<sup>c</sup> Mosheim, Cent. 12. Part 2. Chap. 5. Sect. 4.

<sup>d</sup> Augustin’s Works, Tom. 8 and 9. p. 82.

<sup>e</sup> See Lard. Vol. 2. p. 413.—and Vol. 9. p. 187.

<sup>f</sup> John Fox, in his “Acts and Monuments,” (or Martyrology), speaks first of some errors of the *Romanists*: one topic is, “Difference between the *Law* and the *Gospel*.”—See p. 34.

<sup>g</sup> See Book I. Chap. x. and XI.

must be interpreted too literally; without any of those limitations or additions, which, in things familiar to us, we make by means of our feelings and common sense. The Scripture, thus interpreted, contradicts itself frequently, and so must the doctrines of literal interpreters: we may, on this account, always expect to find great *confusion* and inconsistency amongst them. And, as they have no precise ideas, and therefore no Creeds, Catechisms, Confessions of Faith, nor any ecclesiastical History, their doctrines will be unsteady; and sects will ramify and mix imperceptibly, keeping the same *names*, in such a manner as to elude all regular and systematical investigation<sup>b</sup>.—Without such a previous remark as this, the thinking man might be disappointed with the best accounts that can be given of *Antinomians*, *Anabaptists*, &c.

III. The *Antinomians* present us with an instance of what I am saying. It is certain, that *Luther* writes very sharply against Antinomians; it is equally certain, that Luther is esteemed<sup>i</sup> an Antinomian himself. And yet those, whom Luther rebuked, were really very different from himself.—A solution of this difficulty might give us all the idea of Antinomians that we should want.

The etymology of *Antinomi*, or Antinomians, is plain enough: a word compounded of *anti* and *nomos* will imply adversaries of *Law*; and what Law is particularly meant in any case, must be determined by circumstances.

I do not conceive, that any set of Christians ever called *themselves* Antinomians: it is a term of opprobrium

<sup>b</sup> Fuller, wittily enough, compares low Sects to confluent small-pox. Church History, B. 9. p. 113. they rise separately, but soon run together so as to be no longer discernible from each other. Some might add, they become only one mass of corruption.

<sup>i</sup> See Bp. Hallifax on Prophecy, Ser. 7. p. 212.

opprobrium or reproach; *Quakers* is also a name imposed, not assumed; but it is rather expressive of facts.—It may not be clear who first used the term Antinomians; but I should conjecture, that it might be Martin Luther, intending to disgrace the notions of *Agricola*, and make even *him* ashamed of them. I conclude this from different expressions in Luther's writings<sup>k</sup>. Antinomus does not seem so descriptive and confined as *Quaker*; rather more vague, like "*lawless*;" but his bold asperity might naturally use it. John *Agricola*, against whom he applies it, thought he paid a proper compliment to the perfection of the *Gospel*<sup>l</sup>, by depreciating every thing that could any way stand in competition with it. Accordingly, he set aside the *Law*, meaning thereby the whole religion of *Moses*; to which the strong things said in the Epistle to the *Galatians*, against the *Law*, might not a little contribute. Of his followers Luther says, qui *Legem* ab ecclesiâ tollere<sup>m</sup> volunt; and in another place he affirms, that they teach, "*Legem in ecclesiâ non predicandam*"<sup>n</sup>."

This term or appellation, of Antinomians, got to be used, not only amongst the reformed, but also on both sides, in the controversy between Luther and the Papists. The Polish Cardinal

*Hofius*

<sup>k</sup> *Αντινομία*, in the Greek Classics, seems only to mean a contrariety of Laws, as when one Law contradicts another, or is *inconsistent* with it: but Luther might borrow the word and twist its meaning a little on one side.

<sup>l</sup> Antinomians, and others like in this, were called *Gospellers* in England, at the Reformation.

<sup>m</sup> Luther's Works, Fol. 7 Vols. Wittibergæ, 1583. Vol. 1. p. 405.—like *repudiandum* in Art. of 1552.

<sup>n</sup> Vol. 6. p. 222.—See also Vol. 1. p. 400, *Antinomi cujusdam positiones*;" and Vol. 3. 8. a sensible Dissertation on reading the Law of *Moses*.

*Hofius*° lays the blame of Antinomianism on Luther himself; and indeed, though Luther had made Agricola recant his errors, yet Agricola had certainly been his disciple. Luther, in answer to Hofius, says<sup>p</sup>, that some Popish Monks had such contemptible notions of all *Jews*, that they thought the ancient Patriarchs like the modern Jewish Usurers; and that one of these Monks had said, that, so long as he had any brains, he never could believe, that Christians received their religion from *Jews*.

*Paul Crellius*<sup>q</sup> and John *Maclaurin*<sup>r</sup> seem to have been in the same way of thinking with John Agricola.

But, when Martin Luther himself is called an Antinomian, the *Law*, that is the Law of *Moses*, has properly no concern in the matter; so, at least, I conceive: he is called so because he depreciated “the <sup>s</sup> *works of the Law*,” in order to give greater authority to his favourite doctrine of justification by *Faith*. Now, though in the expression, “the works of the Law,” the word Law may sometimes signify the Law of Nature, and sometimes the Law of Moses, yet that makes no difference in the present case; it is merely as *works*, that Luther depreciates the Works of the Law;—as opposed to *Faith*. And indeed that may be St. Paul’s sense of

° See his Works, Vol. 1. p. 442. Lib. 1. de Hæresibus.

<sup>p</sup> Works, Vol. 7. Pref. to Letter contra Sabbatarios.

<sup>q</sup> Nicholls on this Article refers to Paul Crellius’s Book *de Libertate Christianâ*, but I do not find it any where. A *speech* of his is in the Bodleian Catalogue, but not this work.

<sup>r</sup> I have, in some old papers, a remark, that this author, John Maclaurin, in a Sermon on Gal. vi. 14. (Vol. 12. p. 97,) has a notion like that of Marcion, that the Gospel could not come from that Being, who made this world. But I do not remember where I saw the Book: and now I cannot find it (1790). However, I have no doubt but there is such a book.

<sup>s</sup> Rom. iii. 20. and ix. 32. Gal. ii. 16.

of " Law," when he <sup>t</sup> says, that no flesh is justified by the works of the Law. If he spoke to *Jews*, he must mean *their* works, if to *Gentiles*, theirs: their obedience to their laws, respectively. —But, as the eleventh Article is upon justification, we need only observe here, that, when Luther rebukes men as Antinomians, they are of that sort which belongs to this Article; when he himself is ranked amongst Antinomians, they are of the sort which is to be considered under the eleventh <sup>u</sup> Article.

The next of the illiterate sects, which we shall have occasion to take notice of, is that of the *Anabaptists*. That the compilers of this Article had them in view, appears from the 4th Chap. de Hæresibus in the *Reformatio Legum*. Those here meant sprung up, probably, in Germany, in the heat of Reformation;—they were ignorant and furious; indulged any fancy that happened to arise in their minds from a literal and barbarous interpretation of Scripture; and by that means were a great disgrace to the Reformers, and occasioned them very great trouble. We shall often have to mention their weak notions in treating of our Articles.—Whether Pacimontanus was the first of them, as Hofius <sup>x</sup> says, or Stork, Stubner, and Muncer <sup>y</sup> should be considered as their founders, is a matter of no consequence. The source is too obscure and foul for us to take much pains in tracing it out. *Sleidan* has written an History of them,

<sup>t</sup> Rom. iii. 20. Gal. ii. 16.

<sup>u</sup> These sorts of Antinomianism approach nearer to each other, when seen in one point of view; see afterwards, Sect. vii.

<sup>x</sup> Hofii Opera, Vol. i. p. 431.

<sup>y</sup> Mosheim says, these were leaders of the *factious* Anabaptists: Cent. 16. 3. 2. 3. 4. but he conceives a sort of embryo Anabaptists before the Reformation.

them, which is translated into English by Bohun<sup>z</sup>: but we must not be surprized if we meet with some inconsistencies; nor must we think accounts false for that reason: those who declared against all war, engaged in a war particularly furious and bloody, which was called the rustic war<sup>a</sup>, or the war of the Peasants;—they might indeed be oppressed, but who, even amongst those that allow the lawfulness of war, justifies it except on principles of self-defence? Neither must we be surprized if we find some writers speaking of them as of *two* sorts<sup>b</sup>, others<sup>c</sup>, as of twelve or thirteen, or still more. The name of Anabaptists came from baptizing adults, or from baptizing *ανα*, over again, those who were converts to their sect, and had only been baptized in infancy: yet, what would be more striking, was their notion of Christian *Liberty*; of that Liberty, with which Christ had made them free: and their idea of that “yoke of bondage<sup>d</sup>,” with which they ought not again to be entangled.—They not only thought, that they ought to throw off the yoke of *Mosaic* bondage, but of all *civil* government, and *Law*:—yet, as they could not act together without some sort of government, they got possession of the city of *Munster*, and called it the *New Jerusalem*.—Some of them did, moreover, indulge fancies concerning the

<sup>z</sup> A good short account of the German Anabaptists—in Wall’s *Inf. Bapt.* p. 414, Quarto; or Part 2, Chap. 8, Sect. 4.

<sup>a</sup> In 1525.

<sup>b</sup> Neal’s *Hist. Pur.* Index, Anabaptists.

<sup>c</sup> Bullinger contra Anabaptistas, L. 2. Cap. 12. (Bullinger died in 1575.) See a treatise against Socinianism by Dr. *Cheyne*, p. 56; Dr. Cheynell was a Presbyterian Bigot, preferred by Parliament in 1647: Lady Margaret’s Professor of Divinity at Oxford, and Head of St. John’s College there. Some mention of him may be found by the Index, in Neal’s *History of the Puritans*.

<sup>d</sup> Gal. v. 1.

the Holy Trinity, and the Incarnation<sup>e</sup>. Those, who came over to England, were all cruelly used, though perhaps lawfully; and two were actually burnt in 1575.—Indeed Joan<sup>f</sup> of Kent also, who had suffered before, in 1549, might perhaps rightly be called an Anabaptist.—Their notions concerning *magistrates, war, property, oaths, law-suits*, will occur hereafter<sup>g</sup>.—In some things, they revived *Pelagian*<sup>h</sup> notions.

The modern *Baptists* wish to be considered as perfectly distinct from these Anabaptists; no wonder.

It may not be improper here to mention that sect, who called themselves the *Family of Love*; and who were, by others, sometimes called *Familiſts*. They were *Myſtics*, (I call every one a *Myſtic*, who professes to know how he is inwardly taught of God); their founder, *Henry Nicolas*, a Dutchman, who taught in his own country about<sup>k</sup> 1550, and afterwards came over into England.—That *Myſtics* in general were considerable about the time of the Reformation, appears from the 19th Article of Edward VI; and from the *Reformatio Legum*<sup>l</sup>. And in 1579 the Family of Love were important enough to produce a Proclamation<sup>m</sup>; and a test tendered by privy counsellors.—They were persecuted in a very inquisitorial manner; but such was the custom of the times. This persecution

<sup>e</sup> Art. II. Sect. XIII.

<sup>f</sup> Hume, Ed. VI. Chap. I. end. Fuller, in the Diurnal of Edw. VI. Book 7, p. 398.

<sup>g</sup> Under Articles 37, 38, and 39.

<sup>h</sup> Ridley's Life, p. 344: compare Wall's Infant Baptism, Chap. 19.

<sup>i</sup> See B. III. Chap. xv. Sect. XI.

<sup>k</sup> Fuller, B. 9, p. 112.

<sup>l</sup> De Hæresibus, Cap. 3.

<sup>m</sup> See Sparrow's Collection, p. 171. Fuller's Hist. p. 113. B. 9.

tion was the reason why the writings of Henry Nicolas are published as the works of H. N.—They thought H. N. a personage not enditeable. Some mention this Sect as the source of English *Quakers* and French *Quietists*; some make them the same with the *Philadelphians*, whom others state to have risen from *Jane Leadley*;—but it seems to me, that there have been Mystics in *all ages*; and that, when people assign a source of known sects, they only look back till they can see no farther, and then fancy they see to the *source*.—How such sects spawn, it seems impossible to discern minutely.—Most sects of Mystics seem to have had leaders of weak intellects; *Fuller* gives<sup>n</sup> an humorous account of the weakness of Henry Nicolas; and *Anthony Randall* shews his own weakness in that declaration, for which he was deprived of his preferment<sup>o</sup>. The vicious perversions of the doctrine of *Grace*, which this sect ran into, must be mentioned hereafter:—we observe now only what relates to setting aside the Law of Moses;—they do not reason, like the Manicheans, on the contrariety of the Old to the New Testament, but they effect the same end: they *repudiate*<sup>p</sup> the Old by *spiritualizing* and *allegorizing*<sup>q</sup>. *Woolston* used to do the same, but with more learning and ingenuity<sup>r</sup>. This is not to leave what *we* call the *Law*; though we shall have to make a remark<sup>s</sup> seemingly contradictory, with regard to the ceremonial part of the Law of Moses.

But

<sup>n</sup> B. 9. p. 112.

<sup>o</sup> Strype's Whitgift, Append. p. 93, He would own no *Sacraments* of *divine* authority, because the word *Sacrament* is not in Scripture.

<sup>p</sup> Non est repudiandum (vetus Test.) sed retinendum, &c. Art. 6 of 1552,

<sup>q</sup> See Luther's Works, Vol. 3. beginning of Preface.

<sup>r</sup> See B. 1. Chap. xvi. Sect. vii.

<sup>s</sup> Sect. v. of this Article.



But whoever allegorized away the part, which we think is still of importance, and established that part, which we think ought to “vanish away,” might be properly enough said to repudiate what we conceive to be the *Old Law*. And such persons seem to require some mention in this place.—The *Doctrina*<sup>u</sup>, &c. published in 1617, mentions the *Mennonites* as troublesome at the time of the Reformation; they are not so remote from these Familists, as to require a separate consideration.—The *Libertini* seem to have been of the wilder sort of Antinomians.

We may here, by the way, observe, that Bishop Burnet seems scarcely accurate in saying<sup>x</sup>, that this whole Article was formed against the *Antinomians*. It can certainly affect no sort of Antinomians but those, who reject the Law of *Moses*; not those, who only have too high notions of the efficacy of *Faith*: and how can that part be against them, which blames the *retaining* a portion of the Mosaic Law; I mean the ceremonial part.—Then, it seems clear, from the *Reformatio Legum*, that the Article was made against *Anabaptists*, in some measure;—perhaps Bishop Burnet might say, that Anabaptists were Antinomians, and Fuller<sup>y</sup> owns, that it is hard to “banke, and bound their several absurdities;”—yet I think Bishop Burnet mentions, in the body of his Exposition<sup>z</sup>, some enthusiasts as aimed at, whom he would not call Antinomians in any sense relating to the *Jewish Law*.—But in truth it is a matter of consequence *in itself*, to point out both the *connexion* and the *difference* between the Old and

New

<sup>u</sup> Heb. viii. 13.

<sup>v</sup> P. 19. Juel's Apology. Also B. iv. Introd. Sect. vi.

<sup>x</sup> Burnet, Art. 7. opening. Nicholls commends Burnet's notion.

<sup>y</sup> Fuller, B. 9, p. 113.

<sup>z</sup> P. 96, 97, Fol. P. 120, Octavo.

New Testament; and not only a matter of consequence, but of nicety; and one, which a variety of notions has given occasion to explain. Martin Luther is very careful to <sup>a</sup>explain it.

This nicety might perhaps be the reason why some illiterate sects might reject the old Law totally:—that would be the natural consequence, if they thought rejecting it wholly was a less evil than retaining it wholly;—and were unable to adjust the degree and manner, in which part of it might vanish away, whilst the rest remained in force.—Such persons would find the Epistle to the *Galatians* very obscure; (if it did not seem to require the rejecting of the Law:) so indeed might the generality of us, if we had not had it explained by a great Philosopher<sup>b</sup>.

iv. By whom has it been said, “that the old Fathers did look only for transitory promises?”—*Promises* there certainly are in the Old Testament: some relating to *temporal* benefits, to a land flowing with Milk and Honey, &c; some, which may be in a degree *ambiguous*; or which may denote worldly prosperity in a *primary* sense, and spiritual and eternal blessings in a *secondary* sense.—(See Gal. iii. 14, &c. to the end.—Luther, Vol. 3. fol. 8.)—And any thing in the divine *dispensations* may be deemed a *promise*, which excites a reasonable *expectation*.—How have these promises been understood?—by some, we hold, in a sense too confined and *worldly*. The framers of our Article might have in view the *Jews*, many of whom, even though they expected a *Messiah*, expected him not as the Lord of an *eternal* Life;—especially the *Sadducees*: but, in composing the Article, attention would be chiefly fixed on *Christians*. *Calvin*, in his *Institutes*,

<sup>a</sup> Vol. 3. Fol. beginning. Quomodo Libri Mosi legendi sunt.

<sup>b</sup> Mr. Locke.

tutes, has three chapters on this subject<sup>c</sup>; and he expressly mentions the *Anabaptists* <sup>d</sup> as his adversaries, and *Servede* in particular;—and as making it *necessary* for him to write upon it.

If I understand their notion rightly, they tried to magnify the goodness of God by saying, that though he would freely give us an Heaven through Christ, yet that he still *need* not, he was not *bound* to do so by any *promise*. Promises he had *made*, to be sure, but they were *fulfilled* by the *coming* of Christ; he had promised us *Christianity*, and he had given us it; so there was an end of that matter: what remained, would come from gratuitous goodness, not from mere justice; it would be a free *gift*, not a payment of a *debt*. Thus, according to the notion of these men, the *promises* made by God to the Patriarchs were only *transitory* promises; they did not include *eternity*.

Calvin supported his opinion, that the promises were more than transitory, that they were *endless* in their effects, by John v. 24. or 1 John iii. 14. which made it look like the doctrine of *assurance* of future happiness; or as if it were thought, that the heavenly state was already *begun*;—but he says also, that the same persons held, that God blessed the *Israelites* only as *animals*<sup>e</sup>.—One would think the error described was *recent* at the time of the Reformation, because Calvin speaks of it<sup>f</sup> as arising from

<sup>c</sup> Calvin, Inst. Lib. 2. Cap. 9, 10, 11.

<sup>d</sup> Vide Cap. 9. Sect. 3. Cap. 10. Sect. 1, 7. “Magnitudinem gratiæ Christi extollere vult.” Cap. 9. Sect. 3.—(all in Lib. 2.) The *Servetiani* are one set of Christians, against whom our Articles are said to have been compiled. See Doctrina, &c. Ecclesiæ Angl. Lond. 1617.

<sup>e</sup> As Hogs; fatted them well; Cap. 10. Sect. 1.—In Sect. 23, there is mention of wealth, power, a number of children, as well as of the belly and the flesh.

<sup>f</sup> Lib. Cap. 9. Sect. 3.

from what he himself had said; that Christ had finished all his work:—It is wrong, he says, to conclude from what I said, that we are not to live in *hope*; that, because an offer is completed, the benefit of that offer is immediately enjoyed.

It seems as if those, whom Calvin opposes, had dwelt *generally* upon the opinion, that the promises of the Old Testament were temporary, and that the purpose of such promises was, to make the Jews expect *temporal* rewards; and it is not improbable, that Calvin's opponents set up the notion just now mentioned, by way of *persisting*, when they were pressed with arguments proving, that Christianity had been promised.—On all accounts, it became proper for Calvin to shew, that a future state appears from the *Old Testament*. As *Patres*, he mentions *Adam*, *Abel*, *Noe*; and he says, that a future state might be collected from the death of *Abel*: *Abraham* was always panting after a future state. He mentions *Isaac* and *Jacob* with a reference to *Heb. xi. 9<sup>g</sup>*. He says, *Balaam* foresaw a future state, as did *David*;—*Job* also and the later Prophets. *Luther* also enumerates <sup>h</sup> *promises* made to *Adam*, *Abraham*, and *Moses*.

*Acontius*<sup>i</sup> was in England about the time when our Articles were published, and dedicated a Book to *Queen Elizabeth*; he came from *Trent*, and was looked upon as a favourer of *Socinianism*, and as coming between *Lælius Socinus* and his nephew *Fauftus*: he is represented<sup>k</sup> as leaving it doubtful whether *Abraham* believed in Christ.

v. Have

<sup>g</sup> See *Clem. Rom. 1st Ep. Sect. 31.* in *Wake's Transl. p. 24.*

<sup>h</sup> Vol. 3. beginning.

<sup>i</sup> I do not see *Acontius* in *Strype's Parker*, or *Grindal*;—he is in *Ladvoat*. His book seems uninteresting.—I suppose, as *Cheynell* says, he was afraid of speaking out: which might give a dryness and insipidity to his style.

<sup>k</sup> See *Cheynell* against *Socinianism*, p. 38.

v. Have any Christians ever held, that the *ceremonial* Law of Moses continues in force under the Christian dispensation?

The very early *Jewish Sects* of Christians did this; but of them we have spoken before<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>m</sup> And it seems clear, that there were some who did the same at the time of the *Reformation*, from the latter part of the same Chapter of the *Reformatio Legum*, to which we have already referred<sup>n</sup>.

The Book of the *Familists* called *Evangelium Regni*, mentioned in Queen Elizabeth's Proclamation, is said to hold the same<sup>o</sup> doctrine: and this sect may be meant in the Law *de Hæresibus*.

Bishop Burnet<sup>p</sup> thinks, that only *Jews* are here to be disputed with: surely we have proved the contrary;—we may perhaps add the *Schoolmen*<sup>q</sup>, who, according to Bishop Burnet's<sup>r</sup> own account, said the Levitical Law was perpetual. How fully persuaded the Jews of later ages were of the eternity

<sup>1</sup> Appendix to Book I. Sect. XXI. XXII.

<sup>m</sup> There seem to have been doubts amongst Christians how far particular rules were *Jewish*, and how far *Christian*, moral, perpetual. *Oaths* have been rejected by some great Christian Fathers, as allowed to Jews, not to Christians. See Art. 37. Sect v; and Barclay's Apology.

<sup>n</sup> De Hæresibus, Cap. 4.

<sup>o</sup> Rogers on this Article.

<sup>p</sup> On the Article, p. 125.

<sup>q</sup> Mosheim, Cent. 16. 1. 3. 11: Maclaine's Note, referring to Burnet's History of the Reformation, and Hume.—See Burnet's History of the Reformation, Vol. 1. p. 38.—Henry the VIIIth's scruples about marrying his Brother Arthur's Widow.

<sup>r</sup> Here is an ambiguity: the Schoolmen might retain the Levitical Law; but retain it, not as *ceremonial*, but as *moral*. Maclaine on Mosheim speaks more than Burnet as if they retained it *though ceremonial*. In the case of Henry VIII. Lev. xx. 21, should not be reckoned more valid than Deut. xxv. 5. merely as *Levitical*. Prince Arthur left no child; was only 16 years old.

nity of their whole Law, may be seen in *Maimonides*<sup>s</sup>.

Martin Luther writes to *Sabbatarians*.—And *Strype* speaks of “a *Jewish* Sabbath-keeping” in 1595, in consequence of Dr. *Bound*’s Sermon; but it appears from Fuller’s ‘History, that *Jewish* is no more than a declamatory expression for very *strict*. However, there have been Sabbatharians (Christians I mean), who have kept the Jewish Sabbath, and on the Saturday<sup>n</sup>. In Fuller, Book 11. p. 144, &c. there are three columns, expressing the two extremes, of Sabbatharians and Anti-Sabbatarians, and the mean: whence it appears, that in 1633 there were some perfect Sabbatharians. *Heylin*’s History of the Sabbath would give more information, if wanted; and shew what very different notions have been held about it. Some ancient Christians used to keep *Saturday* holy, in compliance with the prejudices of the Jewish Converts, though they kept *Sunday* as sacred \* also.

vi. Has it been affirmed, that the *civil* law of Moses is binding upon Christians?

In answer, we might again refer to the early judaizing Christians, and, I think, to our Reformation<sup>y</sup> Legum, but we had better go on to something

<sup>s</sup> On the 10th Chapter of the Part of the *Misna* called *Sanhedrin*. *Fundamentum nonum*. p. 175, Pocock. In *Surenhusius*, at the end of *Sanhedrin*. But see Bishop Chandler, p. 270, about the older Jews.

<sup>t</sup> B. 9. p. 227.

<sup>u</sup> See Chambers’s Dictionary. Sabbatharians.

\* See Bingham, B. 20. Ch. 3. but see also Lardner’s Works, Vol. 4, p. 343, and a little before. *Tertullian* is indignant about Christians keeping the *Sabbath*: i. e. Saturday. Bingham’s Authorities are none of them very early, though he might think the *Constitutions* were so.

<sup>y</sup> In the title of Cap. 4. de *Hæresibus*, we have, “aut *totum* exigunt,” (*vetus testamentum*): circumcision might be the *instance*, as what was the least likely to be retained.

thing peculiar:—the reformed Ministers soon after the Reformation were intent upon reforming *States*<sup>z</sup> upon *Jewish* ideas; and our *civil*<sup>a</sup> *wars* shew many instances of such a turn. Dr. Balguy expresses this folly well, near the beginning of his sixth Discourse.

The *Brownists* might be mentioned here, a species of *Puritans* under one *Robert Brown*<sup>b</sup>;—not that I know their notions exactly, but I have imagined, that, looking on the Mosaic constitution as divine, and therefore perfect, they wished to adopt as much of it as possible, in Church and State. *Strype* has preserved<sup>c</sup> a Letter from this *Robert Brown* to the Lord Treasurer<sup>d</sup>, from which it appears, that he thought the Scriptures, as being *divine* and therefore *perfect*, the proper source of instruction in all *arts and sciences*<sup>e</sup>.—We have already mentioned the *Anabaptists* of Germany as setting

<sup>z</sup> See Warb. Alliance, p. 46; or B. I. Chap. iv. fifthly.

<sup>a</sup> B. I. Chap. xi. Sect. 11.

<sup>b</sup> He is sometimes said to be of *Northampton*, but he had only the living of *Achurch* in the county, after he had given up his own seat, in 1589. His Father was a gentleman (and once Sheriff) of Rutlandshire, his Mother a Boteler of Woodhall near Hatfield, in the county of Hertford. His return to the Church has a look of great inconsistency, as he had been particularly strenuous in declaring the Church of England sinful, and, I think, idolatrous. He was probably a weak man in intellect, at the same time that he was strong in passion; turbulent and ungovernable. At last he was committed to Northampton Jail, for striking a Constable, and died there aged 80, A. D. 1630.—See *Strype's Whitgift*.

<sup>c</sup> Life of Whitgift, Appendix to Book 3. No. 45.

<sup>d</sup> Chancellor of the University of Cambridge from 1557 to 1598: Lord Burleigh, Robert Cecil, was a relation of Brown's, and got him preferment; see Neal, and Strype, and Fuller.

<sup>e</sup> Neal makes the Brownists to be only strict Puritans, refusing all communion with the Church of England; but this letter makes the preceding notion probable. It is not dated, but by the History it seems to have been written in 1589.

setting up a new *Jerusalem*, in which, probably, some Jewish civil laws would be adopted: and *Luther*, in his discourse on the right manner of reading<sup>f</sup> the Law of Moses, mentions “quosdam imperitos et phanaticos spiritus,” &c. who said, that *we* ought to conform to the Jewish *polity*; and afterwards<sup>g</sup> he calls them indocti, and decepti κακοζηλῖα, and at the same time tells us how they reason.

Civil Laws against *Usury* will be mentioned by and by

VII. Have Christians ever been considered as free from the obligation of the *moral* Law of Moses? The answer may be given in the affirmative, merely from what has gone before; because those, who are for setting aside the *whole* Law, must be for setting aside the moral part of it.—But, before we proceed farther, it may be proper to settle what is *meant* by the moral Law: the *Decalogue*? or that part which enjoins what is *right*<sup>h</sup> in itself?—If the Decalogue, are we not obliged to keep our<sup>i</sup> *Sabbath* on the Saturday, and observe a very great strictness of rest?—If what is right in itself, is not the proposition, we ought to keep the moral Law of Moses, *identical*? as if we said, ‘we are obliged to that, which is universally obligatory.’ But this difficulty is rather overcharged; because the Decalogue may be binding in *substance*, though not wholly so as to *circumstances*<sup>k</sup>:—and it is not an *identical* proposition  
to

<sup>f</sup> In this work, only every other page is marked: this passage is opposite Fol. 7, Vol. 3, beginning.

<sup>g</sup> Opposite Fol. 9.—Also Fol. 9, he says, there must be confusion and Sects if the unlearned *will* cry out to the common people, “Hoc Dei verbum, Dei Mandatum est.”

<sup>h</sup> Ephes. vi. 1.

<sup>i</sup> Something of this B. 1. Chap. xi.

<sup>k</sup> We are always supposed to be able to distinguish between the invariable *essence* of a Law, and the variable *circumstances*  
in



to say, that whatever rules of conduct in the Law of Moses are calculated to promote the good of *mankind* at large, as much as that of a people situated like the *Jews*, those rules have the sanction of *Revelation*: and, where the Rules are such as have been established by *reason* and experience, it may be said, that the duties of morality are confirmed from *Heaven*<sup>1</sup>.—Luther rejoices in such a confirmation<sup>m</sup>.

But, though clearing up ideas may be *useful* to us, it does not seem absolutely necessary for our historical account; the distinction between the Decalogue and the moral Law is in fact much overlooked; and our Article does not make it necessary. Martin Luther speaks<sup>n</sup> of the Decalogue, as if it was not binding *as* Decalogue, though we are under obligation to do every thing which it enjoins.—On the other hand, the *Assembly* of Divines met at Westminster in 1643, in their 7th Article revised, have these words, “By the moral Law, we understand

(<sup>i</sup> n which it may be executed; as in the Law of *condescension* executed by our Lord in *washing* his Disciples’ feet. Other instances occur, B. 1. Chap. xi.

<sup>1</sup> The Assembly’s larger Catechism, approved by the Presbyterian Parliament in England, and by Scotland, has a pretty enlarged definition of the *Lex moralis*; and affirms, that the moral Law may be looked upon as briefly comprehended in the Decalogue, if we take in what is *implied*; as prohibitions, threats, &c. The two Catechisms of the *Assembly* were confirmed by Parliament; but it was by the Parliament of 1647:—however, King Charles 1. offered reluctantly to licence the smaller. See Neal, *Index Catechism*.

<sup>m</sup> *Lardner* says, on another subject, “though a thing be in itself reasonable, and highly expedient; yet there is nothing that so effectually puts objections to silence, as a divine precept or precedent.” Works, Vol. 11, p. 240

<sup>n</sup> In Preface to Vol. 3, fol. 2, p. 2; see also fol. 7, p. 2; (only every *other* page, or only every *leaf* is numbered in Luther’s Works)

understand all the *ten* commandments taken in their full extent<sup>o</sup>.”—And the same seems to be implied in our Latin Article by the *Parenthesis*:—“*obedientia mandatorum (quæ moralia vocantur)* ;” this parenthesis makes the *mandata* seem to mean ‘the<sup>p</sup> *commandments*’ in the popular sense: but by what authority it is placed, I do not at present<sup>q</sup> know. Bishop *Burnet* mentions the ten commandments as the moral Law; but seems to look beyond them.

If it be asked, what is the *right* idea of the moral Law of Moses, we answer, there need be no difficulty about it; our Article gives no definition of it: every one therefore may use his own sense. And, if we are bound to obey every thing enjoined in the Law of Moses, which is for the general good of mankind (as we certainly are), what does it signify whether it is in the Decalogue or not?—No one conceives the moral Law of Moses to be the whole of morality.—But we shall have occasion to mention the Decalogue again.—Our business now is *History*.

The *Antinomians*, followers of *Agricola*, whom Martin Luther rebukes, being those who wished to set aside the *whole*<sup>r</sup> Law, did not need to be here mentioned again as setting aside the moral part of it, were it not for introducing the sentiments of *Agricola* with regard to the *Decalogue*. These are not easy to clear up; but *Mosheim* seems to

<sup>o</sup> See Articles of England revised in 1643 by Assembly of Divines; in Appendix to Neal’s Hist. Puritans.—See also Advice of the Assembly to Parliament, Chap. 19; and *Doctrina*, &c. p. 80.

<sup>p</sup> There are three words in the Article, *Law, Precepts, Commandments*: the two first are set aside; the last retained.

<sup>q</sup> Bennett gives this Parenthesis, and mentions some copies which have two commas instead of it.

<sup>r</sup> Luther’s Works, Vol. 1, Fol. 400, p. 2.

to have succeeded as well as might be expected in laying them together: to him<sup>1</sup> therefore I will refer.—Only adding, that possibly Luther's idea of the Decalogue<sup>2</sup>, as such, might help Agricola forward; though Luther blames him and others for setting aside the Law of Moses at large, in order to free themselves from the moral Law in particular.

In this point of view, the Antinomians, whom Luther blames, seem most nearly connected with those, of which Luther himself is reckoned one: and the sorts seem to differ rather in *degree*, than in *kind*, when we observe them lowering the value and authority of *any* Law in order to get rid of obligations to *good works*.

It may be worth our while here to read a case, which is mentioned by *Strype* in his *Life*<sup>3</sup> of *Whitgift*, and afterwards more succinctly in his *Annals*<sup>4</sup>. Though Luther would undoubtedly have blamed the Antinomians or Libertines mentioned in this case, yet it seems as if his own principles, followed on to a great length, might have led into the error of rejecting the moral Law of Moses.—If any Antinomians wanted to settle the maxim, that a man, who has true Christian *Faith*, cannot sin, they would have to combat the authority of the *Decalogue*, and, in the heat of battle, would make the fiercest attacks upon it they were able.

We may place here, as well as any where, the notion of the *Familiſts*, “that as many as receive Jesus Christ and his Doctrine, do fulfil and keep  
and

<sup>1</sup> Mosheim, Cent. 16. Sect. 3. Part 2. Chap. 1. Sect. 26.

<sup>2</sup> Conc. Trent. Sess. 6, Canon 19

<sup>3</sup> P. 75.

<sup>4</sup> Vol. 2. p. 451.

and do all the *moral* Law given by God to *Moses*:" this seems nearly related to the notion of the later Antinomians. The words quoted are part of the assertions made and signed by Anthony<sup>z</sup> Randall, for which he was deprived by the Bishop of Exeter in 1581, of the Rectory of Lydford.

The *Anabaptists* have<sup>a</sup> also been here mentioned as aiming to set aside the *whole* Law; it may therefore seem, that they need not be mentioned again, as desirous to set aside a *part* of it: nevertheless, their *morals* seem to deserve particular mention. *Sleidan* gives an account of a man, who cut off his brother's head, in the presence of their father and mother, and persuaded them, that God had commanded him to do so<sup>b</sup>. Those, who had to defend such an action, must have frequent occasion to disclaim the authority of the sixth commandment.—In the same history, we find accounts of the Anabaptists allowing of *Polygamy*, which is an offence against the seventh Commandment:—their King puts one of his Queens to death with his own hand: as he does a prisoner of war, with great coolness: representing him as being guilty equally with *Judas*.

Mr. William *Chillingworth*, celebrated as a logical<sup>c</sup> reasoner, mathematician, and accidentally as an engineer, refused to subscribe to our 39 Articles; for one reason, because he did not believe the *morality* of the fourth *Commandment*<sup>d</sup>. Yet our  
Article

<sup>y</sup> Perhaps a good Christian *would*, as such, obey all the ten commandments; but yet it does not seem right to deny all *authority* to the Decalogue.

<sup>z</sup> Strype's Whiggift, Appendix to third Book, No. 23.

<sup>a</sup> Reform. Legum de Hær. Cap. 4.

<sup>b</sup> At San-gall in Switzerland. p. 116.

<sup>c</sup> See Neal, Index. In Biogr. Britannica there is a Life of him.

<sup>d</sup> This expression is in Neal; who also says, in another place, that the Assembly of Divines had been blamed for allowing in their Confession "the morality of the Sabbath."

Article requires no assent to the morality of the Decalogue in every circumstance. Any part of it, which is not strictly moral, might be set aside as ceremonial. If this great man allowed, that periodical intervals of rest, and periodical exercises of moral and religious sentiments, are for the general good of mankind, he needed not to have scrupled arbitrary modes of promoting these ends in particular cases, any more than he needed to question the morality of the fifth Commandment, of giving honour to *Parents*, because the reward proposed to obedience is *length of days* in a particular country.

But *Chillingworth* seems to rank with *Whiston* and *Woolston*; we may add *Cheyne*, in another way; men of great intellectual abilities and attainments, overheated by wrong methods of pursuing religious knowledge.

VIII. From the history of this seventh Article, we pass to what may be called the *Explanation*: the intention of which is, so to *arrange* the matter contained in it, that we need not prove any unnecessary propositions: and that those, which we do prove, may be as clear and unembarrassed as possible.

Indeed our present subject is one, which will employ our most extensive acquaintance with things divine; and require our best discretion in the management of it. In other subjects, men are different in having different feelings, and in chusing different points of view; but here, difference consists chiefly in degrees of solid, useful *knowledge*. God hath spoken to man at sundry times and in divers manners. All the dispensations of Heaven are to be contemplated together; and the suitableness of each to the circumstances, in which it was given, is to be taken into consideration. With regard to the *Mosaic Law* in particular, it should be seen, how

how it suited the times, in which it was published, how all after times; how the Jews, how all mankind. To repeal a Law of God by the reason of man, is a solemn and awful thing: what but the fear of retaining what was intended to be removed, could possibly make any one venture upon it?—But to proceed to our business of simplifying.

1. Though the first proposition of our Article, “The Old Testament is not contrary to the New,” seems as if it would bring on a comparison of the *whole* of both, yet, since the *reason* assigned is, that both teach *everlasting Life through Christ*, they need be compared in nothing else.

2. In order to shew, that the Old Testament is not contrary to the New, with regard to eternal happiness through Christ, we need not examine them *both*; there can be no doubt as to the New; we need therefore only examine the *Old*: and see, whether in *any* sense it can be said to offer mankind everlasting happiness through the medium of Christianity.

3. As Christ has clearly brought Life and immortality to light, if we prove, that the Old Testament *promises Christianity*, that Christianity which we profess, it must follow, that it promises also immortality, or “everlasting life.”

4. But, though we are only to examine the *Old* Testament, yet it must not be thought, that we need prove from the *Old* Testament, that Christ is the only *Mediator*; we only affirm, in a kind of parenthesis, that he is so. Moses was <sup>e</sup> a kind of Mediator, but it cannot be said, that he *is* one: nor indeed could he ever be properly called a mediator between God and *Man*; or even between God and the seed <sup>f</sup> of Abraham; but only between God and one particular *nation*.

5. When

<sup>e</sup> Lev. xxvi. 46. Deut. v. 5. <sup>f</sup> See Mr. Locke on Gal. iii. 20.

5. When we say, that the *Jewish Scriptures* offered to mankind everlasting life by Christ, we must not be supposed to affirm precisely who *accepted* or even *understood* this offer. An offer is often made, when it is not accepted, or even understood, for want of due attention. It is no way necessary, that the *Jewish people* should understand every thing that is offered through their Scriptures to *mankind* at large. It is the *Christian* who is to determine whether *he* can see, with the help of both Old and *New Testament*, that everlasting life through Christ was intimated to *mankind* under the *old Dispensation*.

6. Lastly, It is not affirmed in this Article, that a future state is announced in the Dispensation of *Moses*, strictly so called. If everlasting life by Christ is announced to mankind in *any part* of the Old Testament, that is sufficient. As it is the opinion supported in that masterly work, the *Divine Legation* of *Moses*, that *Moses* does not offer more than *temporal* rewards to the *Jewish People*, it seems proper to observe, that such an opinion is *not inconsistent* with our Article. This Bishop Warburton hath himself proved<sup>g</sup>. Many of the *Jewish Prophets*, as well as the *Patriarchs* before the Mosaic Dispensation, say *Moses* himself, might believe in Christ, and yet the *People* under him might only be *governed* by rewards and punishments of a temporal nature.—*David*<sup>h</sup> lived 500 years *after* *Moses*, and the *Prophets* considerably later, down to 430 years before Christ; during these 500 years the doctrine of a future state was *dawning*, and about 150<sup>i</sup> years before Christ Bishop Warburton

<sup>g</sup> See Div. Leg. Index, "Article."

<sup>h</sup> Div. Leg. 8vo. Vol. 4, p. 199.

<sup>i</sup> Creation about 4000 before Christ—Abraham about 2000  
—Moses about 1500—David about 1000—Prophets (Jonah  
and

Warburton owns that the doctrine of a *future state* was a *national* doctrine amongst the Jews.

Bishop Warburton has observed a difference between saying, the Old Testament is "*not contrary*" to the New, and saying, the Old Testament is "*the same*" with the New; namely, in the manner of proposing eternal life through Christ. Two different parts of *one plan* may be very *different*, but cannot be *contrary*. Chrysostom seems to have had the same feeling when he says, διαφορα μόνον ἐστὶ νομαμάτων, οὐ μάχη, οὐδ' ἐναντιώσεις· τὸ γὰρ πάλαιον ἐκ τῆς κινήσεως γίνεται πάλαιον. Hom. 56. Edit. Sav. Tom. 5, p. 376, cited by Nicholls on the Articles.

It may seem strange, that the omission of the sanctions of futurity should afford an argument in favour of the Divine Legation of Moses; but suppose a person to assume the character of a Law-giver, and to profess, that he would undertake to reward every one, immediately, exactly in proportion to his good conduct, with all the good things of the present world, health, long life, pleasure, riches, honours; we should say, no human power can do this; he who can act up to such pretensions, must have some supernatural influence. How could he *know* men's merits with exactness? how could he provide the *means* of rewarding them? how could he stop the ravages of the earthquake, fire, lightning, inundation? of the pestilence that walketh in  
in

and Hosea) about 800; *Isaiah* began about when Rome was built, 753 A. Chr.—Daniel about 550—Malachi about 430, end of Old Testament—Maccabees began about 150.

I have found it convenient to reduce the principal æras prior to the Christian æra, into the above numbers; the regularity of the divisions of time not only assists the memory, but strikes the mind as exhibiting a regularity of plan in Divine Providence: neither does it seem materially inaccurate to conceive the time of Abraham as dividing the whole duration before the coming of Christ, into two equal parts; the time of *David* as dividing the duration between Abraham and Christ into two equal parts: and so on.



in darkness, and the sickness that destroyeth at noon day?—And if, besides his power, he shewed a *propriety* in what he did, shewed that his plan was part of a wise and comprehensive *scheme* to communicate happiness to a great distance, of place or time; certainly our belief in the truth of his pretensions would be much more strong.—We should perceive, that such an one had a much more difficult task than one, who had only to *tell* his Disciples, that, if they would adhere to him, they should be rewarded *hereafter*.

ix. From Explanation we proceed to *Proof*.—And here our first proposition is, properly, “The Old Testament is not contrary to the New:”—but, by what has been said in the explanation, this proposition is equivalent to the following; “Everlasting Life is offered to mankind by Christ” in the Old Testament. This proposition might be proved by declarations of the Old Testament, as well as by the Types of futurity there mentioned. But, with regard to Types, they were treated in the first \* Book, and, in our reading of Bishop Pearson on the Creed<sup>1</sup>, we find no part of our Saviour’s History, which is not shewn to have been pre-signified by them: and, with regard to declarations, promises, predictions, perhaps we may as well take them into our proof of the next proposition, concerning the actual expectation of the most eminent Jews; for though it is one thing to shew, that the Old Testament *does* offer to mankind through Christ everlasting life, and another, that the leading Jews or Patriarchs understood such offer, and founded expectations upon it;—yet, as every proof of the offer must afford some argument for its being acknowledged,

\* Chap. xvii. Sect. xviii.

<sup>1</sup> See Advertisement to the printed Syllabus, or Heads of Lectures, 1st, 2d, and 3d Editions.

acknowledged, we may as well incorporate the proofs of the two propositions together.

x. Our *second proposition* then is, "The Old Fathers did" not "look only for *transitory promises*." Who are meant by the "old Fathers" here, has been already <sup>m</sup> shewn from the Institutes of Calvin<sup>n</sup>.

We are first to give some account of the *Promises*, which were made under the Old Testament : and secondly of the *expectations*, which those promises raised in the Jewish Fathers<sup>o</sup>.

First the *Promises* made.—Gen. iii. 15. has been, in all times, considered as a promise of the *Messiah*, though one to be particularly understood only by future ages. The Scripture may be considered as referring to it, when the Serpent, or Draco, is spoken of (Rev. xii. 9.) as having the qualities of the evil Spirit or Satan.—But to keep to the Old Testament; we have a series of promises made to *Abraham*, and relating to his posterity. One on the *calling* of Abraham, Gen. xii. 3.—One on appointment of *Circumcision* as a *seal* of the Covenant; Gen. xvii. Which is accompanied with the first Promise that *Sarah* shall bear a Child. Another on the dismissal of *Ishmael*; Gen. xxi. 12.—Another on the sacrifice of *Isaac*; Gen. xxii. 18.—These were all made to Abraham *himself*;—afterwards there was a *renewal*, to *Isaac*, Gen. xxvi. 24. and another to *Jacob*, Gen. xxviii. 14.—To which we may add, Jacob's dying *Benediction*, Gen. xlix. 10.

These, with *Balaam's* *παράβολον*, Numb. xxiv. 17. and the prediction of *Moses*, Deut. xviii. 15. may

<sup>m</sup> Sect. iv.

<sup>n</sup> "That great man."—Lard. Vol. 11, p. 241.

<sup>o</sup> Pearson on the Creed, Article 11th; (p. 745, Quarto; or p. 379, Folio,) gives arguments to prove, that the Resurrection of the dead was revealed under the *Law*.

may constitute a *class*; as occurring occasionally in the *historical* Books of the Old Testament.

This class of declarations will scarcely fail to have an effect upon us, who have seen the coming of the *Messiah*, whatever effect they might have on the Jews.

Another class of declarations may consist of the prophetic *Psalms*, the 2d, 16th, 22d, 45th, 102d, 110th, &c; and of those Books, which are more commonly acknowledged to be prophetical.—To enter into these predictions minutely at present, so as to get a satisfactory knowledge of them, would detain us too long. I must therefore refer to the 17th Chapter of our first Book, and to our Readings in Bishop Pearson. But it seems as if I should not pass over the information, which is given us in the *New Testament*, in order to assist us in our interpretation of the Old. Our Lord tells us, John v. 39. that the Old Scriptures “testify of” him; and ver. 46, that *Moses* wrote of him. Acts iii. 22, or vii. 37, refers to Deut. xviii. 15.—Acts xiii. 23, interprets the promises made to the Seed of *David*; and the 32d, 33d, and following verses shew, that the second and sixteenth *Psalms* were intended to be understood as prophetical. Rom. iii. 21, 22. “The Righteousness of God” is spoken of as being “witnessed by the Law and the Prophets,”—“even the righteousness of God, which is by Faith of *Jesus Christ*.”—Gal. iii. 16. makes the Seed of Abraham, to be “*Christ*.”—And ver. 24. informs us, that “the Law was our School-master, to bring us unto *Christ*.”—These passages being sufficient to shew the *nature* of the promises made under the old Dispensation, we may proceed to the *effect* of such promises, on the *expectations* of

† 2 Tim. iii. 15. the *old* Scriptures save through *Christ*.—Here repeat Rev. xii. 9.

of the most eminent Jews, or the “old Fathers;” observing only, in consideration of our having omitted prophecies in this place, that these passages of the *New Testament*, even without an attempt to interpret the Old, afford the *Christian* sufficient reason for believing, that “everlasting Life” *is*, in the Old Testament, offered to *mankind* by *Christ*.

The *negative* form of expression used in our Article, seems to arise from the nature of the thing expressed: it *denies*, “that the Old Fathers did look only for transitory promises.” It does not affirm, that they assured themselves of *eternal* Life, or that they had *distinct* conceptions concerning the nature of the Dispensation to come; it seems rather to represent them as having their minds *elated*, and their views *enlarged*, by what was communicated to them, as looking forward to *something* great, noble, beneficial; something which the Divine Counsels had prepared for mankind, some august and awful though benevolent plans, to which they had not for a moment the presumption of conceiving any *limit*.

That these eminent men, to whom the promises were made, should have some idea of their completion, is what I find myself much more inclined to believe than the contrary;—and that is enough for our Article. Are *we*, from certain expressions, able to see, that promises of Life through Christ have been made, and were those, to whom they were made, totally blind to the meaning of those very same expressions?—The reasoning of our Article is the same as that which we now are using: “Everlasting Life is offered to mankind by Christ” even in the Old Testament; “*wherefore*” those, who were instrumental in making the offer, could not be wholly ignorant of the nature of the offer: they

they could not be so ignorant, as to confine the benefits of it to mere earthly luxuries.—If we were to put ourselves into the place of Abraham, or Moses, or David, we could not conceive it possible.—Could *Abraham* receive such assurances as he did, on every great and solemn occasion, attended with so many striking circumstances, and fancy, that his posterity were only to be blessed with abundance of *milk and honey*? Could *Moses* receive the Law in the manner he did, and govern the Jews as he did, and when, his mind full of the most sublime conceptions, he came to give intimations concerning futurity, mean some limited futurity, which he could discern the end of? its blessings wholly to be confined to such a life as the present? this is the less likely, in the cases of Abraham and Moses, on account of the supernatural communication, which they held with the Supreme Being. Must they not *suspect*, at least, something beyond the transitory things of this life?—With regard to *David* and the *Prophets*, as Prophets, the case seems clearer still: few will be inclined to consider them as foretelling mechanically things, of which they had no idea: yet, if we only allow, that David, and the Prophets after him, looked for *any thing* more than transitory promises, or even *suspected* any thing more, we allow enough for our Article<sup>p</sup>.

But

<sup>p</sup> We might ask, how could *Balaam* apply what he utters, by force of inspiration, to mere worldly enjoyments? He might think the fate of kingdoms a very grand thing, but do not his words, by a comparison with other phrases, bear an higher import? Balak was afraid for his *dominions*; Israel (and Judah in particular, perhaps, might be intended by the *Lion*) would overcome all resistance, and get a settled government; but, if Balaam had meant only to express this, would his *extacies* have been needed? would his sublimity have been natural? St. Peter (2 Pet. iii. 15.) calls him a *Prophet*:—but see Div. Leg. Index. *Balaam*.

But the authority of the *New Testament* must have the greatest weight. Therefore we will select a few passages relating to *Abraham*, *Moses*, and *David*, and then a few relating to the eminent persons of the Old Dispensation *collectively*.—As to *Abraham*, John viii. 56, seems decisive; whenever it was that he saw the *day* of Christ: but I must confess, that Bishop Warburton's account <sup>a</sup> appears to me not only ingenious but probable.

Gal. iii. 8. says, that the Scripture “*preached* before (προεγγελισατο) the Gospel unto *Abraham*, saying, “In thee shall all nations be blessed.”—A man is always supposed to have some idea of what is *preached* to him.—*Abraham* was *promised* Christ, Gal. iii. 16. and the reasoning in that and the 17th verse seems to me to imply, that *Abraham* had a competent understanding of the promise and covenant made with him. How can any one be a party in a promise or *covenant*, without some knowledge of its nature?—As to *Moses*, it is not so easy to conceive, that he wrote of Christ, without any idea of him, as that he had some conception of the person and character which he was describing: and this will be confirmed, by comparing John v. 46. with Acts iii. 22. and vii. 37.—As to *David*, the expression Acts ii. 31. is clear; “he seeing this before, spake of the Resurrection of Christ.”—Things much to our purpose are also said of the Jewish Fathers *collectively*: consult Acts iii. 21, 24.—Acts xiii. 32.—Heb. xi. in several places; where, though some of the instances may be as late as the Maccabees, others are plainly earlier; as ver. 10, 13, 16, &c<sup>r</sup>.

1 Pet.

<sup>a</sup> See Div. Leg. Index; or B. 6. Sect. 5. also B. 1. Chap. xvii. of this.

<sup>r</sup> It may be useful to see these proofs in a small compass.

1 Pet. i. 10—12. should also be read:—and lastly, as clearly expressing the *gradual* display of God's will to mankind, the three last verses of the Epistle to the *Romans*.

xi. Our next Proposition is, that Christians are not bound to retain and obey the *ceremonial* Law of Moses. Something on this head may be deduced from the *Old Testament*, and therefore addressed to the *Jews*.—Jer. xxxi. 31—37, is a wonderful prediction; in reading it, we should remark, that Jehovah (or LORD) is the proper name of the God of the Jews; as *Astotheth* was of the<sup>s</sup> Idol of the *Sidonians*; or *Chemosh* of the *Moabites*:—we should also remark the *internal* or spiritual nature of the new Law<sup>t</sup>; and moreover what is implied in God's being set forth as superintending the *Universe*. This prophecy seems to denote, that, at some time or other, there would be a *change*: whatever be the time, change is inconsistent with the *eternity* of the Law, of which some Jews have boasted. Indeed some Jews have expected a new Law

*Promises made*.—Gen. iii. 15. Serpent.—xii. 3. call of Abr. xv. xvii. circumcision.—xxi. 12. dismissal of Ishmael.—xxii. 18. offering up of Isaac.—xxvi. 3, 24. renewal to Isaac.—xxviii. 14. ditto to Jacob.—xlix. 10.—Jacob's benediction.—Numb. xxiv. 17. Balaam.—Deut. xviii. 15.—2d Class, David and Prophets, (Isaiah, &c.)—Psalms ii. xvi. xxii. xlv. cii. cx. &c. Prophetic *Books* as usual.

*Promises applied*.—John v. 39. both Life and Christ.—v. 46. Moses.—Acts iii. 22. Moses, or vii. 37.—xiii. 23, 32, 33. David.—Rom. iii. 21.—Gal. iii. 16, 24.—Rev. xii. 9.

*Expectation raised*.—In Abraham—John viii. 56.—Rom. iv. 20.—Gal. iii. 8, 16, &c.—In Moses—John v. 46.—with Acts iii. 22.—vii. 37.—In David—Acts ii. 31.—In the Fathers collectively—Luke x. 24.—Acts iii. 21, 24.—xiii. 32.—Heb. xi. 13, &c. 16.—1 Pet. i. 10—12 —Conclusion—Rom. xvi. 25, 26.

<sup>s</sup> 1 Kings xi. 33.

<sup>t</sup> See Div. Leg. 6. 6. 2.

Law to take place on the coming of the Messiah<sup>u</sup>; but others, even in early times, have flattered themselves<sup>x</sup> with this eternity.

It might be intelligible to the Jews, that, if their Religion were the only true one, its ritual must be temporary, because those at a great distance from Judea could not conform to it: consult Exod. xiii. 14, 17,—and Deut. xvi. 16<sup>y</sup>.—And moreover, because only the Descendants of Aaron could officiate in it as *Priests*. See Exod. xxviii. 1.—xxix. 9.—Lev. i. 5, 7, 8.—Numb. xviii. 7. (with the account of the Rebellion of Korah, Numb. xvi.) and 1 Chron. xxiii. 13.—Can it be conceived or allowed to be impossible, that *man-kind* should profess the only true Religion?

Extension and universality of true Religion is inconsistent with the Jewish ceremonial Law; yet such extension is not only *likely* to be provided for, but even *foretold* under the Jewish Dispensation itself.—Read the 2d and the 110th Psalms.—Isaiah ii. 2.—At the conclusion of Isaiah's Prophecy, it is said, that the Lord will take some<sup>z</sup> persons “*for Priests and Levites:*” as also, that he will make new *Heavens* and new *Earth*, which, in prophetic language, means a new scheme<sup>a</sup> of Government,  
or

<sup>u</sup> Chandler on Proph. p. 270, as before, Sect. v.

<sup>x</sup> Div. Leg. 8vo. p. 470, Vol. 4; or Book 6. 6. 3.

<sup>y</sup> See Lardner about St. Paul's vow: Works, Vol. 1, p. 209; but evasions are not to be put on the footing of Laws.—Or, if it should be said, that some Jews dispensed with the Law through *necessity*, yet it cannot be conceived, that cases of necessity should be more common than cases, in which men could worship regularly.

<sup>z</sup> Isaiah lxvi. 21, 22. *Jerusalem* is mentioned verse 20; but may it not mean ‘the true or general Jerusalem?’—the head place of worship, in any Church?

<sup>a</sup> See Daubuz with Lancaster; Symbolical Dictionary, p. 64: *Heaven*. Hurd, p. 195, Sermon 6, where the texts about making



or a new *People*.—Consult also Mal. i. 11.—and compare Is. xi. 9, 10. with Heb. ii. 14.—See also Daniel ix. 27. and Zeph. ii. 11.—The Jewish mode of divine worship could not therefore be *perpetual*, because it could not be *universal*.

All the Jewish Prophecies are authentic to Christians; but to Christians it may be proved, not only that the Jewish ceremonial Law was *intended* to be superseded, but that it is *actually* superseded by Christianity.—The Epistle to the Galatians was written on purpose to prove this<sup>b</sup>; but we will take a few passages of the New Testament separately. Gal. iii. 3. may, to Christians, serve as a kind of general principle.—See also Acts xv. <sup>c</sup> 24.—Gal. iii. 25.—Gal. iv. 1—10.—Col. ii. 16, 17. (or from ver. 11.)—Heb. vii. 12.—viii. 8, 13.—x. 1.

As

making an universal religion are collected; as they are in Pearson on the Creed, p. 89, Fol.—This sense of *Heavens* was mentioned in our Chapter on Prophecy.

<sup>b</sup> See Locke's account.

<sup>c</sup> The more Acts xv. is studied here, the better: the four things, which the Council of Jerusalem *request* the *Gentile* converts to abstain from, are not wrong or *immoral* in themselves, but such as would particularly hurt the *Jewish* converts, and perhaps bring the *Gentile* converts into some danger and difficulty. The *Jewish* converts would be much *shocked* to see the *Gentile* Christians eat *blood*, or things *strangled*, or partake of *feasts* on heathen sacrifices. While the *Gentile* Christians used their liberty in these things, it seemed impossible for them and the *Jewish* Christians to coalesce, to become one family or fraternity.—As to the *fornication* here meant, it is *not* the *vice* commonly called by that name; nor any *vice*; it seems, by Scripture language, to be something some way connected with *Idolatry*.—Lardner thinks it *may* be making *Alliances* with *Idolaters*:—he has many texts which favour him: 1 Cor. v. 1, has not caught my eye as being amongst them. (Lard. Vol. 11th, p. 333.)—And so part of *our* Scriptures too may “*vanish away*.”—It should be observed, that this Council of Jerusalem absolutely *refused* to ask the *Gentile* converts to be *circumcised*:—that was *repeal* enough of the Law of Circumcision, for Christians.

As there has not been perhaps any *express* abrogation of the ceremonial Law, Mr. Locke's three Notes on Eph. ii. 15. might here be read to advantage.

xii. The next proposition is, "the *civil* precepts" of the Mosaical Law "ought" not "of necessity to be received in any commonwealth."—*Instances* of these may be seen in Exodus, Chapters xxi. and xxii.—It can scarce be said of these, that they are calculated to produce the greatest possible happiness of all nations, in all ages, whatever improvements may take place. Civil Laws should be peculiar to each people, and should depend upon climate, situation for commerce, temper, prejudice, populousness, fertility, &c; they should impose no restraints, except where probable evils are apprehended. This might be urged to <sup>d</sup> *Jews*, in order to give them an idea, that, in the natural course of things, their civil Laws must lose their propriety, and therefore their force. Indeed it is not easy to understand how they themselves can obey them, since the destruction of Jerusalem.—It might moreover be urged, that the departure of the *Sceptre from Judah* and of the legislative power, was soon <sup>e</sup> foretold: and that the cities appointed for <sup>f</sup> refuge have no longer any being.

To *Christians* this will have still more weight, as they are more enlarged in their notions. It is indeed so clear, that the Apostles seem to take it for granted. Compare Acts xxv. 9, 10, 25, with Deut. xvii. 8.—See also Rom. xiii. 1, &c. and Tit. iii. 1. These relate to St. *Paul*; who offers prudential and conscientious motives; and seems earnest to clear Christians, sometimes called *Galileans*,

<sup>d</sup> What it is here said might be urged to *Jews*, may of course be urged to all judaizing *Christians*.

<sup>e</sup> Gen. xlix. 10.

<sup>f</sup> Numb. xxxv. 13.

*leans*, from the scandal of favouring the seditious principles of Judas <sup>g</sup> of Galilee;—or of refusing tribute to the Roman Emperor. St. Paul uses general moral reasoning to enforce a provision <sup>h</sup> for ministers of religion; though he borrows a principle from Scripture.—St. Peter also seems to take for granted, that different civil governments are lawful; see 1 Pet. ii. 12, 13;—and even the different *expressions* <sup>i</sup> of Peter and Paul seem to arise from the different forms of Government, under which those persons lived, to whom they wrote. *St. Peter*, writing to *Asiatics*, says plainly, that they were to submit to the *King*, the despotic Monarch, as supreme;—*St. Paul*, writing to *Romans*, who had a sort of *Consular* government in theory, and great confusion in practice, inculcates submission only to higher powers, and to powers actually subsisting.

In Deut. xxiv. 1. we have a Mosaic Law concerning *Divorces*; our Saviour, Matt. xix. declares this Law to be suited to the Jews peculiarly, but to be different both from that which had preceded, and <sup>k</sup> that which was to follow: though all three of divine appointment. Our Lord may be said perhaps to have repealed the law of *retaliation*, as one of a severity no longer necessary; the only difficulty is, that what he substitutes <sup>l</sup> is indeterminate, or a duty of imperfect obligation:—however he clearly commands, that *Tribute* should be paid to the Roman *Emperor*.

XIII. Our last proposition is, no Christian is free from the *moral* Law of Moses.—Here we have  
no

<sup>g</sup> See Bp. Sherlock's Discourses, Vol. 4, p. 349.

<sup>h</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 7—14.

<sup>i</sup> Compare 1 Pet. ii. 27, with Rom. xiii. 1—7.

<sup>k</sup> Matt. xix. 8, 9. <sup>l</sup> Matt. v. 38, &c.

no controversy with the *Jews*; we argue only with *Christians*.

If, by the moral Law of Moses, be meant those rules of conduct, which are parts of the *Law of Nature*, there can be no need of proof; such rules are obligatory without any sanction from Moses. Only some change in human nature can repeal them<sup>m</sup>. But some have thought the moral Law meant the *Decalogue*, which will make it proper for us to say something of the Decalogue.—However, as this distinction is often neglected, we may first make a few remarks without attending to it.—It seems plain from Scripture, that *something* of the Law was to be retained;—see Matt. v. 17, 18<sup>n</sup>.—Rom. iii. 31.—In Rom. vii. ver. 12, 14, 16, the Law is called holy, good, spiritual;—the same 1 Tim. i. 8. where the instances in the following verse are *moral*.—This must mean the *moral* Law; though *any* code of Laws may be called good, as a standard, of which actions fall short.—Christ, in his Sermon on the Mount, corrects abuses of the Law; that Law which is corrected, is to be continued.—No body of Laws can be totally repealed, because it must be the intention of some Laws in every code, to enforce *virtue*.—That mercy is to be preferred to sacrifice, or moral duties to positive, when there is any interference, is a principle of Christianity. See Matt. ix. 13, and xii. 7; both passages from Hosea vi. 6. which seems to confirm our separation of the ceremonial Law of Moses from the moral.—When our Saviour tells us, that our righteousness must *exceed*<sup>o</sup> the righteousness

<sup>m</sup> See Div. Leg. 6. 5. p. 375, 8vo, Note, quotation from Rimius; or Rimius's Narrative, p. 53.

<sup>n</sup> Wotton understands this to mean, that Christ as the *Anti-type* came to fulfil the *Types* of the Mosaical Religion. Misna, Vol. 1, p. 304.

<sup>o</sup> Matt. v. 20.

eousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, he must imply, that we must give up no moral rule which they observed.

But, as some have thought, that the moral Law of Moses means the *Decalogue*, we will offer a few remarks upon that. There is a *mixture* of moral and ceremonial in it, which perplexed the great *Chillingworth*<sup>p</sup>.—Of the ten commandments, the first four relate to *Religion*, the six others to the social duties of *men*. The first is about Polytheism; the second about Idolatry; the third about Perjury; the fourth about setting apart times for things spiritual. These four make the first Table.—The fifth is about *filial* obedience; the sixth about injuries to men's *persons*; the seventh about violation of the rights of *marriage*; the eighth about injuries respecting *property*; the ninth about injuries respecting *reputation*; the tenth about the regulation of our *sentiments*.

All these may be called *moral*, though moral is sometimes opposed to *religious*; but there are moral duties of religion, that is, such duties respecting the Supreme Being, as result from our best use of our faculties; rules of *conduct*, arising in the pursuit of general happiness.—The fourth commandment seems moral in *substance*, and ceremonial in circumstance<sup>q</sup>. Its principle is, the utility of *rest* or refreshment, and of periodically reviving good *sentiments*. Suppose this principle to operate, it would want determining to some certain *modes*, but so do other moral principles; as that human beings should not act for themselves, till they come to years of *discretion*. There might have been, whether there ever was or not, such a thing as a Sabbath in *natural religion*; if *weeks* could have got settled by a division

<sup>p</sup> Sect. VII.

<sup>q</sup> Before, Sect. VII. also Book I. Chap. xi. Sect. v,

division of lunar months. Yet even then a good deal of time would have been requisite. Men form moral rules on perceiving, that, if such a thing was done, some good must follow: But the good of making periods of religious rest would but operate *slowly*.—However, if it be allowed, that such an institution as our Sabbath *might* have taken place on *moral* principles, after any time, however great, that is enough to establish the morality of the fourth commandment, as to its substance. Indeed, if we allow the other nine to be moral, it will be difficult to deny this to be so, considering the peculiar and awful manner, in which the ten were published *together*.

I suppose, that our Lawgivers enact the observance of our Sabbath, on the idea, that a Sabbath was ordained immediately upon the Creation, and therefore belonged to all mankind<sup>r</sup>: and with a design to fall into the usual manner of reckoning time by <sup>s</sup> weeks; and to adopt the practice of the first Christians in marking the succession of the new Law, and in celebrating, at the same time, the Resurrection of their Lord: induced also, in a principal manner, by the probable and the tried benefits of the Institution<sup>t</sup>.

What our Saviour says, that the Sabbath was *made* <sup>u</sup> *for Man*, and not Man for the Sabbath, together with the occasion of his remark, may confirm what we have laid down, both as to the morality  
of

<sup>r</sup> *Heylin*, in his History of the Sabbath, denies that it was instituted at the Creation, or that Heathens can be said to have reckoned by weeks.—*Wotton*, in his book on the Misna, opposes the opinion of *Heylin*, in the first matter.

<sup>s</sup> See also the renewal, *Exod. xx. 10.*—and all Sabbatical texts collected by *Wotton* in his *Misna*.

<sup>t</sup> See *Mr. Mede*, Book 1. Disc. xv. p. 57. quoted at the end of *Wotton's Misna*.

<sup>u</sup> *Mark ii. 27.*

of the substance of the fourth commandment, and as to the ceremonial nature of its particular circumstances.

We have already observed, that the fifth commandment, though of perpetual obligation, is enforced by a temporary motive in the Jewish Decalogue.

Bishop *Burnet* calls the tenth commandment only *secondarily* moral. I would not dispute about a word, but yet the management of our *sentiments* is an essential part of *Virtue*; as will appear under the ninth Article. Dr. *Balguy*, in his \**System of Morals*, before quoted, of which I entertain a very high opinion, has five Chapters on Sentiments.

As the name Decalogue implies *ten* commandments, the Romanists make ten: yet they get rid of the second, through fear, probably, of making a difficulty about their *Images*, and seem to divide the tenth into two. In a church about 35 miles S. E. of Paris (*Moret*) are the ten commandments in old French; round the chancel: "the second is entirely left out: the *ninth* is,—*give not up yourself to the Flesh, and marry but <sup>y</sup> once.*—the tenth,—*desire not the goods of others, and lye not at all.*" I have two prayer-books, in which the same in substance is in French verse, but neither of them contains a regular *Decalogue*, though one is large, and contains all the three <sup>z</sup> *Creeds*.

XIV. All

\* Book III. Chap. vi.

<sup>y</sup> This is from the MS. travels of a Friend.—The lines in the Prayer-books are,

L'œuvre de chair ne desireras,  
Qu' en mariage seulement.

<sup>z</sup> Livre d' Eglise. . . de Reims.—The "Necessary Doctrine," &c. distinguishes between *Images*, and paying them divine honors. It often goes between Popery and Protestantism.

There has been a different splitting, made for the same purpose; to keep *ten* commandments in number, and leave out one of

xiv. All our propositions are now proved : yet sometimes considerations of *fitness*, propriety, &c. satisfy the mind as much as regular proofs ; let us therefore enter on a few such considerations.

So lost was the world in *Idolatry*, and the corruptions attending it, that nothing less than a *Theocracy* seems to have been capable of bringing any part of mankind to a sense of the true God ; hence the *Jews* were put under such a Government ; they were governed by Laws coming evidently from Heaven, and executed by men of sacred characters, endued with supernatural powers. Their minds were kept continually intent upon their God, by a number of significant ceremonies ; they were under continual discipline, and more quickly rewarded or punished than they could be as mere men. Nothing could be better adapted than such a plan, to keep them from connexions with their Idolatrous neighbours<sup>a</sup>.—And it is such a plan, as St. Paul might well compare to the Discipline of a *Schoolmaster*<sup>b</sup> : when youth are formed, they must be incessantly watched and employed, encouraged, checked, rewarded and punished. The schoolmaster trusts his scholars out of his *sight* but little ; he gives them precept upon *c precept*, line upon line ; “ here a little and there a little : ” he is more a friend to them than he seems ; his ultimate views he mentions but seldom ; it is distant good at which he chiefly aims ;  
and

of our ten. See *Heylin's History of the Sabbath*, p. 351.—or Part 1. Chap. iii. Sect. iii. *Hesychius* in Lev. 1. 6. c. 26. is quoted as saying, that the fourth commandment ought not to be in the Decalogue ; and as splitting the *first* into two, in order to get rid of the *fourth*.—But the *manner* in which this is done I cannot see ; *Hesychius* not being at hand.

<sup>a</sup> M. Luther, in his Dissertation above-mentioned, (Sect. vi.) shews himself sensible of this.

<sup>b</sup> Gal. iii. 24.—Hosea v. 2. where the Lxx. have *παιδευτης*.

<sup>c</sup> If, xxviii. 10.



and when he punishes, it is with a view of preventing distant evil.

This account of the Law of Moses must shew it to be divine; but yet our reverence for it, and our admiration of it must be heightened, when we reflect, that those very ordinances, which were so useful at first, were also *types* and *proofs* of the subsequent and ultimate dispensation.

By this train of thought, we may reconcile those passages of scripture, which describe the Law as *carnal*, with those which call it *spiritual*. As the Jews were to have a great number of observances, and were at the same time to prepare the way for a more perfect dispensation, it was wisely contrived, that their observances should be *typical*: these, as duties, would be carnal; as presignifications, spiritual. —Compare Rom. vii. 14. & 4. with Heb. ix. 9, 10. 24.—x. 1.—vii. 15, 16.—The general thought is expressed 1 Cor. <sup>d</sup>xv. 46.—2 Cor. iii. 13, 14.

Things being thus prepared, a new Dispensation might be grafted on the Old: In which the reasons of temporal sanctions ceasing, the sanctions themselves would cease, and of course the extraordinary providence necessary to support them. And an ordinary providence would take place, and men would be directed to look forward to a *future Life*.

And, as we may discern propriety and fitness in the *whole* of the Mosaic Religion, so may we in distinct *parts*. Deut. xxii. 5. has been thought to be intended, not only to prevent indecency, and its consequences, but also *Idolatry*; as the Priestesses of Mars used to worship him in Man's Apparel, and the Priests of Venus used to worship her in woman's apparel:—the word, “abomination,” βδελυγμα, has seemed to favour this Idea<sup>e</sup>.

I said,

<sup>d</sup> Div. Leg. 8vo. Vol. 4. p. 197, 316, 366.

<sup>e</sup> More instances may be seen in Stillingfleet's *Origines Sacrae*. B. ii. Ch. 7. at the end.

I said<sup>f</sup>, that our Saviour had declared the Mosaic Law of *Divorces* to be suited to the Jews; let us now see the particular reason of it; the *hardness of their* <sup>s</sup> *hearts*. Poets and Historians have described <sup>h</sup> the Jews as rancorous and malevolent.— Since the time of Christ, they have been often persecuted; and hatred easily becomes mutual: But *in* the time <sup>i</sup> of Christ, perhaps spiritual pride might have arisen from their separation from the rest of the world; from the severities seemingly authorized in some of their predecessors to the enemies of their Religion. Any kind of malevolence or rancour would make them treat the weaker sex ungenerously, and in an harsh manner, inconsistent with the Christian principle of “giving honour unto the Wife, as unto the weaker Vessel<sup>k</sup>.”

The

<sup>f</sup> End of Sect. xii.

<sup>g</sup> Bp. Warburton ascribes the whole ceremonial Law of the Jews to the Hardness of their Hearts. Div. Leg. Vol. 3. 8vo. p. 394.

<sup>h</sup> Dio Cassius says of the Jews, το γὰρ τοι γένος αὐτῶν θυμῶθεν, πικροτάτων 151. l. 59.— And see the *Shylock* of Shakspeare.

In 1794, I think, Mr. Cumberland brought on to the Stage a Comedy called *the Jew*, in which old *Sheva* is represented as benevolent and grateful. To appearance indeed he is a miser; and in fact lives very frugally; but he does good in secret.—We can only *wish* this may be founded in Nature, and ourselves endeavour to promote Christian benevolence.

<sup>i</sup> In the time of Christ, the Jews might have got some malevolent sentiments from being subject to the *Romans*. Being obliged to submit to persons, whom we esteem inferior to ourselves in merit, generates *hatred*; especially if those persons have pretensions to superiority in some respects, and treat us with contempt.

<sup>k</sup> 1 Pet. iii. 7. What St. Peter recommends is precisely Mr. Hume's sense of the word *Gallantry*; Essays 8vo. Vol. 1. p. 148, &c. Essay xiv. On the rise and progress of the Arts and Sciences.

What Mr. Hume says on the subject may help to illustrate the difference between Judaism and Christianity, in point of civilization of manners. And therefore to shew how ill Judaism would suit

The Jews were not allowed to take *Interest* for money, of *Jews*<sup>1</sup>, but of *strangers* they were.—How far forbearing to take *Interest* was a duty of imperfect obligation, or *indeterminate*, like mercy to the poor, &c. may not be certain: the prohibition to take *Interest* is not followed by any specific *penalty*, but is expressed like prohibitions to oppress the poor<sup>m</sup>: yet, as the Jews were under a special Providence, they might be sure, that *they* should be punished for offences, however men might sometimes evade human Laws.—This idea brings indeterminate offences amongst Jews, under the Theocracy, near to the determinate. We may therefore endeavour to assign the reasons of forbidding *Usury* amongst the Jews, much as if that prohibition were perfectly determinate.

The Jews were to be a separate *Nation*; that Nation was to be divided into separate *tribes*; each tribe into separate *families*, and each family was to have its portion of *Land*, which should be cultivated by that family, and descend from generation to generation: this was the *ordinary* state of things: the only proper *business* of Jews, as such, was, to support and transmit a *Religion*; *gain* was not their business; and all arguments in favour of *Interest*, limited or unlimited, turn upon the right, which a man has to improve his property. Their business was, to keep the Jewish polity inviolate, till the coming of the Messiah. But though, in this ordinary course, they needed not either to lend nor borrow; yet *misfortunes* might sometimes happen:

if

suit the present times.—I could almost paint to myself a peevish Jew taking a rancorous disgust against his wife, on account of some unavoidable infirmity, and using her so, as to make separation the least evil on the whole.

<sup>1</sup> Lev. xxv. 36, &c.—Deut. xxiii. 19, 20.

<sup>m</sup> Lev. xv. 7.

if they were of a *lighter* sort, Brother must help Brother, mutually, gratuitously, ignorant whole turn it must be next to suffer. But, if Calamity was *weighty*, a family might part with its real property, in the way of *mortgage* or *sale*; only for a time; it must return at the *Jubilee*, every fiftieth year at the farthest<sup>n</sup>. Such a scheme seems best preserved by allowing no Interest, no Usury.—Why then allow Jews to take Interest of *Strangers*? Here the reasons ceasing, natural *liberty* revived. But, would not this liberty *unsettle* Jews? scarcely: they would have but *little* to lend; being not in the *habit* of lending, they would be very *fearful*; then their *Land* at home would always be the great tie: what they lent to strangers would be much more to *residents* than absentees; and would leave them still Jews, both in religion and politics.—When indeed their circumstances came to be very much *altered*, by their subjection to the *Romans*, by the destruction of *Jerusalem*, &c. they would have to judge of the *grounds* of their Laws, and see how far they might innocently depart from the <sup>o</sup>strictness of them.

xv. The reasoning commonly used does not satisfy the *Jews*, with regard to the abolition of their ceremonial Law.—Why did not Moses tell us plainly? say they. When he uses such expressions

<sup>n</sup> See Reland's Sacred Antiquities, Part 4. Chap. 11. of *Jubilees*.

<sup>o</sup> It has been a notion, that taking Interest for money was *immoral*: but such notion does not seem well grounded. It must be always wrong to *oppress* the needy; but oppression is a vice of the *indeterminate* sort.—Even in the *Jews*, Usury was allowed to *Strangers*, that is, to *men*, as mere men: this could not have been, if it was radically immoral. *Grotius* supported the opinion, that Usury was wrong (de Jure, &c. 2. 12. 20.); but Barbeyrac's Note shews, that he did not continue always of that opinion.

sions as a <sup>a</sup> Statute *for ever*, a perpetual Statute, did he mean to deceive? We answer, popular, natural language will always deceive if taken too literally; but where is the fault? not in him who uses the expressions, but in him who interprets them as he interprets no others. But let us look at a few particulars, in which expressions occur, that are *not* taken literally by the Jews: from these, their unfairness will appear, in taking others literally. The children of *David* <sup>a</sup> were to sit upon his throne for evermore; that eternity has been long concluded. The children of strangers, after a price was paid for them, were to be *Bond-men*<sup>r</sup>, or slaves, “*for ever*!” they could not *live* for ever, and any one of them might be manumitted.—“O King, live <sup>s</sup> for ever!” might express loyalty and respect, but could never prevent mortality.—*Twelve Stones*<sup>t</sup> were to be a memorial *for ever* of the dividing of the river Jordan when the Ark passed.

The Prophet speaks of “*everlasting mountains*;” and these might continue longer than the twelve stones; yet “the everlasting mountains were scattered;”—nay, “Heaven <sup>x</sup> and Earth shall pass away.”—As to a perpetual Statute, or “a Statute for ever,” it is literally a thing <sup>y</sup> impossible, because the power that enacts can always repeal. *Darius* <sup>z</sup> made a decree about Daniel; it was immutable;—  
in

<sup>a</sup> Lev. xxiii. 14. 21. 31. 41.

<sup>q</sup> Psalm cxxxii. 12.

<sup>r</sup> Lev. xxv. 46.

<sup>s</sup> Dan. ii. 4.

<sup>t</sup> Joshua iv. 7.

<sup>u</sup> Hab. iii. 6.

<sup>x</sup> Matt. xxiv. 35.

<sup>y</sup> See Exodus xxix. 9. The first Article of the *Treaty* in 1785, between the *Emperor* and the *Dutch*, agreed upon an *eternal* friendship between them. And our Law about the Church of England decrees, that it shall be safe “for ever.”—*Sherlock on Tests*. Oxf. 1790.

<sup>z</sup> Dan. vi. 15.

in fact, it lasted one night. From these instances, we may see the *real meaning* of the expressions in question; “*for ever*,” in popular language, denotes an *unlimited* futurity, according to the circumstances of the case:—“*bond-men for ever*,” are bond-men for an unlimited time<sup>a</sup>: the *stones* were to be a memorial, not for five or ten years, but for as long a time as such a memorial would naturally last. A *Law* is perpetual<sup>b</sup>, when it is for no certain *term*, when those, who are to obey it, are to see no time when it will be repealed.

The Jews are against the repeal of their Law, because it is the dictate of *infinite* <sup>c</sup> *wisdom*. Yet a Being infinitely wise may himself repeal, in one situation of things, what was made for another<sup>d</sup>. To take a Son from his schoolmaster, is as much a mark of wisdom, when the Son comes to maturity, as it once was to place him “under Tutors and Governors<sup>e</sup>.”

xvi. Our *Application* in the present article will be short;—if we consider in what sense any one may now *assent* to it, we shall do it merely in the way of recapitulation.

‘Though some through zeal, others through want of discernment, have held, that the Old and  
New

<sup>a</sup> These bondmen for an unlimited time, who are foreigners grown poor, and unable to support themselves, are immediately (Lev. xxv. 46, 47, &c.) opposed to bondmen for a limited time: that is, to the children of Israelites, if reduced to poverty and bought by Sojourners; these last might be *redeemed*; and *must* regain their Liberty at the next *Jubilee*.

<sup>b</sup> Spirit of Laws, B. 3. Chap. 10.—March 1795, The *Taxes* just now imposed have been argued upon as *perpetual* taxes: that is, they are not temporary; or for any time, whose limits are known.

<sup>c</sup> This Stillingfleet mentions as the argument of *Abravanel*, Orig. Sacra: and Luther, in his Essay on reading Moses. Vol. 3, of his Works; beginning.

<sup>d</sup> See before, about Divorces, end of Sect. xii.

<sup>e</sup> Gal. iii. 24. and Gal. iv. 2.

New Testament are contrary to each other, I believe them to differ only as different parts of the same plan. If I review them together, I can see Christianity opening gradually, ever since the Creation. Whether the Jewish People at large were able to discern this, need not be settled: yet, from what I read in both old and new scriptures, I can by no means allow, that Abraham, Moses, and the Prophets confined their views and expectations to this Life.—When I say, that the Old Testament is part of the same *plan* with the new, I do not mean, that the Laws of the former are to be obeyed indiscriminately, like those of the latter. The ceremonial and civil Laws of Moses were always intended to be temporary; though the moral Law must for ever be of force; except we may reckon as part of the moral Law some circumstances of the Laws of the Decalogue, which seem distinct from their moral essence. These may be varied, if it be done by authority, for the benefit of any part of mankind, by whom they may happen to be carried into execution.'

As to *mutual concessions* of those, who contend about this Article, we need only recommend it to Jews, Antinomians, and others, to consider what has been advanced, and not to retain or reject, without a calm consideration of all circumstances.

*Improvements* must be of the same nature here with those mentioned under the preceding Article; they must still be improvements in studying the *Scriptures*. So we need not dwell upon them.

I will therefore *conclude* with observing what a grand and interesting employment for the mind this Article affords. Can any thing be more truly called so, than the contemplation of all the Dispensations of the Almighty, with their connexion, resemblance, difference, according to the different circumstances,

for which they were intended? What wonder, if low and illiterate sects should have run into various errors on a subject, which requires such extensive knowledge and sound judgement? What wonder, if the learned themselves have not been able in all things to coincide?





## ARTICLE VIII.

## OF THE THREE CREEDS.

THE Three Creeds, Nicene Creed, Athanasius's Creed, and that which is commonly called the Apostles Creed, ought thoroughly to be received and believed : for they may be proved by most certain warrants of holy Scripture.

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I. I need not say, that the word *Creed* comes from *credo*. In Greek, a creed is called μαθημα, γραφη, κανων and συμβολον. The last name only, *Symbol*, has occasioned any difficulty.—Some have taken it in the sense of contribution, or *collection*, under an idea of the Apostles contributing each his share; or of Doctrines being *collected* into a small compass :—Others in the senses of a *watchword*, a badge, or a *teffera* or ticket of admission. Lord King suits my notion best, when he says, it was something among Christians analogous to *symbols*, which those *heathens* had, who were *initiated* into any *mysteries*, in order that they should know one another, and be admitted into the place where the mysteries were celebrated. This sense may be allowed to comprehend most of the others. Symbols<sup>a</sup> were either things to be *shewn*, or forms of *words* (Ld. King): either visible or audible.

One

<sup>a</sup> On the word συμβολον, one might consult Suicer, Vossius, &c.—and, on the subject of *Creeds*, Ld. King, Bp. Pearson, Walk  
on

One can scarce conceive a Christian church without some kind of Creed. No person could be admitted into the Christian religion, without giving some account of his belief; that account, however short, must be a *Creed*.—The creed of the Treasurer of the Æthiopian Queen, was only this, “I believe, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God<sup>b</sup>.”—On this belief he was baptized; and all Creeds are *baptismal* confessions; or those confessions<sup>c</sup> enlarged. It soon got to be thought essential to declare a belief in each of the persons of the Holy *Trinity*, according to Matt. xxviii. 19; but all beyond, was addition. Additions, however, became necessary, by the evasions and perversions of Heretics<sup>d</sup>:—Whatever is wanted to preserve peace and unity of doctrine, is necessary to promote religious sentiments, and to answer the ends of religious Society.—Not but we may conceive some use of a Creed even where men are unanimous; it may be used<sup>e</sup> as an *Hymn*<sup>f</sup>.—So long as no harm arose from it, *each Bishop* was at liberty to express the faith of his Church in what terms he thought proper; and so would

on Baptism, Part 2, Chap. 9.—Nicholls on this Article; Bingham, Usher on Creeds.

*Tessera* was sometimes a *ticket* to receive a share in a division of *Corn*; sometimes a kind of bill of exchange; then called *nummaria*, (assignat): sometimes a kind of billet of a quartermaster, or, however, a ticket entitling to a reception in the way of Hospitality. Sometimes a *watchword*, or perhaps a *sign* used as a watchword.

<sup>b</sup> Acts viii. 37.

<sup>c</sup> Pearson on the Creed, Art. viii. p. 665, 4to. p. 331. Fol. Wall, Part. 2, Chap. 9.

<sup>d</sup> See an instance (of the insertion of *indivisibilem*, and *impasibilem*) Pearson on the Creed, p. 321, 4to. p. 159. fol.

<sup>e</sup> See Cyril's 5th Catechesis, p. 78. . . quoted by Waterland, p. 285, 2d. Ed. on the Athan. Creed. Ref. Leg. de Trin. Cap. 13.

<sup>f</sup> The Creeds used to be called *Salms*. See Waterland ib. p. 50.

would suit its circumstances. Hence we have “*impassible*” in the Aquileian Creed;—a word directed against the *Patripassians*.

II. Our method will be, to take the most simple and ancient Creed first; to give the *History* of *each*, subjoining such remarks, as have not so convenient a place elsewhere.—

The expression of the Article is very like what we find in the Reformatio<sup>h</sup> Legum; but I do not conceive the meaning to be, that we should affirm one creed to have been really made at *Nice*, or another by *Athanasius*. As, in the Article, we have “commonly called the Apostles Creed;” so, in our Rubric, we have “commonly called the Creed of St. *Athanasius*.” Some *names* must be given to the Creeds; and our Article gives them those names, which were most *usual*<sup>i</sup>.

We come then to some *History* of the *Apostles Creed*.—It is sometimes called the *Roman Creed*, because used in the Roman Church; yet several clauses have been added at unknown times, by unknown persons. On these, Bp. Pearson and Lord King may be consulted; and different forms may be seen in Bingham and Usher, and Wall on Baptism.—But why has this Creed been commonly called the Apostles? Our reason for calling it so, is, that some of the *Fathers* have called it so. Yet, they do not seem to refer to any one fixed form; which would make one think, that their calling it so was eloquence rather than History. Dr. Wall  
says,

<sup>g</sup> Ld. King, p. 40.

<sup>h</sup> Ref. Leg. de Trin. Cap. 5. & 13.

<sup>i</sup> A person calls the Translation of the Bible the *Septuagint*, who does not believe all the stories about the seventy Cells, &c.—In Ref. Leg. the Roman Creed is called the Creed of the *Apostles*.

The names given in English Liturgies to the Athanasian Creed may be seen in Waterland, p. 244. Note to beginning of 10th Chapter.

says, every thing was called *Apostolic*, which was done at any See, where any of the Apostles had ever presided.—(See on Baptism, Part 2. Chap. 9. Sect. 13.) That each Apostle contributed his clause, is not credible, especially as St. Thomas's contribution was said to be the Descent into Hell; the minor James's, "the holy Catholic Church;" and that of Simon Zelotes, "the communion of Saints:" which clauses were not in the Creed till some centuries after the age of the Apostles.—Yet it seems no way improbable, that part of this creed might *originate* from the Apostles, and be handed down as having been used by them, either orally, or in writing.

III. There are only *two things* in the Apostles Creed not treated by us elsewhere. "The holy catholic Church;"—and, "the Communion of Saints."

"*The holy catholic Church*" is indeed treated in Art. <sup>k</sup> XIX and XX. in some sort; so that we need only speak of it here as part of a *Creed*. Ld. King says<sup>1</sup>, that this clause is first found in Tertullian, or rather, some part of it; for it came into the creed gradually; in this order, as I conceive; "the Church," "the holy church," "the holy catholic church." The reason of inserting it is not clearly known. Probably, it might be inserted in order to discourage *Herefy*, to *unite* Christians for their common credit and support; or to give weight to large bodies of Catholics assembled in councils, or to those, who were most fit to dictate or govern, though living separate from each other.

IV. "*The communion of Saints*."... I think Bp. Pearson says, that this clause was inserted *last*.  
And

<sup>k</sup> See also Book I. Chap. XIX. Sect. XVI. and Book III. Chap. XI. Sect. IV.

<sup>1</sup> P. 324.

And Lord King, that it was introduced by Augustin with a view to the *Donatists*, who refused to hold *communion* with other Bodies of Christians.—So that, in the primary sense, he who believed the communion of Saints, believed that all Christians (called *Saints* in Scripture) ought to *communicate* with each other, though they belonged to different particular societies; that they should all be interested for the rest, and have a religious patriotism.

The “Necessary Doctrine,” &c. makes the communion of Christians, (the members of Christ’s Body,) to be like the communion of the members of the *natural body*; such that the nourishment, which is given to the Body, benefits every member. “In so much that it lieth not in the power of any manne to saie, that the meate whiche he putteth into his owne mouthe, shall nourish one particular membre of his bodie and not an other.”

Yet to some, this clause has seemed to imply a common feeling, not only between cotemporaries, but also between Christians of all different ages and generations.—That such an idea is not without some foundation in Scripture, seems evident from several passages. Successive generations are baptized in one form; Christ is with his church unto the end of the world; he prays (John xvii. 20.) for all his disciples without distinction of times; he was the *Lamb* slain from the foundation of the world; and “if we walk in the light as God is in the light, we have *fellowship* (or communion, κοινωνία) one with another, and the blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all Sin.” 1 John i. 7.—the Holy Spirit guides men into all truth: these things must unite Christians to make a common interest; nor does departure out of this life make any interruption in the views of the good Christian:

Christian: there is still, for any friend he has lost, or for himself, “the heavenly Jerusalem,” “the general assembly and church of the first-born,” and “the spirits of just men” made perfect.”—

“*Forgiveness of Sins*” is treated under the sixteenth Article.

v. In treating of the *Nicene Creed*, the same method may be used.

The common notion is, that this Creed, as far as the words “*Holy Ghost*,” was made at the Council of Nice, or Nicæa, in Bithynia, in 325; and that the remainder was added at Constantinople, in a general Council, in 381, or 382.—The Nicene Council is often called the Council of 318; Beaufobre<sup>n</sup> supposes, that though there might be about 300 Bishops present, the precise number 318 was borrowed from Gen. xiv. 14. about the 318 servants<sup>o</sup> of Abraham, by whom he overcame his enemies.—This Council was mentioned before; it was held on account of the disputes about *Easter*, and the Doctrine of Arius; and the Meletian Schism, relating probably to Ordinations.—The shorter Creed may be compared with the fuller in Books of Councils<sup>p</sup>; the shorter is in Dr. Rutherford’s fourth Charge<sup>q</sup>, and Archbishop Usher’s Dissertation on Creeds; but they both seem to trust to the Liturgy<sup>r</sup> for the longer. Waterland calls it “the Nicene<sup>s</sup> or Constantinopolitan Creed.”

Archbishop

<sup>m</sup> Heb. xii. 23.

<sup>n</sup> Lardner’s account of the Council of Nice makes a Chapter in his Credibility, &c. Works, Vol. 4. p. 187.

<sup>o</sup> See Pearson on the Creed about the *Cross*, beginning of “*was crucified*.”

<sup>p</sup> Labbé, Vol. 3. col. 27. 951.

<sup>q</sup> Rutherford’s Charges, p. 83.

<sup>r</sup> *Symbolum autem hoc quod in divinatorum mysteriorum administratione recitatur*, &c. Usher p. 16.—Yet he says, his form from Epiphanius, is very *near* that of Constantinople in 381.

<sup>s</sup> Hist. Athan. Creed p. 161, 2d. Edit.

Archbishop Usher was, at one time, of the common opinion, but afterwards thought (as I understand), that the *whole* of our Nicene Creed was *known* at Nice in 325, though no more was *published* than what relates to *Arius*<sup>t</sup>: the part published he looked upon as *recital*<sup>u</sup> of so much of the Creeds then in use, as was to the purpose of the meeting: the remainder being easily supplied from other Creeds, when wanted. What made him change his opinion was, finding, in writings composed between 325 and 381, the substance of the last paragraph of that Creed, which we use, and commonly call Nicene; and quoted as the doctrine of the Nicene Fathers.—Yet there might be doctrines professed by the Nicene Fathers, which were not inserted into any *Creeds* at the time of the Council of Nice.

We now proceed to remark on those parts of our Nicene Creed, which have not before been treated, nor are likely to find a more convenient place hereafter.

VI. “*Light of Light*,” that is, “I believe” in Christ, “begotten of his Father,” “God of God;”—and I am willing to acknowledge the propriety of this expression or comparison, “*Light of light*.” Now, one does not see how this can appear an improper expression, even to an *Arian* or a Socinian; for both the Father and the Son are called *Light* in Scripture<sup>x</sup>. The expression is in fact used be-  
cause

<sup>t</sup> Yet did not Arius reckon the Holy Ghost “*creaturam creaturæ?*”—Epiphanius. *Hær.* 69, treats of Arius. And see Aug. *Hær.* 49.

<sup>u</sup> Dr. Rutherford maintains the same opinion. See his *Charges*, p. 84.

But see Lord King, p. 319, from Epiphanius; quoted before: where the *Macedonians* about 360 boast, that they received the *Whole Nicene Creed*.—See also Wall 4to. p. 503.

<sup>x</sup> See Cruden’s Concordance, *Light*, or John i. 5. and John i. 9.

cause it seems to contain an *illustration* of the eternal generation of the Son of God, likely to reconcile different parties. The Father is the Light as the *luminary*, the Son is the Light as the *effulgence*, or emanation: the sun-beams are *coeval* with the luminous body; they are inseparable, or of the same *substance*, and yet distinct. The word *απαυγασμα*<sup>y</sup>, in the opening of the Epistle to the Hebrews, has given occasion to this illustration; it seems to have been adopted with pleasure by men so eminent as *Origen* and *Dionysius* of Alexandria, before the Council of Nice, and about that time by *Athanasius*<sup>z</sup>.—Every illustration must, in such a case, be *inadequate*, but he, at least, who scruples not to use the words, “God of God,” need not scruple to use the expression “*Light of Light*.”

VII. In the fifth Article, though we proved several propositions concerning the Holy Ghost, the expressions of that Article did not lead us to prove, that he might with propriety be called “*Lord*,” and “*giver of Life*;” το κυριον<sup>a</sup> και το ζωοποιον, (not Lord of Life), though we used some texts, from which that might be proved. These expressions were used, no doubt, in opposition to the degrading notions of *Arians* and *Macedonians*.

The Church might think themselves authorized to call the Holy Ghost “*Lord*,” from a comparison of Acts i. 16, with Acts iv. 24;—and from a comparison between Exodus xxxvi. 34, and 2 Cor. iii. 17; the word κυριος being used in its highest sense in the former, and used of the Holy Ghost in the

<sup>y</sup> Heb. i. 3.

<sup>z</sup> See Parkhurst's Greek Lexicon, *απαυγασμα*.

<sup>a</sup> Το κυριον must be an *adjective*, agreeing with *πνευμα*. but κυριος seems sometimes *substantive*, sometimes adjective, and sometimes a substantive put as an adjective; in the manner in which we say, a *Master-Key*.—The *proof* must be the same, as if the Greek was a substantive as well as the English.



the latter, in speaking of one and the same *fact*.—Also from 1 Theff. iii. 12, 13, where the three persons of the Trinity are enumerated.

The council (of Nice, or Constantinople,) might call the Holy Ghost “*giver of Life*,” from Rom viii. 10, 11.—1 Pet. iii. 18.—and indeed from Rev. xxii. 1,—if the enumeration of the three persons of the Trinity, and the “*proceeding out of the throne of God and of the Lamb*” were noticed, as<sup>b</sup> well as the word “*Life*.”

And though, when it is said, “the Spirit giveth Life,” 2 Cor. iii. 6., and “it is the Spirit that quickeneth,” John vi. 63, Spirit may be opposed to *Letter*, or *Body*; yet these expressions seem to me to imply a sort of *general maxim*, that whatever, in any sense, can be called Spirit, must be conceived as giving Life to that, of which it is the Spirit.

The Church might deduce the expression, “*who spake by the Prophets*,” from Acts i. 16.—And 1 Pet. i. 10, 11.

The *propriety* of these several expressions in their several places, would probably appear from a diligent and accurate attention to the circumstances, in which they were introduced.

VIII. We now come to the *Athanasian Creed*. This was not always called a *Creed*, nor, when it was so called, was it always named *Athanasian*. It has been called *Fides Catholica*, *Sermo fidei catholicæ*, *Fides quicunque vult*, *Psalmus quicunque vult*, *Sermo Athanasii de Fide*, *Expositio Catholicæ fidei Athanasii*<sup>c</sup>, &c. &c. It was not called *Athanasian* till near the end of the seventh Century, and then it might be called so as containing his  
Opinions.

<sup>b</sup> Ver. 1—4 of Rev. xxii. might be all read.

<sup>c</sup> See Waterland's History of this Composition, p. 121, 2d. Edit. and p. 89.

Opinions. Athanasius flourished in 326, and died about 373: Yet some have thought it the composition of Athanasius; nay, such eminent men as Baronius, Allatius, and Bp. Andrews.

It has been thought to have been composed by *Hilary*, a French Bishop, about the year 430, for use of the Gallican Clergy; this was the opinion of *Dr. Waterland*.

Several writers have thought, that it was written by *Vigilius Tapsensis*, that is, Bishop of Tapsum, or Tapfus, in the Byzacene, a region of Africa; about the year<sup>d</sup> 484.

Some give only a *doubtful* or a *negative* judgment; saying the Author was “a Latin Author,”—“a Gallican writer,”—“doubtful,”—“not Athanasius<sup>e</sup>.”—And some have assigned Athanasius of *Spire* as the Author, before the middle of the seventh Century.—Bishop Pearson says<sup>f</sup>, “a Latin author, and one later than the famous Athanasius.”

*Dr. Waterland* has written a very able book on this subject; he seems to have consulted all authorities, as a learned man ought to do. His MS. copies amounted to 74, and the authors, ancient and modern, to a much larger number. When he has given accounts of what information he has met with, he forms his recapitulations into *tables*, which are very useful in exhibiting a subject at one view.

As far as my reading goes, it inclines me to agree with this respectable writer;—therefore it seems necessary to take notice of one difficulty; the Creed  
opposes

<sup>d</sup> This opinion is adopted by Mr. Gibbon, *Hist.* Vol. 3. p. 544, quarto; whose decision is said, by the Author of a pamphlet entitled “*Hints*,” &c. to be “acknowledged by *all*.” See Bingham, 10. 4. 18.

<sup>e</sup> See *Waterland* p. 24.

<sup>f</sup> Creed, p. 324. Fol. p. 647. 4to.

opposes the *Nestorian* and *Eutychian* doctrines; the former were condemned at Ephesus in 431; the latter at Chalcedon in 451; yet Waterland supposes the creed to have been composed about the year 430. We have had difficulties similar to this<sup>g</sup> before; the general solution is, that doctrines have been often disseminated, or have even grown up so as to be very troublesome, before those by whom they are professed have acquired that *name* by which, as a sect, they are denominated in History. Waterland mentions the *Apollinarians*<sup>h</sup>, as having held a doctrine nearly the same with that of Eutyches; and the Nestorian doctrines were well known in 430.

It must not be thought inaccurate to speak of doctrines by their usual names, taken from those sects which were the most famous for professing them, though with reference to a time before those names were imposed.

It seems agreed, that the original language of the Creed in question was *Latin*; though there are several Greek MSS. of it: this is so generally acknowledged, that even those, who ascribe it to Athanasius, say, that *he* wrote it in Latin, when he was at *Rome*, or in *Germany*.

*Comments* on this creed have been made not unfrequently: at first, none were wanted;—as it contains nothing but what was to be found in the writings of the Fathers, the expressions and allusions were understood; but afterwards, comments were useful; some were made towards the end of  
the

<sup>g</sup> *Familists*, though aimed at in 1562, had scarce their *name* till near 1579.—Of the *Socinians* it has, I think, been said, that their *doctrines* were forming in 1562.

Embryo *Anabaptists* also before, Art. VII. Sect. III.

<sup>h</sup> Waterland, Athan. p. 197, and thereabouts.—Wall, Bapt. 4to. p. 203, on Pelagius's Creed.

the sixth<sup>i</sup> Century; and before the year 1500, there had been *thirteen* Commentators upon it, which are known now.

The *reception* of this Creed in the *Western* Church, was favourable; it was there read and admired; but some have doubted whether it was ever in the *Eastern* Church<sup>k</sup>. Not with the *Filioque* as we now have it, probably<sup>l</sup>. In *England*, it got ground in the *tenth* Century; but it was never supported by any *Council*. Yet, in the *middle*<sup>m</sup> *ages*, it was appealed to as authority<sup>n</sup>.

Whoever wrote this Creed, he meant nothing more than to *collect* things said in various catholic writers, against the various *Heresies* subsisting, and to *simplify* and *arrange* the expressions, so as to form a confession of faith the most concise, orderly, and comprehensive possible. Not with any view of *explaining*<sup>o</sup> any mysterious truths, but with the sole design of *rejecting* hurtful or heretical *errors*.

Mr. Gibbon objects bitterly to this Creed as being *spurious*<sup>p</sup>; but the early Christians used sometimes

<sup>i</sup> Waterland, p. 88.

<sup>k</sup> Why then so many Greek MSS?

<sup>l</sup> See a curious passage, p. 372, Octavo, 2d. Edit. of Travis's Letters to Gibbon; from Gibbon and Petavius.

<sup>m</sup> Middle ages continued from 475 to 1453, according to Harris. Philol. p. 240.

<sup>n</sup> Opposite the title-page of D-5-6, Magd. Coll. Cambr. is the following MS. Note: in Bp. Gibson's hand, as I have reason to think.

“ A *Swedish* Minister assures me to day, that the Athanasian Creed is read constantly in the publick Service, on *Rogation* and *Trinity* Sundays, and that all children are obliged to get it by heart.”

EDM. LONDON.

*Whitehall*, Jan. 21, 1730-1.

<sup>o</sup> “ The famous Creed which so clearly expounds the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation,” &c.—Gibbon's Hist. Vol. 3. p. 544, quarto.

<sup>p</sup> Gibbon as above. p. 544, this objection is adopted in *Hints*, &c.

times to ascribe to others their own works, without any bad intention<sup>a</sup>; and what is customary does not deceive:—And, moreover, this creed may have been adopted on account of its excellence, in bringing the errors, which were to be shunned, into a small *compass*, in exposing them in a kind of poetic numbers, which strike and possess the ear; and may have been called *Athanasian*, only on account of its containing *Doctrines*<sup>r</sup>, which had been defended with peculiar force and brilliance, by the great Prelate of Alexandria<sup>s</sup>.

IX. Let us now pass from the History of this Creed, to some Historical *explanation* of its several clauses. We will follow the *order* of the Creed itself.

Some condemning clauses come first; but, as the Creed concludes with one of them, we may consider them last.

The doctrinal part of the Creed may be divided into *two parts*; one relating to the doctrine of the *Trinity*; the other to that of the *Incarnation* of the Son of God. I wish the paragraphs had been *numbered*.

The

<sup>a</sup> Lardner's Works, Vol. 2. p. 310.—B. 1. Chap. xii. Sect. iv. of this.

<sup>r</sup> That it did contain his doctrines, see quotation from Dr. Burgh's *Inquiry*, &c. p. 384, Note; made in the answer to *Hints*, &c. called an *Apology*, &c. (supposed to be written by Bp. Hallifax) p. 48. Perhaps some of the old *Titles* of the Creed might bear such a construction as the following: The true *faith*, according to the opinions of Athanasius. If it was not called *Athanasian* till the end of the 7th Century, it could scarcely have been *published* as Athanasius's; in 430 at least;—and it *does* contain his *Doctrines*: No imposition therefore.

<sup>s</sup> Waterland observes, p. 273, that “Athanasius has left some Creeds and confessions, undoubtedly his, which yet have never obtained the esteem and reputation that this hath done.”

The first question which occurs is, have any Christians *confounded* the Persons of the Holy Trinity? the answer is, the *Sabellians*<sup>c</sup> did this. Have any *divided* the *substance*? All those who denied consubstantiality; that is, who were not homoûsians; all those who have denied the Divinity of the second and third persons; and those also may be added, who have held *three* original principles, τρεῖς <sup>u</sup> ἀναρχοι:—these would be Tritheists; but some would be *called* so, who only maintained three *Persons* in *one* Deity: therefore the Orthodox might have occasion to declare against such division of the divine nature, or substance.

I look upon all, down to “*three Lords*,” to be in opposition to those, who divided the substance; the first<sup>x</sup> sentence may seem an exception, but I think it is here only introductory to the rest.—The term “*uncreate*” would appear to relate to the *Arians*, who thought the *Son* a Creature, and the *Holy Ghost* a Creature of a Creature: as also indeed to others.—The word *incomprehensible* means here to express *immensity*, as appears from the Latin<sup>y</sup> and Greek, and from some old English: that which is immense cannot be comprehended in any space, but

<sup>c</sup> The heretical opinions referred to in this explanation, lie so in order, in the first and second Articles, and are so easily found by the Syllabus, or Heads of Lectures, that it seems needless to put down the pages where they are to be met with.—1795. I have also given some short accounts of them in my printed Sermon on Mark xvi. 16.

<sup>u</sup> See Bingham, 11. 3. 4.

<sup>x</sup> “For there is one Person of the Father, another of the Son, and another of the Holy Ghost.”—This sentence rather corresponds to what went before, “neither confounding the Persons;” and makes it easier to take the subject of *dividing* the substance first.

<sup>y</sup> Waterland p. 249. ἀκταληπτος, απειρος, αμικτος,—*im-mensus*.

but we do not now commonly use the term incomprehensible to signify this.—The expressions “*three eternal*” and “*one eternal*,” may seem out of the common way; but the thing to be expressed is, that each divine attribute is common to the three persons, though each has personal relative qualities, peculiar to himself.

All the rest, which relates to the Holy Trinity, except a kind of recapitulation, is against those, who *confounded the Persons*; and sets forth the personal, relative, peculiar qualities now mentioned;—so that what has been already said, expresses the Union of the three divine persons; what remains to be said (of the Trinity) will express the distinctions between them. But there seems no occasion for any explanatory remark, unless we observe, that those, who neglected the distinction of Persons, might *substitute* one for another at will; which would make it indifferent to them whether they spoke of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, or of three Fathers, or three Sons, or “*three Holy Ghosts*.”

As the former part of the Creed rejects and excludes all prevailing errors with regard to the Trinity, so does the latter part with regard to the *Incarnation* of Christ. We will proceed as before, inquiring who the persons alluded to, are. Who then have denied, that Christ is *God*? Ebionites, Nazarens, Photinians, Arians; as appeared under the second Article.—Who, that he was *Man*? The sects of Docetæ, the Apollinarians, and the Eutychians. Who, that he was “God of the substance of his Father?” The Arians called Christ a God, but denied the rest. Who held, that Christ was not “begotten before the worlds?” all who denied his Divinity, except the Arians.—Who denied, that Christ was “Man of the substance of his Mother?” the Eutychians; not to mention the Anabaptists,

who arose since the Creed was made. Who denied, that Christ had a reasonable soul? the Apollinarians; they maintained, that the Logos was to him in the place of a reasonable soul. By the way, the *colon* put after “perfect man,” for *chanting*, may mislead: it should rather be after “perfect God:” perfect *man* consists of soul and body.—Who have spoken of Christ as of *two* agents? the Nestorians.—Who have conceived the Incarnation to be effected by means of a conversion or transubstantiation of the Deity into Flesh? And who, when such conversion took place, or was supposed to take place, imagined a *confusion* or consolidation of the natures divine and human?—Here perhaps Heretics have spoken less plainly, than in other cases; but they have said enough to require the attention and vigilance of the Catholics in *rejecting* their errors; which is all we are *here* concerned with. The Arians conceived the Word to be made Flesh in such a sense, that he was susceptible of suffering<sup>2</sup>. The Eutychians seem to have conceived, that the Word was so united to Flesh, that the humanity was lost, or *absorbed*, annihilated, though the Body or Flesh evidently remained; which *amounted* to a conversion of the Godhead into Flesh; and they, conceiving the *nature* to be but *one*, *accounted* for the unity, by a *melting down* of the two natures together:—In the *Creed of Pelagius*<sup>3</sup>, we find some mentioned, who held a *double*<sup>b</sup> conversion of nature  
or

<sup>2</sup> Pearson on the Creed under “*suffered*.” p. 380, Quarto, p. 187, Folio.

<sup>3</sup> Serm. de Tempore 191, aut 236, inter opera Augustini.—This Creed of Pelagius is also in *Jerom's* works: and in Wall on Baptism, Chap. 19. Sect. 29, 30.

<sup>b</sup> Illorum quoque similiter execramur Blasphemiam, qui *nova* sensu asserere conantur, à tempore susceptæ carnis, omnia quæ erant Divinitatis in hominem demigrasse, et rursùm quæ humanitatis



or substance at the same time, so that the divine nature became human, and the human divine : thus a *confusion* of substance was accomplished ; and the Son, instead of being *both* God and Man, was *neither*. These persons are not called by any *name*, as a sect, but are said to assert the incarnation in *novo sensu*.—The expression, “ taking of the Manhood unto God,” answers to one in the same Creed of Pelagius : “ Verbum carnem esse factum, sed *assumendo* hominem, non permutando Deitatem ;” and to one in the genuine works of Augustin ; “ à divinitate carne *susceptâ* ;” and I do not suppose, that more is meant by taking the manhood *into* God, than by Christ’s taking man’s nature *upon* him. If a junction is to be expressed, it cannot be expressed more harmlessly, than by saying, the finite was *assumed* by the infinite, or taken *into* the infinite. We want to *reject* all notions inconsistent with an *union* of the natures divine and human ; or with their continuing *distinct*, though united.

“ *Unity of person*,” is opposed to Eutychian unity of *Nature*, as well as to the Nestorian duplicity of *Person*.

The Paraphrase or Commentary of *Waterland* on this Creed, which makes his tenth Chapter, is the best that I know of.

x. After the explanation, should come the *Proof* ; but it is the nature of a Creed to collect propositions supposed to have been already proved.

We

tatis erant, in Deum transfusa : ut, quod nulla unquam hæresis ausa est dicere, videatur hac confusione *utraqve* exinanita esse substantia, et Deitatis scilicet, et humanitatis ; et amisso proprio statu, in aliud esse mutata : ut [nos] qui tam Deum perfectum in Filio, quàm hominem confitemur, nec Deum verè nec hominem tenere credamur.

We have indeed, in the two former creeds, mentioned a clause or two, which had been left unproved, but we have no such clauses here.—There is only one thing, which wants proof here, that I am aware of, and that is, the propriety of the *anathemas*, or *damnatory clauses*.—But we will drop the word *anathema*, as that will be considered under the eighteenth Article.

xi. These damnatory clauses have occasioned much needless uneasiness. When such men, I say not as Chillingworth, for we have judged him weak in religious reasoning, but as Clarke, Tillotson<sup>c</sup>, Secker, could be uneasy under them, I can ascribe it to nothing but the influence of religious *terror*; a sentiment which operates in all possible *degrees*; which makes us *scruple* to admit in religion, what would occasion no difficulty in common affairs, lest our acquiescence *should* be owing to some corrupt or indirect motive. Indeed these great men, or some of them, might possibly attend as much to presumed scruples in *others*, as to any of *their own*—They might judge, that, whatever they themselves could do, it was not to be expected, that the generality of men would be induced to set their minds at ease.

Scruples of this kind are owing to not freely admitting those limitations, which common sense suggests in the application of every general proposition. Here I would recommend a careful perusal of the opening of *Dr. Ogden's* fifth Sermon on the Commandments; because it expresses well what I mean, and was written without the least view to our present subject. It also explains the expression, "*before all things it is necessary.*" I will only give you

<sup>c</sup> See *Hints*, &c. p. 32. and Answer p. 51.—*Clarke* perhaps, as favouring some degree of Arianism.

you a small part of it. “The Preacher<sup>d</sup>,” says Dr. Ogden, “prohibits in the most comprehensive expressions, and under the severest penalties. For the making of necessary exceptions and limitations, we are left to our own reflections, to nature, to experience, and the common sense of all the world.”

The damnatory clauses before us may be divided into *two kinds*. The first declaring the evil of rejecting *Christianity*, or<sup>e</sup> the Catholic Faith, without specifying wherein that faith consists: the second declaring the evil of rejecting the particular *doctrines* of the Creed.—The two first sentences speak of the Christian doctrine in general, be it what it may; and the last says the same thing;—that the Creed may end as it began. And that clause, which says, that we should believe *rightly* the Incarnation, mentions no particulars, and is therefore such, taken separately, as any Christian might agree to.—But the others relate to the doctrines of the Creed.—“The right faith is *this*:” —“must *thus* think of the Trinity:” and “the right faith is,”—and then specifying what it is, with regard to the Incarnation.

First, let us take the threat, which concerns the right Faith in general, or genuine Christianity at large. Does this differ from Mark xvi. 16? “He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved; but he

<sup>d</sup> A proposer of a system of religion, may come under this idea of a *preacher*; it must have been the sense of our Lord, when he said, “Go ye into all the world, and *preach* the Gospel to every Creature,”—Mark xvi. 15.

<sup>e</sup> By the Catholic faith seems to be meant, genuine Christianity; unadulterated by fanciful notions, whims, refinements, &c.—the expression has come from such Christianity being held by what might be called the *whole* Church; reckoning a few fanciful Sects as exceptions not worthy of notice.

he that believeth not, shall be damned.”—Suppose it does *not*, you say, that does not clear up my difficulties. But it ought, considering the Creed only as a Creed: for a Creed is perfect, if it agrees with Scripture. If you have any objections to the text of Scripture, those must not be objections to the Creed; in whatever the Scripture is blameable, the Creed is free from blame, supposing the Creed to quote Scripture, or say what is equivalent to it.

But we will not be so strict; we will consider this text a little, though commenting on Scripture is not now our immediate business.—Christ, having given all his proofs of the truth of his Religion, just before his ascension, commands his disciples to preach his Religion after his departure; and to those *ministers*, whom he commissions to preach, he says, Converts shall be saved, but those, who refuse to be converted, shall be condemned. The truth of this religion, which was to be preached, was all the while undoubted; taken for granted.

Therefore the meaning is, whoever accepts a message really sent from heaven, must gain some benefit from it; whoever rejects such message, must at least suffer the loss of that benefit; but he may moreover have positive punishment inflicted upon him, because of his rejecting what God gave him sufficient opportunity to accept. For it cannot be questioned, that God suits his evidence to our faculties, so that we may receive divine truth if we use them rightly. What more reasonable than such a declaration?

Such is the case, when the Gospel is committed to Apostles or other authorized teachers, who believe it, to be by them proposed to Mankind; or when it is preached amongst those, who have no prejudice against it. But, if a preacher proposes Christianity to an *infidel*, threatening punishment  
on

on refusal, the measure may seem more doubtful; yet still the truth of what he proposes must be taken for granted, in order to make his threatening of any significance. And therefore, in that case, the meaning of the threat is, supposing my doctrine *true*, you will incur great evil by rejecting it. This is a very great incitement to examine diligently and honestly, but it cannot afford any argument to accept without examining. For, if the religion were false, it could not be accepted without excluding the true; and all threats of its preachers must be vain.

It is strange, but, apparently, nothing more is wanted for easing all difficulties arising from such threatenings as we are speaking of, than the plainest and most self-evident of all moral propositions; *No man is punishable for rejecting falsehood*: Why then, you say, does not the Creed express this? because it is so plainly implied as to be needless; and because it would (according to Dr. Ogden's observation) weaken the effect, which a warning must be intended to produce.—Why, you urge, need a Creed make any warning or threat? A threat is not indeed essential to a Creed; but if those, for whom it is made, are negligent, light minded, contemptuous, interested, timid, prejudiced, capricious, or devoted to pleasure; or if they rely on being well-meaning, or commonly honest; or if they have any religious faults, such as fanaticism, &c. a threat may be very *useful* to *rouse* them, or to *restrain* them, to make them follow their best reason, and exert their best faculties<sup>f</sup>. It is a solemn

<sup>f</sup> Perhaps the thoughts here offered, may appear better in the following order:

1. A threat promotes examination, instead of preventing it.

2. It

solemn thing to publish, amidst a crowd of heresies and religious extravagancies, a system of sound doctrines: it must, in some cases, require all the efforts of the most powerful teacher to make *truth* ingenuously received. Yet it must always be needful to banish, as much as possible, all indifference for sacred truth. If it is indifferent to neglect *Truth*, then *Reason* was given us in vain; then error leads to no mischief; yet what are moral errors, but opinions that are hurtful to mankind?—If it be indifferent to reject Christianity, then Christ died in vain<sup>2</sup>: and the Prophets in vain foretold his coming, ever since the world began.

I suppose this might suffice to justify those threats of our Creed, which relate to rejecting pure Christianity, or the Catholic Faith at large, without specifying any particular doctrines: Yet it may be worth while to make one or two additional remarks.

1. Being *saved* and being *damned*, or condemned, do not imply any one fixed degree of happiness or misery; but admit of *various degrees*,  
without

2. It is made needful by the many *faults*, which may hinder a man from allowing the infinite Importance of Religious Truth.

3. Wherein the Importance of religious truth consists: from the nature of the thing, and from the positive declarations of Scripture.

<sup>2</sup> The necessity of a right Belief, or of endeavouring to attain one, might be more fully shewn, if it were made a separate subject.—See Dr. Balguy Ser. 9. p. 158—160. What he says in one part answers exactly to my idea of our damnatory clauses when rightly taken; though he probably was not thinking of them. “Let those, who think it a matter of small importance, whether the Religion of Jesus be true or false, attend well to the force of these expressions, (of Scripture) and *tremble* at the consequences of their own neglect.”

Whatever should be offered, in treating this subject of the necessity of acquiring a right belief, or right notions, as far as, humanly speaking, we are able, would be so much in favour of the damnatory clauses in question.

without limit. Both in Heaven and Hell, there may be *many mansions*. Nor is any great degree necessarily implied in the word "*everlasting*," taken singly. Indeed every *fine*, however small, is an everlasting punishment. Yet we may easily suppose too small a degree of evil, as well as too large an one, to be implied in the word "*damned*."

The endless number of degrees of happiness and misery, which may be comprized under the terms salvation and condemnation, might serve to compose some disputes about the salvation of *Heathens*, and of those, who lived before the time of Christ.—These persons may possibly enjoy lower degrees of happiness than good Christians, and yet may be *saved*; or may suffer misery in a lower degree than wicked Christians, and yet be *condemned*.—It does not appear to me a Christian doctrine, that any person will be happy in the same *degree* with a good Christian; whether his want of Christian Faith was his *fault*, or only his *misfortune*. Every man may miss happiness by *misfortune*; by bad *parents*, by being amongst savages, &c. &c.—under a bad civil *Government*, &c. &c.—indeed this is the very meaning of the word *misfortune*.

2. Mark xvi. 16. must be so understood, as to be consistent with the texts about *judging*; Matt. vii. 1.—Rom. xiv. 4.—James iv. 12. Therefore no man, not even a commissioned teacher, has a right to apply Mar. xvi. 16. to any particular case. Not even to his own case. That is, he is not, by the general denunciation, to imagine, that he can see how any particular man will be finally rewarded or punished.

3. And, as Man is not a judge, and as God is the only judge in all particular cases, no extraordinary situation ought to occasion any uneasiness. It is not to be supposed, that a Judge all-wise and all-

all-powerful will proceed mechanically : his remission of punishment, as well as his adjusting of rewards, may fully be believed capable of suiting all situations, however nice and complicated.

As therefore a person, who believes and is baptized, may not in effect be saved, if he neglect the conditions stipulated in baptism ; so it may possibly happen, that a man may disbelieve and reject the truth itself, and yet not be condemned to any great positive evil, if God knows that his disbelief is owing to some extraordinary want of the means of information. Hence no one should be unhappy about any extraordinary case, of himself or his friends : the true of Heart should be glad.

4. Denunciation of vengeance against *vice* is made in general terms, as in Rom. i. 18.—ii. 6, &c. yet it is not imagined, that repentance will be unavailing, or that much will be required of him, to whom little has been given. It would be difficult to shew why threatenings against infidelity should be more strictly interpreted.

These additional remarks are often wanted, on a subject which is apt to occasion uneasiness : if they are *abused*, the guilt must fall on those who abuse them.

Let us now consider those condemning clauses of our Creed, which threaten all who reject its particular *doctrines*. Here Mark xvi. 16. will assume this form :— ‘ He that believeth the *orthodox* doctrines of this *creed*, (having been already baptized) will be saved ; but he that believeth *them* not, will be damned.’ When this form is addressed to such as have no particular objections to those doctrines, but only think a *good sort of man* need not trouble himself about such matters, I suppose there is not much difficulty : the threats are then plainly *seen* to be, what in truth they always are,



are, *warnings* and *incitements* to a fair and diligent study of religious truth.

But, if an orthodox preacher proposes his system to a Dissenter or Heretic, then the case, though it may seem more difficult, is the same as when an Apostle<sup>h</sup> proposes Christianity to an Heathen: to make his threats of any consequence, his doctrine must be supposed to be true. The orthodox teacher says, in effect, *supposing* my doctrines to be *really* those of Christianity, or of the true catholic faith, you will suffer by rejecting them; to reject them, is to reject the catholic faith itself. This is, as before, an *incitement* to attention, because still, if the person adopts what is false, he cannot be at liberty to adopt what is true;—and therefore the threat, in reality, operates against accepting implicitly.

If, as before, you ask, why does the author of the Creed say positively, “the catholic faith *is* this,” and not speak on supposition of truth? the answer is the same: it *must* be implied; and it would be unnatural, and unsuitable to the purpose of his solemn exordium, which is of the nature of an eloquent exhortation, to introduce doubts and hesitations, when he wanted to rouse an earnest attention to what he assured himself was truth: common sense, when you thought calmly, would easily supply you with the *supposition* or limitation, in case you found yourself unable to think that true,  
which

<sup>h</sup> So it seems to *me*; our Divines in 1689 settled, that the condemning clauses should “be understood as relating only to those, who obstinately deny the *substance* of the Christian Faith.”—A man cannot be condemned for rejecting the substance of the Christian Faith, but on supposition of the Truth of Christianity. And a man may suffer for rejecting the Doctrine of the Church of England, on supposition of the *truth* of that Doctrine:—and the same is true of the tenets of any set of *Dissenters* from the Church of England.

which he imagined to be indisputably true. It will bear repeating, No man is punishable for rejecting falshood: and every man sees this, when he thinks coolly; and is ready to act upon it.

If you ask again, why need the Author of the Creed prefix a threat to his system of doctrines? the answer may be repeated; because he thought the errors of great importance, which his Creed was intended to exclude; because he thought every effort wanted to animate men's zeal in the cause.—*You* will do well to prefix a solemn warning to *whatever*<sup>i</sup> you publish as true and highly important.

One difference may be urged as subsisting between the two cases. Some men may say, (if they receive Christianity, but not what is called Orthodoxy) how unreasonable is it to alarm men with the denunciation of vengeance, in case they do not receive and profess doctrines, which are *unintelligible*!—it may not be amiss to take some notice of this difficulty, though we before had a chapter on assenting to unintelligible propositions<sup>k</sup>.—In that chapter it was observed, that a proposition may be intelligible as *rejecting*<sup>l</sup> an error, which is not so in itself. We can sometimes see, that a thing is wrong,

<sup>i</sup> I am told, that the *Baptists* at a certain Town, at a solemn ordination, declared in their sermons repeatedly, that no one can be saved, who is only baptized as an *infant*, or, who does this or that, contrary to *their* peculiar notions.—I hope they meant as is here settled.—Mark xvi. 16. would assume this form; He that believeth *our* doctrine, and is baptized, as an *adult*, shall be saved; but he that is baptized as an *infant*, or believeth *not* our doctrines, shall be damned.

Our Reformatio Legum has a short chapter on this subject: De summâ Trinitate et Fide Catholicâ, cap. 17.

<sup>k</sup> Book III. Chap. x.

<sup>l</sup> The negative form of some propositions in the Creed of Pelagius, or the Ser. de Tempore 191 (236) are worthy of commendation; as has before been observed.

wrong, when we have not a distinct idea how to alter it, so as to make it right. I look upon the propositions of the Athanasian Creed as rejecting errors, even when they are not in a negative form. Nay, it might bear an inquiry, whether even the unintelligible propositions contained in the *Articles*, ought not, in strictness, to be considered in that light. But, if this is true only with regard to the *Creed*, the propositions of it may be all intelligible, if rightly taken. And, if this be true in part, they may be intelligible in part—Some propositions in the Creed are unintelligible to some persons, because they know not the opinions rejected; as was observed in the chapter above-mentioned.—But these are only on the footing of other unintelligible propositions, to which a man may have occasion to give a verbal assent, for the good of Religious Society. (Book III. Chap. x.)—For whatever *reasons* any propositions are unintelligible, it should always be remembered by those, who are to assent to them, that, when we have no *opinion*, we can have no feeling of *certainty*, or clear conviction: our mind is unfixed; our assent fluctuating. The want of such fixed feeling has sometimes occasioned uneasiness and scruples; and so has excited prejudices against confessions of Faith.

We may here also make the same additional remarks, as in the former case.

1. The word “perish” admits of *degrees*, as well as “saved” and “damned:” it is probably used either as equivalent to “damned,” or as being somewhat less harsh.

2. An orthodox preacher has no more right to pass final *judgement* on an heretic or dissenter, than a preacher of Christianity at large on an infidel.—Nor has an orthodox preacher any right to *apply* the  
threat

threat of St. Mark to any particular case; not even to his own.—That is, though any man may say, I must be careful how<sup>m</sup> I reject *truth*, because if I do, I shall suffer; though any minister has authority to say, You must be very careful how you reject *truth*; yet no man ought to make himself unhappy, as if he must of course be damned for disbelieving the tenets of a certain Creed; no Minister has a right to say, you will be damned, if you do not account my doctrines essential to the true Christian Faith.

3. The Deity may exercise his power of *remitting*, on the Heretic, as well as on the Infidel; according to the circumstances of education, &c. —perhaps such power of remitting may be exercised in a greater degree on rejecting a right *mode* of Christianity, than on rejecting the *substance*.

4. The denunciations against heresy ought not to be interpreted more strictly than those against infidelity; perhaps somewhat less strictly:—certainly therefore not more strictly than denunciations against Vice.

I hope I may now conclude, that a mind not tinctured with superstition, or religious fear, will be able to supply such rational limitations to the general threatenings of our Creed, as to judge them harmless in all situations, and useful in many; that their tendency is, when terror does not discompose the judgement, to make men “prove all things,” and not to accept even the doctrines of the Creed itself implicitly, lest, in accepting anything erroneous, they should eventually reject the truth.

XII. But,

<sup>m</sup> Would not this be the right idea for any one to have when he said *Amen* to the curses or Anathemas in Deut. xxvii, introduced in our *Communion*?

XII. But, lest there should be some too scrupulous in supplying limitations, I will put an end to my remarks on these damnatory clauses by an attempt to supply such limitation myself, in a kind of *Paraphrase* on the opening of the Creed; and, as they make the most difficult part of our present Article, which does not come into some other Article, we may suppose the *Application* to begin here; and with a kind of form of *Affent*.

‘ Heresies are very numerous; defiling the purity of the Faith, making men act on wrong principles, affording handle to infidelity, and dividing Christians amongst themselves, so as to defeat the ends of religious Society, and probably lose some degree of future happiness; it seems needful therefore to draw the erroneous notions, which are so pernicious, into a small compass, and solemnly reject them; that the unwary may be cautioned, and the bold and busy innovator discouraged.— And, lest the unstable, who are tossed about with every wind of Doctrine, should continue to indulge their childish fondness for Novelty, and live on without any regular and permanent principles, it seems also needful to remind them of the last solemn declaration of our blessed<sup>n</sup> Lord: not surely with a view to bias the judgement, but only to enforce the duty of a sober and serious attention to sacred *Truth*, uninfluenced by passion or caprice; to suggest, that what Christ died to accomplish, cannot be an indifferent matter. He, who is impressed with this thought, will of course describe *particulars* according to his own judgement; but he will do that without denying, that all other men, duly qualified and authorized, may do the same.’

<sup>n</sup> Mark xvi. 16.

fame.' Such an act of assenting, no one, I should hope, would deem unreasonable.

*Mutual concessions* seem to have little place in the present Article: such as relate to the *Doctrines*, have been proposed (or will be) under the several *Articles*, in which those doctrines are respectively laid down.—And concessions with regard to damnatory clauses seem to be rendered unnecessary, by the liberty of using them being equally allowed to all.—As also by our declaration, that they are not essential to a Creed.—At least, if the explanations of them here given are not sufficient to prevent disputes, I know of nothing which would answer that purpose.

We may consider therefore whether anything in the way of *Improvement* occurs on looking back on this Article.

And the first question which is suggested by such a review is, whether on the whole it would be an improvement, if the Creed, of which we are treating, were to be expunged from our Liturgy. In *America*, it is excluded; and several eminent <sup>o</sup> men in our own church, from whose works the members of it receive continually instruction and improvement, have seemed to wish it removed. Dr. *Waterland*, on the other hand, who seems to have attended to it most fairly, is for retaining it. In the commission<sup>p</sup> of 1689, it was to be retained. Bishop Gibson, whom I consider as very eminent for extensive knowledge, under the guidance of sound reason and plain unadulterated common sense, appears to have been a friend to the retaining of it.

Some

<sup>o</sup> See *Hints*, &c. p. 32, and Answer p. 47.

<sup>p</sup> See *Waterland's* Pref. Nov. 7, 1727: and Apology, in answer to *Hints*, &c. p. 46.

Some have had an idea of throwing out the condemning clauses, and retaining the *Doctrines*: which is not an impracticable plan, if desirable on the whole<sup>1</sup>.—But let us take them separately.

With regard to the *Doctrines*, one does not see why they may not be retained as long as our Thirty-nine *Articles* are retained, which coincide in doctrine with the Creed<sup>2</sup>. The doctrinal part of the creed has been called a *Bulwark*<sup>3</sup>; and if it be maintained, it should be maintained as a *fortification*. In time of peace, the inconvenience of keeping up fortifications occasions their being sometimes neglected, but when war breaks out afresh, every one is clamorous in blaming the imprudence of such neglect; if we are at peace now with the powers, which would attack us where our Creed would be our defence, we are always *liable* to be at war with them again. We have seen<sup>4</sup> how naturally all the Heresies condemned in the Creed arise, when men once become eager in solving the difficulties of the Trinity and the Incarnation: and such eagerness might at any time arise, on any revolution, or great disturbance, or confusion. The *Eutychian* notions,

<sup>1</sup> This plan was recommended in a separate paper, or very small pamphlet, printed at Ipswich, in 1794; which the British Critic approves. I am very much obliged to the Author for the handsome things, which he says of me.—Some time after the publication, and after I had spoken thus, my friend, Mr. Pearson, of Sidney college, Cambridge, owned himself to be the Author; a Gentleman, to whom our Country is obliged for the best *set* of Sermons on the State Fast and Festivals (as far as my judgement goes) that I ever read. Bp. Butler's I have not read lately; and they are only on two out of the four.

<sup>2</sup> The Candid disquisitioners are for retaining the Creed, but never having it publicly read; in the same manner as we retain the 39 Articles.—p. 96. 2d Edit.

<sup>3</sup> Waterland, p. 274, from Luther.

<sup>4</sup> Under the Second Article.

notions, which make the most difficult part of our Creed, were revived at the Reformation<sup>u</sup>; and the *Maid of Kent* suffered death at the stake rather than relinquish them, after a twelvemonth's reflexion in confinement. And in case of renewed attacks, our present Creed would be a much better defence than any new one that would be made at the time it was wanted. In the candid disquisitions, too much difference is made, in my opinion, between literate and *illiterate* people: an illiterate man understands the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation, as well as the literate: there is no part of Learning, which is of any significance to the Creed, but an acquaintance with the opinions of some Christian Heretics, and that lies in a very small compass<sup>x</sup>.

But we are now in actual war about many doctrines rejected by our Creed. And I suspect, that many of those, who are so impatient about it, secretly favour a change in the Doctrines of the Church; and are, at bottom, adverse to the Creed because it is so impregnable.

With regard to retaining the *condemning clauses*, they seem so little difficult to *me*, that I am scarce a judge what should be done. Some *alterations* they might admit; but I think the explanation now given<sup>y</sup>, both of them and the Doctrines, such as,

<sup>u</sup> Whiston revived the *Apollinarian* Heresy.

<sup>x</sup> See Free and Candid Disquisitions, beginning of Chap. 6.—Also p. 280, 2d Edit.

<sup>y</sup> 1795. It has sometimes occurred to me, that the explanations of the condemning clauses here given, go more upon the idea of teaching others, than of confessing one's own belief.—Yet Mark xvi. 16. is a general Declaration, applicable to all particular occasions: a man may use it in settling his own principles, and in listening to instruction, as well as in instructing others. Besides, in the more particular and fuller creeds, one who repeats them is really in *controversy*: he is professing in what



as, by proper language, might be made intelligible even to the people.

The Creed taken all together has been *admired*; I can conceive it; I believe it is now <sup>2</sup> admired by many, who have not given themselves to speculations and scruples about it. Doubt and perplexity damp <sup>a</sup> the warmth of any sentiment; but, if these were settled by some authoritative and received limitations, &c. I should expect it to be admired generally by those, who resigned their minds to its *doctrines*. If it really be admired and esteemed, though only by a *part* of our Congregations, that is some reason for retaining it. Christians, when they can, should be indulgent to wishes of their Brethren.

What shall we say then? Let the Creed be retained, read seldom, and explained (according to what has been said of explaining things unintelligible) to the people. The *Swedish* custom introduces it too seldom, only twice in the year: ours perhaps rather too often, thirteen times; it is a matter, which need not be settled to a great nicety <sup>b</sup>.

But before I quit the subject of improvements, I will submit to the judgment of the candid, whether

what he *differs* from his Brethren. He is making a *tacit contraſt* between himself and others; and is, in effect, *propoſing* to them to join his Society.

<sup>2</sup> I was once warmly reproved by a sensible and respectable Parish Clerk for not reading it on *both* the two successive Sundays, Whit-sunday and Trinity-sunday. — The parish a small one in the Country.

<sup>a</sup> Book III. Chap. III. Sect. IV.

<sup>b</sup> The Commission of 1689 had agreed, that it should be read *six* times a year, instead of thirteen. See Postscript to Waterland's Preface, (to his Hist. Athan. Creed) dated Nov. 7, 1727. — A note of Waterland, p. 244, beginning of 10th Chapter, says, that it was, at one time, 1555, read *daily* in the Church.

ther every *Sett* should not produce <sup>c</sup> a Creed, in order to entitle it to *Toleration*? and (leaving the two shorter Creeds, as being established) whether something thrown into the Athanasian Creed, about the nature of unintelligible Doctrines, and of verbal arguments made out of them, might not give satisfaction to many minds?—and *lastly*, lest the damnatory clauses should still occasion difficulty, whether it would not be better to have the *threats* in words of *Scripture*, than in words of human composition? whether if Mark xvi. 16, was pronounced, or sung, at the opening and conclusion, instead of the present application of it, and also between the rehearsal of the Doctrine of the Trinity and that of the Incarnation, in the manner of the Gloria Patri; and instead of “the Catholic faith *is* this,” some other expression was used, such as “the faith *we hold* is this;” the Creed would not be more generally satisfactory, and its solemnity be at least equally great?—If Mark xvi. 16. appeared, after all, too striking and alarming, perhaps that expression so often repeated in Scripture, might sometimes supply its place; “*He that hath ears to hear, let him hear* ;” but I must confess, that, if these passages of Scripture were introduced, I should give my suffrage for the continuance of the Creed, in all its parts. And I do not decline assenting to it in its present Form<sup>d</sup>.

<sup>c</sup> Dr. Wall says, he fears that the *Baptists* have no fixed Baptismal Creed. See Hist. of Inf. Baptism, p. 509, Quarto.

<sup>d</sup> 1796.—In the year 1790, I seemed to have a kind of call upon me to lay before a respectable audience, at a Visitation, some thoughts on the Athanasian Creed; those, which the Reader has now gone through, being in my mind, I of course took such as seemed to suit the purpose: I was desired to print, I complied; saying, in an advertisement prefixed to the Sermon, that I had delivered the same things more at length, in Lectures. This small publication was thought worth a pamphlet in answer,  
called

called "*a Review*," &c. but that Review contained so many things contrary to my ideas of Controversy, ideas expressed in the Second Book of this System, that I forbore replying to it.—I felt, indeed, a natural propensity to set several things right, both relating to myself personally, and to the reasonings which I had used; but I have had the happiness to find, that those whose opinions I valued most, have done what I had wished to do, for themselves.—In my Lectures since the *Review* came out, I have declared to my hearers, that I had repeatedly perused it, in hopes of deriving improvement from it, but that I really had no new knowledge to communicate.—I hope I shall always peruse with attention, and with a real desire of correcting my errors, whatever may be written in opposition to any work of mine: and as the present work contains many controverted opinions, this may be a proper occasion to say, that if any persons, adversaries or friends, should ever make me see any subject in a new light, I shall be desirous to make my new opinion as public as the old one; and therefore if I retract nothing, it may be concluded, that I think I have nothing material to retract.—As to defending, it is often, as was just now hinted, labour thrown away. Readers in general, or at least the more estimable sort, are able to see through Sophistry themselves, and to despise personal abuse. And I might now claim some exemptions on account of age, and of other works which want a finishing hand. Nevertheless, if any candid person, kindly disposed, will openly, under his own name, take the trouble to inform me, that, after a fair and attentive consideration, he cannot get over any particular objection, either to my conduct or my reasoning, it will be my wish, at least, to give such a person satisfaction.



The Articles of the Church of England may be considered as consisting of *three Parts*. The first ends, and the second begins, here. The third begins with the eighteenth Article. That part which we have gone through, relates to what we are to study, in order rightly to obey *God* and his *Word*. That which we now enter upon, regards the nature of *man*, and human obedience; taking man as an *individual*. The last part relates to the same, taking him as a member of a *Christian Church*. As our Articles were composed chiefly with a view to separating from the Church of *Rome*, the doctrines of that Church are treated with peculiar attention.

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#### INTRODUCTION TO THE SECOND PART.

I. **T**HE second part, which is now our immediate object, seems more easy to comprehend in one's own mind, than to explain to others; the doctrines it contains, if only *thought* of, may seem consonant to common sense, but, if delivered in *words*, may seem nice and abstruse.—These doctrines are connected together; and have all a tendency to determine how far the *agency of God* or the *agency of Man* should be conceived as effecting the salvation of Christians <sup>a</sup>.

The many disputes and perplexities, which have arisen concerning this class of Doctrines, have been so much owing to the want of considering the nature

<sup>a</sup> Those, who favour the agency of man, speak, in their most *formal* discussions, the language of *ordinary Life*: those, who favour the agency of God, speak *frequently* the language of *ordinary Life*; but, on more *solemn* occasions, introduce a mode of language, which makes man no agent at all, merely passive.

nature of human LANGUAGE, that it would be worth while to lay down a few *preliminary* remarks on that subject, before we come to be biassed by our prejudices about any particular tenets.

And we shall do this with the greater clearness and effect, if we consider language, as relating to human actions, in the first place, independently of scriptural expressions.

We must not expect, by this method, to gain any thing that can be called a complete knowledge of the human mind; or of those principles of action, on which virtue and its rewards depend: it must be thought sufficient if we learn where to submit to the ignorance belonging to our present state, so as to avoid *dispute* and perplexity; which are generally owing to our speaking as if we understood that, which our Maker has placed beyond our comprehension.

II. Some men are greatly *prejudiced* against this sort of discussion. Not so much on reflexion, as before reflexion: they throw it aside in *disgust*; it is trifling, quibbling, perplexing; too difficult to do good, or perhaps too obvious to require any thought or care. And *after* reflexion, it is sometimes condemned as having led men into great intricacies, and produced much false science.—There may be some truth in the *facts*; and it is really mortifying to find, that we know so little as we do about our own actions; but I consider the evil as having arisen from *abuse* rather than from the Nature of the thing: and I am persuaded, that great *care* to admit only what we really do see and feel, and that only just *as* we see and feel it, is a much better plan, than running away from discussion, or shutting our eyes whenever we cannot see distinctly.

III. If *popular language* is understood too strictly, it will always mislead. It is taken from our *feelings*, made for *use*, and suited to circumstances; a proposition expressed universally is by no means to be taken as liable to no limitations<sup>b</sup>. A person indeed in the proper circumstances makes the due limitations easily, scarce conscious of what he does;—but one not in the proper circumstances, or not able to conceive himself in them, always gets wrong.—This is true both of language about *Bodies* and language about *Spirits*: But yet we are less deceived by the former than the latter: especially since the improvements made by Mr. *Locke*. A man conversant in philosophy, when he hears of fire being <sup>c</sup> hot, gold being yellow and malleable, does not understand the expressions as if he had a knowledge of Bodies independent of their *effects*, though that is what the words seem to imply; but is aware, that nothing is meant but to describe the result of past experience. I fear, that, when any one speaks of the *foreknowledge* of God, or the *Will* of Man, the expressions do not get so rationally reduced to what they really mean.—To prevent men from taking popular language concerning the mind, of God or Man, as if it were strictly philosophical and universal, is the intent of what I am going to offer.

IV. First, then, the language, which we make use of to express the acts of the mind, is not taken from any Theory, perfectly understood, but it is merely such as arises from our *feelings*, and such as is *wanted* for the active purposes of Life. It *sounds* as if it were more speculative and theoretical, but, if we take it as such, it will mislead us:—when we  
have

<sup>b</sup> See Book I. Chap. x. Sect. i. & v.

<sup>c</sup> See the last Section of Article 111.

have said a thing first with a particular view, we are very apt to make our observation *general*, and then it appears like mere theory; but, in reality, words are only invented and used originally, when expressing our feelings has some tendency to procure good.—To compare the language of men with that of *Brutes*, might perhaps be invidious; else I would wish any one to consider, whether the difference is not more in *degree* than in *kind*?—When “the Lions<sup>d</sup> roaring after their prey, do seek their meat from God;” When the Horse “saith among the Trumpets<sup>e</sup>, ha, ha,” they are not suspected of making abstract propositions; they are only deemed to express that, which they really *do* express, their *feelings*, with a view to *good*. If *men* were more commonly supposed to do the same thing, human language would be better understood. Or, were mens expressions to be construed more with a view to *particular facts* than it is, less error and dispute would arise.

v. A man says, “I am my own master; I am certain I can do what I chuse:”—he expresses what he *feels*, and there is no *deceit*. Of the same man, another says, “hold a pistol to his breast, and tell him, you will shoot him if he does not give you a shilling; I am certain he *must* give it you;”—this man expresses the result of *experience*, and again there is no deceit. Yet put these into *abstract* propositions, and then the first is, ‘Man is free;’ the second, ‘Man is under necessity.’ And all the disputes about *freedom and necessity* arise from no other cause, than the seeming interference between these two propositions. I say *seeming*, because, though they interfere when delivered abstractedly, they do not interfere at all in their primitive form.—One man, who is the *agent*, expresses an inward *feeling*;

<sup>d</sup> Psalm civ. 21.

<sup>e</sup> Job xxxix. 25.

*feeling*; the other, who is the *spectator*, expresses a result of *experience*.—These two cannot interfere, for they have no connexion with one another; any more than if one had said, ‘I have the *Gout* in my foot,’ and the other had said, ‘the *Sun* will rise to-morrow morning;’ how strange it would seem to argue from the admission of one of these events to the exclusion of the other!

VI. Men are often misled by language about the mind, because they take it for *proper* language, whereas it is always *metaphorical*.—We express the acts of the mind by a *comparison* with bodily actions. To *reflect*, is originally to bend back; to *instill*, or *inculcate*, is to drop in, or tread in: and so on. *Melancholy* is black bile; *dejection* casting down, &c.<sup>f</sup> Now, what we know by comparison only, we must know much less *distinctly* than what we see immediately, and have a plain and proper *name* for: and the less distinctly we *see* anything, the less distinctly can we *reason* about it.—And, if we affix *ideas* to metaphorical terms, as if they were plain and proper, we are continually filling the mind with wrong ideas; which must, in time, produce erroneous propositions and conclusions.

VII. Language about human voluntary actions is imperfect in other respects: in using positive terms in *negative* senses. *Spirit* is a word, which is used as if we had a positive idea affixed to it; yet the safest way is to consider it as a mere *negation* of matter: and so the *Soul*, as a negation of the Body. But this observation is most wanted for the terms which imply *infinity*: for, though *infinite* is evidently in its etymology a negative term, yet *omniscient*, *omnipresent*, *immense*, *omnipotent*, &c. are apt to occur to the mind as having a positive signification: and  
Mr.

<sup>f</sup> This has been mentioned in Book II. Chap. III. Sect. IV. but it is particularly wanted here.



Mr.<sup>s</sup> Locke says, “there be those who imagine they have *positive* ideas of *infinite* duration and space.”—This greatly affects our *reasoning*; for, if men go on *connecting* these terms in arguments, they get into errors, which they would have avoided if they had constantly kept in mind what kind of ideas are really annexed to them.—Such terms, indeed, of positive sound and negative meaning, do occur in common life; *Health* means often only a negation of diseases; those particularly, to which the person in question is subject;—*sweet* often means only, *not putrid*;—and it may be the least<sup>h</sup> evil to use such terms in such senses; but this does not remove our danger; in matters of a metaphysical sort, we cannot be too cautious about admitting false conceptions.

VIII. The imperfections of language in assigning *causes* should also be clearly seen. Assigning causes is a thing, which is so very frequently to be done, that it is done quickly, and familiarly;—inconsiderately, one might say; in words not weighed or attended to: those to whom it is done, are left to supply, from the nature of the thing, what is deficient in the expression.

Sometimes a *partial cause* is assigned as if it were the whole;—this happens when there is some particular *end* in view, of *recommending* or *depreciating*. The Romans were freed from Kingly Government, and enjoyed liberty under Consuls. To whom was their Liberty owing? to *Brutus*, says an orator complimenting his family: To *Lucretia*, says another, either

<sup>s</sup> Underst. 2. 17. 13.

<sup>h</sup> When I speak of imperfection in language, I only mean, that it is imperfect if taken *strictly*. The present manner of speaking may possibly be as convenient as any; and it is that, into which men naturally fall; only we must take care it does not deceive and mislead us.

either speaking in favour of her act of Suicide, or proving, that Providence brings good out of evil.—Here, for *Theory*, that which is omitted should be *supplied*; as in assigning good *principles* as a cause of anything, good *actions* are implied; and in assigning good *actions* as a cause, good *principles*. What is the *cause* of that man's preferment? his good *conduct*: this cannot be a *complete* account, except his good *principles* are supposed to be implied.—What is the cause why you are so attached to that man? because I believe him to be a man of thorough good *principles*. This is a partial account, in some sense, except good *conduct* be supposed to be implied.

Sometimes an effect is ascribed to a cause, which is merely *verbal*.—What is the cause of the Moon's being retained in an orbit? *Gravity, Attraction*:—but you know nothing of Gravity or Attraction, except those very effects which you ascribe to them.—In this way, events are ascribed to *Nature*, or to *Fate*; and, we might perhaps add, to *Merit*.

Errors frequently arise from our speaking of unknown causes, as if they were known before their effects: and from our losing *sight* of those effects, from which all the little idea we have of the causes is derived. Whether we know the Being of a God *à priori*<sup>i</sup>, has been doubted: but it seems, that we more commonly form our particular ideas of him *à posteriori*, from what we know of *Man*: we enlarge and purify human qualities to the greatest degree<sup>k</sup> possible, and thence form our conceptions of the character of God. This is the best we *can* do; but sometimes we are not consistent;

<sup>i</sup> Book I. Chap. III. Sect. III.

<sup>k</sup> Book I. Chap. III. Sect. I.

fiftent; we afcribe qualities to God, of which we have had no experience, though perhaps under old names: I fhould not wonder if the difputes about the Divine *Prefcience* were found to have had this origin.

I do not mean afcribing *human* actions, bodily members, &c. to God, but things too remote from humanity. When we fpeak of God's ufing any *human means*, or *powers*, as *arm*, *eye*, &c. we only intend to afert, that God accomplifhes fome *end*, which, if it was performed by man, would be performed by the intervention of fuch means.

We are apt to fay, *Nature intended* that fuch a thing fhould be fo or fo; our being right or wrong in this, feems to depend upon the diftinction before us; if we gather the intention of Nature from *experience* of what is *beft*, we are fafe; if from a notion that we know fomething of Nature as a *Perfon*, before any experience, the intentions of Nature will prove to be nothing better than our own crude fancies<sup>1</sup>.

1x. We have already hinted,<sup>m</sup> that propofitions feemingly univerfal, are in reality calculated for fome particular fituation of things; fo that the circumftances, in which any propofition is ufed, make a *part* of its *fenfè*; and you cannot change thofe circumftances, without *changing* the fenfe. But this fhould now be mentioned again, for the fake of fome illuftrations belonging particularly to our prefent fubject. There are feveral propofitions ufed in morals and religion, which are in ftrictnefs only *declamatory* expreffions, ufed for the  
purpose

<sup>1</sup> We have contended, B. 1. Ch. iv. Sect. iv. for reasoning from effect to caufe, and then back from caufe to effect, in fome cafes; advantage is not taken of that here, becaufe *Nature* feems nothing *real*; a mere *name*.

<sup>m</sup> Sect. 111.—alfo Book 1. Chap. x. Sect. 1.

purpose of *persuasion*: or, as Mr. Harris calls<sup>a</sup> lamentations on the comparative wickedness of the present age, “natural declamations incidental to Man.”—The assigning of partial causes, before-mentioned, comes sometimes very near these eloquent enunciations.—But sometimes *propositions* in general terms have more the appearance of speculation than such descriptions, though they are made for a particular situation or conception of things. “A state of *Nature* is a state of *war* ;”—suppose the state of Nature mentioned to be a state of undisciplined *passions*, and the assertion may be true: suppose the state that, in which every principle of human action has the strength and influence *intended* it by Nature, and the assertion is false. The former state comes nearer *fact*, the latter nearer *ideal* perfection; so we may say, the assertion is true in *practice*, though false in *Theory*.

x. Hence, if due regard be not paid to circumstances, propositions will *seem* to *contradict* each other, when they really do not: or, they will be contradictory in *words*, though not in *meaning*.—The Gravity of a Body, says one, is greater as the size of the body towards which it is attracted, and moves, is greater. No, says another, the gravity of a body must be greater as its *own* size is greater; the larger a body is, the more it will weigh: no, says a third, the gravity of a body is greater the nearer it is to the center of attraction. These are all *right*, and only *seem* to contradict each other through want of attention to circumstances.—However, it has been thought worth while to mark the different situations here to be conceived, by giving gravity different *names* when spoken of in those different situations. In *morals*, this is not done;

<sup>a</sup> Harris's Works, Vol. 4. p. 529.

done; therefore we should use the more caution, to answer the same end. The *Will* of Man is sometimes understood as equivalent to his *wish*, or desire; sometimes to his *determination*; so that, when a man determines to do anything disagreeable, or contrary to his desire, his will is *contrary* to his will.—And sometimes a man *permits* another to follow his own choice; who may, by acting in consequence of the will of his superior, do something *against* his will. Nothing can be more intelligible than all this, (if the jingle of the words does not give some alarm) and yet, when things are said about the will of God, or man, without due attention to these circumstances, dispute and confusion are apt to arise.

XI. The subject reckoned most difficult in Religion, natural and revealed, is *Predestination*.—I believe, that most of the difficulties attending it are owing to want of attention to the elements now laid down.

*All* our observations are useful on this subject: about words being taken from *facts*, being intended to answer some *good* purpose, and being *metaphorical*; about *negative* senses; assigning *causes*, *partial* and *verbal*: and confining general affirmations to particular *circumstances*; including *declamatory* expressions; for I am persuaded, that no saying about Predestination is any thing more than a declamatory expression, calculated to *persuade*, or excite good *sentiments* or emotions.—But to enter farther into this at present, would carry us into too great length for an Introduction. Therefore I pass on to expressions of *Scripture*; only hinting, that elements are seldom perfectly clear at first mention: that their justness must not, in general, be expected to appear fully, till they come to be applied to those particular cases, for which

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they were intended, and from which, indeed, they were *collected*.

XII. Let us then first observe, that the *same* kind of expressions occur in *Scripture*, which have been now examined. Scripture-language is *popular* language; and *must* be so, however imperfect that language be; otherwise it would have misled all those, to whom it was addressed.

As to words coming from *facts*, external and internal, it will suffice to say, that numberless instances may be found, in which an *agent* speaks of himself as *free*, and in which a *Spectator* speaks of an agent subject to *necessity*. We might allege such instances as Matt. xviii. 7.—Luke xvii. 1.—which give merely the result of *experience*.—Scriptural terms relating to the mind must be metaphorical; there are no others:—Positive terms with negative meanings are common in scripture; as *Spirit*, *Almighty*, *All-wise*, &c.—*Partial causes* are assigned, as in the case of *Faith* and works; and one of these is *implied* in the other. And I believe *Predestination* may be, sometimes at least, considered as a *verbal* or unknown cause of known effects: and much the same might be said of *desert*, or *deserving*. Descriptions of *God* taken from the qualities of *men*, and even from their bodily members, are more numerous in Scripture than in any other Book.

From general expressions supposed to be used within certain *situations*, arise all the seeming *contradictions* of Scripture. I have already mentioned *declamatory* expressions, and I might add instances of such lamentations as Mr. Harris was speaking of in the passage beforementioned: “there is none that doeth good, no *not one*,” &c. . . the seeming inconsistencies about *Temptations* being desirable, or the contrary, and about the *Will* of God, are all  
to

to be referred to this head : and indeed every other seeming inconsistency whatsoever°.

XIII. But, besides these difficulties, common to the scriptures and other popular writings, we seem to have some in addition, when we study the sacred Volume.

Our judgements are apt to be *discomposed*, by a warmth of veneration sometimes running perhaps into superstition : or by admiration and devotion : or by fear of deceiving ourselves ; or, sometimes possibly, by a fear of being obliged in conscience to give up the party, to which we have been attached ; or by suspicions, that we are not so ready to give it up as we ought to be : such feelings hinder us from judging *calmly* ; they prevent our common sense from doing its proper office.

XIV. Our belief, that Scripture is the *word of God*, makes us scrupulous of treating it so freely as we would the word of man ; and therefore we decline making those limitations, which are necessary to give us the true meaning. And though it must be a weakness to omit any thing, which we know is calculated to bring to light the truth, yet scruples do in effect produce the evil here described.

XV. As the Scripture is a *Revelation* of the will of God, we are apt to expect, that every part will open to us some *new truths* ; and therefore, that we must not use our reason and rules of interpreting here as in common cases. . . . New *facts* may produce some new reasonings ; but in general it appears, as we improve in the knowledge of the Scriptures, that the sacred writers took the knowledge of our duties for granted<sup>p</sup> : and, if we take

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° Book I. Chap. x. Sect. x. Note Vol. I. p. 73.

<sup>p</sup> Dr. Balguy, p. 196.—See also p. 87, about Politics.

a scriptural remark on a *known* virtue for a publication of a *new* one, we must run into error.—The scriptures have no doubt improved morality, by occasional remarks and reproofs, and by proposing new motives, &c. in short by methods which cannot now be particularly enlarged upon; but nothing is delivered, which need be exempted from the ordinary rules of rational interpretation and criticism.

xvi. Another thing, which has occasioned difficulties in understanding the Scriptures, is the use which the sacred reasoners sometimes make of the *Argumentum ad hominem*<sup>a</sup>. They sometimes do say things as *true*, and reason upon them, without seeming to mean more than that those, to whom they address themselves, will *allow* them to be true. And the length, to which they carry this, does not seem very easy to be ascertained. Some have thought, that St. Paul only speaks of the History of *Adam* in this light: and Christ of *Demoniacs*.—But it is easy to carry the notion too far. I should keep it in *mind*, when I read expressions of God's *hardening* the heart of Pharaoh<sup>r</sup>, *hating* Esau, and leading men into *temptation*: and I should consider, whether St. Paul did not sometimes, through a principle of compliance with the Jewish notions and expressions, use terms, which he might not have used to gentiles.

These remarks about additional difficulties in the language of Scripture, seem to shew, that it might be useful, in considering the Articles which follow in the second part, to try how near to each article

<sup>a</sup> Book 1. Chap. xvii. Sect. xix. near end.—Book 11. Chap. 11. Sect. xiii. Bp. Sherlock's Discourses, Vol. 2. p. 2. Collyer's Sacred Interpreter, Vol. 2. p. 228. Warburton on the Spirit, Pref. p. 17. also p. 175. Note.

<sup>r</sup> Book 1. Chap. x. Sect 1x.



article of revealed religion, a corresponding *article of natural religion* could be brought. Such an attempt might shew, that the difficulties in our way were not such as belonged peculiarly to the scriptures: and might contribute to make us satisfied with several doctrines, which are at present apt to occasion uneasiness and discontent.



## ARTICLE IX.

## OF ORIGINAL OR BIRTH-SIN.

ORIGINAL Sin standeth not in the following of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk); but it is the fault and corruption of the Nature of every man, that naturally is ingendered of the offspring of Adam, whereby man is very far gone from original Righteousness, and is of his own Nature inclined to evil, so that the flesh lusteth always contrary to the spirit; and therefore in every person born into this world, it deserveth God's wrath and damnation. And this infection of nature doth remain, yea, in them that are regenerated; whereby the lust of the flesh, called in Greek, *φρονημα σαρκος*, which some do expound the wisdom, some sensuality, some the affection, some the desire of the flesh, is not subject to the law of God. And although there is no condemnation for them that believe and are baptized; yet the Apostle doth confess, that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of sin.

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Having now finished our Introduction to the second part of our 39 Articles, we proceed to the Articles themselves, contained in that Part.—In treating the ninth, we may follow our former plan, as to giving *History, Explanation, Proof, and Application.*

I. We

I. We begin with the History. And first, if we put ourselves in the place of *early Christians*, we cannot but think, that they must find it necessary to form *some* doctrine concerning the sinfulness of man. Several things in Scripture must conspire to this end. The History of Adam, the application of it by St. Paul; the lamentations of wickedness and corruption, and of man's being even conceived in sin: and these they would naturally join together; and a cause of evil being wanted, this would most naturally occur. Then justification by faith is grounded on the idea of all men's being concluded under sin; and Christians are represented as being born again, as if their natural birth was so impure, that it was to be set aside, and something was to be substituted in its place. Whatever these things in Scripture may really mean, they are too solemn, and in appearance too *fundamental* to be wholly passed over and neglected: some *doctrine must* result from them.

II. What did result, we are now to consider; but, in order to do this distinctly, we must divide the notion of original sin into *two parts*. One thing implied in original sin, is the *state* or condition of offenders in the sight of God; the other is a mind, or set of *passions*, disordered, or strongly *inclining* man to commit actual sin; we call this, *concupiscence*.—These parts are sometimes professed independently of each other; sometimes they are supposed to be joined together, and the vicious passions are accounted the *effect* of the *state*, in which we are born, or of Adam's transgression, which brought us into it. Sometimes original sin is taken as compounded perhaps of both, without any attention being paid to the division<sup>a</sup>.—

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<sup>a</sup> There is something like these two parts in the Necessary Doctrine, Article of Justification, beginning.

Were I to speak of this *state* of offenders as somewhat analogous to a state of native *slavery*, or of hereditary *rebellion*, if I may use such an expression, when families are disgraced for rebellion, and their estates are forfeited, I should only mean to give my idea, not to prove any thing.

III. Thinking men and *Philosophers* seem to have been struck, in different ages, with the appearance of *evil*; and have thought it a phænomenon so extraordinary, as to require some particular *solution*. (Which, by the way, must hinder *any* solution from appearing entirely vain and unnecessary<sup>b</sup>.)

IV. What notion the *Jews* had of original sin seems not satisfactorily ascertained. *Voltaire*<sup>c</sup> indeed has no difficulties; he says, the Jews knew nothing of the matter: and others have said the same:

<sup>b</sup> See Bp. Gibson's second pastoral Letter, Sect. 3. where he translates a part of Cicero's Tusc. Disp. 3, Pref.—I rather wonder he should not have translated a few words more, ut penè cum laste nutricis errorem fuxisse videamur. For, if we suppose *errorem* to mean what was mentioned in the preceding sentence, (which *ut* seems to imply,) Cicero's idea of *pravitas et perversitas* taken in with our Mother's milk, comes to much the same thing as ours of *birth-sin*.—It might be proper also to read here Horace, Od. 3. 6. particularly ver. 1, 18, 33, 48.—The Delph. note on the opening of that Ode refers to *Plato*: I do not find the exact thought in *Plato*; but I find, in Lib. 2. de republ. (about one fourth from the beginning) that certain persons called ἀγυετοὶ καὶ μαντιῖς, circulatores et vates, perhaps some low sort of Priests, used to go to the doors of rich men, and tell them, that, if any ἀδικηματα had been committed by them or their *Ancestors* (προγόνων) they could appease the Gods by Sacrifices, and (ἐπωδαίς) incantations. Origen mentions *Oracles* to our purpose: Contra Celsum, Edit. Spencer, p. 403. quoted in Div. Leg. B. v. 5.

In Shakspeare's Tempest, Act 1, Scene 2. we have "*thy vile race*," where the Note says, "*Race*," in this place, seems to mean original disposition; "*inborn qualities*." Edit. Stockdale.—See also Dacier's Life of Pythagoras, Preface; and Vol. 2. p. 125. 199.

<sup>c</sup> See Vol. 26. 4to. index, or p. 384.

same: and it must be confessed, that *Maimonides*<sup>d</sup>, in the 13th Century, said, that no one could be born with *habits*, and therefore, that original sin was a thing impossible: which does rather look as if nothing had been recorded about it by the ancient Jews (such as had come down to Maimonides), which the moderns thought very important; or which they thought need prevent their attacking the Christians on this head: but yet, they (the ancients) must be supposed acquainted with the History of *Adam*, though they might find difficulties in it: they also must know of the *Curses* denounced against him; and of the many complaints of human *depravity*, which are contained in their own scriptures. Some of the Jews seem to have solved the appearance of evil by a *pre-existent* state<sup>e</sup>. And it is said, that some of them understood the casting away of the præputium after circumcision, was casting away corruption, at least emblematically. And they not only circumcised, but baptized or washed those, whom they admitted into their religious community: for what was such cleansing wanted? But I do not see how *Christians* can deny, that the Jews in St. Paul's time had notions of what we have since called original sin.—For St. Paul argues with Jews from Adam's transgression, to redemption by Christ: he must argue from what was well known, to that which was to be proved: therefore, whether we suppose St. Paul to believe the history of Adam, or not, in its literal<sup>f</sup> sense, we must think, that he knew the  
*Jews*

<sup>d</sup> Calmet's Dictionary, under *Grace*.

<sup>e</sup> John ix. 2. It is a Jew that asks, "who did sin, this man or his Parents, that he was born blind?" So that the man *himself* might have sinned, some way or other, before he was born: or the sin of his *Parents* might have caused his blindness.—See Macknight on the passage.

<sup>f</sup> About the *Allegorical* sense of the History of the Fall, see "Warb. Div. Leg. B. 9. Vol. 3. p. 640. quarto.

*Jews* believed it. When Christians judge concerning the notions of the Jews in this point, they forget, that it could not appear to a Jew, of the same consequence<sup>g</sup> as it does to a Christian, who esteems it the corner-stone of his own system: I look upon it therefore as a probable conclusion, that the Jews professed the Doctrine of original sin in as great a degree as they wanted it in their Religion; although those, whose writings have come down to us, may have been tempted to oppose St. Paul and the Christians on this popular ground.

v. We come next to the *early Christians*; that they knew nothing of our Doctrine, though affirmed by Voltaire, I do not grant: Let any one consult *Wall*<sup>h</sup> on infant-baptism, and see the passages which he has collected from the early Fathers.—I am mistaken if he does not allow, that they held our doctrine with as much exactness and precision as could be expected before disputes arose<sup>i</sup>.

After the very early Christians, we may take all those together, who lived *before the fifth Century*.—Here we have artless, unsystematical expressions, like those of scripture, sometimes implying the *state*, sometimes the evil *propensities*, as occasion required. The doctrine was as much brought into form as it could be without controversy. And when, at last, controversy did begin, it proceeded by the same degrees, which have been before<sup>k</sup> described, in the case of other doctrines.—Perhaps  
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<sup>g</sup> The principal things to attract a Christian's notice would rather make a Jew desirous of evading our Doctrine.

<sup>h</sup> Part I. Chap. 1, 2, 3, &c.

<sup>i</sup> This must appear probable, merely from the considerations offered in our first Section.

<sup>k</sup> Art. I. Sect. IV. Vol. 2. p. 227.—Art. II. Sect. II.

it would be found, from Wall's quotations, that the doctrine grew from time to time more *particular*.

In this place, we may recollect what was before<sup>1</sup> mentioned with regard to the *Manicheans*; as they are placed as flourishing toward the close of the third Century. By setting up an original evil principle, they allow, that the existence of evil wants accounting for. They are, moreover, said to have considered the *soul* as originally *pure*, but as having contracted evil by its union with the material *Body*. Thus they accounted for what we call *concupiscence*. And in saying, that by this union the soul lost its *freedom*, they approach near to the idea expressed in our tenth Article. — (See Lardner's Works, Vol. 3. p. 475.) It has been thought strange, by some modern Christians, that those writers, who contended with the Manicheans, did not shew them, that the true Christian method of accounting for *evil* is that used in explaining the doctrine of *original sin*: But a good reasoner will always reason on some principles allowed by his adversaries; it would have been in vain to refer to the Old Testament, or to quotations of it in the new; for the Manicheans rejected both.— Therefore Augustin and Titus of Bosra<sup>m</sup> were more logical in arguing on topics of natural Religion, than they would have been in dwelling on those of Revelation. Indeed the Hypothesis of the Manicheans, with regard to evil, was not properly *Christianity*, even in their own ideas, but *Philosophy*; *Persian Philosophy*, as professed long before<sup>n</sup> the Christian æra. It might as well have been

<sup>1</sup> Appendix to Book I. Sect. IV. Vol. I. p. 348.

<sup>m</sup> See Lardner's Works, Vol. 3. p. 388.

<sup>n</sup> In the time of *Plato*, it seems to have been disputed whether Evil arose from *Matter*. — See Dacier's *Plato*, Vol. I. p. 163. 165. (French).

been applied to solve the transgression itself of our first Parents, as any bad consequence of that transgression.

VI. We will now proceed to the *fifth Century*, to the age when the doctrine of Original Sin was brought, by the warmth of Controversy, to its full maturity.

*Pelagius* is placed in the year 405: he was an Englishman, or, more strictly perhaps, a Welchman; his real name was *Morgan*, which is said to mean the same as *Marigena* in the Latin, or Πελαγίος in the Greek. He chose the Greek as best suited, probably, to all parts of the then world. He was a Monk, but that term did not always imply one belonging to a community; only a person giving up worldly greatness and pleasure, and applying himself to religious pursuits. He was a man of good understanding; learned and pious; and amiable in his disposition<sup>a</sup>. He had two followers, who were as much known as himself, *Celestius*, an Irishman, (*Scotus*<sup>b</sup>), and *Julianus*, who was somewhere a Bishop. Pelagius was at Rome in 405, and lived in friendship with the best and most eminent<sup>c</sup> of the Christians; but Rome being sacked in 410, we find him in Africa, and afterwards in Palestine; Celestius remaining in Africa. He always wrote on the *Trinity* as an Orthodox Christian; and, when he wished to publish something against Original Sin, and the necessity of Divine Grace for Salvation, he mentioned his own opinions as if they were those of other people.—After the seeds of his doctrines were thus sown, he was less reserved about them; and at length publicly owned them to be his. As to *Original Sin*,  
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<sup>a</sup> See Bower's *Life of Zosimus*.—Wall's *Infant Baptism*, Part 1. Chap. 19. Sect. 3. & 29.

<sup>b</sup> See Wall, Sect. 3.

<sup>c</sup> Ibidem.



he professed, that Adam would have died, had he never offended; that he hurt only himself; and that all children are born in the same state, in which Adam was born; and in which he always remained, before his offence: yet Pelagius and his followers seem to have been sometimes so much pressed, that they gave way as far as they possibly could; even so as sometimes to have had some appearance of prevarication. It seems probable, from his character, that Pelagius had only in view<sup>r</sup>, to hinder men from running into fancies injurious to the honour of God. He was however attacked and censured; and he, or his two followers above-mentioned, underwent excommunication and banishment. There are reckoned up twenty-four Councils, which were held on their account, in the fifth Century, and before the death of Augustin: that is, we may say, between 412 and 430. How much agitated must the Christian world have then been in discussing his Doctrines! He defended himself, and sent a *Creed* to the Pope, which is still extant: I suppose no other intire work of his remains, except a Letter<sup>s</sup> to *Demetrias*, a female Christian, though many fragments may be found in the writings of those, who opposed him. The notion attributed to the Pelagians in our Article, only rose out of what has now been mentioned; the particular nature of it will appear under our explanation.

VII. The principal person who opposed Pelagius was *Augustin*: Jerom indeed did labour in the same work, but not with the same gentleness<sup>t</sup> and

<sup>r</sup> That the Pelagians *argued* to this purpose, is said by Wall, 19, Sect. 1.

<sup>s</sup> These works are, I think, in the last Volume of Augustin's Works: Edit. Benedict.... They are also amongst Jerom's works.

<sup>t</sup> Bower's Lives of the Popes, Vol. 1. p. 329.

and candour. Indeed the more I see of Augustin's works, the more I am pleased with his character: he was certainly an open and zealous opponent of Pelagius; but I cannot with satisfaction call him an enemy: for, though he has written a great <sup>u</sup> deal against the Pelagians, he "always speaks of" Pelagius himself "as a man of extraordinary capacity and <sup>x</sup> accomplishments; and one, whom he should much admire and love, were it not for his heterodox opinions." — It has been charged upon Augustin, that, whilst he was writing against the Manicheans, he wrote in defence of free-will, and that when he came to write against the Pelagians, he depreciated it. We know he was capable of retracting an error on perceiving it; but yet it is possible he might seem to contradict himself when he did not; as is the case with the Scriptures. The Manichean servitude of the Will is, in its nature, distinct from any scriptural notion; so that an idea of free-will might be maintained in opposition to that, which should be no way inconsistent with our Doctrines of Original Sin and Grace. Indeed I am not aware, that Free-will, in the common sense of the word, is understood to be taken away by either of those doctrines. To examine Augustin's works on this question, would carry us too far out of our way. I will only observe farther, that both Pelagius and Augustin seem to have been able and worthy men. In modern times, they are spoken of too hastily. The only aim of Pelagius might be, to defend the justice and goodness of God; the only aim of Augustin, to defend the Christian Religion, or keep its doctrines strictly *scriptural*: at the same time, Pelagius was a true Christian, and Augustin a true believer in the divine justice and goodness.

VIII. After

<sup>u</sup> Cave—Augustin. in Hist. Lit.

<sup>x</sup> Wall 19. Sect. 29.

VIII. After giving my own idea of this celebrated æra of the Pelagian controversy, it is natural to mention one or two writers, from whom others may seek information relative to it. Dr. *Jortin* is a favourite author, but his remarks on Ecclesiastical History do not quite hit my fancy: He appears to me in *them*, to have a kind of flippancy, which does not suit a man of his character in other respects; it always reminds me of a school-boy, who, having acquired some talent for writing, uses it in ridiculing those, from whom he has received instruction, and who ought to be the objects of his veneration or respect. He seems, in this work, one of that class, who consider ingenuity as consisting in pulling to pieces every thing that is established; and liberality of mind, in striking out something singular, which shall relax habitual reverence, and indulge the presumption and petulance of the forward and inconsiderate. He seems to make no allowances for the customary follies and weaknesses of different ages and countries, but to try all men, as if they had every advantage of modern improvement.

I should depend much more on the information, which is to be gathered from *Wall's* History of Infant Baptism. Original Sin being one great cause of Infant Baptism, an History of Infant-baptism is, in a manner, an History of Original Sin. This writer is very well informed, grave, sensible, attentive, and candid: indulgent, not only to those whose opinions he favours, but to all who deserve indulgence, whatever opinions they prefer.

IX. Not long after the rise of the Pelagians, there seem to have arisen some, who thought that the Pelagians were right in some respects, but that they had carried matters *too far*. These were called  
Semi-

*Semi-pelagians*; probably, not by themselves. As the tenets of those who had this name have occasioned some dispute, we must not enter upon the subject very minutely. We may conceive the title to have been given lightly, whenever any persons mitigated the Doctrines, either of the Orthodox or the Pelagians; and, as this might be done in various particulars, various opinions might come to be called Semipelagian<sup>y</sup>.—As to our present subject, it used to be called a notion of Semipelagians, that those, who died under years of discretion, would be rewarded or punished according as they *would have been* good or bad, had they <sup>z</sup> lived. If you ask whether this is meant of baptized or unbaptized, they would answer, God *decreed*, that those *should be* baptized<sup>a</sup>, who *would have* behaved well. Whereas Augustin is said to have held, that God decreed that certain Infants should be baptized, and so they were saved of course; (I now speak only Historically).—This approaches too near the subject of Predestination to be considered at present.—And, as we shall meet the Semipelagians again under the tenth and seventeenth Articles, we will dismiss them now. Any one may consult Mosheim, Cent. v. 2. 5. 26.

x. The *Mahommedans* seem to acknowledge a something of native corruption in Man, as they think it necessary to settle some way, in which their *Prophet* is freed from it. An angel, I think, plucked a black grain out of his heart, or squeezed three droops of black blood from it, and then he was cleansed from the pollution of humanity.

xI. The

<sup>y</sup> Of Pelagians and Semipelagians see more Art. xvii. Sect. v. and vi.

<sup>z</sup> Bower's Life of Zosimus, p. 350. Vol. 1.

<sup>a</sup> Wall, Chap. 19. end.

XI. The *School-men* refined upon our Doctrine, and entered into curious questions concerning the nature of Original Sin, and the manner in which it descended from one generation to another<sup>b</sup>; but, as our Article does not require any such investigations, and as the Schoolmen are expressly mentioned under the thirteenth Article, we may dismiss them for the present.

XII. We may proceed to the Age of the *Reformation*.—The general idea is, that, though we differed from the Romanists in many things, we did not<sup>c</sup> differ with regard to Original Sin. Which may be right enough; yet there seems to be a verbal difference, at least, between our present Article and the Decree of the Council of Trent<sup>d</sup>.—*We* say, “the infection” remains after Baptism; *they* say, original sin is taken away by Baptism; but all we mean by “the infection” is *concupiscence*, which they allow *does* remain: we say, concupiscence “has the nature of *Sin*.” they allow, that the Apostle *calls* it Sin; but not *strictly*; only because it *comes* of Sin, and *leads* to Sin; which seems to be our reason for calling it Sin. Such a difference as this seems<sup>e</sup> scarcely worth dwelling upon, though the expressions seems to be intentionally opposed<sup>f</sup>.—The *state* of offenders may be changed or superseded, though the *mental corruption* may require a course of discipline to change it.

The *Anabaptists* are particularly mentioned in the Article of 1552, and in the *Reformatio<sup>g</sup> Legum*. All

<sup>b</sup> One need only consult the *Index* to Thomas Aquinas, under *Peccatum Originale*.

<sup>c</sup> See Heylin's *Historia Quinquarticularis*, p. 518.

<sup>d</sup> Session 5th.

<sup>e</sup> See Rhemists on Rom. ix. 11.

<sup>f</sup> The 5th Session of the Council of Trent, was held, A. D. 1546.

<sup>g</sup> De Hæresibus, cap. 7.

All those, seemingly, who are against infant-baptism, must deny original sin.

Martin Luther is very strong in his expressions against those, who let down the Doctrine of original sin<sup>h</sup>. It suited his temper to be so, and his views of Justification.

Strype says<sup>i</sup>, that it was common in England for men to call each other *Free-willers* and *Pelagians*, by way of Opprobrium: So that introducing Pelagians into our Article would not, at the time, seem uncouth or strange; as I fear it does now, to many readers.

XIII. The *Calvinists* and *Arminians* must of course differ about Original Sin; as will appear when we come to speak of them more particularly hereafter<sup>k</sup>.

XIV. The *Socinians* have varied their ground considerably: The Racovian<sup>l</sup> Catechism says of Man, that he was *created* mortal: and then for Adam's offence, he (man) was decreed to *eternal* death.—Afterwards, “omnes homines eò quòd ex eo nati sunt, eidem eternæ morti subjeant.”—In a subsequent chapter<sup>m</sup>, “Peccatum originis nullum prorsus est.” This may be acknowledging, that men are now in a *state* worse in some way than before Adam's offence; but denying that the *mental* corruption observable in the world, has any connexion with it.

Dr.

<sup>h</sup> See his Work on Genesis, Vol. 6. Folio.

<sup>i</sup> Annals, Vol. 1. p. 331.

<sup>k</sup> It seems enough at present to read a few Heads out of the *Indexes* to Calvin's Institutes, and Arminius's Works.—Near the end of Arminius's Volume, there is a sort of *summary* of his opinions,

It might be mentioned, that our Puritans, particularly the *assembly of Divines* were Calvinistic; especially as John Taylor has strictures on the Assembly's Catechism.—See Taylor on original Sin, p. 90. &c.

<sup>l</sup> De via Salutis, Cap. 1. p. 15, &c.

<sup>m</sup> Cap. 10. de Libero Arbitrio.

*Dr. John Taylor*, the celebrated Author of a work on the Epistle to the Romans, is a very respectable writer. He has published a volume on the subject of Original Sin. His notion is, that “*Death, Labour and Sorrow*” came into the world by Adam’s sin, and that we, the *descendants*<sup>n</sup> of Adam, are subject to Death, Labour and Sorrow merely on account of his Transgression. He owns<sup>o</sup> that, in *fact*, there is great *corruption* in the world, but he does not *join* this corruption to the History of our first Parent. He holds, that *Virtue* must be<sup>p</sup> a man’s *own*; that no man can be virtuous or vicious for another. (Which, by the way, seems wandering from original to *actual* sin).

*Dr.<sup>a</sup> Priestley* sets out with Taylor’s words, “Labour, sorrow, and death;” and supposes, that though “the mind may be more feeble, and therefore more prone to comply with some temptations,” by “the body being more subject to disease,” yet as sickness does some moral good, “it is probable” “upon the whole” “that our condition is more favourable to Virtue than that of Adam.”—But afterwards he seems to quit Taylor’s ground, and *deny*, that the Sin of Adam was imputed<sup>r</sup> to subject men to *death*: he seems also to make Death the recompence of “actual and personal Sins.”—He is afraid to take Taylor’s ground; and, if I understand them right, Taylor would be very unwilling to take his; for he (Taylor) reasons copiously on Adam’s offence as bringing death on mankind.—Either there is much *unsteadiness* among the Socinians, (which shews a want of *satisfaction*) or I am not able rightly to comprehend their opinions.

xv. It

<sup>n</sup> Taylor, p. 27, 30. 37. 164.      <sup>o</sup> Page 98.

<sup>p</sup> Page 127. 190.

<sup>a</sup> Famil. Illustr. p. 11.

<sup>r</sup> Page 13.

xv. It seems needless to offer more historical accounts here, especially as, from the connexion of this Article with those that follow it, we may expect to meet with the same persons and sects again. We are to come now to the *Explanation*; the intent of which is, to clear up the terms of our Article in such a manner, that the propositions contained in it shall be intelligible, and require nothing but such proof as the mind can easily attend to.

xvi. "*Original Sin*" has been usually opposed to *actual Sin*: it is called "*birth-sin*," because men fall into it by *Birth*; either by being so born as to appear in the state of offenders; or by being born in such circumstances, that their *propensities* will, in the common course of things, be disorderly. —(See Section the second). Human beings are supposed to have no concern with any other sort of Sin till they come to have some sort of self-government. But, when members of any *community* are said to offend, as such, it is worth observing, that they may be all the while perfectly innocent in their *individual* capacity. A Corporation, or a City, a Regiment, or an University, may behave so ill as to deserve and bring on *extermination*; yet there may be in such worthless *Body* the most virtuous *Man* that ever lived: Notwithstanding, this virtuous man may, *as a citizen*, be said to behave ill or offend, because the citizens offend *collectively*: these two different ways of offending, in the social and individual capacities, should never be *confounded*. In order to keep them distinct, I would call the sin of the individual *proper sin*; and that of the member of a *Body*, as such, by way of contradistinction, *improper sin*. I should hope this distinction would be *intelligible*, and if so, I doubt not of its being very *useful*, in solving *objections* to the doctrine



doctrine of original Sin.—And *punishment* may be distinguished into proper and improper, in the same sense.—I do not expect this explanation of terms to give full satisfaction at present. *Original* sin is not mentioned in *Scripture*, in so many words.

XVII. It “standeth,” or consisteth, “not in the *following* of Adam (as the Pelagians do vainly talk,” — “fabulantur.”) — The word “*following*” here may mislead an English reader; it means *imitating*, *acting* as Adam acted, sinning after Adam’s *example*. The Latin is, “in *imitatione* Adami:” we find the English word *following* for *imitating*, in *Scripture*. The word “Followers,” is *always*, in our Bible, the English for *μιμηται*, that is, six times; in the passage Eph. v. 1. “Be ye therefore *followers* of God,” and five other passages.—The Pelagians, by this idea, seem to exclude both our parts of Original Sin, the *state* of offenders, and the disorder of human *propensities*; they make it to consist in *acting* after a certain *model* or *Original*: and therefore, in effect, speak only of *actual* sin, and annihilate original. Augustin’s reasoning\* against them agrees with this notion; and in King Edward’s intended Laws, in the Chapter against Heresy, those are censured, who reduce original sin to this, quòd ex Adami delicto propositum “sit peccandi noxium *exemplum*, quod homines ad eandem pravitatem invitat *imitandam* et usurpandam.”

XVIII. We come next to the words, “the *fault* and *corruption* of the *Nature* of every man,”  
 &c.

\* Ep. 88. 89. or, in the new order, 156, 157, from and to Hilarius.—See the passages translated in Wall on Infant Baptism, p. 179. 2d. Edition.—And in Nicholls on the Article, p. 73.

&c. *Fault* in the Latin is *vitium*, which seems always to imply a sort of comparison between what is and what might be; or would be, if things were as they were intended to be. Sometimes the *vitium*, or fault, is *defect*, sometimes *excess*, sometimes a *change*, after the manner of *putrefaction*, or *corruption*; so that, in some views the words, *fault* and *corruption* coincide, though fault has the more extensive meaning.—“*Infection*” varies the idea a little; but language about the mind is all comparative.

If we consider what we mean by the *Nature* of any thing, we shall find it something of this sort: that combination and relative strength of its different powers, on which the effecting of its peculiar *end* and purpose depends. The *Nature* of any thing is *corrupted*, when any of these powers is too much *diminished* to answer that end; or so much *increased* as to *overpower* others, and prevent their executing their proper office. The nature of a *Watch* is corrupted, when the spring is become too strong, or too weak; or when any of the wheels are clogged, retarded, accelerated, beyond the velocity *intended* for it by the maker. The *Nature* of any particular civil *Government* is corrupted, when the people have diminished the constitutional power of the King or Senate; or when these have diminished the constitutional power of the people; so that the political machine cannot promote *Security*, &c. in that way which was *intended* by those who framed it.—But what is the *Nature* of *Man*? He is a very nice and complicated machine; consists of a great number of powers, some of which impell, others restrain; they are all *intended* to act together, each with its proper force, and in its own manner, so as to promote the greatest good which can be called human. Every man sees this himself in some degree, but  
the

the description of the human constitution given by Bishop Butler in his three Sermons on human nature, may be recommended as the best extant.—Conscience is the constitutional Supreme: extensive prudence and benevolence have great authority; and of many passions and appetites, together with the senses, there is none which has not its proper work and department, though under controul of superiors. Any one who has once acquired a right idea of our Nature, will find no difficulty in seeing wherein consists its *corruption*. When sensual pursuits prevent intellectual attainments; when appetites overpower prudence and benevolence; when passions rebel against Conscience, and continue in a state of rebellion, then may our Nature be said to be *corrupted*: or even if the inferior principles are only *troublesome*, *seditionous*, as it were, and turbulent; do not yield *easily* and *freely* to those powers, which ought to be superior to theirs.

In order to see the right sense of *nature*, *natural*, &c. in common Life, (and therefore in Scripture,) we might observe, in what sense it is said, that an Englishman *naturally* speaks English: this seems to mean, that it is according to the *common course of Nature* that a person *born* in any country should speak the language of that country. But here is no idea of compulsion or *necessity*<sup>f</sup>; he *may* speak a *foreign* language.—The best mode of learning the *sense* of words is from such common expressions as these.

As we are speaking of *Nature*, we may take, in this place, the expression, “is of his own *Nature* inclined to evil:” it seems to mean, not that man is *irresistibly* impelled to evil; and that this is seen  
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<sup>f</sup> Taylor on Orig. Sin, p. 127.

in his constitution; *in fact* only it appears, that the inferior propensities *have* too great influence in our constitution; so constantly, that an *expectation* is raised of finding the same thing in *future* instances.

XIX. The expression, “every man, that is naturally engendered of the *offspring of Adam*,” seems to me an expression of some nicety: The word, “*naturally*,” seems only intended to exclude our *Saviour* from original sin, his birth being *supernatural*; but I mean to take the expression independently of this word. Does it mean only, ‘*every man*?’—*all* men are, “engendered of the offspring of Adam:”—or does it mean, that every man is inclined to evil naturally *because* he is sprung from the first offender?—I should rather think, that the intention of the compilers was, to leave men a liberty of assenting, who should *doubt* whether the disorderly propensities of man were owing to Adam’s transgression; though to omit Adam entirely, in this place, would have given offence to many. My reason is, because many serious and thinking Christians have judged, that the first part of Genesis is not a literal description of *fact*, but an *allegorical*† story (like the Pilgrim’s progress?); now it was probably far from the intention of our Church to exclude any such; and if this clause was made with a view to giving liberty to them, it must, though perhaps accidentally in some measure, give liberty to those, who understand, “every man that naturally is engendered of the offspring of Adam,” as meaning no more than, *every man*.

xx. The

† See Div. Leg. B. 9. in Warburton’s Works, quarto, Vol. 3. p. 640,

xx. The next expression we come to is, "*Original righteousness*:"—the primitive " meaning of which is, that righteousness, which our First Parents had before their Fall.—They are not described as having offended immediately after they were created; and if they did not, their minds must have been *pure*, though inexperienced; free from shame and remorse; and their conscience cheering:—and had they and their offspring continued in such a state, while their experience increased, it is not conceivable, that, in later generations, the lower and grosser appetites would have been disorderly in the manner we now find them: but I mean not here to reason, farther than is necessary for the explanation of the idea affixed to the words "*original righteousness* \*."

This original righteousness, though spoken of only as in fact belonging to our first parents, must be, in its *kind*, such rectitude of mind, such a combination and relative strength of mental powers, as God originally *intended* for man; such as he adapted to procure his *greatest good*. May we not therefore understand "*original righteousness*" in that sense? without relation to *Adam*, or to man's ever having actually been in a state of such righteousness?—And so only mean, by man's being "*far gone from*

\* See Necessary Doctrine, on Free-will and Justification.—Also Heylin's *Historia Quinquart.* p. 513. And first Paragraph of Homily on the Nativity.

\* We might digress so far here, as to give a *conjectural* idea of the situation of our first Parents before their fall: some would say, it had better be omitted; but my purpose would be, to shew what the situation *might* be; on this principle, that if *any* situation could be described consistent with the short account of Scripture, it would follow, that the scriptural account is not objectionable.—Any one might read Archbp. King's Sermon on the Fall, and my Poem on Redemption, v. 115—122.—If this be done, Div. Leg. Book 1x. (former part) should be attended to.

from original righteousness," that every man is at a great *distance* from that frame of mind which our Creator *intended*<sup>y</sup> for us? Dr. *Balguys*'<sup>z</sup> manner of speaking of the act of our first Parents as of one "of which we are very obscurely and imperfectly informed," seems rather to *imply*, that he would not lay much stress on a state so little understood.

XXI. This seems the proper place to take some notice of the expression, "God made<sup>a</sup> man in his own *image*;" as it is sometimes, though not in our Article, made a proof of actual original righteousness. The expression seems to me *indefinite* and *comparative*: Man might be said to be like the intelligent Creator in comparison of other earthly things. Adam begat *Seth* after his own<sup>b</sup> image; that is, so that his son should be of the same nature, and in the same situation with himself: in like manner, *we* now bear the image of *Adam*, as far as we are *men*; as *Christians*, we are described as to be conformed to the image<sup>c</sup> of *Christ*, which means the same as putting on the *new*<sup>d</sup> *Man*: we must labour to acquire the true Christian *disposition*; and then the words of St. Paul<sup>e</sup> will be applicable to us; "as we have born the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly."

Bishop Warburton Div. Leg. B. 9. makes *Reason* to be the image of God, in Adam.

XXII. We now come to an expression, which is more terrible in the sound than in the sense.— "It (original sin) deserveth God's *wrath* and *damnation*." The *wrath* of God can only mean<sup>f</sup> the cause,

<sup>y</sup> The *Golden age* of the Heathens implies dissatisfaction with the *present* age: shews (if not borrowed from Scripture) that the idea of original righteousness is natural.

<sup>z</sup> Charge 2d. p. 200.

<sup>a</sup> Gen. i. 27.—ix. 6.

<sup>c</sup> Rom. viii. 29.

<sup>e</sup> 1 Cor. xv. 49.

<sup>b</sup> Gen. v. 3.

<sup>d</sup> Eph. iv. 24.

<sup>f</sup> See Book I. Chap. XIX. Sect. v.

cause, in God, of such effects as, in man, would be produced by wrath. It is not implied, that wrath must actually be exercised on all who are subject to original sin; they only *deserve* it, or are *liable* to it. They are called the “*children*” of wrath,”—but children in scripture are not always supposed to inherit. The children of this world do not always inherit<sup>h</sup> this world; nor can the children of light inherit light.—*Damnation* is only equivalent to *judgment*<sup>i</sup>; it does not, of itself, imply judgment *after*<sup>k</sup> *death*, nor does it imply any *determinate* degree of evil: It is as applicable to the *Socinian* scheme as to any other; as Taylor himself contends. (p. 29, &c).—A *verdict* against any one, in our civil judicatures, is judgment, or *damnation*, how small soever the fine. But we are going too far in speaking as if *any* judgment *must* be passed, or any fine levied: men are often *liable* to punishment in some theory of Law, who are never punished, or so much as sentenced to punishment. As is the case, in our country, with those who continue assembled after the *Riot-act* has been read.

XXIII. Here it may be proper to take notice how many expressions of our Article are immediately taken from *Scripture*. “The flesh lusteth always contrary to the Spirit,” seems to be Gal. v. 17. with a reference to Rom. vii. 7. &c. and ver. 23. —“wrath,” alludes to Eph. ii. 3.—“damnation,” refers to Rom. v. ver. 16. or 18. only we should observe, that, if we take the latter verse, our article rather softens the expression of scripture; *κριμα*, judgment, or damnation, being a softer term than *κατακριμα*, condemnation: *Φρονημα σαρκος*

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<sup>g</sup> Eph. ii. 3.<sup>h</sup> Matt. v. 5.<sup>i</sup> 1 Cor xi. 29, margin.<sup>k</sup> Ver. 30.

is taken from Rom. viii. 6. —and “is not subject to the Law of God,” from Rom. viii. 7.—“There is no condemnation to them that believe and are baptized,” is from Mark xvi. 16. and Rom. viii. 1.—“The Apostle doth confess, that concupiscence and lust hath of itself the nature of Sin:” this may refer to several places; as Rom. vi. 12.—Rom. vii. 7. &c. but this latter seems sufficient; “I had not known Sin but by the Law, for I had not known *Lust*,” (*ἐπιθυμίαν*, translated in the margin, and in other passages, *concupiscence*,) “except the Law had said, thou shalt not covet.”—Mr. Locke paraphrases, “I had not known Lust,” “I had not known concupiscence to be *Sin*.”—These passages are not mentioned here as *proofs*, but only to give the reader a right notion of what is *composed* in our Article, and what is *quoted*. No interpretation is yet given of any passage; yet it seems as if our propositions would scarcely be cleared from all extraneous matter, without an *explanatory* remark on one or two scriptural expressions; as *φρονημα σαρκος*, and, “is not subject to the Law of God.”

XXIV. But the word “*regenerated*” comes first; which is so very near the phrase “*born again*,” that it may be reckoned *scriptural*; “*renatis*” must be reckoned so, which is the word in our Latin Article: though we should see in what sense it was *used*, when our Articles were compiled.—*Wall*<sup>m</sup> says, “’tis abundantly evident, that the common phrase of the Jews, was to call the Baptism of a Proselyte, his *Regeneration*, or new Birth.—And the Christians did in all ancient times continue the use of this name for Baptism.” This remark he applies to John iii. 3.—In our Article, the Latin word for “*regenerated*” is “*renatis*,” and “*renatis*,”

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in this same Article, is the Latin for "*baptized*;" whence it appears, that our Article means the same thing by "*regenerated*," and "*baptized*,"—Some may apprehend danger from this remark, as if it let down regeneration to mean only the external form of baptism: but I do not see how it does that; when shall we complete our contract? when shall we sign and *seal*? these being used for one another, does not let down *contracting* to the mere outward ceremony of *sealing*. The outward part, in a symbolical act, must always imply the thing signified: that is, in Baptism, putting on the *new*<sup>n</sup> man, or acquiring the true Christian disposition. When we speak of *entering* on any state of Life, as by manumission, indentures, marriage, &c. we take for *granted* the ordinary effects: they pass unmentioned, because it seems needless to mention them.

xxv. The sense of *φρονεμα σαρκος* might be sought in Lexicons, which indeed give a satisfactory account; but three verses of the passage, from which the expression is taken, would be sufficient of themselves.—I mean Rom. viii. 5, 6, 7. *τα της σαρκος φρονεσιν*, "*mind* the things of the flesh," *think* of them, *relish* them, are *interested* about them; this expression explains what is meant by *φρονεμα*, the *minding*, &c.—the understanding and feelings are both concerned; which they are in the word *Sentiment*. Indeed they are naturally much connected, because we *think* of that which we *enjoy*. Hence *φρονεμα σαρκος* has been thought\* well translated in our version, because *mind* contains both understanding and feelings, or both sorts of sentiments. The English and Latin articles give us each *four words* to chuse out of; which I only mention as a specimen of the liberality of the compilers in interpreting; the same  
that,

\* Eph. iv. 22, 23, 24.

• Parkhurst's Lexicon.

that, I should imagine, they intend us to use on all occasions.

XXVI. This interest about carnal things, “*is not subject* to the Law<sup>p</sup> of God:” that is to say, allowing the inferior propensities of our nature to take up our attention, so that we cannot attend to the higher principles, is keeping them in a state of rebellion to Nature, and the author of Nature.—The Apostle, not the Article, adds, “neither indeed *can* be;” which may mean, it is not possible, that such a state should be any other than a state of Rebellion. God having fixed and settled our constitution to be such, that conscience and enlarged self-love shall have authority over the desires of the Flesh.

I do not observe any other expressions in our Article, which want clearing up, and therefore I here close the *Explanation*<sup>q</sup>. Nothing is affirmed concerning *Death* being introduced into the world by Adam’s disobedience; nor indeed about man’s being made in the *image* of God, though I have touched upon that expression.

XXVII. Let us now therefore proceed to the *Proof* of the propositions, which our Article contains. . . . I cannot perceive more than *four* propositions.

1. Original Sin consists in the corruption of our nature, or mental constitution.

2. Into our state of corruption, there is some reason to conclude, that we were brought by the offence of our *first Parents*.

3. Whatever

<sup>p</sup> See Taylor on Orig. Sin, p. 123.

<sup>q</sup> It might indeed be observed, that concupiscence having “the *Nature* of sin,” is distinguishable from its *being* Sin, as murder is sin: but we have already (Sect. XII.) described it as coming of sin, and leading to sin. And more will appear, relating to concupiscence, in what follows: particularly in the latter part of Sect. xxx.

3. Whatever strictness of propriety there may be in calling this state a state of *Sin*, we have ground to consider it as making us liable to what may be called a *judicial sentence*.

4. Not only mere men, but Christians, are capable of sinful concupiscence, or mental corruption.

XXVIII. In the proof of the first proposition, I find a difficulty. Original Sin is not a *scriptural* expression, and yet all we want is to establish a set of doctrines on scriptural foundation. What then is the question here between us and our adversaries? The best idea I can acquire, is this. There is *something* in Scripture, which has given *occasion* to the expression *original Sin*: so that this expression has become *established*; and all parties have made some use of it; but it has suited best with the notions of one party to use it in one sense, and with those of another party, to use it in a different sense. The question seems to be, which speaks with the greatest *propriety*, or most according to the true meaning of Scripture? The *Orthodox* says, it consists in mental depravity; the *Pelagian*, wishing only to deny, that there is any such thing as depravity in any human being when he is *born*, speaks to this purpose; if you *will* have such a thing as original sin, I do not see to what you can give that name, but to sin as committed after the *example* of our first Parent, taken in the light of a *model* or *original*.—Now therefore, if we can prove, what they wish to deny, that mental depravity is a thing, which may be called *hereditary*; or that it is a thing which does depend, in some measure, upon our *Birth*; we seem to prove the only thing which is needful<sup>r</sup>. The *fact* is allowed, that men *are* very

<sup>r</sup> So that the first of our four propositions may stand thus:  
 “our corrupt nature may be looked upon as, in some degree,  
*hereditary*;

very corrupt; and Dr. John Taylor allows of the word *degenerate*<sup>s</sup>; but he will have it, that each man's moral corruption depends wholly upon *himself*. For authority of *Scripture* consult here, Gen. viii. 21.—Psalm li. 5.—lviii. 3.—cvi. 6.—and Job xiv. 4.—These passages, if they are taken literally, make men, in some way or other, to have a pollution even from their birth; and if they are construed with latitude, as declamatory expressions, it does not seem easy to explain them without supposing a mental depravity or corruption in men, such as would not have been found in any man, had he been the *first* human being.

On these scriptural expressions, *reason* and *experience* will furnish the best comment. What then do we see and observe? That human Beings have different *minds*, different *principles* and *feelings*, according to the circumstances in which they are *born*. Savages have savage principles and passions: An Algerine feels differently, from an Englishman, in treating a Captive: and so on. Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws would afford many instances, of different principles and passions handed down from generation to generation, in different societies of men.

It may be said, mens different principles and passions depend, not on *propagation*, but on *education*, in a large sense of the word, as including *sympathy*, and all the effects of *living together*;—*consuetudo*. But first, what is the *cause* of Education, or sympathy? you must not say education is the cause, and so go back for ever<sup>u</sup>. . . . The question, how

*hereditary*; inasmuch as it depends, in some measure, on the circumstances of our *Birth*.<sup>v</sup>

<sup>s</sup> Taylor on Orig. Sin, p. 98. 125.

<sup>t</sup> Taylor on Orig. Sin, p. 58, Note \*.

<sup>u</sup> Perhaps it would be answered, the cause of bad education is bad *choice*, bad use of powers, in those who educate: so it is, in some

how far propagation is concerned in handing down mental depravity, was, I think, one of those which was given up<sup>x</sup>; and indeed if we know not how diseases of body descend, it is not likely that we should understand the descent of qualities of the mind. The word "*engendered*," in our article, may seem to favour the idea of descent by propagation; but it is scarcely intended to<sup>y</sup> require us to adopt such idea, strictly and exclusively. We are concerned, in Scripture and Articles, with popular, not philosophical language; and that seems to regard any thing as hereditary, which is handed down from one generation to another, in a course of Nature<sup>z</sup>. It is *probable*, that qualities of *mind* are sometimes continued by propagation, as well as by sympathy, instruction, praise and blame, &c. and it seems as if the causes of such continuance are often not clearly discerned; which may be one reason why popular language does not try to distinguish them. Children *resemble* their Parents in features: is this by propagation, or sympathy? perhaps by neither wholly; yet it is ordinarily ascribed *wholly* to propagation. However, *Insanity*

15

some measure; but traditional error, and habitual mental disorders, cause bad education in a much greater degree.

<sup>x</sup> The authority for this was not distinctly enough noted down, and is now forgotten.—Yet it may possibly refer to what was said, Sect. XI. about the *Schoolmen* having entered into niceties (particularly, I suppose, about propagation) which we do not meddle with.

<sup>y</sup> Sect. XIX.

<sup>z</sup> Taylor, p. 124. ascribes the corruption of many men to Seth's posterity *intermarrying* with the Cainites. He did not mean to ascribe wickedness to propagation, but he mentions a *fact* (supposed true) which might be mentioned here. He ascribes what we should rather call the *joint* effects of propagation and sympathy, sometimes to one, and sometimes to the other.

is a striking instance of mental disorder handed down by propagation; and bodily qualities, which are allowed to be propagated, (Taylor, p. 192), do frequently increase or diminish the strength of mental powers. We have before referred to a passage of Horace, where he makes *fortitude* to depend on breed. (Od. 3. 6. 33).—I have been told, that the Scrofula, which is reckoned the most hereditary of all bodily disorders, affects the intellects.—Mr. Ludlam, paraphrasing “that which is born<sup>a</sup> of the flesh is flesh,” says<sup>b</sup>, “that which is of the breed and race of fallen man, has by birth and nature, the carnal and corrupt affections that belong to all the race of fallen man.” And this sentence is a kind of reference to *experience*; with regard to the breed of *Animals* in general. The ancients were aware of the influence of good parentage in *Brutes*; though they might not enter into all the niceties of modern *pedigree*.—*Bien né*, in French<sup>c</sup>, means one who has good *inclinations*: and amongst *us*, a well-bred man means a man of polished *sentiments*. In good *families* (in different ranks) there is a *something*, which we value, whether we are looking out for Patrons, friends, or servants; something good in the disposition; we are led to ascribe this to *birth*, though we know it is in part owing to early living with good people.—Vice may possibly diminish it, virtue may strengthen it; but its *reality* is acknowledged in practice: and it arises from the *circumstances* in which a person is *born*. The qualities of body and mind conveyed down by propagation, we do not as yet precisely understand; we cannot tell beforehand the *degree*, in which any quality of Parents will appear in their descendants; but the *general* notion, that all sorts of human

<sup>a</sup> John iii. 6.<sup>b</sup> Essay on Scrip. Metaphors, p. 4.<sup>c</sup> Dict. Acad.

human qualities may be propagated, or transmitted to posterity, seems sufficiently established. And still more clearly the notion, that moral qualities, good and bad, descend from generation to generation, in a course of Nature.

It seems to *follow*, from what has been said, that the prevalence (not necessary, nor invincible, but usual, probable) of inferior and sensual appetites in our constitution, may depend, and is generally understood to depend, upon the circumstances, in which we are *born*; and therefore, that such disorder and irregularity may be called *Original or Birth-Sin*.

XXIX. Our second proposition is, "Into our state of mental corruption, there is some reason to think that we were brought by the Offence of our *first Parents*."—I say *some* reason, because the History of our first Parents is faint, obscure<sup>d</sup> and imperfect; and has been differently understood by candid and thinking Christians:

The principal authority for the opinion, that the offence of Adam was, in some degree, the cause of our corruption, is the reasoning of St. Paul in the fifth Chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, where he compares the effects of Adam's transgression with those of Christ's obedience. This reasoning, it must be confessed, is not perfectly clear and perspicuous; yet I think a candid and attentive reader of it will at least find a very sufficient *apology* for any Church, which should profess the orthodox doctrine. We may begin with the 12th verse, and read to the end of the Chapter. The 13th and 14th verses seem intended to prevent any one's thinking, that the death of men, after Adam, was owing to their *own* offences, or *actual* sins: those between Adam and Moses, having

<sup>d</sup> Dr. Balguy, p. 200, as before.

having no *Law*, might<sup>e</sup> be looked upon as free from mortal sin: yet they died; their death must therefore, supposing death caused by some sin, have been owing to *Adam's* offence, and inherited from him. The 18th and 19th verses, according to our translation, are very strong; and I believe our translation to be on the whole a very good one: not faultless, but better than any we are likely to have in this age. The passage now before us will recur very soon; therefore we may now pass on to another proof. The necessity of being<sup>f</sup> *born again* shews, that there was something faulty or deficient in our natural birth; and when could the fault begin, but with our first parent, if it belongs to all mankind? "that which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit, is spirit:" Taylor says<sup>g</sup>, that this means no more than that the natural birth produces only the powers of a man; the spiritual birth produces "a man sanctified into the right use and application of those powers in a state of holiness."—The difference between generation and regeneration is here rightly described, supposing no fault in the parents which could affect the offspring; but this idea does not seem to me to come up to what is implied in the word "*flesh*," considering the many places of scripture, in which that word denotes the *vicious* prevalence of carnal appetites. Regeneration, or entering on a Christian scheme of purifying our nature, does not seem to be described as if it were intended merely to lessen the hazard of abusing our natural powers; but as if its proper

<sup>e</sup> See some passages in Taylor, p. 44. Note; they explain how the idea of *Death*, as a penalty, is included in the scriptural notion of the word *Law*.

<sup>f</sup> See John iii. 5, 6.

<sup>g</sup> On Orig. Sin, p. 146.



per end were, to correct some abuse, or moral evil, already existing.

I own myself unable to believe, that, if Adam and his Race had continued faultless, we should have been, in point of disposition, passion, sentiment, what we are now. *Savages* have, as was before observed, savage *dispositions*; can we avoid concluding, on the contrary, that, after an uninterrupted succession of virtuous generations, our dispositions would have been virtuous?

When I see the good produced by a few good successive generations, in one family, parish, &c. I could be in raptures at the thoughts of what we should all have been now, had our predecessors been virtuous.

The *Socinians* (or at least *John Taylor*, the most eminent of of them) hold, that all generations of men have experienced *sorrow*, merely in consequence of the first Transgression. Sorrow is in the *mind*; the *sentiments* then are affected by the Fall? we are approaching very near to passions and appetites. When *sorrow* is *excessive*, or even *defective*, it is the “fault and corruption” of our nature:—but then sorrow is not *made* excessive or defective by the Fall, in the Socinian idea.—It seems however here as if it were only some apprehension of *consequences* which kept us asunder:—for *we* do not hold, that our passions are necessarily and *unavoidably* excessive or defective; but only, that from experience it is to be *expected*, on a footing of *probability*, that they will be so: in the same sense, in which Scripture says, “Offences must needs<sup>h</sup> come.”

xxx. Our third proposition is, Original Sin makes men *liable* to *Judgment*.—Or, with whatever propriety

<sup>h</sup> Matt. xviii. 7.

propriety original sin may be called sin, with the same may we say, that *punishment* is *due* to it. As proper punishment is due to proper sin, so may we look upon that *evil*, which men suffer through the sins of their predecessors, and which is often popularly called punishment, though not in strictness of propriety<sup>i</sup>, as *due* to such sins in different generations taken collectively.

But there are some *prejudices*, which may hinder this truth from being accepted; these should be done away before the proof can have its effect.

It seems always to be presumed, when it is said, such conduct *deserves* punishment, or, it must excite the divine *displeasure*, that it of course is *punished*<sup>k</sup>. It is amazing how often this is presumed, even in good writers; as if God had given up his power of *remission*: as if every man *amenable* to the Law, was punished by the Law<sup>l</sup>. I take the cause of this fallacy to be, a strong inward sentiment; an indignation at the sufferings of innocence, an horror at the dreadful state, in which a man's imagination paints his brethren to be, not without a distant reference to himself: this shock throws Reason out of her seat.

Men have also a reluctance in coming into the opinion, that God will punish different *generations* *collectively*. Not so much when the thing is expressed in this form, as when they come to speak of innocent men suffering for what, as individuals, they have not committed. Then their reasonings about this matter are continually warped. But is their reluctance reasonable? God *does* punish men collectively

<sup>i</sup> This want of strict propriety is too much insisted on by Taylor, p. 21. See before, Sect. xvi.

<sup>k</sup> Sect. xxii.

<sup>l</sup> Ludlam on Divine Mercy, p. 47. Note.

collectively in various ways. It appears in his Government, he confesses it in his *word*<sup>m</sup>. Supposing this unjust, that is nothing to us, at present; what the Author of Nature does, what the Scriptures declare, that is our foundation; we go no deeper. Were we defending truths of natural Religion, we might ask why the Author of Nature does so:—Were we defending the divine authority of the Scriptures, we might ask whether what is said of Jehovah is consistent with the true character of the one supreme wise and good Being;—but we are not defending scripture; we are reasoning upon it, taking its divine authority for granted. Not that it would detain us long from our proper business, to see, that a good Governor may *unite* men together by sometimes rewarding and sometime punishing them *jointly*, whenever union amongst them is that which promotes their greatest *good*.

Another thing to be mentioned here, as continually preventing reason from having its proper effect, is, confounding two different punishments together; I mean, the punishment of the *individual*, and the punishment of the *community*. God sometimes punishes one, sometimes the other, and, as the punishment of the community affects the individual, so the punishment of the individual in some measure affects the community: but if the ideas are not kept *distinct*, dispute and confusion must ensue. How often have men complained, that the punishment of the individual was unjust, when in reality there was *no* punishment of the individual, but only one of the community, which affected the the individual incidentally, and by

<sup>m</sup> Exod. xx. 5.

by a Law calculated to promote the *general good*<sup>n</sup>!

We will now, without attempting to remove more prejudices, proceed to our *proof*.

It will not be denied, that there are several passages of scripture which represent men collectively as standing before God *in the light of sinners*: read Rom. iii. 9. & 19, with marginal translation: Rom. v. 6, 8, 10.—Gal. iii. 22.—If it be said, that this is meant as the effect of *actual sin*<sup>o</sup>, my difficulty is this; when men are spoken of as amenable to law as individuals, they should be spoken of individually; the peculiar circumstances of each individual should be stated; for, in that light, every man will be subject to a sentence of his *own*; one different from the rest.—And if men are spoken of as punishable collectively, it will make no difference whether you collect different *generations*, or different *cotemporaries*.

Now, that the Scriptures do represent men as to be *considered*, nay as to be *rewarded* or *punished*, collectively,

<sup>n</sup> To what was said, Sect. xvi. we may add here, that the sin and punishment of a Community *may* be what we have called a *proper* sin and punishment. This is the case when a community sins *as* a community, and is punished *as* a community: Sin and punishment are only what we have called *improper*, when a man, innocent as an individual, is a member of a community which sins, and when he therefore sins only in his social capacity; and is punished only in his social capacity.—*Families* are communities; a member of a family may offend and suffer as such, (in family quarrels) when in his private capacity he is kind to the inimical family, and beloved in return.—This illustration brings to one's mind the Play of Romeo and Juliet; the more common the instance, the more it will serve to shew, that we must not turn from the distinction here offered, as *abstruse*: we all make and acknowledge it continually.

<sup>o</sup> Taylor, p. 116. 254.

collectively, may<sup>p</sup> easily be proved.—*considered*<sup>q</sup>, as when *Levi*<sup>r</sup> paid tithes in Abraham, to Melchizedec; *rewarded*, as when Abraham<sup>s</sup> was made Father of the faithful; *punished*, as when God declares, that he himself will visit the sins<sup>t</sup> of the Fathers upon the children, unto the third and fourth generations:—Suppose any man of one of those generations, to be *born*; would not he appear in this world in the light of a sinner? or, at least, as one of a *number* which stood in that light? One might add the instances of *Esau*<sup>u</sup>, *Canaan*<sup>x</sup>, and others; but why should we go lower than our first parents? a sentence of this sort on *them*, is a sentence on the whole race of *man*. Taylor will not allow, that the sentence on Adam was a *curse*<sup>y</sup>: it seems clear to me, that what was pronounced upon him, was an infliction of *evil*, in consequence<sup>z</sup> of his *Offence*: a *condemnation*: and this appears from Taylor's own reasoning<sup>a</sup> on Rom. v. 19.—If only his posterity was spoken of in this sentence, and not himself, that is in our favour;  
St.

<sup>p</sup> This rewarding and punishing a set of men collectively, is not inconsistent with rewarding and punishing individuals separately, at the same time.—A remark is made, not unlike this, with regard to the *Jews*, in Ep. Green's 1st. Pamphlet about Methodists, p. 46.—But he seems to say, that individuals, who did not fulfil *conditions*, would not share in *any* of the benefits which the Jews had as *elect*, &c. that is going rather too far: But we can scarcely dwell too much upon the different rewards (or punishments) which any *one* man may have; one resulting from all the various circumstances of his private conduct, as an individual, others from the different situations in which he stands as member of different communities.

<sup>q</sup> See Taylor on Romans, p. 32. Note.

<sup>r</sup> Heb. vii. 4.

<sup>s</sup> Gen. xxii. 15. 18.—Gal. iii. 6. 9.—Rom. iv. 11. 16.

<sup>t</sup> Exod. xx. 5.

<sup>u</sup> Rom. ix. 13.

<sup>x</sup> Gen. ix. 25.

<sup>y</sup> P. 20.

<sup>z</sup> This is owned by Taylor, p. 21. and sufficiently, I think, for all our purposes.

<sup>a</sup> P. 33. and 30. note.

St. Paul says, that by Adam's offence, "judgment came upon all men to condemnation,"—"many, or *the* many, were made *sinners*;"—all men therefore were made *liable to judgment, in some way or other*. Taylor says, they were only condemned to *Death, Labour, and Sorrow*; but this is saying that we *do* suffer in consequence of Adam's Sin; and can our Church say any thing more strong to shew, that the generations of men are judged collectively? and therefore, that each individual appears in this world in the light of an offender?—Still it would probably be said, to come into the world under the sentence passed on Adam, is not to *be* a sinner, a man can only <sup>b</sup> be a sinner by some *choice* of his own;—certainly not a *proper* sinner, as an *individual*; but who says he is? yet it seems to have been proved under the first of our propositions, that a man is more *likely* to have his mind in a corrupt and disorderly state for having had sinful progenitors. Taylor allows, that the *Jews* are treated by their Lord *collectively*<sup>c</sup>, nay that the bad conduct of Adam affects his posterity: but that is all that is needful for our purpose; that is owning, that all men are punished *collectively*; *proper* punishment is, in that case, on the *race* of man, on the *community*, not on the *individual*.—He says, Adam's offence only affects our *external circumstances*; what punishment does more? if we may reckon *sorrow* amongst external circumstances?—But it does not make us *vicious*? it makes us *rank* as offenders collectively, and in fact has disordered our principles, though not by a proper compulsion.—But this matter of compulsion belongs to the 10th Article<sup>d</sup>.

What

<sup>b</sup> Taylor, p. 58.

<sup>c</sup> P. 203. favoured and rejected, (as I remember) on Rom. ix. & xi. . . for Adam, see p. 205.

<sup>d</sup> See Taylor on Romans, Key, Paragraph 310.

What is called *Original Sin* has before been<sup>e</sup> said to contain two different ideas; our appearing in the world in the *state* of Offenders; and our having a *corrupted Nature*. I will offer nothing more to prove, that our coming into the world ranked as offenders makes us liable to Judgment; but I will now endeavour to shew how our having a *corrupted Nature* makes us so.—But here we might premise something similar to what was premised before: as we said, that men might be amenable to Law, and yet Law not be executed against them; so we say, that men, whose *minds* are in a disorderly state, may keep continually *correcting* the disorder, and continually *improving* their principles and dispositions, without limit. And this work may be continued through any number of successive ages. In such a case, the desert of “wrath and damnation,” would continually decrease without limit.—Of the *assistance* given us for this purpose, we need take no notice at present.—That a corrupted nature deserves punishment, might be left as self evident; for a corrupted nature means a mind, in which the inferior principles are in a state of rebellion to their lawful superiors: But as this is all internal, it may be better to say something more on the subject. Our *explanation* has already<sup>f</sup> led us to consult Rom. vii. 7. as a proof, that “concupiscence and lust hath, of itself, the nature of Sin.”—But some texts are more *clear* than that. We may consider the tenth commandment; and some parts of the Sermon on the mount, as Matt. v. 22, about being *angry*; ver. 28, about<sup>g</sup> *lust*, and ver. 44, about love of *enemies*;

<sup>e</sup> Sect. II.<sup>f</sup> Sect. XXXII.<sup>g</sup> Incesta est etiam sine stupro, quæ cupit stuprum.—quoted in Essay on Old Maids. 2. 98.

*enemies*; and 1 John iii. 15.—<sup>h</sup> These passages shew, that irregular and corrupt sentiments and passions make us guilty in the sight of God, or, at least, liable to judgment and punishment.

And reason and experience coincide with declarations of scripture. As punishment is intended to *prevent* wickedness, every thing *requires* (or *deserves*) *punishment*, which *must* be punished in *order* to prevent wickedness; this is the case with bad sentiments: and therefore we have *Laws* against bribery, subornation<sup>i</sup> of perjury, and seduction: exciting bad sentiments will as naturally produce bad actions, as *sowing tares* will produce tares: in both cases, it may be said, “an *enemy* hath done<sup>k</sup> this:” and in both cases, the enemy deserves restraint and *punishment*.—Who will say, that *Guy Faux* suffered unjustly, though he did not blow up our Parliament? or that he did not *deserve* King James’s *wrath* and *damnation*?—Some difficulty there is, arising from one man’s ignorance of another’s thoughts; so that it is sometimes said, that human laws do *not* punish sentiments, but only *overt acts*; yet, in some cases, it seems to me, that *sentiments* are really punished, though it must be in those cases, wherein *overt acts* *prove* the reality of the sentiments.

Difficulty may also be raised from the notion, that sentiments are involuntary: but they can seldom in strictness be deemed so; sometimes in their nascent state they may be involuntary, or nearly so; but even then, they may be owing to occasions, which we might have avoided, or to  
habits

<sup>h</sup> We might add, Matt. xv. 19.—Acts viii. 21, 22.—Ephes. iv. 22, 23.—James i. 15.

<sup>i</sup> We had occasion to make this observation, Book III. Chap. III. Sect. 1.

<sup>k</sup> Matt. xiii. 28.



habits which, by proper discipline, we might have conquered.—The actions of a drunken man are involuntary, but he might have kept sober.

We conclude therefore, that concupiscence has so far “the nature of Sin,” as to make us liable to judgment<sup>1</sup>.

Ephes. ii. 3. might here be read, as *joining* the two parts of original sin together: the state of sinners, and the corruption of our Nature.

If any one says, that, though concupiscence has the nature of sin, that has no relation to *Adam*, we can only refer him to what was said under the preceding proposition.

xxxI. In short, though the doctrine of original sin has occasioned many difficulties, and does involve discussions of some nicety, when it comes to be argued, yet a plain *case* seems to take in the whole of the matter.—Suppose our King to address himself to a descendant of one of the Lords, who were beheaded in the *Rebellion* of 1745; he might say, (and he might say it with a smile of benignity)—‘You are born of a Family, which bears me no good will; and in truth I *must* consider You and your Family *collectively*; you are, from your *birth* therefore, a *Rebel* in my sight; and for being of such a family, you are more *likely* to be really *disaffected*;—if your parents, and afterwards yourself, encourage your disaffection, you will be not only a *native* but an *actual* rebel: then I must *punish* you *as such*, on having sufficient evidence. But, if your Parents bring you up by *correcting* your disaffection, and you *acquire* the *principles* of a good subject; You have nothing to fear from

<sup>1</sup> How near Dr. John Taylor comes to our representation of the *probability* of men being drawn into sin by the usual propensities of the human mind in its present state, see p. 188; or his Answer to objection 3d.

from me. Though, in strictness, you may be *amenable* to the Law, at least so as to *lose privileges*; yet, while you give me *hopes* of a favourable change, I shall not carry the Law into execution against you.’

XXXII. There yet remains a *fourth* proposition; namely, ‘Christians, after baptism, are capable of concupiscence, or mental corruption.’—This proposition rather belongs to the fifteenth Article than the present; we may however observe, that Baptism only puts us in a *way* to conquer our evil propensities; we may not therefore conquer them instantaneously<sup>m</sup>. And this agrees with the language of Scripture, Gal. iii. 17.—1 Pet. ii. 11.—<sup>n</sup> What is affirmed, is so plain, that it is only the appearance of the objection alluded to in the Article, which makes it to be expressed at all. “There is no condemnation for them, that believe and are baptized<sup>o</sup>,” that is, they are in a *state* of safety; that *sentence*, under which they laid, as members of human society, is taken off and abolished, by virtue of Christianity<sup>p</sup>;—they may, indeed, by their ill conduct, defeat this plan, but this is the plan which is contrived for their good. The context of both Mark xvi. 16. and Rom. viii. 1, shews this to be right; they both take comprehensive and general views. “Go ye into *all the world*, and preach the Gospel to every creature;” then there is

<sup>m</sup> See Warburton on Grace, p. 90, &c. about primitive Christians having *immediately* good minds.

<sup>n</sup> And with practice. A soldier who has taken the sacramentum, or military oath, has not at once the steadiness of a Veteran. The Apprentice does not make himself master of his Trade by signing and sealing his Indentures.—Sect. xxiv. End.

<sup>o</sup> Rom. viii. 1.

<sup>p</sup> This may be the meaning of Dr. Balguy, p. 157.—This comes near Vossius’s account, *remanere vitiositatem, tolli reatum*.—De Baptismo Disp. 6. Thesis 1.—Works, Vol. 6. p. 276.

is only one grand division, into those that believe, and those that believe not<sup>a</sup>. The Apostle too looks over the whole *world* at once; Jews and Gentiles are in a state of condemnation<sup>r</sup>, but Christians are relieved from it; “there is no condemnation” for *them*. Exceptions, and failures of individuals, could not be properly mentioned on so great an occasion. Human Governors, when planning enlarged schemes of policy, take the compliance of individuals for granted.

XXXIII. I will not enter into more proof of the direct kind; but we have generally found it useful to give some *indirect* proof; that is, to answer some *objections*.—The reasonings of our adversaries have been already examined in some particulars; but still it may be worth our while to select a few objections, were it only for the purpose of illustrating and applying our more formal proofs.

XXXIV. It has been thought, that our doctrine has *fewer* supports than might have been expected from our account of its importance.—In *Scripture*, Taylor says, there are but *five*<sup>s</sup> passages, which *certainly* relate to it. Suppose there were no more, are *five* passages of scripture to be neglected? whatever they may teach? The passages from Gen. iii. and Rom. v. are of very considerable length. On what ground are they to be neglected? because, if the doctrine had been essential, it would have occurred more frequently? I do not see what right any man has to say that: or to judge how frequently God shall repeat any truth in his sacred volume.

<sup>a</sup> Being baptized is making a *contract*; that must imply observing the *conditions* of that contract.

<sup>r</sup> See Mr. Locke's last note on Chap. 7.—that is, on the verse next before the passage in question.

<sup>s</sup> On Orig. Sin, p. 5, 6. 254.

volume.—Because, if St. Paul had not been led by a particular subject to use certain reasoning, (in Rom. v. &c.) we should never have heard of such a doctrine?—This is not to be admitted: if God had not used this method of instructing us, he might have used others: the question therefore is not, what the state of things *would have been*, if “these passages had never been written;” but what it is “now they *are* written.”—Because Christ himself did not mention it in form<sup>†</sup>? but it seems agreed by all judicious<sup>\*</sup> Divines, that Christ himself meant to open his Religion only in part, and to leave the rest to be opened after the whole proof of his resurrection and ascension could be laid before the world, by persons to whom he gave credentials by enabling them to work miracles: some things might more properly be opened by himself, others by his agents; shall we take upon us to determine what things were most proper to be opened by him, and what by them?—If we adopt no doctrines but those, which were delivered by Christ himself, we must cut off a number<sup>‡</sup> of those, which the Church has usually thought important.—This is our answer on the supposition, that there are no more passages in Scripture to our present purpose than five: But we see, that a great many more have been of use to us: and more still might have been added.

Some valuable authors, it must be confessed, have not dwelt much on original sin. Bishop Butler, in his *Analogy*, seems to be<sup>‡</sup> brief upon it. We have not an *Homily* on the subject by name, though much is said to the purpose, in the Homilies of

† Gibson's 3d Pastoral Letter, p. 235.

‡ Taylor, p. 6. 254.

\* See Gibson's 3d Letter, as before.

‡ Gibson, Ibidem, p. 235.

‡ Part 2. Chap. 1. p. 186, 12mo.

of the *Misery of Man*, and the *Nativity* of our Saviour.

Dr. Balguy has only two very short expressions relating to it. Probably, some candid men have been diffident about it; or, though satisfied themselves, have thought it the part of modesty and forbearance, to desist from pressing what was esteemed difficult, on others. And they found, that the omission of this subject did not hinder them from proceeding to others, even to such as are connected with it; the sinfulness of the world, and the communication of evil, natural and moral, from parents to children<sup>a</sup>.

P. S. Bishop *Warburton*, in his ninth Book of the *Divine Legation*, has shewn no desire of evading any part of this subject.

xxxv. We will mention, as a second objection, that question, which is often urged by Taylor<sup>b</sup>: can any man be sinful except by *choice*? not as an *individual*; but, as a *member* of a community or *collective* body, he certainly may. A member of a corporation may vote against some abuses; and yet, if they are practiced, he, as a member, is guilty of them, and liable to be punished; not by evils inflicted purposely upon *him*; but by evils inflicted on the Corporation, and incidentally affecting

<sup>a</sup> Talking the language of *common life*, about good sort of men, &c. sometimes seems to exclude this Theory, when it really does not: and this language is in *Scripture*, as well as in common writings; it is a language, which may be allowed even to those who are perfectly Orthodox, in the ordinary intercourse of men.—Saying, ‘Fire is hot,’ is allowable in the strictest natural Philosopher; and his using such common expression on all common occasions, does not hinder his speaking with *precision* when the *case* requires it.

<sup>b</sup> Taylor, p. 127. 190. though the former passage rather relates to the tenth Article.—Also p. 58.

fecting him.—And, in the case of corrupted nature, though no man is strictly sinful without choice, yet being born in certain circumstances will make it more *difficult* for him to chuse right; infomuch that, on a footing of *probability*<sup>c</sup>, it may be said, in the language of scripture, “it is impossible<sup>d</sup>” but that he will offend. But this is only the same as saying, if a man is drawn into bad company, he will be drawn into the commission of some bad actions.

xxxvi. The generality of objectors to our doctrine exclaim against its *cruelty*: or conceive it as implying cruelty (supposing it true) in the supreme Being.—But this a groundless objection. If any men come into this world as sinners, it is because God treats some men, or all men, collectively; but to do so is, or may be, a mark of a good<sup>e</sup> Governour. If any men derive inordinate appetites from others, it is by a benevolent law, which connects different generations together. *Good* is hereditary, as well as evil. Indeed the law of our Nature, by which *things* or *qualities* are hereditary, has nothing to do with good and evil properly; only as *qualities*, which are hereditary, are good and evil; *evil* is hereditary *accidentally*, as *belonging* to those things or qualities, which are made hereditary by Nature. How is this then cruelty?—If you are still dissatisfied, and cannot get rid of your idea of cruelty, except your individual be spared, who has only offended as member of a community,—except he also be spared, who has offended through the impulse of irregular propensities, owing in some measure to others;

<sup>c</sup> Taylor treats this as an absolute *necessity*; a notion which we have frequently contradicted and disclaimed.—Taylor on Orig. Sin, p. 58. 131. 188.

<sup>d</sup> Luke xvii. 1.

<sup>e</sup> Sect. xxx. and Taylor, p. 205.

others; how do you know that, at the last judgment, they will *not* be spared? if it be *cruel* to punish them, assure yourself God will *not* punish them. I defy all the world to prove, that he *will*.

Taylor allows<sup>f</sup>, that God may entail Labour and Sorrow on all men, in this world, and at last death, in consequence of Adam's offence; but nothing which can be punished as *Sin*: where would be the cruelty of this last, except in inflicting sorrow after death? does it then lessen the cruelty, that the evil should be suffered on this side the grave? is not an evil equally an evil on both sides the grave?

Dr. Ogden's second Sermon on Christian Faith might be consulted here: particularly p. 140. 12mo<sup>g</sup>.

## XXXVII. A

<sup>f</sup> On Orig. Sin, p. 27. 101. 149.

<sup>g</sup> Having, in this Section, endeavoured to *enlarge* our ideas of hereditary qualities; and to take the mind out of the narrow and confined track of original *sin* and *evil*, into the more open and extensive way of original *qualities*, of different kinds, sometimes evil and sometimes *good*; I think it may illustrate my idea of *hereditary good*, or *original virtue*, to reprint a Letter from the Duke of Fitzjames to Louis XVI. which appeared in the public prints in January 1791.—The community is a *Regiment*, the virtue is *military virtue*, but it is what was pursued and felt as virtue: the sentiments of loyalty, &c. are the counterpart to our *Concupiscence*. The "*original purity*" mentioned has some correspondence to our "*original righteousness*."—The qualities of the community are distinct from those of the *individual* members: yet the individuals *deserve reward* as members of the community.

An authentic Letter of the Duke of Fitzjames, just sent to the King of the French.

S I R E,

A faithful subject, who has not the honour of being particularly known to your Majesty, thinks it his duty, at this interesting crisis, to lay the homage of his sentiments at your Majesty's feet. These *sentiments*, Sire, are *hereditary* in his family, and he claims no other merit than that of preserving them

XXXVII. A great deal of alarm has been given, as if it necessarily followed from our doctrine, that

them in their *original purity*. My grandfather, a stranger in this kingdom, but of an illustrious descent, was created by your magnanimous ancestor a Peer of France; since which period both himself and his descendants have ever been distinguished for their loyalty. Of this he gave various proofs, during the course of a long and glorious life, terminated in the service of France at the siege of Philipbourg. My father followed his example, and *transmitted* with his name *the same sentiments to me, his son*.

In the midst of the public calamities, Sire, I am deeply affected by a consideration, peculiar to myself, which my confidence in the goodness of my King emboldens me to lay at his feet.

My grandfather came not alone into France—*His brave companions are now mine*, and the dearest friends of my heart. He was accompanied by thirty thousand Irishmen, who abandoned their country, fortunes, and honours, to follow an unfortunate King. For the *descendants* of that respectable class of men, whom your ancestors thought worthy of protection, because they had been faithful to their Sovereign, I now entreat the same bounty from the Great Grandson of Louis XIV. It is reported, and seems not improbable, that the National Assembly purpose disbanding the Irish regiments as foreign troops. The blood *they have shed* in the cause of France ought to have procured them the advantage of being *denizens* of that kingdom, although their capitulation had not entitled them to that privilege. Permit, Sire, that I lay at your Majesty's feet the ardent wish of the *Irish regiments*, as much attached to France by gratitude, as they formerly were to the House of Stuart by love and duty. If the Assembly of France now rejects their services, they implore your Majesty's recommendation to the Prince of your family now reigning in Spain; presuming to assure your Majesty, that the present will be worthy of being made by a King of France, and of being favourably received by a Prince of your royal House.

Fidelity and valour are their titles of recommendation. Of the former they expect an authentic testimonial from the French nation, setting forth that *they have never once departed from their duty, during the space of more than a century*, that they have fought its battles, in which *their valour* has been uniformly conspicuous. I entreat you, Sire, to listen to their request; for myself I ask no compensation—for me there is none. The honour of commanding them is not to be repaid. It secures my glory, since to lead them against the enemy afforded a sure pledge of speedy victory.



that *Infants* dying unbaptized must suffer eternal *torments*. Poor harmless babes! they are perfectly sheltered from all ill-treatment in the bosom of an all-kind and powerful Creator!—can any one shew, that *He* is bound by the letter of any law, contrary to the spirit of it? or that he is tied up from shewing even *mercy*<sup>h</sup> where the case requires it?—Suppose the Theory indispenfible, that Christianity alone can take off the condemnation pronounced upon our first Parent; yet, cannot God, in cases of extreme necessity, dispense with forms of admission? is it impossible that those, who have no chance of being baptized, should benefit by the Christian sacrifice? all men are mortal, all have been condemned to death through the offence of their first Parent: is it impossible, that, as the offence came on all men to condemnation, so the free<sup>i</sup> gift should come “upon all men unto justification of Life?”—But, when men will treat extreme cases as if they were ordinary, they must involve themselves in difficulties.

Laws are made for ordinary cases, and are superseded by necessity. We talk of different genera and species, as if they were perfectly distinct; but we find some intermediate things, which perplex our classing:—we talk of *human beings* having such and such qualities, rights, &c.—but we find some beings such, that we cannot decide whether they are human<sup>k</sup> or not. Of these we can only say, *as far forth* as they are human beings, such and such things may be predicated of them: and this we may say of Infants; as far as they have the *moral* qualities of an human being, so far they seem susceptible of human rewards and punishments:

we

<sup>h</sup> Rom. ix. 15.

<sup>i</sup> Rom. v. 18.

<sup>k</sup> See Locke 3. 6. 26. on Hum. Understanding.

we may talk abstrusely ; but, in reality, there need be no more difficulty about an infant being rewarded or punished, than there is about a young Lord or Emperor, who is “ mewling and <sup>1</sup> puking in the Nurse’s arms,” and at the same time governing an extensive Monarchy.

It may, moreover, be observed, that the speculative doctrines of scripture do not seem intended for *mere* speculation, or to make us judges of each other ; each man should take them as applicable to *his own practice*. If then you think the Theory of Christianity such, that infants are in danger, if not admitted into the community of Christians, baptize ; but do not *judge*.—What I have now said, though I think it just, seems liable to be misapplied : those who form hasty conclusions, may think, that I make the baptizing of infants a matter of too little importance : but this is not really the case ; in practice, I think it *indispensible*<sup>m</sup>, (in case of sickness) ; but doing *our parts* is a very different thing from determining what part *God* shall act. Nay, I not only think, that negligence may affect the Parent, but even the *child* : I say, *may* affect ; to say, *will* affect, is to run into the error I am condemning ; what is omitted through *negligence* is very different from what is omitted through *necessity*. As the negligence of the Parent may deprive the child of education, health, or even life itself ; or occasion his having vicious principles ; no man can prove, that negligence with respect to a Sacrament will *not* occasion material evil to the child, or deprive it of material good. I say not, it *will* do so ; you must not say,  
it

<sup>1</sup> Shakspeare’s *As You like it*, Act 2. Scene 7.

<sup>m</sup> I am only speaking *here* of those, who *hold* infant-baptism.

it will *not* <sup>n</sup>.—But this affords no argument against the Doctrine under consideration.

XXXVIII. We find, in disputes about original sin, passages are frequently quoted out of the eighteenth Chapter of the Book of *Ezekiel*, as expressing, that a man's goodness or wickedness is to be ascribed to *himself*. "The soul that sinneth, *it* shall die." On first view, we can say, that the declarations of the prophet must be, in some way or other, *reconcilable* to Exod. xx. 5. otherwise both cannot come from God: therefore to argue from one of these passages, without any attention to the other, is not the way to arrive at truth.

But the case seems to be this; if any part of scripture be abused, and that abuse corrected by a subsequent writer, the correction, expressed artlessly and warmly, will sound like a contradiction<sup>o</sup>. Some men seem to have abused Exod. xx. 5. as expressing the influence of one generation on another.—The end and design of visiting sins of parents on children probably is, to make parental love act as an auxiliary motive to virtue: for many men will be more careful for their offspring than for themselves:—some Jews<sup>n</sup> seem to have made this plan of Providence, instead of a motive to virtue,

<sup>n</sup> There is something, I think, in *Augustin* very like some part of this; but I do not recollect where:—sometimes, he, and the other ancients, run too much into determining what *will* become of Infants.—*Our church* (see end of private Baptism) goes so far as to say, that Infants baptized will certainly be *saved*;—this is much better, I think, than any other determination of the kind. It is intended to *comfort* parents, and encourage Baptism.

<sup>o</sup> This I conceive to happen, when St. James corrects the perversions of St. Paul's Doctrine about justification by Faith.—Lardner dates Paul to Romans, 58; James, 62. But this will be a subject of discussion in Art. XI.

virtue, an excuse for vice, and a pretence for evading their duty. We *cannot* be in the favour of God, say they; It is vain for us to be careful or good; our parents have already made us reprobates. To this evasion they seem to have added insolence; in applying a taunting proverb, “the fathers have eaten four grapes, and the children’s teeth are set on edge.” Instead of using that Law of God, which connects generations, to assist virtue, they used it to overthrow virtue, and then laid the blame on God:—impudent hypocrisy! yet they said, “the way<sup>p</sup> of the Lord is not equal!” well might the prophet retort, “are not your ways unequal?”

From comparing Exod. xx. with Ezekiel xviii. it appears, that there are *two Laws* of God’s Government; one is, ‘Parents by their conduct affect their children:’—the other, ‘each man must work out his own salvation:’ supposing these rules declared for men to *act* upon, they do not interfere with each other; the first is for the *Parent*, the second for the *child*;—and, if a man is *both* parent and child, they conspire, and assist each other, as motives to virtue; the man does what is right, for the sake of his *offspring*, and also for his *own* sake. The *degree*<sup>q</sup>, in which the parent affects the child, we know not precisely; but we know, that communication of good and evil from parents to children by no means renders diligence fruitless or unnecessary<sup>r</sup>.

XXXIX. I

<sup>p</sup> Ezek. xvii. 25. 29.

<sup>q</sup> Sect. xxviii.

<sup>r</sup> Bp. Warburton gives a different account of this matter, Div. Leg. B. 5. Sect. 5.—8vo. p. 151, &c. to 160. His notions are always well defended, but I am unable to give up my own:—I have been rather at a loss with regard to Jer. xxxi. 29, 30.—Can the meaning of the Prophet be, that under the new Dispensation, men should not be guilty of such impudent hypocrisy as to use the proverb about four grapes?—The *Law* of  
of

xxxix. I fear, that our doctrine has been considered, even by some <sup>s</sup>candid persons, as a Theory of little *utility*. But who shall call a doctrine useless, which Scripture has published? which gives us the most grand and comprehensive view of God's Government, and shews us, how he treats our whole *Race* as one; and how he makes one generation to depend upon another?—Can that be useless, which lets us into the right way of treating ourselves? which keeps us from presumption on the one hand, and despair on the other?—Can that seem useless to a Christian (for with such we now argue), which makes us set an high value on our Redemption by Jesus Christ?—If a child is diseased from his <sup>t</sup> Birth, is it useless to be aware that he is so? or to know, that he is not incurable? And, if we can come at some knowledge of these things without having recourse to our present doctrine, yet can it ever be useless to see a subject to the bottom? I mean, as far as man is capable of seeing it? or to endeavour to hold it on the best grounds?

xl. Lastly, <sup>u</sup> I believe it is often objected to our doctrine, in one way or other, that it *disgusts* men

of visiting sins of Parents on children might continue, in some degree, though men improved so as to leave off the use of an insolent *proverb*.

And the Law of making Parents to affect their children, may be enforced in different degrees at different times; without limit. If the *Mosaic* dispensation required, that preceding generations should affect Posterity *in a greater degree*, than under the mere Law of Nature, yet in *all* ages the *two Laws* subsist; and therefore our solution retains its force.

<sup>s</sup> Sect. xxxiv. latter part.

<sup>t</sup> See Girtanner on the venereal disease in children; reviewed Sep. 1790. in the *Analytical Review*; 8vo. 459 pages, 1788.

<sup>u</sup> I might here reply to the objection, does not Christ take away original sin wholly? how then can concupiscence remain in Christians?—but I have already mentioned this objection.—  
(Sect.

men of *philosophical* minds, and makes them averse to Revelation.—But, if it has had this effect, I think the fault was in the minds of those, who were disgusted. The pride of Science has often hindered men from treating the doctrines of revelation with sufficient respect, even on their own principles; or seeing how nearly they are connected with natural Religion<sup>x</sup>. Shall not the true philosopher enlarge his views of things? shall he not study the Laws of God's Government, giving particular attention to those, which are great and extensive? shall he not study the state and condition of human nature? and the provisions to be made against bad internal principles?—Suppose he thought, that all mankind had not two common parents; but that several tribes of men had each its own; yet still each tribe must trace his present qualities up to some confessed origin, in the same manner that we trace ours up to Adam. Shall Horace shew, that he had the idea of improper<sup>y</sup> sin and punishment? shall he say, that effeminacy in the offspring is to be ascribed to vice in the parent?—Shall Cicero lament our early depravity?—Shall Plato<sup>z</sup> hold, that God punishes offences down to the fourth generation,—and shall the Philosopher set our doctrine at nought?

What

(Sect. xxxii.) I am inclined to mention it here, because it is properly an *objection*.

<sup>x</sup> Mr. *Locke* himself is thought to have “set himself to reduce the fundamental doctrines of Christianity to the narrowest compass he possibly could.” (See *Gibson's 3d. Past. L. p. 231*):—this is *scarcely* treating the doctrines with sufficient respect, it is being afraid, and almost ashamed of them.

<sup>y</sup> See the passages, Sect. 111, Note; it might be proper to read them again before entering upon this objection.

<sup>z</sup> See *Hor. Delph. Od. 3. 6. 1.* Note.

What Voltaire<sup>a</sup> has written on this subject is silly and contemptible.

XLI. Let us now come, in the last place, to our *Application*:—or, to consider, what is the result of the foregoing remarks, in our present circumstances.—It has been already<sup>b</sup> observed, that it would be useful, in treating most of the Articles of our second part, to try how near an Article of *Natural Religion* would come to each Article of our church. Be this our first task. A right execution of this, will facilitate the rest. We must suppose our Pagan to say nothing but what is found in ancient heathen writings, or is clearly to be gathered by the light of Nature. On this ground, a man might say thus;—

‘ We, at this time, cannot be such as our Creator *intended* when he formed us. A *golden age*, though feigned by Poets, shews a sense of our present depravity. What is the cause? Surely, in some degree, the generations that are passed. If our forefathers had been better, so should we. But how *far* are we to go back, in order to find the first source? as far back as the generations of man extend. It is not merely to bad *examples*, that we owe our moral disorder: in the descent of qualities from Parents to children, there is an *influence* much greater than that of example; whether it lie in *propagation*, or in education, or in both.—But, while one generation after another keeps in a state of depravity, in what *light* can our *species* stand before our Creator? only in that of a *criminal*. He does not regard each man merely as a separate individual;

<sup>a</sup> Voltaire’s Works, quarto, Vol. 26. p. 384. I should not have left this matter so very short, though I believe I should not have detained my hearers long upon it, had I not been unable to procure the 26th Vol. of Voltaire’s works at the time of giving the Lecture.

<sup>b</sup> Sect. xvi.

dual; (for he punishes the children for the faults of the Parents); but if he *did*, our *depravity* must *incense* him; and the state of our *passions* makes it *probable*, that we shall *continue* to offend.—What is to be done? We might agree upon some *plan*, some *association*, for *meliorating* our Nature:—And, though we must not expect to get all the benefit of such plan at *once*; though *habitual desires* are not to be rooted out in a moment, and *purity* planted in their stead, and brought to maturity; yet it is to be hoped, that God would, from the *first*, consider us and our undertaking in a favourable light.’

XLII. Having thus prepared the way, let us come to our proper business, and see in what sense a *Christian* may *assent* to our Article at this day.—We may suppose, in some such sense as the following;

‘Scripture treats men, considered before Christianity has had any effect, as concluded under Sin, and children of *wrath*: it also describes the carnal appetites as, what we find them, too prevalent and unruly: this is true description, but unruly appetites, however truly described, must be wrong. God did not *create* man for a state so defective: so long as we continue in it, our *species* must appear *criminal* in his eyes, and therefore so must *every one* that helps to compose our species. Nay, *each* man must be punishable *singly*, so long as his *passions* are in a state of rebellion or anarchy; because vicious passions have the *Nature of Vice*. What is the *cause* of this evil?—the offence of our first *Parents*? the account of them is drawn in *faint* characters; yet our evil is, confessedly, in *some* measure traced up to them; and many instances appear of God’s treating human Beings *collectively*; and experience shews, that faulty passions *are* trans-

mitted



mitted in a course of nature, from generation to generation.—*Example* cannot solve such appearances; for example is only forcible, when the models are *at hand*.

Our *remedy* for these mischiefs must lie in the *Christian Religion*: that, immediately on admission, *restores* us to a state of *favour*, so far as to take off the *condemnation* lying upon our *Species*; and puts *each man* into a *way*, by which he may *purify* the principles and passions of his mind. Only he must be aware, that mere *admission* into Christianity will not, *of course*, effect a thorough reformation in his *Heart*.’

XLIII. The next part of our application relates to *mutual concessions* between contending parties.

We, on *our* part, might perhaps drop the expression *original sin*, if that was found to be the real cause of dissension; using some harmless terms, with which no idea of dispute was associated.—We might also change any expressions, which seem to imply, that sin is a part of our *nature*, as *reason* or *memory* is, fixed, *indelible*; into such as shewed, that the prevalence of our carnal appetites was a thing only to be expected on a footing of *probability*, and always *voluntary* in each particular instance; and always *curable*. We might also change the word “*damnation*,” into any word which would convey less *terror* to common minds, and would allow of all possible *degrees*.—We might perhaps leave more *latitude* for those, who doubted whether the History of *Adam* was to be understood *literally*.

On the part of our *adversaries*, (I speak not of *Infidels*, for the question is only about different interpretations of scripture amongst those, who acknowledge its authority), it might be allowed, that

that individuals, though *innocent* as such, may be, agreeably to what we find in scripture, affected by what is properly the punishment of the *community*. — That vicious sentiments may *descend* from parents to children, in a course of *Nature*, like *insanity*; and that the *usual* acceptance of *hereditary* does not pretend, in *all* cases, *precisely* to distinguish<sup>c</sup> between the effects of *propagation*, and *living together*. That, when it is very *probable*, from experience and observation, that certain *passions* will prevail, it is according to custom of *language* and *scripture*, to speak of them as *prevalent*; though in *each act* of the mind there may be *choice*, and though the *state* of the mind admits of continual *amendment*.

It seems to me as if those, who follow *Taylor*, might make these concessions; and then but little matter of dispute would remain. If any should remain, *moderation* in carrying it on would be here peculiarly becoming:—and it would also be *practicable*; because all parties allow the *existence* of *evil*, the difference is, about the manner of *accounting* for its existence. And this is a difference, which need not hinder men from *uniting* in finding and applying *remedies* for our mental disorders.

XLIV. We now come to the last thing, which is, as before, to consider, whether our researches have made any openings for *Improvement*,—The great subject of improvement here, must be *hereditary evil*, natural and moral. The *nature* of this, and its particular *Laws*, should be investigated by a series of *experiments*. In such investigation, the *remedies* would be observed with a watchful eye.—  
And

<sup>c</sup> Perhaps it may be from this part of the subject, that Augustin says, “eo (peccato originali) nihil ad predicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius.”—(quoted in Encycl.)

And success in this, would lead to an *analysis*<sup>d</sup> of human *sentiments* and passions; and to the best methods of regulating them, and producing from them their greatest good.

Improvement might be made in *classing* texts of *scripture*, which have any relation to our subject. Some texts consider the Christian in *theory*, others in *practice*; and speak of him, accordingly, as *good* or *bad*:—as free from *condemnation*<sup>e</sup> or obnoxious to it. Sometimes man is spoken of as a *species*, sometimes as an *individual*.—Sometimes the *entrance* into Christianity means nothing more than mere admission; sometimes it implies all the *consequences*, which follow from it in the common course of things.—But we shall again have occasion to mention this classing; a great deal of dispute has arisen from the want of it.

The *denunciations* made<sup>f</sup> on occasion of the offence of our first Parents, with regard to *Labour*, *Agriculture*, and *Parturition*, might afford hints for improvements in those particulars.

*Labour* might be improved, or the evil of it diminished, by every one's *sharing* in it; with a view to health, and other ends; and by improving the condition of those, who earn a subsistence by Labour.—As also by contriving to have incitements to labour from some noble or affecting sentiment; for we know, that, in the warmth of friendship, compassion, emulation, &c. the evil of labour is entirely annihilated. Amongst these incitements should be, the *hope* of success; to which it would contribute greatly, if the *materials* were improved on which men labour.

This last thought leads us to improvement in *Agriculture*. The ground seems to *resemble*, in some

<sup>d</sup> See *Essai sur les moyens de plaire*, p. 178. said to be written by Moncrieff.

<sup>e</sup> Sect. xxxii.

<sup>f</sup> Gen. iii. 16. 19.

some sort, the mind of man: if *neglected*, it gets *over-run* with weeds; but attention and experience shew the best methods of *extirpating* them, and *preventing* their growth. The present generation is too well skilled in the methods of improving agriculture, for me to offer any hints concerning that subject.

Nor dare I hazard any particular remarks on the subject of *Parturition*. I think it does admit of improvement; and some cases have appeared, in which a strong sentiment, particularly that of *shame*, and a course of *healthy activity*, have greatly reduced its evils. These are hints of nature, which should be pursued: probably the "pain and peril of child-birth" would be diminished as *Labour* grew more pleasing. And as yet, no particular *limit* appears, at which the improvement *must* stop.

XLV. We may now draw towards a *conclusion*. And what thought is so natural, after the discussion of our grand, awful, and interesting subject, as this? that the whole History of mankind seems to consist in a departure from original perfection, and a gradual return to it. We may recollect what was said about a *state of nature* being a state<sup>s</sup> of *war*. . . . Supposing man to come out of the hand of his Creator such as he must have been *intended* to be, his first state would be a state of *peace*: but he offends, he grows corrupted, his *passions* grow turbulent, he falls into contentions; his state of undisciplined nature becomes a state of *war*. He gets involved in such evils, that *civil society* becomes necessary for his *security*: civil society brings on *order* and discipline, encourages industry and *civilization*; its benefits cause it to be *enjoyed*; *patriotism* springs up in the mind; and the public good is pursued with *ardor* and affection: the result is  
*peace*.

*Peace*.—How like to this is the progress of the *mind* in its *moral* capacity, according to the scriptural History so much decried!—It sets out from *original righteousness*, falls, becomes depraved, suffers, is made sober; has recourse to Christianity, is regulated by Christian discipline, gets corrected, meliorated, purified: and becomes, at last, what it was originally *intended* to be, virtuous and happy.

Is it too visionary to hope, that the same progression may, at one time, be experienced in those other things, to which the first dreadful condemnation related?—Were this to be the case, *Labour* would become like the animated and generous exertions of the beneficent Hero, or the eager activity of the hunter, or the engaging pursuits of the man of science, and the enthusiastic virtuoso.—*Agriculture*, by adopting what was *useful*, in the field or plantation, and embellishing it with an ornamental simplicity, would make the earth, if not a perfect *Eden*, a beautiful *Garden*, delightful to the senses, as well as replete with salutary nourishment.—And the generations of man would be continued and perpetuated, without danger, pain, or material inconvenience to those, who never appear more amiable than in the maternal character.



## ARTICLE X.

## OF FREE-WILL.

THE condition of man, after the Fall of Adam, is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself, by his own natural strength and good works, to faith, and calling upon God: wherefore we have no power to do good works, pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God by Christ preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us, when we have that good will.

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1. The *connexion* of this Article with the preceding is obvious. In the preceding, Man is described as under the influence of disorderly *passions*;—that influence must affect his *choice*, or *Free-will*, as it is called; he will not so easily chuse, what is *right*, as if he was free from that influence. This is a lamentable state, it may be said, if we consider the consequent punishment;—true; but the present Article affirms, that God will *assist* man under this difficulty: by his *spirit*, or what has been usually called his *Grace*. So that the present Article relates as much to *Grace*, as to *Free-will*; or perhaps more; for the remedy is more the object of this Article, than the disorder.—However, it had been customary to discuss  
Freedom

Freedom of Will; and the fifth Article had laid down doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit.

II. We begin, as in former Articles, with *History*; and we must be careful not to repeat what was given under the ninth Article, nor to mention any facts, which would be more advantageously introduced hereafter.

Let us first see whether *Heathens* and infidels have held any notions resembling our present doctrine. The ancients seem not unfrequently to refer men's good qualities to divine assistance and inspiration. Agamemnon says<sup>a</sup> to Achilles, in Homer's *Iliad*,

Εἰ μάλα καρτερος εἶσι, Θεὸς πᾶ σοι τογ' ἔδωκεν :

*Fortitude* is one of the four cardinal *virtues*. Parkhurst mentions<sup>b</sup> several instances, in which Homer uses the word *ἐνεπνεύσειν* for inspiring the *mind*.—*Pythagoras*<sup>c</sup> makes truth and virtue the gifts of God. *Pindar* says<sup>d</sup>, of Virtues in general, *Ἐκ Θεῶν γὰρ μάχαναι πασαι βροτεαῖς ἀρεταῖς*, &c.—*Socrates* used to say, *Θεὸς — σημαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις περὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπείων πάντων*<sup>e</sup>.—*Erasmus*<sup>f</sup> speaks of Cicero as inspired; and, in modern times, Lord Herbert of Cherbury, a famous Deist, addresses God as “giver of all inward illuminations<sup>g</sup>.”—These seem to be instances of referring *moral* qualities to God:—*natural* events are frequently referred, as the finding of Polycrates's<sup>h</sup> ring, to Neptune; but I will only recall

<sup>a</sup> *Iliad*, 1. 178.

<sup>b</sup> Hebr. Lexicon under *וְיָרָא* — sense vii.

<sup>c</sup> See his *Life* by Ladvocat;—also by Dacier, Vol. 2. p. 219.

<sup>d</sup> *Pyth.* 1. 79. or *σεφνη γ*: see also some of his Commentators. The ancient idea of *Virtue* was extensive; see Hume's *Essays*, Vol. 2. p. 282.

<sup>e</sup> Xen. *Memorab.* 1. 1. 19.

<sup>f</sup> See Oliver's *Tusc. disp.* beginning.

<sup>g</sup> See Leland's *View*, Vol. 1. p. 24. 4th Edit.

<sup>h</sup> Valer. Max. 6. 9. quoted by Pearson on Creed, p. 444-1st. Edit. or 218. fol.

recall to your minds the prayer of the Countryman to *Hercules*, as that is an instance of uniting *divine assistance* with *human*<sup>i</sup> *endeavours*<sup>k</sup>.

III. The *Jews* seem to have been more in the *habit* of referring things to God, than any other people: they spoke of him, not only as the cause of *good*, but of *evil*. One reason probably was, that they were more immediately under the Government of God than any other people. When the more extraordinary communications between God and them ceased, they had the *Prophets* to connect them with him; and, when Prophecy at length was silent, they still remained a distinguished people.—I imagine no other people would speak of God's *hardening* the Heart of an oppressive Prince, or of leading men into *Temptation*<sup>l</sup>. Yet they had not all exactly the same idea of the divine agency, when opposed to human. The *Essenes* are<sup>m</sup> said to have favoured divine agency, the *Sadducees* human; and the *Pharisees*, to have been in a kind of middle opinion.—The *Psalms* contain some prayers

<sup>i</sup> *Fable* of the Countryman and Hercules.

<sup>k</sup> These instances do not express the *Slavery* or captivity of the will; nor distinguish between preventing and assisting Grace: niceties are not to be expected: yet, in Dacier's account of the doctrine of Plato, (French Edit. p. 153,) there is a something about *blindness* of the mind: and vicious actions becoming *involuntary*, which seems really to bear some affinity to the Christian (or Jewish) expressions. Men are drawn on, (Dacier says, representing the doctrine of Plato,) “ par le mal heureux penchant de leur cœur, qui leur fait commettre le mal qu'ils ne voudroient pas faire; ils sont *esclaves* du péché, qui les domine, et au service duquel ils ont engagé leur liberté.”—But I have not an opportunity at present of giving the passages in the Original.

<sup>l</sup> Introd. to Part. II. Sect. XVI.

<sup>m</sup> Burnet on the 17th Art.—Rogers on the 10th Art. mentions both Sadducees and Pharisees, as holding Free-will, “ and that unto the best things.”



prayers for moral qualities<sup>n</sup>. *Maimonides* says<sup>o</sup>, that every man has it in his power to turn himself into a good way, and to be just, צדק, righteous. And this he proves from Gen. iii. 12, which is consequent to the Fall.—His expression is general; but it seems to be opposed, in his mind, to *decrees*, rather than to mental corruption, or slavery of the will.—Isaiah xi. 2, 3.—and lxi. 1. may be reckoned out of the ordinary course of things.—Prov. xvi. 1. 9.

iv. With regard to *early Christians*, the same observations may be made here, which were made under the preceding Article<sup>p</sup>:—including that on the Manicheans: if any one doubts whether any passages can be found in the early writers, which are to our purpose, I need only refer him to Vossius's <sup>q</sup> *Historia Pelagiana*, and Nicholls on this 10th Article.—Nicholls has collected some passages, with regard to the *Slavery* of the will, others concerning *preventing*, others concerning *assisting* Grace.—*Baxter* also tells<sup>r</sup> us, that “both Greek and Latin Fathers, who wrote before the days of Augustin,” “deny any such Grace” as, by an insuperable operation, “shall infallibly convert.”

v. We now proceed to the *fifth century*: and here we again get into the Pelagian controversy. The history of Pelagius<sup>s</sup> has been given before; and a charge of inconsistency<sup>t</sup> against *Augustin* has been mentioned, which belonged, as to the subject of it, to this place; though, as affecting his character,

<sup>n</sup> Psalm li. 10, 11.—and cxix. passim.

<sup>o</sup> De pœnitentiâ, cap. 5. Edit. Claverius, Oxon. 1705.

<sup>p</sup> Art. ix. Sect. v.

<sup>q</sup> P. 644. 6. with regard to Grace in general.—but with regard to *preventing* Grace, see B. 4. Chap. 2.

<sup>r</sup> On Perseverance, p. 3.

<sup>s</sup> Art. ix. Sect. vi.

<sup>t</sup> Art. ix. Sect. vii.

character, more properly to the former. Our present subject seems to have been the principal one of the Pelagian controversy; the others were rather secondary objects; but it admits of so many niceties, that to give the history of that controversy with precision, should be a separate work.—*Vossius* has been very attentive in giving it, and a student, who is desirous of searching into this matter, can scarcely, I should imagine, read a better work". *Forbes* may also deserve mention.—The general idea of the doctrine of the Pelagians, with regard to our present subject, is, that they wanted to reduce all the sayings of Scripture concerning the divine assistance in things moral and spiritual, or concerning the divine influence on the *mind*, to *external* helps; such as the publication of the gospel, the promise of eternal rewards and punishments, &c. these were allowed by all to influence the mind; but the orthodox understood the scriptures to declare an immediate action of the Deity on the mind of man.—The Pelagians contrived several expressions, which had very much the appearance at first of delivering the orthodox doctrines; but, on an accurate examination, they were found to be ambiguous: such is that strong one mentioned by Dr. *Jortin*<sup>x</sup>, God "assists us," "by illuminating us with divers and ineffable gifts of his heavenly Grace:" this many orthodox would be ready to take in their own sense; but it is capable of being construed so as to signify only *external* information:—and other parts of the Pelagian writings required such construction, in order to avoid inconsistency.—We have before produced the

<sup>u</sup> P. S. I am glad to see so good a character of this work as there is at the end of *Plaifere's Appello*, given by Dr. Chr. Potter, p. 423.

<sup>x</sup> Dissertation 2d. p. 51.—Wall, p. 169.

the *Creed* of Pelagius, as delivered to Innocent the first. We find these words in it, with relation to our present subject, “*Liberum sic confitemur arbitrium, ut dicamus nos Dei semper indigere auxilio.*” Augustin shews<sup>y</sup> the ambiguity of *auxilio*, which indeed may mean *external* help; and was probably intended to convey that idea to the Pelagians.—What the Orthodox doctrine was, we may see from the Letter of the African Bishops to Pope *Zosimus*, who seems to have taken the Pelagians in the sense they wished, and therefore to have been desirous of favouring them. These prelates require, that Pelagius and Cælestius “do by a *plain* confession own, that we are in every action assisted by the Grace of God, not only to *understand*, but also to *practise* righteousness; in such wise, as that, without it, we are not able to do, to speak, to think; or to have anything of true and sincere *piety*”<sup>z</sup>.—It might be added to this account, that the Pelagians seem to have carried on their idea of *imitation*; as original sin was an imitation of Adam, so the grace of Christ consisted in part in his setting<sup>a</sup> us a good *example*:—It should also be mentioned, that the Pelagians talked much of the grace of Christ illuminating the human *understanding*<sup>b</sup>; not perhaps internally<sup>c</sup>, as some moderns do, and immediately.—Jerom’s Letter to *Ctesiphon* may lastly be mentioned, as shewing

<sup>y</sup> De Gratiâ Christi, C. 33. Vol. 10. Edit. Benedict.—(See Wall, Chap. 19. Sect. 29.)

<sup>z</sup> Prosper contra Collatorem. C. 10. this translation is in Wall, C. 19. Sect. 15.—Prosper’s was a famous work against Cassian, in defence of Augustin.

<sup>a</sup> See Vossius Hist. Pel. p. 654, or Lib. 3. par. 2. Antith. 3. from Aug. adv. secundam Juliani—Responsionem, Lib. 11. Cap. 145. (should be 146). p. 753. Edit. Ben.

<sup>b</sup> Vossius ibidem.—Wall, p. 171, or C. 19. Sect. 15.

<sup>c</sup> See Ludlam’s Essay on the Spirit.

shewing the manner, in which the Pelagians *argued* against divine grace; they used a kind of *reductio ad absurdum*, by asking, whether, if we wanted to do the most vulgar or unclean actions, (specifying them) we need require the divine assistance<sup>d</sup>.

VI. Though I have not read regularly all *Augustin's* writings relating to the Pelagian controversy, yet from what I have seen, I retain my partiality for him as an acute and noble writer; especially, the times considered. Allowing, that controversy warmed him into saying some things too strong in favour of divine agency, as interfering with human, (though I should doubt whether it really did, notwithstanding<sup>e</sup> I have seen some things, which at first appeared strong) yet one would think nothing very bad could come from one, who uses the following expressions<sup>f</sup>: “*si non est Dei Gratia, quomodo salvat mundum? si non est liberum arbitrium, quomodo judicat mundum?—Quia ista questio, ubi de arbitrio voluntatis et Dei Gratiâ disputatur, ita est ad discernendum difficilis, ut quando defenditur liberum*

<sup>d</sup> See Wall, Ch. 19. Sect. 20.

<sup>e</sup> P. S. See afterwards in Art. xvii. Sect. v.—The change of opinion in Augustin consisted in this: (De Pred. Sanct. Cap. 3.) He once thought, we had something so much our own, that we need not ascribe it to God; but he was struck with 1 Cor. iv. 7. and he found other passages, in which even Faith was ascribed to God; as 1 Cor. vii. 25. therefore he determined to ascribe Faith to God:—his former opinion, he says, was right, as far as it went; he had before ascribed Virtue (or Benevolence its chief source) to God; now he ascribes both Faith and Virtue. They are both our own, he says, “*propter arbitrium voluntatis*,” yet both may be called the Gifts of God. “*Love with Faith*.” Eph. vi. 23.

I see no fault but taking the sentimental expressions of Scripture in too strict and speculative a way. But one side did that as much as the other. Here is no scheme to set aside free-will: there is rather the *contrary* in the writings of Augustin to the monks at *Adrumetum*.

<sup>f</sup> Vossius Hist. Pel. ad init. from Aug. Ep. 46. ad Valentinum. printed Edit. Ben. in 10th Vol. p. 470.

liberum arbitrium, negari Dei Gratia videatur; quando autem asseritur Dei Gratia, liberum arbitrium putetur auferri<sup>g</sup>". Since this is the case, he says, only let Pelagius express himself in terms, which are not *ambiguous*, and all controversy will cease.

This is not the language of a Bigot!—Quod si forte latentèr sentit, *ignoscat* aliter suspicantibus; ipse enim<sup>h</sup> hoc facit, &c.—it is Pelagius's own fault if we suspect him, he might so easily speak out: this surely is liberal, as well as acute. In his book de Civitate<sup>i</sup> Dei, Augustin speaks in favour of Free-will, on principles of natural Religion; just as any Philosopher would speak.

VII. Augustin died in the year 430; *Fulgentius*, who was also an African Bishop, and lived to the year 533, may be considered as a *successor* to Augustin, in taking the lead as far as related to defending the orthodox doctrines. Indeed the Bishops in other parts of the world, both in *Europe* and *Asia*, seem to have had that diffidence with regard to the doctrine or expressions of Augustin, and to have felt that shock, which some good men in other parts have felt in most ages. This occasioned the sending of *Petrus Diaconus* from the East, at the head of a deputation, to confer with the *Africans*. It also was the occasion of some debates, into which a countryman of our<sup>k</sup> own entered; his name was *Fausus*, and he was distinguished from others of that name by the Title of *Riensis*, or *Regensis*, from the Bishopric of *Riez* in France, which he held.—Fulgentius lived much under persecution, as the *Arian* party were in power in his time:—he wrote to *Thrasimund* with

<sup>g</sup> Aug. de Gratia Christi, cap. 47. or Sect. 52. p. 168.

<sup>h</sup> Aug. de Naturâ et Gratia, Cap. 59, or Sect. 69. p. 105.

<sup>i</sup> Vol. 7. Edit. Ben.—Lib. 5. cap. 10.

<sup>k</sup> Cave says, natione Gallus, only of a British Family.

with great and unaffected dignity, at the time when he was under a sentence of banishment, passed by the authority of Thrasimund himself:—he wrote in a style so manly and so rational, as nothing but a strong conviction and a fixed sense of duty could dictate.

VIII. We have already<sup>1</sup> given a general idea of the *Semipelagians*. Their opinion with regard to our present subject, is most briefly expressed thus; they allowed an assisting or co-operating grace, but denied a *preventing* grace: this is said, but there are some distinctions, which might be made, if it were our particular business to get a very precise idea of their notions: as that they allowed a grace preventing, or previously inspiring, good works<sup>m</sup>, but not dictating *Faith*, or good will. They did not allow, that grace was given exactly according to men's *deserts*; yet they thought a good character was an *occasion* of giving it; or rather of *offering* it; for they thought, that every man was *free* to accept or *reject* the divine<sup>n</sup> assistance.—The person mentioned as the leader of the Semi-pelagians, is *John Cassian*, who is placed in the year 424, six years before Augustin's death.—Cassian founded two Monasteries near *Marseilles*, and therefore the Semi-pelagians are frequently called *Massilienses*.—The chief person who opposed Cassian, was *Prosper*, who is placed in the year 434: he followed Augustin, and his works are sometimes made an appendix to the works of that Father. Notwithstanding his efforts, the Semi-pelagians gained ground in the sixth Century; and have never been extinct: they seem likely to  
continue,

<sup>1</sup> Art. ix. Sect. ix.

<sup>m</sup> See Vossius, Lib. 4. par. 1. p. 683.—Aug. De Predest. sanctorum, with the Letters of Prosper and Hilary prefixed, Ed. Ben. Vol. 10.

<sup>n</sup> Mosheim. Index.

continue, and to be popular; as they neither offend by depreciating scripture, nor by neglecting reason. The *English* Divines have been supposed to favour their tenets, though the Liturgy of our church implies, in several ° places, that we hold the doctrine of *preventing Grace*.

IX. The disputes about Grace, which began in the fifth Century, have never wholly subsided; they have grown more and more *intricate*, and therefore more *voluminous*. *Calmet* lays<sup>p</sup>, that more has been written by Divines upon Grace than upon any other subject. *Voltaire* seems to account for it by saying, “cette question, ainsi que presque toute la<sup>q</sup> métaphysique, rentre pour le fond dans le labyrinthe de la *fatalité* et de la *liberté*, où toute l’antiquité s’est égarée, et où l’homme n’a guères de fil qui le conduise.”—This being the case, we must content ourselves with selecting a few remarkable æras.

The *Mohammedans* seem to attribute a great deal to the divine assistance; nay, so much as to take away even human co-operation. See *Calmet’s Dictionary* under *Grace*.

In the *ninth century*, our doctrine, and those connected with it, occasioned disturbance. *Gotescalc*, or *Godeschalchus*, studied the works of *Augustin* with great ardour, and filled his mind with lofty conceptions of the divine Grace and decrees; some of them such as *Augustin* had really never entertained, as they ran into the extremes of absolute reprobation. He was a *German* by birth, but belonged to a monastery in France, near *Soissons*; there is a Bishop of *Soissons*, but he is under the Archbishop of *Reims*.—This zealous monk took a journey

° See *Nicholls* on this tenth Article.

<sup>p</sup> Dict. under *Grace*.

<sup>q</sup> Siècle de Louis xiv. du Jansénisme; near beginning.

journey to Rome, in order to visit the Tombs of the Apostles: on his return, he visited the Bishop of *Verona*, and poured forth to him the sublime notions, which he had been imbibing; the Bishop heard so much of

“Fixed fate,<sup>r</sup> free-will, foreknowledge absolute,” that he began to be alarmed and terrified: he thought the matter required advice; he accordingly applied to *Raban* Archbishop of *Mentz*, to whom *Gotescalc* was as ready to open himself, though in a Synod, as he had been to the Bishop of *Verona*. *Raban* caught the alarm, and accused this admirer of *Augustin* to his highest superior, the Archbishop of *Reims*; the hot, imperious *Hincmar*. *Hincmar* called a provincial *Council*, had the monk condemned, degraded, imprisoned, beat with rods; nay, what might be worst of all, compelled to burn his own writings with his own hands. He died<sup>s</sup> in prison, and after the sacraments had been refused to him when alive, burial was refused to his body.—On this occasion, the flames of controversy about Grace (and the doctrines allied to it) broke out afresh. And the affair of *Gotescalc* has seemed of such consequence in later days, that eminent men have written upon it; *Vossius* and Archbishop *Usher* particularly: *Usher* was a strong predestinarian, and published a little volume about *Gotescalc* expressly. *Vossius* has made the transactions here imperfectly mentioned, the subject of the last part of his *Pelagian History*.

x. The *Schoolmen*, in the twelfth century, seized on every question in the subtle controversies about Grace, and separated it into its minutest fibres: which they moreover twisted with the fine threads of

<sup>r</sup> Paradise Lost.

<sup>s</sup> About the year 868.—He was imprisoned in his Monastery.



of the Aristotelian Philosophy. We shall have occasion to speak of the Schoolmen under the thirteenth Article; we will only mention some here as the leaders of *Se&ts*. *Thomas Aquinas*, of the illustrious Family of the Counts of Aquino (Juvenal's birth-place) followed the notions of Augustin. He is often called St. Thomas; his *Summa Theologiæ*, or body of Divinity, is praised by the authors of the French Encyclopédie, as a great effort of human intellect. But what I mean now to say of him is only, that from him his followers had the name of *Thomists*; they were opposed to the *Scotists*, whose head was *John Duns Scotus* an Englishman, (or Irishman according to Cave): probably his name was *John<sup>t</sup> Duns*; *Scotus*, as before observed, was in old times, the Latin word<sup>u</sup> for *Irishman*; which might not be distinguished from Englishman. In the age we are speaking of, the *Dominicans* and *Franciscans* had all the learning of the times between them. The Dominicans were *Thomists*; and Scotus (or John Duns) being of the Franciscan order, the Franciscans were *Scotists*.—Any one, who wished to take a slight view of the subtleties of the Schoolmen, with regard to the doctrine of *Grace*, might read part of the index to Thomas Aquinas's *Summa*. There are in it about nine columns of the word *Gratia*.—Or he might read the disputes of the Dominicans and Franciscans at the Council of *Trent*<sup>x</sup>. The greatest intricacies seem to be about the *beginnings* of *Grace*, with acts of the *will*: I think it was said, that God waited for the *volition* when a man was previously

<sup>t</sup> See *Ladvocat*.—Sir John *Duntze* is an English Baronet.

<sup>u</sup> Handel was called *il Sassone*:—So Paul *Veronese*, Claude *Lorrain*, &c.

<sup>x</sup> Heylin's *Hist. Quinqu.* Part 1.—Chap. 3. Sect. 4. &c.—Paolo's *History*.

ously prepared by *Grace*; that is, in the language of the Schools, when the man was “constitutus in actu primo sufficiente ad bene operandum.”—It will not be forgotten, I hope, that I am here speaking historically, and not explaining or reasoning.

XI. We will now proceed to the age of the *Reformation*. The *Reformers* in general, from Wickliffe down to Luther and Calvin, were much inclined to high notions of the divine agency; or, as they thought, to be followers of *Augustin*.—Severity of manners, and great seriousness about the Majesty and Glory of God, might promote this turn. The doctrines debated on as *Lutheran* in the Council of *Trent* are very strong<sup>y</sup> indeed.—But the Church of *England* meant to be much more moderate; as appears from the *Necessary doctrine*; and as is well described by Glocester<sup>z</sup> Ridley in his Life of Bishop Ridley.—Nothing indeed can better shew the intention of our church than one short sentence at the end of *the Article of Free will* in the *Necessary Doctrine*<sup>a</sup>; “All men be also to be monished, and chiefly preachers, that in this highe matier, they lokyng on both sides, so attempre and moderate themselves, that neyther they so preache the grace of God, that they take away thereby freewill, nor on the other side so extoll freewill that injury be done to the Grace of God.”—I do not think there was ever anything said more sensibly on this subject<sup>b</sup>.—The *reformatio legum* has these words, “Et similiter nobis contra illos progrediendum est, qui tantum in libero arbitrio roboris et nervorum ponunt

<sup>y</sup> See Heylin *Quinqu*. Part I. Chap. 3. Sect. 1.

<sup>z</sup> Book v. Chap. vii.

<sup>a</sup> Our church afterwards got nearer Calvinism.

<sup>b</sup> It is like Augustin's, Si non est Dei Gratia, &c. Sect. vi.

ponunt, ut eo *solo* fine aliâ speciali gratiâ, rectè ab hominibus vivi posse, constituunt<sup>c</sup>.”

We have no *Homily* professedly on this subject; some few expressions are to be met with in the first part of the *Homily* on *Salvation*, but nothing in the way of theory, or speculation, or definition.—Room seems left by our church for persons of different persuasions; the doctrine is left as unintelligible; *both Free-will* and *Grace* being established, without any authoritative *solution* of the difficulty arising from their seeming inconsistency.—I suppose any of *Plaifere's* five opinions might be professed in our church.

XII. We have before<sup>d</sup> spoken of *Antinomians*, under the seventh Article. All we need say of them here is, that they held Grace to be *irresistible*: which tenet would imply, that all human *endeavours* are unnecessary. Some who held tenets of this nature were<sup>e</sup> called *Gospellers*<sup>f</sup>; but Antinomians were of all countries. These Antinomians opposed the *Anabaptists*<sup>g</sup>, who revived *Pelagianism*.

XIII. The order of *Jesuits* was founded in 1540. Bower says<sup>h</sup>, that they followed the Semi-pelagians; they have been enemies to the high orthodox doctrines of Grace, &c.—So indeed have been other scientific men.—There is a short history of them, said to have been written by D'Alembert, which seems well worth reading; though I should not think the author a Friend to Revelation<sup>i</sup>. He considers the Society as only using Religion

<sup>c</sup> De Hæresibus, Cap. 7.

<sup>d</sup> Art. VII. Sect. III.

<sup>e</sup> Dr. Jortin's 2d. Diff. p. 96. from Burnet.

<sup>f</sup> At first, extolling *Gospel* by setting aside *Law*; afterwards by heightening *Gospel* in any way.

<sup>g</sup> Life of Ridley, p. 344.

<sup>h</sup> Vol. I. p. 350.—Lives of Popes.

<sup>i</sup> Printed 1765. (no place).

Religion as a means of getting Power; yet he considers *Le Tellier* (p. 107,) as sincere about doctrine.

The Jesuits might be, properly, religious at first, and when they found the effect of religion in acquiring power, might apply it to that purpose: this, I imagine, has been often done: they *must* take up *some* doctrine about *Grace*, &c. and they took up that, which would succeed best, in courts particularly. Either *extreme*, of the Pelagians or their adversaries, would have impeded their progress in the *world*: and thinking men would adopt prudential views most easily where they found they had no clear ideas.

The doctrine of the *Romanists* may be seen in the sixth Session of the Council of *Trent*; in the first five *Canons* concerning Justification.—I do not see, that our Article is incompatible with them.

The Romanists have been, since the Reformation, perplexed to determine what part they should take in controversies concerning Grace, &c.—They have extolled Augustin so highly, as to think they must be for him; and they must be against the Reformers: yet the Reformers were great admirers of Augustin; and the Jesuits, devoted to Rome, inclined to Semipelagianism. This, and the divisions amongst themselves, have been the occasion of many inconsistencies, and of many refined strokes of papal policy. What we say of such transactions shall be arranged under heads of different *countries*, rather than in the order of time.

XIV. *Spain* has produced Molina<sup>k</sup>, or Molinos: he was a Jesuit, and a kind of leader in reconciling

<sup>k</sup> Distinguish between this *Lewis* Molina, or Molinos, and *Michael Molinos*, a Quietist.

ciling Grace and Free-will by nice distinctions<sup>1</sup>. *Voltaire*<sup>m</sup> reckons him the original author of the distinctions used in the controversies of the last Century; but some persons ascribe their origin to the Schoolmen.—Disputes<sup>n</sup> have arisen on this question, into which it does not seem necessary for us to enter.—Molina has been of consequence enough to have his book called the precursor<sup>o</sup> of Antichrist, and to be appealed against at Rome<sup>p</sup>.

xv. *Holland and Flanders* have not only produced the famous *Michael Bay*, a divine of *Louvain*, whose doctrines were condemned at Rome, and afterwards brought forward, in order to throw odium on a rival party; but they have been the scene of warm contests with regard to the agency of God, as opposed to the the agency of man.—Those who had high notions of the Divine agency in the salvation of Mankind, were called *Gomarists*, from one *Gomar* born at *Bruges*. Their opponents were called *Arminians*, from *Jacob van Harmine*, in Latin *Arminius*, born at *Oude-water*<sup>q</sup> in 1560.

The *Arminians* got the name of *Remonstrants*, from remonstrating against the treatment they met with; and on that account, the *Gomarists* came to be called *Contra-remonstrants*: they are now most commonly called *Calvinists*, from *Calvin*, who, though a Frenchman, was principally settled at *Geneva*. The famous *Grotius*, or *de Groot*, was an *Arminian*; he was born at *Delft*; his great eminence

<sup>1</sup> See a short account of his Book in Dupin's *Compendious History*, Cent. 17. Chap. 1.

<sup>m</sup> Jansénisme; Louis xiv.

<sup>n</sup> See *Vitringa's Theology*, Vol. 1. where he speaks de *media scientiâ*, under de *Attributis Dei*; (*Sapientia*).

<sup>o</sup> *Voltaire*, ib.

<sup>p</sup> *Dupin*, ib.

<sup>q</sup> *Ladvocat*.

eminence in Learning did not prevent his suffering for his opinions. In 1618, it was thought proper to hold a synod at *Dort* (or Dordrecht) on account of the contentions between the two parties now mentioned. It sate from Nov. 1, 1618, to April 26, 1619: Politics got mixed with Religion: the Arminians were overpowered, Prince Maurice exerting himself against them; and their great support, the Pensionary *Barneveldt*, was beheaded, under pretence of Treason, within a month after the Council broke up. *Grotius* was imprisoned soon afterwards, but escaped out of prison, and became an eminent statesman in *Sweden*, and an Ambassador; nay, at last he received honours in his own Country. Arminius ended his life in a less fortunate manner; he was cited to the Hague, where he defended his opinions; but he was so harassed by the intrigues of the opposite party, that he died at the age of 49: this indeed was before the Synod of *Dort*; but after it, his followers were obliged to fly their country.—Amongst his followers have been many learned men: *Episcopius*, *Limborch*, *Le Clerc*; and others might be mentioned.

It may be as proper here<sup>r</sup>, as anywhere, to mention, that the *points* in dispute between Calvinists and Arminians are reduced to *five*; frequently called the *five Articles*, or the *five Points*. *Heylin* has written an History of them, which he calls his *Historia Quinquarticularis*; a very respectable work.—The first is *Predestination*; the second is the extent of *redemption*; the third, the state of the human *will* before conversion to Christianity; or what helps it requires to enable it to do right: the fourth, the nature of the divine  
*assistance*

<sup>r</sup> “The *quinquarticular*” Controversy “is generally supposed to have acquired that name much about the time of holding the Synod at *Dort*.” Tucker to Kippis, p. 69.

*assistance* in and after conversion: and the fifth is *Perseverance*<sup>s</sup>. These subjects constitute what we have called the *second part* of our 39 Articles (admitting a sort of digression about works of supererogation), and they all come into the canons of the sixth Session of the Council of *Trent* under the head of *Justification*. We may here read a few expressions, shewing different notions of our present subject; either in *Heylin*, *Mosheim*<sup>t</sup>, or in *Plaifere*'s<sup>u</sup> *Apello Evangelium*:—We may read also a short passage in *Wall* on infant-baptism, 4to. p. 168.

XVI. *Germany* produced both *Luther* and *Melancthon*, great and able men; of very different tempers indeed; *Luther* bold and severe; *Melancthon* mild and amiable; but both greatly instrumental in promoting the Reformation. They lie buried near each other at *Wittenberg*, where they had both taught Divinity. The worst of *Luther*'s opinions have just now been mentioned<sup>x</sup>; but, by correcting the errors of *Agricola*<sup>y</sup>, he moderated his own; and it is thought, that the moderate Lutherans in general are, in the Doctrines we are now speaking of, very near the tenet of the Council of *Trent*. The notions of *Melancthon*, on our present subject, are well represented in *Heylin*'s quinquarticular History, from the *Augustan confession*, which

<sup>s</sup> In the English Articles of 1552, there is one Article *De libero Arbitrio*, another *De Gratia*: in those of 1562, there is only one of these; retaining the title of the first, *De libero Arbitrio*.—In *Heylin*'s account of the five Articles, according to the Doctrine of the Church of England, he puts the second and third as being both contained in our present Article, the *tenth*.—Dean *Tucker* calls the five Points “Predestination, Redemption, Grace, *Justification*, and *Perseverance*.” *Letters to Dr. Kippis*, p. 69.—*Whitby* wrote a book on the *five Points*.

<sup>t</sup> Vol. 2. p. 521, quarto, or Vol. 5. p. 444, octavo.

<sup>u</sup> *Plaifere*, p. 28.

<sup>x</sup> Sect. XI.

<sup>y</sup> Art. VII, Sect. III.

which was compiled by Melancthon<sup>2</sup> chiefly : though Luther is said to have been concerned in it.—But for an account of this Confession I will refer to Dr. Robertson's History of Charles V. as to a work which will be acceptable : Charles V. confirmed the Augustan Confession in 1555.

XVII. In *France*, the Doctrines of Free-will and Grace, (and the others with which they are connected) occasioned the memorable disputes between the *Jesuits* and the *Janfenists*. Cornelius *Janfen* was born in Holland, but was afterwards Bishop of *Ypres* in Flanders. He was a great admirer of Augustin, and wrote accounts of his works, which made a Folio Volume; the Book was called *Augustinus*; and was published after his death, though left prepared : it is in our libraries. He died in 1638, but a friend of his, the Abbé of *St. Cyran*, spread the doctrines contained in it ; in consequence of some directions in his *Will*. This gave great offence to the *Jesuits*, who made interest with the Pope to have it condemned as a sequel to the Book of *Baius*, which had been condemned before. The court of Rome was perplexed ; however they condemned *five propositions*, and ordered all the Clergy to sign a condemnation of them. Voltaire gives the conclusion of the Form ; “ Je condanne, de cœur et de bouche, la doctrine des cinq propositions contenûes dans le livre de Cornelius Janfenius, laquelle doctrine n'est point celle de Saint-Augustin, que Janfenius a mal expliquée.” Now the five propositions, though collected out of Janfen's Book, were not expressed in his *words* ; nor were any *places* referred to, from whence they were taken. So that it may be doubted, 1st. Whether the five propositions were really in Janfen's book ;—and 2ly. Whether Janfen's notions were really in Augustin's works.—

Here

<sup>2</sup> Introduction to Book IV. Sect. IV.



Here was a fine field for dispute ! and the zeal, numbers, rank, abilities, of the partizans, carried dispute to an enormous length. Miracles were performed on both sides : those of the Jansenists are introduced into Mr. Hume's essay on Miracles.—When the dispute becomes, instead of a comparison of doctrines, a trial of strength of parties, it ceases to be our concern. I had once<sup>a</sup> occasion to mention some of the consequences of the dispute ; the rest may be found in *Voltaire*<sup>b</sup>, and the book about Jesuits lately mentioned<sup>c</sup>.—The five propositions are in Mosheim's ecclesiastical<sup>d</sup> History ; and even in Dupin's compendium.—Dr. Powell mentions the subject in his Charge on Controversy<sup>e</sup>.

XVIII. As we are going on according to *Countries*, we may take the *Socinians*, as what they call themselves, *Fratres Poloni*. The *Racovian* Catechism will sufficiently shew us their opinions.—There is in it a chapter de libero arbitrio, from whence it appears, that they hold as follows ; free-will was not taken away from *Adam*, (such deprivation was not mentioned as a part of his punishment) nor from us, by his offence : Man is *weak*, but a *will* remains, and he can do the will of God, “*divino auxilio accedente* ;” and God refuses help to no man. Help is *external*, or *internal* ; the latter is when “*Deus in cordibus eorum qui ipsi obediunt, quod promissit, obsignat*.” The *drawing*, mentioned John vi. 44. is by the excellence of God's *promises*.—It is true, that some men are *incorrigible*, in particular *instances* ; God *rejecting them from his Grace*. There is also a chapter on the promise of  
the

<sup>a</sup> B. III. Ch. x.

<sup>b</sup> Siècle de Louis XIV. Jansénisme.      <sup>c</sup> Sect. XII.

<sup>d</sup> Vol. 2. p. 397, quarto.—Vol. 5. p. 213, octavo.

<sup>e</sup> P. 299.

the *Holy Spirit*, in which the *sealing* on the *heart* is also mentioned, as that by which we acquire an *hope* sufficiently strong to make us impregnable to *temptations*; but it is affirmed, that the gift of the *Holy Spirit* is not *previously* necessary to our *believing* the Gospel, because none have that gift except such as do already believe.

Dr. Priestley<sup>f</sup> speaks as if what is said of men in common discourse, that they can do all that God requires of them, was to exclude the more strict System of Christianity; as if St. Paul, in reasoning from what would be *allowed* by *Gentiles*, said all he would ever wish to say.—He allows a “*moral impotence*” to receive “the doctrines of Revelation,” owing to “*sensual dispositions*” indulged, and “*habits*” contracted: which is seemingly all that one of our church need own: we conceive such habits to be partly what may be called *hereditary*; but that is a matter belonging to the ninth Article.—He considers the assistance given by God as consisting in *instructions* and *motives*; or as being *external*<sup>g</sup>:—though he allows of *divine influence* “on certain occasions,” given to men duly disposed; so as to be “the proper subjects of such extraordinary assistance.” Every one must perceive a likeness between Dr. Priestley’s notion of Grace, and that of the *Pelagians*.

Dr. John Taylor has made a collection<sup>h</sup> of texts, in order to shew the different senses of the word *χαρις*. *Pelagius* reckoned<sup>i</sup> up a number of senses, in which he allowed of divine Grace: or a number were reckoned up for him. Taylor makes *ten*  
senses

<sup>f</sup> Familiar Illustration, p. 1. 4. 5. 10. 11.

<sup>g</sup> Though the motive impells the *Will*, it is to be considered as external: the choice is made in a manner purely human, as any other choice is made, in worldly concerns.

<sup>h</sup> At the end of his Book on Original Sin.

<sup>i</sup> Wall, p. 169.

ferences of *χαρις*, and concludes, that it does never “particularly, and only signify, the influence of the spirit of God upon the heart, disposing us to believe in Christ, and to practice Virtue.” But it may possibly be *included* with “other blessings in the general notion of the favour, or Grace of God.”—This collection of texts is a posthumous work, and relates only to one word, *χαρις*.—In his paraphrase on Rom. viii. 27, Taylor says, that the Holy Spirit inspires good *dispositions*.—Writers use the word *Grace* as a *technical* term established by custom; and as such we adopt it.

XIX. We have now brought our History down to the present time; but we have not thought it worth while to mention all particulars; we have rather aimed at giving right general ideas than many particular ones; and have therefore dealt, as it were, by *samples* or *specimens*. I might here mention the distinction between *common* and *special* grace, as Taylor thinks it worth while to prove that such distinction is not founded<sup>k</sup> in scripture; and it is mentioned by *Voltaire*<sup>1</sup>. *Common*, or *sufficient* Grace seems to be such as may *enable* men to become Christians, if they do *all* in their power to become so. It seems supposed, that this grace *might* have its effect, but, through the weakness and vicious habits of men, it *has* not.—*Special* grace<sup>m</sup> supplies this defect; or is so strong, that it not only *might* succeed, but *does* succeed: this is also called *efficacious* Grace:—A curious jumble of cause and effect! *Voltaire* says, “ils soutenaient

<sup>k</sup> Orig. Sin, p. 249, 252.

<sup>1</sup> *Candide* — Louis XIV. Jansénisme.

<sup>m</sup> *Plaifere*, p. 22.—I should think, that the jest about Dr. Swift's degree, being given *speciali gratiâ*, was an allusion to this technical expression of Theology; as well as to University Graces.—I see it is *speciali gratiâ* in the Reform. Legum.

soûtenaient une grâce *suffisante* à laquelle la volonté peut consentir et ne consent jamais; une grâce *efficace* à laquelle on peut résister et à laquelle on ne résiste pas<sup>n</sup>.”

As Free-will is opposed to *necessity*, it may be proper to mention, that very worthy and sensible men have favoured the hypothesis of necessity; as Dr. *Hartley* and Jonathan *Edwards*; I suppose few men have exceeded these two in understanding, information, and Christian Piety.—Mr. Hume is not to be reckoned amongst the Friends of Christianity, but his essay on Liberty and Necessity contains things, which seem reasonable. His ideas seem, in some respects, like my own; how far I may have formerly borrowed my thoughts from his, I cannot tell.

Amongst those, who own *internal* influence on the mind, there are, (or have been) some who hold, that such internal influence is *immediately discernible*;—others who say, that it is only *mediately* perceivable; that is, by means of virtuous disposition and conduct. The former sort are, by the latter, accounted *enthusiasts*: and perhaps they may not allow such doctrine in the way of profession of Faith, or definition, though they are generally supposed to hold it.

xx. I have reserved for a separate mention those, who have expressly and openly held, that God immediately causes the sinful state of some men's minds, by withdrawing his Grace from them.—Something indeed to this purpose has been produced out of the Racovian Catechism, because the whole of what we wanted to take from it, came most commodiously together; though, by the way, I cannot at present reconcile God's refusing Grace to no man, and his leaving some men incorrigible,

incorrigible, by rejecting them from his Grace.—There are, to be sure, in scripture, many expressions about *blinding* men, hardening, giving them up to a reprobate mind, not renewing them, &c. ; now, when these expressions are made into *Theories*, they produce such hypotheses as those we are now speaking of.—In the sixth Canon of the sixth Session of the Council of *Trent*, those Christians are condemned who say, “*mala opera ita, ut bona, Deum operari; non permittivè solum, sed propriè et per se*;—that this is meant of *human* actions, appears by what follows; “*adeò ut sit proprium ejus opus non minùs proditio Judæ, quam vocatio Pauli.*”—Some ancients are referred to in the margin; but we must not be too particular. It appears from *Irenæus*<sup>p</sup>, that he was obliged to oppose one *Florinus* for holding, that God was the author of Sin. This might be conceived to happen either by *decree* or *influence*; the latter only is our present concern.—*Heylin*<sup>q</sup> says, that, after the time of *Irenæus*, the doctrine was not held till the sixteenth century, and then only by an illiterate set of men called *Libertini*<sup>r</sup>, whom all parties disclaimed. *Calvin* gives us their notion in a few words; “*Quicquid ego et tu facimus, Deus efficit; nam in nobis est.*”—In the Synod of Dort, one *Macorius*<sup>s</sup> is mentioned as holding a doctrine near this.—And the *Manichean* doctrine seems the same in effect.—*Jansen* thought, that  
Augustin

<sup>p</sup> Martin Luther, in his Table-talk, expresses himself thus; “When the Deity intends to destroy kingdoms and states, he taketh from them their wisdom, he leaveth them no wife and honest counsellors; that is, he *blinds* them, and afterwards he bereaveth them of their power and ability; they go on in blindness and security, and at last perish.”

<sup>p</sup> Heylin *Quinqu.* i. i.

<sup>q</sup> Heylin, *ibidem*; where are Calvin's words here quoted.

<sup>r</sup> Antinomians.

<sup>s</sup> Heylin *quinqu.* p. 529. 533.

Augustin held the *impossibility* of virtue in some men: not only in the *blinded* and *hardened*, but in the faithful and *just*; grace<sup>t</sup> failing: St. *Peter* was an instance.

XXI. I will close this History with observing, that it is credible the contending parties might each have a *good meaning*; some being afraid of depreciating "*Scripture*", others fearing to do violence to right *reason*, or destroy the foundation of all *Virtue*; or encourage folly and superstition and enthusiasm. The truth is, (though no one party perhaps had a full right to say so,) reason must rejoice in the genuine sense of revelation; and revelation must wish to improve reason.—In setting aside Revelation, there must always be danger of doing harm to reason; and, in neglecting reason, there must always be danger of mistaking Revelation.

XXII. Having finished the *History* of our tenth Article, we come to the *Explanation*: which is, as before, intended to *prepare* the propositions, and clear them of all extraneous matter.

The title "*Of Free-will*," might draw us into difficulties, because there may be some doubt about the propriety of the expression<sup>x</sup>; but every man *feels* what is meant by it. He feels himself *chuse* the right hand or the left. He sometimes perceives himself and other men *chuse* with great *difficulty* that which is right; as in case of inveterate habits, of drinking, &c.

XXIII. "The condition of *Man*:"—this must relate to *mankind*, as such; and therefore would best be conceived, in the first place, of those, who never were made Christians: though it may be applied

<sup>t</sup> Volt. Louis XIV. Jansénisme, p. 268, 269, Ed. Lond. 1752.

<sup>u</sup> See Dr. Potter's Preface in *Plaifere's Apello Evangelium*; as well as Art. II. Sect. III.

<sup>x</sup> See R. Hey on Liberty, p. 22.

applied to those, who call themselves Christians without being really such.

XXIV. “*After the fall of Adam;*” in strictness, this is not the same as saying, ‘*because of the fall of Adam;*’ yet no doubt he would most fully agree with our church, who considered the fall of Adam as the first beginning of our depravity, or of the undue prevalence of our inferior passions over our choice; or, as Dr. Priestley speaks, more strongly, of our “*moral impotence*.”—Nevertheless, as every thinking man will keep in mind the faintness and obscurity of the scriptural History concerning our first Parents, it might perhaps be worth while to extend the question, proposed under the ninth Article, to the present. I mean about the expression, “every man that is naturally engendered of the offspring of Adam,” signifying only, ‘*every man*.’ I should imagine, that, had men continued in a state of original righteousness, they would have ascribed their good actions to divine assistance, in some way or other: but that state would have been so different from our present, that we cannot form distinct conceptions about it. We can see, that the more assistance we want, in order to be virtuous, the more should we ascribe to heaven when we are so.

XXV. “Is such, that he cannot turn and prepare himself”—“*Cannot*”—may not this word be fairly understood in the same sense with the *scriptural* expressions beforementioned<sup>a</sup>: “it is *impossible*,” &c?—if it may, the meaning will be, that it is not at all to be *expected*, on a footing of *probability*, grounded on *experience*: taking this word *singly*, it seems consistent with a man’s being able, in

<sup>y</sup> See Sect. XVIII.

<sup>z</sup> Art. IX. Sect. XIX.

<sup>a</sup> Matt. xviii. 7.—Luke xvii. 1.—1 Cor. xi. 19.—See Art. IX. Sect. XII. & XXXV.

in each *instance*, to turn and prepare himself.—And this may point out a sense, in which God may command things *impossible*; he may enjoin a number of duties, *each* of which is practicable, though, considering our evil habits, it is not to be *expected* beforehand, that we should duly perform them *all*<sup>b</sup>. What is to be *expected*, is a matter of *calculation*; but such calculations belong only to *spectators*; the *agent* has no more to do with them, than a running-horse has to do with the wagers, which are laid upon his winning: his business is only to exert himself, and strive to overcome. Difficulties on this subject must arise from some fallacy; generally, from taking advantage of the different senses of the word *impossible*, and substituting the idea of *natural* for that of *moral*<sup>c</sup> impossibility. I do not mean to say, that, if any one thought that man cannot *possibly*, in the strict sense, turn and prepare himself to Faith, he would dissent from our Article;—I would only wish, that *others* should see in what sense they may assent. If it is strictly impossible for man to convert himself, we trust that God always affords help sufficient to make it possible, in each particular instance; though it seems clearly a *Law* of his Government, to punish our giving too much sway to any passion, by giving it still more power over us.—Yet, *cannot* without help, at most, means only, if he does, 'tis *owing* to help.

XXVI. “*Turn and prepare himself.*”—The word “*turn*” is probably an allusion to Jer. xxxi. 18.  
and

<sup>b</sup> Council of Trent, Session 6. Canon 18.—If it was thought, that *cannot* rather denotes *strict* impossibility, then the mind must go on to the *end* of the Article: and the meaning will be, cannot, without help from above: but this, since all men are to *try* and do their *best*, only means, that when they succeed, their success was *owing* to divine assistance. According to this sense, the Law of God enjoins what it is *impossible* for mere unassisted man to perform.

<sup>c</sup> See Wall, p. 166.



and Lam. v. 21. passages the more familiar to our ears for having been introduced into our Liturgy. The passages in the *new* testament are equally necessary to be kept in mind; not only where the word *turn* is used, as Acts xiv. 15.—xxvi. 18. 20. but where anything is said about *conversion*: as Matt. xiii. 15.—xviii. 3.—Acts iii. 19. &c.—*Conversion* is the word often used in the *five points*.

The word “*prepare*,” is chosen with a view to several passages of Scripture; Rom. ix. 23.—Eph. ii. 10.—2 Tim. ii. 21.—Such passages as Psalm lxxviii. 8. (margin) might have some effect; but Luke i. 17. has both the words “*turn*” and “*prepare*,” used much as they are here.—*Præparatio Gratiæ*, is <sup>d</sup> used by Augustin, for predestination.

xxvii. “By his own *natural* strength;” this expression carries us back to what was said under the *ninth* Article<sup>e</sup> about the *nature* of man, and the corruption of that nature. It implies, that man, taken at *any* time, has *some* natural strength; or that the subordinate propensities do not *totally* overpower those principles, which ought to bear *rule*. For, according to what was said under the last Article, our natural strength consists in the comparative force or influence of our conscience and higher principles; and our natural weakness in the comparative force of our lower propensities. What I should wish to submit to your consideration is, whether the “*natural strength*,” or rather natural weakness, here spoken of, is anything fixed and *invariable*? I should rather conceive, that the habitual weakness of our mental constitution, or nature,

<sup>d</sup> Pet. Lombard, Lib. i. dist. 40, (beginning) where Pet. Lomb. uses, “*præparavit* (Rom. ix. 23.) *sanctos ad justitiam percipiendam*,” and “*præparavit iniquos*,” &c.—See Rhem. Test. on Acts x. 2. mentioned afterwards, Art. xiiii. Sect. v.

<sup>e</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xviii. & xxviii.

ture, is different in different *ages* and *nations* : that, if the intermediate generations between Adam and us had been more wicked, we should have been still more *weak* than we now are; and, if they had been more *virtuous*, we should now have more *natural strength* than we have: each generation might do something towards diminishing the natural weakness of man, or encreasing his natural strength.

XXVIII. “*And good works:*” that is, his *own*, *natural*, good works; in the *Latin*, “*naturalibus suis viribus et bonis operibus:*”—there are, then, *some good works* which man, as mere *man*, may perform: there is a something which may, in some sense, be called *natural virtue*; it may be imperfect, it may be insufficient to serve as the ground of a strict *claim* upon God; but it may nevertheless be a great *recommendation* to God, (as in the case of *Cornelius*), and may deserve the applause and admiration of Man. We must not think, from the manner in which natural good works, acts of greatness and generosity, are here introduced, that we are forbid to be *pleased* with them, or even to *weep* over them with sympathetic joy and exultation; all that is said is, that, according to the disorderly state of our passions, they are not sufficient, of themselves, to place us in a state of *Christian perfection*; so that nothing more need be wished for, or attempted. And, though they must naturally make us *inclined* to accept of a pure religion, yet when we do accept it, we should humbly thank God for enabling us so to do.

XXIX. “*To faith;*”—what *kind* of faith is that which is here meant? there is a faith in *natural* religion; which Bishop Warburton understands to be described in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews: “without faith it is impossible to  
please

please God." "For he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently<sup>f</sup> seek him." Could our reformers mean to speak of Faith *in general*? No, it appears to me, that they meant *Christian* Faith; such faith as is spoken of in the following *Articles*: the subject in view is conversion to Christianity. The article sets forth an inability to acquire Faith; how is that inability to be *supplied*? by "the Grace of God *by Christ*;" the faith which is acquired by *such* help, must be *faith in Christ*. This is also implied in the words, "*turn and prepare*."—That Faith is the *preliminary* to conversion, is evident enough; from Mark xvi. 16.—Acts xv. 9. and Ephes. ii. 8. where being *saved*, means being admitted into the Christian covenant; as Mr. Locke shews in a note on the latter passage<sup>g</sup>, well worth the perusal of every one, who is studying our present Article.

xxx. "And *calling upon God*:"—this must be considered as a kind of *technical* expression; in its ordinary literal sense, it has no force in this place: any Pagan, surely, can call upon God: the phrase is used here, when joined with Faith, as it is several times used in the *new Testament*, for entrance on a course of *Christian worship*. Let any one compare Acts ii. 21. & ix. 13, 14. & Rom. x. 13. with Joel ii. 32: there he will meet with the term just mentioned, "*saved*," which will shew how properly the phrase, "*calling upon God*," is *joined* to "*Faith*." I suppose, if we were to go as far back as possible, we should find a more extensive sense for this phrase; namely, worshipping God in an *acceptable* manner<sup>h</sup>.—Acceptable worship must vary with circumstances;

<sup>f</sup> Heb. xi. 6.

<sup>g</sup> Locke on Ephes. ii. 8.

<sup>h</sup> See Parkhurst's Greek Lexicon, under *επικαλεομαι*,—the second sense.

cumstances; but, when Christianity comes to be published, acceptable worship must be *Christian* worship.

XXXI. “*Wherefore;*”—this word divides the Article into *two parts*; the former may be considered as *premises*, the latter as *conclusion*. The manner of drawing the conclusion may not seem strictly logical;—we cannot *convert* ourselves to Faith and right worship, *therefore* we cannot do *works* perfectly good, without divine<sup>i</sup> assistance.—Perhaps the full force of this deduction may not appear till after the thirteenth Article: therefore we should endeavour to see what is our proper business at present. We are not to dwell on the nature of *good works*, for that subject is found in the twelfth Article; we are not to shew how only *Christian* good works are, in strictness, completely *acceptable* to God; for that is the business of the thirteenth Article. It was unavoidable to bring the expressions into this Article; but our proper question is, *supposing* works good and acceptable, to what are they to be *ascribed*?—taking this for the proper matter of the Article, the slavery of the *will* in the former part, is rightly connected with the divine *influence* on the will, in the latter part.

XXXII. “*We have no power* to do good works:” not to repeat what has been said about the word “*cannot*”—this does not mean, that we, as men, cannot *contribute* anything towards the performance of our Christian Duty:—nor are we to understand from it, that we are to *suspend* the performance of  
our

<sup>i</sup> There may have been an idea of joining in one Article, what is sometimes made the matter of two; and this may have made the connexion of the former part with the latter, less smooth than it might have been: yet, throw out what does not properly belong to this Article, and then, I think, the conclusion is well enough connected with the premises. — See Note<sup>s</sup> near the end of Sect. xv.

our duty till we are sure, that we have that assistance which is here declared necessary. The countryman, who requested the assistance of *Hercules*, because he had *no power* to forward his own cart, was not therefore to be excused from exerting himself; indeed we may be said to have *no power*<sup>k</sup> to do a thing, though we come ever so near doing it, if at last we fall short.—The latter observation here made results from the *sort* of assistance given: “what *king*, going to make *war* against another king, sitteth not down first, and consulteth whether<sup>l</sup> he be able with *ten* thousand to meet him that cometh against him with *twenty* thousand?”—if, in such a case, he cannot *previously know* that he can procure, from allies, the necessary aid, he *declines* the combat;—but, in *spiritual* difficulties, in “*moral*<sup>m</sup> *impotence*,” the assistance is *invisible*, communicated in a manner, which we do not comprehend; we are therefore to attempt the performance of our most arduous duties, with our best *efforts*, and in the same manner as if all depended on *ourselves*, only begging of our invisible protector, that he would help our infirmities.

XXXIII. “Pleasant and *acceptable* to God”—good works which are so, are here opposed to our own *natural* good works, before<sup>n</sup> spoken of: the works meant, then, are virtuous actions performed on *Christian* principles, and regarded by God as done by men in the capacity of those belonging to that *society*,  
of

<sup>k</sup> See Bp. Sherlock, Vol. 2. Disc. 4. p. 79.

<sup>l</sup> Luke xiv. 31, 32.

<sup>m</sup> The reader need scarcely be reminded, that this is Dr. Priestley's expression, quoted Sect. xviii. from *Familiar Illustration*.

<sup>n</sup> Sect. xxviii.

of which his Son is the *head*°; in the relation of *branches* to the *° Vine*.

xxxiv. “Without the *Grace* of God by Christ *preventing* us.”—Grace is here used in the *customary* sense, for *internal* influence on the mind; more particularly such as is *immediate*.—Though the word *prevent* is now most commonly used as synonymous to *hinder*, yet the Latin, and our Liturgy will make any explanation unnecessary.—Indeed we still hear sometimes of preventing *mens wishes*¹. To prevent, is to *come before*: now, any person may come before another, either so as to seize upon that advantage which the other was aiming at, or so as to provide some benefit or enjoyment; so as to have that *prepared* for him, which it was most probable he should otherwise have been obliged to prepare for himself.

xxxv. We now pass on from Explanation to the *Proof*. After we have made the proper reserves for the subsequent articles, we seem to have but few propositions left: the two following seem to comprehend every thing, which is affirmed in the Article.

1. We cannot *convert* ourselves from being Heathens (or *as* Heathens) to the state of *true Christians*.

2. We cannot perform *good works*, strictly so called, without the assistance of God; without his aid, both in the formation of our good *purposes*, and in the *execution* of them.

This is the form, into which it is natural for us to throw our propositions in the first instance; but thinking upon them, and imagining ourselves to enter

° Ephes. i. 22.

¹ John xv. 5.—Jonathan Edwards impresses this idea, I think, in his long discourse on Justification.

¹ The word *let* formerly meant the opposite to the modern *let*.

enter upon the proofs, will make us wish for some alteration. As the propositions now stand, it seems to be implied, that we are<sup>r</sup> first to procure our assistance, and then to begin our task; but it has already been<sup>s</sup> observed, that the particular nature of our assistance requires, that, at the same time that we own its reality, we should make our attempts and exertions as if we had none: therefore it would be better (on this account, and for other reasons which may hereafter appear) if our propositions stood in some form better suited to the nature of that assistance, which can be most fully conceived on a review of its effects. As thus,—

1. When we *have been converted* to Christianity, we should thank God, and give him the Glory.

2. When we *have done* any virtuous *actions* (or what would be commonly called such) we should ascribe them, *as far* as they really are virtuous, to the assistance of God. And we should thank him both for the good *dispositions* and the good *actions*.

It should be observed, that, as the assistance which is given from above, is not *understood* by us, as our notions of it are extremely *indistinct*, so should be our acknowledgments. But a Christian is bound to make his acknowledgments *through Christ*: or, to consider all the spiritual benefit which  
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<sup>r</sup> If one was to hear, that a man was so ill, that he was unable to get out of *bed* without help, nothing would seem more clear than that he would lie still till help arrived.—See also the misapplication of Ezek. xxiv. 27. (not an exact quotation) in Whitefield's first dealing, cited in "The Principles and Practices of the Methodists."—p. 18.

<sup>s</sup> Sect. xxxii.

he receives, as coming to him from the vine, of which Christians are the branches.

xxxvi. When we have been converted to Christianity, we should thank God, and give him the glory. This will sufficiently appear from the following texts. Jer. xxxi. 18.—Lam. v. 21.—John vi. 45. 65.—xii. 40.—xvi. 13.—Acts xv. 9. and xvi. 14.—1 Cor. xii. 3.—Ephes. ii. 8.—Phil. i. 29.

To which may be added those texts, in which the influence of the spirit accompanies *baptism*; as John iii. 5.—Titus iii. 5, for that influence must be requisite to complete the conversion.—And, if we compare Titus iii. 5. with Mark xvi. 16. it will appear, that the *faith*, by which we are *saved*, or admitted into the Christian religion, is a gift of the spirit. For, in the one passage, the requisites are Baptism and the *Holy Spirit*; in the other, Baptism and *Faith*.

xxxvii. The second proposition relates to both *dispositions* and *actions*.—As to our *dispositions*, several of the texts just now mentioned might be produced again: as those from the old Testament, and Jer. xxxii. 39. Ezek. xxxvi. 26. & John vi. 44. 65. For though, in the particular circumstances, in which they were spoken, their first and immediate view might be to conversion, yet they are expressed generally, and may be applied to mens coming to do right actions at any time. Bishop Hurd has treated John vi. 44. in that sense. We may add Phil. ii. 13.—Also Eph. ii. 8, and perhaps Acts xv. 9, in both which texts, *faith* is ascribed to God; faith being a constant principle of action.

That our good *actions* are to be ascribed to divine grace, is evident from many passages. Phil. ii. 13. may be mentioned again; God worketh in us not only to *will*, but to *do*.—Add Rom. v. 5.—Rom. viii.



viii. verses 13, 14, 16. 26<sup>1</sup>, 27.—1 Cor. iii. 16.—Gal. v. 16.—Ephes. iii. 16, 17.—The doctrine is delivered more at large, 1 Cor. iv. 7. and 2 Cor. iii. 5.

Reasonings from Adam, as opposed to Christ, and from Eph. ii. 2. might here be admitted, in order to shew, that the remedy should operate upon our *minds*, because the disorder lies there.—The good derived from Christ is also much *greater* than the evil derived from Adam". And the *number* of the things revealed in Scripture concerning the Holy Spirit should be attended to: such communications must have been intended for some purpose or other.

XXXVIII. Though our texts shew, that the Church, in all ages, has been right in professing some doctrine of Divine Grace; yet their precise meaning does not seem capable of being ascertained by attending to the mere expressions. In order to acquire a notion of that, we must recollect some of the *elementary* observations, which were offered in the Introduction to this second part of our Articles.

XXXIX. *Popular* language, such as the *Scripture* language must be, does not express acts of the mind as it seems to do, in the way of Theory or speculation; it should be construed as expressing merely our feelings<sup>\*</sup>, and our wants, with some view to good. In order to see its true meaning, we must see what *practical* end it has in view.

Whatever may have been said by writers, about the speculative doctrines of Scripture, if I were to hazard an observation, I should rather be inclined to

<sup>1</sup> See Short Defence of Atonement, p. 85. quoted by Ludlam, Scrip. Met. p. 5.

<sup>\*</sup> Rom. v. 20.

<sup>\*</sup> Introd. to Part II. Sect. IV.

to say, there is no such thing in scripture as a speculative doctrine, relative to the subjects most commonly controverted: there are expressions, which have been collected and extended so as to form such, but that is the work of *Man*. I do not conceive, that we have, in Scripture, any *Theory* of what is called the doctrine of *Grace*. In many *instances*, our conversion, our good designs and actions, are *referred* to God, but in every instance the thing really expressed is, some good *feeling*, with a view to promote some good *principle*. The good feeling is generally *pious gratitude*; the end in view, to promote either that same, or humility, or some virtuous or religious sentiment<sup>y</sup>. — If *there was* a Theory of the doctrine of Grace, properly speaking, the propositions concerning divine assistance would be *universal*, and might be used on all *occasions*; *trifling* as well as important; *future* as well as past. Nay, an action inspired by God, might be pronounced *good, bescrehand*, instead of being ascribed to him, *after* it was performed, *as far* as it was good. But we find no such universality in Scripture. When we hear this popular language in *common life*, we generally can see

<sup>y</sup> Here might appear the boyish and flippant objection of Leclerc and Jortin to Augustin, for referring a discovery about divine Grace, made in reading the Scriptures, to the divine assistance: See Jortin's six Dissertations, p. 33, 92. There is no appearance to me, that Augustin pretended to Revelation in the sense, in which these two writers take the word; or that he meant any more than to refer the correction of his error to God; in the manner of the instances mentioned in this Section. His phraseology was pious of course; and that is enough to produce his expression. Whether his former opinion was a real error, makes no difference. God only knows that.

Calvin, about his Catechism, meant no more when he said, "in quo scribendo Dominum mihi adfuisse confido." — I readily allow, that both Calvin and Augustin favoured Divine agency.

see the end, which is aimed at, and what is taken for granted. M. Luther would say, ‘It has<sup>a</sup> pleased God to enlighten my mind, and employ me to rescue his religion from popish superstition.’—Cardinal Bellarmin, ‘By God’s help, I have restored many to the Catholic faith, who had been seduced into calvinistic heresy.’ Each taking his own religion for true, refers the protection of it to God; and with a *view* of promoting a zeal for its success.—The forming of our *Liturgy* is referred<sup>a</sup> to the Holy Ghost: in 1548, the expression “by *the aid of the Holy Ghost*” was used; some objected to it; but others explained it in a manner not very different from ours.—The Scripture says, “what hast thou<sup>b</sup> that thou didst not receive?” we must not think we have the right meaning of this question, till we see the *end* aimed at in proposing it; namely, “lest any man<sup>c</sup> should *boast* ;” expressed in these words, “why dost thou *glory*?” Nor must we think, that we *apply* it in the right sense, except when we use it as a *motive* to humility.

<sup>z</sup> There is a passage, in the third part of the Homily of Good Works, which might be mentioned here; “Honour be to God, who did put light in the heart of his faithful and true minister, of most famous memory, King Henry VIII. and gave him the knowledge of his Word, and an earnest affection to seek his Glory, and to put away all such superstitious and pharisaical Sects by Antichrist invented, and set up against the true word of God, and glory of his most blessed Name, as he gave the like spirit unto the most noble and famous Princes, *Josaphat*, *Josias*, and *Ezechias*.”—This expression seems no more than a pious and indistinct reference of the benefit of part of the Reformation to the Deity; made by those who took for granted, that the Reformation was a real blessing; but not under any presumption of knowing the mind of God beforehand.

<sup>a</sup> Burnet on the Reformation, P. 2. B. 1. (Vol. 2. p. 93, 94.) See Book 1. Chap. xii. Sect. 111.

<sup>b</sup> 1 Cor. iv. 7.

<sup>c</sup> Eph. ii. 9.

lity. Suppose any one used it thus; ‘I have no virtues which I did not receive, therefore it is in vain for me to endeavour to improve my morals:’ the conclusion is not unfair, on a footing of Theory; yet every one sees it is a *fallacy*. It is, in truth, a *misinterpretation* of the Apostle, arising from giving too *literal* a sense to *popular* language; and not construing his *words* by attending to his *practical design*.

This observation supplies us with a solution of the difficulty proposed by the Pelagians, which is mentioned in Jerom’s Letter to *Ctesiphon*:—if we are to refer our virtues to the divine assistance, why not our most *vulgar* and unclean actions?—no one can shew a reason, on a footing of mere Theory: but it is reason enough to say, because referring such actions to the divine assistance would answer no good *end*, promote no *virtue*. Jerom only *exclaims* against the profaneness of such language.

This objection of the Pelagians reminds one of the Journals of Mr. *Whitefield*, Mr. *Wesley*, &c. who refer almost all events to the divine assistance. Some<sup>d</sup> have thought, that they make pretensions to an extraordinary communication with the Supreme Being: those, who understand them in this sense, will take care not to give credit to such pretensions but upon sufficient *evidence*: upon such evidence as they will not be ashamed to produce at “the judgment-seat of Christ.” It seems to me, that they may *possibly* mean only to refer plain facts to the Divine agency; from an imitation of the sacred writers: if this be the case, they seem to confound different situations; and sometimes to refer events too trivial, to the agency of heaven; as a shower<sup>e</sup> of

<sup>d</sup> Bp. Gibson; see his 4th Pastoral Letter, p. 261.—Also end of Sect. XIX.

<sup>e</sup> Principles and Practices of the Methodists considered, p. 17.

of rain, for instance, or a journey <sup>f</sup> to *Bath*. If they are, as some <sup>g</sup> have thought, *evasive*; if they wish to run from one of these plans to the other, as they are driven; if they wish to have the lower people think them inspired, in a manner different from common men, yet express themselves so, that, when they are charged with this, they can give their narrations a different sense; they appear more blameable than either for mere enthusiasm, or for want of discriminating cases somewhat alike.—Farther, I have not a decided judgment on this matter.

XL. In order to get at the true sense of popular expressions, it should always be remembered, that some words, which have a positive sound, have only a *negative* sense<sup>h</sup>. With regard to expressions, by which actions are ascribed to the divine influence, I will only suggest, that every man should watch his own mind, and prove his own thoughts, that he may be aware what it is that he comprehends clearly and distinctly; that he may judge rightly how far his particular conceptions of divine influence on the mind extends. Does our distinct knowledge really extend beyond the following proposition? it would be wrong, impious, irrational, to *exclude* the Deity from power over the *thoughts* of men? or from any *action*, on which an human being values himself. Every man surely would be ready to say, ‘as God does influence us, I know not but he may in this particular instance; I see not

<sup>f</sup> Gibson, 262. References to *Satan* seem much of the same kind, and subject to the same remarks: Mr. Whitefield refers his idleness at College, to Satan, without diffidence: See his *First Dealing*, &c. p. 67. quoted in *Principles and Practices*, &c. p. 17—

<sup>g</sup> *Principles and Practices farther considered*, p. 29.

<sup>h</sup> *Introd. to Part II. Sect. VII.*

not how far, but to *exclude* him would be shocking; suppose he did, would not such or such a consequence follow? — and some men may think, that this is the chief of what is really meant by saying, God *causes* our thoughts and actions.

XLI. Causes assigned as total, are often only <sup>i</sup> *partial*. Hence, ascribing to God, need not exclude human endeavours: nor need human agency exclude divine: either, or both, may be assigned; and which shall be assigned, is determined by some *practical good* in view; according to the observation made in Sect. xxxix. St. Paul, in Phil. ii. 12, 13. assigns *both* divine<sup>k</sup> and human agency; we are to work out our own salvation with *fear*<sup>l</sup> and *trembling*, because God worketh in us “both to will and to do of his good pleasure:” because we are *assisted* by one, by a partner, as it were, or associate, with whom we may not trifle; who is engaged in assisting us by no views of interest, but assists us from a benevolence, which the greatness and majesty of his character makes deeply affecting. St. Paul also, in Rom. viii. 13. gives much the same idea. “If ye, *through* the Spirit, do mortify the deeds of the Body, ye shall live.”—Christians are the *agents*, but they perform their duty *through* the Holy Spirit. Nor is this peculiar to the *new* Covenant; the *Psalmist* does the same. “Except<sup>m</sup> the Lord build the House, their labour is but lost that build it: Except the Lord keep the city, the watchman

<sup>i</sup> Hey on Atonement, p. 45. Note.—Introd. to our 2d Part, Sect. viii.

<sup>k</sup> Grotius speaks as if *Civil Government* might be referred either to God (Rom. xiii. 1.) or Man, (1 Pet. ii. 13.) De Jure, &c. 1. 4. 7.

<sup>l</sup> That is, with care and respect, as appears from Psalm ii. 11. (Bible).—Dan. vi. 26.—Mark v. 33.—1 Cor. ii. 3.—2 Cor. vii. 15.—Ephes. vi. 5.

<sup>m</sup> Psalm cxxvii. 1, 2.

watchman waketh but in vain." See also Psalm xlv. 3, 4. where it is not to be supposed, that the Children of Israel did not fight<sup>n</sup>.

And, as it is sometimes most useful to refer things to *both* divine and human agency, it seems, on some occasions, a matter of *indifference* to which they are<sup>o</sup> referred. St. Paul, in 1 Cor. xv. 10. first gives a plain relation of his diligence; then immediately gives the same over again, in a way calculated to make a good impression, or raise a religious sentiment: first he says, "*I labour more abundantly than they all:*" then he says, "*yet not I, but the Grace of God, which was with me.*" It is the *same* relation, as to *fact*, whether he says, "*I laboured,*" or "*not I:*"—the latter tells us no more than the former. In 2 Cor. xi. 23. he expresses his comparative diligence, by the words, "*in labours more abundant,*" without any reference to the divine agency: but his business was not then to encourage pious gratitude and humility, but to maintain the dignity of his own character, which had suffered under aspersions. In an instance before-mentioned, things were to be referred to God, lest any one should *glory*; but, in the present instance, St. Paul says, he "*must needs*

<sup>n</sup> In Shakspeare's *Tempest*, Act. iv. Scene 1. Prospero says to Ferdinand,

Thus as my *gift*, and thine own acquisition

Worthily *purchased*, take my daughter.

this is natural popular language; in *strictness*, the same thing is not a *gift* and a *purchase*.

<sup>o</sup> It might not be amiss here to see the manner, in which acts are referred to God the *Father* and to the *Son*, so that one being considered as a cause does not exclude the other. Eph. i. 9. compared with texts in which Christ makes known the Will of God. The Father gave his Son, 1 John iv. 9. 10; the Son gave *himself*, Gal. i. 4.—See Pearson on the Creed, p. 259, 4to. or p. 130, folio.

*needs glory:*" he was called upon to support his honour<sup>p</sup>.

It seems to follow from hence, that, when either the divine or human agency is mentioned separately, the other must be considered as *implied*.—St. Paul, when he speaks of himself as "in labours"<sup>q</sup> more abundant" than some other ministers, certainly did not mean to exclude the Grace of God: nor, when he was told, that God's Grace was sufficient<sup>r</sup> for him, did he understand, that he was not to *endeavour* to extract the thorn<sup>s</sup> in his flesh.

The strongest expressions of divine agency are those, which represent God as *creating* a right spirit, or good works, or causing a *resurrection* of those, "who were<sup>t</sup> *dead* in trespasses and sins."—  
Yet,

<sup>p</sup> St. Peter says (2 Pet. iii. 18.) "*grow in grace.*" St. Paul says (Eph. v. 18.) "*be filled* with the spirit;" though in one case the Christian is active, in the other passive, yet they must mean the same thing; we seem to say indifferently, "*I incline* to such a thing," and, "*I am inclined:*" which should be considered as an *experiment*, shewing how easily the mind changes from the idea of acting, to that of being acted upon.

<sup>q</sup> 2 Cor. xi. 23.

<sup>r</sup> 2 Cor. xii. 9.

<sup>s</sup> Dr. Rutherford, in a *Concio ad Clerum*, gave reasons for thinking, that this "thorn in the flesh," was the disorder of *fore eyes*: for that disorder a friend once recommended to me Smellome's ointment, which seemed to succeed: on our meeting after my recovery, I should naturally say, I am indebted to *you* for being able to read and write comfortably: were the proprietors of the ointment to ask me after its efficacy, the answer would as naturally be, *it* cured me, when other things failed.—Were I speaking with a *religious* view, the natural expression would be, "*it pleased God*, such a night, to relieve me from my "*thorn in the flesh.*"—The *fact* is one only.

Matt. vi. 26. Our heavenly Father feedeth the fowls of the air: not surely without any endeavours of their own.—It is an act of rational piety, in Grace at meals, to refer our plenty to God; but such devotion does not lessen the care of those, who furnish the repast.

<sup>t</sup> Eph. ii. 1.



Yet, from Ezek. xxxvi. 26, 27. and Ephes. ii. 10. and v. 14, 15. it appears, that we may be spoken of as *agents* even under such representations: to *walk*, is the part of one<sup>u</sup> who is *active*.

XLII. When we wish to get the exact sense of popular expressions, we must always consider in what *circumstances* they are<sup>x</sup> used: for every such expression, being of a practical sort, must be made in order to fit certain circumstances: and therefore missing the right circumstances, is missing the right *sense*.—It requires some attention to find out the circumstances, to which any saying is adapted; but, if many instances occur, one may discern what things belong to them in common.—Let any one then try whether *future* actions are not represented in scripture as dependent on *human* agency; and whether actions ascribed to *divine* agency, are not in some sense *past*<sup>y</sup>. As in the case of *Lydia*<sup>z</sup>; her conversion, as an *effect*<sup>a</sup>, is referred to the Lord's opening her heart as a *cause*. If this proves to be a *rule*, we have no right to talk of Grace<sup>b</sup> *in general*: and it should be seen, at some time, that referring our *past good* actions to God makes us *humble* and *pious*; though, to lay our *past bad* actions on God, would increase our wickedness; but referring any *future* actions to divine agency, would make us neglect our own part; would hinder

<sup>u</sup> Archbp. Sharp's Sermons, Vol. 3. Ser. 13.

<sup>x</sup> Introduction to Part II. Sect. 1x.

<sup>y</sup> Sect. xxxv.

<sup>z</sup> Acts xvi. 14.

<sup>a</sup> Whenever the *effect* comes, it is as *past*; and the *cause* is prior to the effect: if some declarations of divine influence in scripture, seem free from the idea of time *past*, as John iii. 5.—Titus iii. 5, suppose an *instance*, and then this observation applies.—Observe also, that *ἐλευσεν*, John vi. 44. may be rendered, shall have drawn.

<sup>b</sup> Wall seems to have felt something of this, p. 168. "It is one thing thankfully," &c.

der us from doing our best. It might also be gathered, from the scriptural instances of referring events to God, that no *trifling* events are referred to him; the reason of which has been<sup>c</sup> assigned; but, if we saw *no* reason, the uniformity of the practice would be sufficient to lay a restraint upon us

It may be likewise observed in scripture, that where an author is entering into the views of the *agent*, he speaks as if our will was *free*: where he enters into the views of the *spectator*, as if the will was *influenced*:—which agrees with what was laid down<sup>d</sup> about freedom and necessity; but, without that, would have afforded a sufficient reason why we should do the same: in this light we may compare, “it must *needs* be that offences come,” with Isaiah’s description of the age of discretion in man; that age when he knows “to refuse the evil, and *choose*<sup>e</sup> the good.” Or with St. Paul’s dilemma; “what I shall *choose* I wot not, for I am in a strait between<sup>f</sup> two.”

If the scriptures do, in a constant and uniform manner, speak of *future actions* as depending upon the human agent, it must appear natural, that *rewards* and punishments should be proposed without reference to divine agency. Nor does there seem any reason for its being introduced in the grand description of a *future judgment* contained in the twenty fifth Chapter of St. Matthew’s Gospel.

Some popular expressions, which seem to be affirmative, or speculative, are merely *declamatory*. Readers of scripture should be aware of this, when they see expressions about divine *Grace*: all which seem

<sup>c</sup> Sect. xxxix.

<sup>d</sup> Introduction to Second Part, Sect. v.

<sup>e</sup> II. vii. 15.

<sup>f</sup> Phil. i. 22, 23.

seem designed to excite good sentiments ; and belong more to the *Heart* than the *Head*.

The New Testament adopts Jewish modes of referring *evil* to the divine agency : as when it speaks of *hardening*, blinding, &c. but this, being the most difficult part of our subject, had better be reserved, as the History of it was, to the last.

XLIII. The *result* of what has been said seems to be this ; take a man, in his moral or religious capacity, at any *instant*, and he is to *set out* upon principles of free-will and human agency ; these will include *praying* to God for spiritual assistance.—When he has proceeded in a course of good living, or what may be ordinarily called such, he is to *look back* upon his conduct with *humility*, and *ascribe* it to the influence of the Holy Spirit, with pious *gratitude*. Thus he sets out a sort of *Pelagian*, and finishes his course as a follower of *Augustin*.

Not that he must be unmindful of the assistance which he receives, as a *Man*, from *Conscience*, and intellect ; and from the continual proofs which he may find, in the course of *nature*, of an hatred to vice and a love to virtue, in the author of nature and Governor of the world.—This assistance has been considered as the *first*<sup>s</sup> *grace* of God ; and as that, by which an *Heathen* may be saved.

XLIV. I have now finished what I meant to offer in the way of *direct proof* of the propositions contained in our Article. But some *indirect proof* seems requisite here, as well as on former Articles ; there are some *objections*, which are of weight enough to deserve an answer.

XLV. It may be asked, is not this subject too *intricate* and perplexed for the generality of mankind ? and does not this manner of treating it make it more so ? particularly, is there any such thing

\* See Jortin's six Dissertations, p. 84.

thing as getting a clear conception of the *beginnings* of preventing Grace and free-will?—We answer, it is not necessary, in order to shew the *truth* of a doctrine, to prove, that all men can comprehend it. We have had an whole Chapter on unintelligible Doctrines, and we have allowed, that the doctrines of the first, second, and fifth Articles are all above human comprehension. But we may believe the *reality* of divine influence, without understanding the particular *manner*, in which it operates.

Our manner of treating the subject does require some thought, and some power of distinguishing; but every man makes as many distinctions, and that very frequently, in the common affairs of life, as we require. Whoever will let his mind ply freely to circumstances, only in the same way he does in interpreting common discourse, will make references to Divine assistance in a right manner, and with right limitations; and will understand them as they are really meant, when they are made by others<sup>h</sup>.

If any one asked, in particular, which *begins* first, preventing Grace, or virtue? I should not scruple to answer, I do not know: if *our part* is clear, we may safely leave the part of God to himself.—Our business is, to profess that God *inspires* us, and that we are to *ascribe* to him our good thoughts and actions. Now, we are not hindered from professing either of these things, by our ignorance of the nascent operations of divine and human agency. No time can be assigned, when we cannot thank God for any virtuous act or purpose, of which we are conscious. The nascent acts of mutual sympathy,

<sup>h</sup> See Principles and Practices, &c. p. 49, 40. “many distinctions may be necessary now, which were not so when his (St. Paul’s) Epistles were written.”

pathy, or friendship, are almost as unintelligible as those of divine influence and human virtue.

XLVI. Is not the general *tenor* of the scriptures as if man was *free*? is it not full of *precepts*, commands, Laws, which presuppose freedom? Does not *conscience* imply the same? Are we not *exhorted* to *repent*<sup>i</sup>, and “grow<sup>k</sup> in Grace?” Nay, are we not told, that, “if a<sup>l</sup> man” “purge *himself*,”—“he shall be a vessel unto honour, sanctified and meet for the Master’s use, and *prepared* (the word of our *Article*) unto every good work?”—Can the supposition of our being passive, impelled in some mysterious manner, stand against sayings so *plain* and intelligible as these?—If our remarks are accepted, I apprehend, that an answer has *already*<sup>m</sup> been given to this difficulty. It is now proposed in order that, in case they should not, another may be offered.—Free-will and Grace are opposed; but are they really *incompatible* with each other?—why may not they *both* be received? even though no reconciliation between them should be attempted?—they seem both to be received by our<sup>n</sup> Church; and also by Augustin. If they both are separately proved to exist, they are reconcileable in their nature, though we should not, at present, know how to reconcile them.—Indeed experience seems to shew, that they do exist together, in the minds of thousands.—We will, then, grant our objector, that there is *no harm* in his referring actions to the agent; nay, that it does not imply any *falsehood*: we only desire him to grant, that to ascribe good actions to the Deity is more *pious*; and therefore, on some occasions, more *proper*, nay, with a view to religion, more *prudent*; as it will

<sup>i</sup> Acts iii. 19.

<sup>k</sup> 2 Pet. iii. 18.

<sup>l</sup> 2 Tim. ii. 21.

<sup>m</sup> Sect. XLIII.

<sup>n</sup> Sect. XI.

will correct and amend our principles, by exciting some good sentiment or affection.

XLVII. It may be urged, that it is inconsistent to say, that *past* actions only are the objects of the scriptural sayings concerning Grace, when it is certain, that we are commanded to *pray* for it; which implies looking forwards into *futurity*.

But all the prospect we have of Grace, in praying for it, is very obscure; all the notion we have of it then is quite indistinct;—that there *is* such a thing may, to be sure, be seen at any time, or without any relation to time. Prayer is an *action* itself, which we may refer, with a retrospective view, to the divine assistance°. It implies endeavours in active virtue accompanying it.—It is itself an *endeavour*; an effort to procure the means of acting well; and in this light it is seen in *future*, as human agency; as well as the end it aims at. There seems nothing unscriptural, when we are using any honest endeavours, in hoping for future assistance, in some indefinite manner. In short, prayer may, in some way, *mix* ideas of divine and human agency; but does not imply any contradiction to our notion, that particular actions are not to be considered as inspired, till they are *past*.

XLVIII. It has been objected, by a Friend<sup>p</sup> of mine, to my way of interpreting and limiting passages of Scripture relating to divine Grace, that it has an appearance of *lowering* their importance, and also the importance of God's revealing the *personality* of the *Holy Spirit*. But it seems to me, that this is only a temporary appearance, which would go off on consideration.

I. It

° Rom. viii. 26.

<sup>p</sup> Mr. Twining, the author of the work so well known and so much esteemed amongst the learned, on Aristotle's Poetics.

1. It cannot diminish our respect for the scriptures to look upon them as written in *popular* language: if they were not, they would in reality be written in no language at all; that is, in no words, which would convey ideas, especially to such persons as they were addressed to. The connexion between words and ideas is *arbitrary*, and wholly dependent on *custom*: sounds, to which we are unaccustomed, are no language; and, if those sounds were *like* something we were used to, they would confound us the more.

2. Though references to divine agency may be *indistinct*, and though the words which express them may require *limitation* in getting at their real meaning, yet they may be ever so *important*: they may be sublime, affecting, and in short may warm the heart to virtue and piety.

3. It is surely of great importance to see all expressions about Grace in such a light, that they shall leave the efficacy of *rewards* and punishments undiminished; and shall afford no pretence for *remissness* in spiritual *diligence*. So long as *our part* in working out our salvation is disentangled from mystery, the *part of God* may safely be committed to the clouds and darkness, which surround<sup>a</sup> his Throne.

4. It does not appear, that the power of the Holy Ghost is limited, by our notions, either upon the understanding of man, or upon his will. —On the other hand, it is consistent with those notions, to maintain, that virtues may be referred to him with a fuller confidence because his particular office is revealed: though still his influence be only mediately perceivable, and though the manner of referring virtues to divine agency continues as before revelation.

5. Lastly,

<sup>a</sup> Psalm xcvi. 2.

5. Lastly, could we flatter ourselves, that our manner of extracting the good from different opinions, would have a tendency to silence *disputes*, we might venture to say, that it would be the means of making the scriptures generally respected as they deserve.

XLIX. But, though *Christians* should be brought to respect Scripture, yet still the same objection remains with regard to *infidels*, which was mentioned under the preceding<sup>r</sup> Article. Will not *any* doctrine of Grace *disgust* men of plain common sense; or of *philosophical* minds, and make them averse to Revelation? particularly, by taking religion out of the regions of experience and common sense, into those of fancy and enthusiasm? and by establishing a sort of doctrine of necessity, on the ruins of freedom of will?

First, with regard to *experience*. That men are influenced and assisted by the Holy Ghost, we do not learn merely by experience; but there is nothing in the doctrine, which is *contrary* to experience. The rational Philosopher will allow, that there is an over-ruling<sup>s</sup> *Providence*; though the manner in which it rules, in particular cases, is unknown. Why therefore should it be objected to the doctrine of *Grace*, that the manner of influencing minds is not understood? It is as *likely*, that God should influence *mind* as *matter*: to exclude him from the former, when his influence upon the latter is allowed, seems a great inconsistency, supported by no philosophical reason.—When men encourage themselves in rejecting the operations of the Spirit, because they do not *see* them, they are apt to fancy, that they *do see* the objects, which excite their passions. The objects indeed

<sup>r</sup> Art. IX. Sect. XL.

<sup>s</sup> See Powell—Discourse xiii. p. 218.



indeed they do see, in some sense, but in one that is but little to the purpose; because they see nothing of the manner, in which those objects exercise any *power* over their *minds*. They *see* too the *lightening* and the *earthquake*, they *hear* the *thunder*; which they may call, with the Psalmist, “the *voice*<sup>t</sup> of the *Lord*;”—but the application of these to the moral government of the world, they understand as little as they do the inspiration of God’s Holy Spirit.—Many material things raise or depress *our spirits*, draw us into speculations of a chearful or melancholy sort; we know not how; nor are we sensible of the effect, till experience shews us it on looking back; what presumption can true philosophy entertain against the same kind of secret influence from heaven?

*Enthusiasm* has<sup>u</sup>, in fact, been owing to presumption; those who have believed the reality of Inspiration, thinking that if they were inspired they must feel it, have presumed, that their internal sensations were immediately from God.

And, with regard to the doctrine of *Necessity*, if the Christian doctrine of Grace did introduce it, I see not that the Philosopher need be disgusted on that account: many able men have<sup>x</sup> favoured that doctrine, independently of Christianity. The scheme of necessity is misunderstood, if it is thought inconsistent with *Virtue*, or any part of moral discipline. Hartley<sup>y</sup> says, “By the mechanism of human actions I mean, that each action results from the previous circumstances of body and mind, in the same manner, and with the same certainty, as other effects do from their mechanical causes.”

<sup>t</sup> Psalm xxix.

<sup>u</sup> Powell, Discourse xiii. or p. 216.—Enthusiasm was treated Book III. Chap. xv, Sect. xi.

<sup>x</sup> Sect. xix,

<sup>y</sup> On Man, Vol. I. p. 502.

causes." This, however, he allows to be consistent with each man's having a power "of deliberating, suspending, chusing, &c. or of resisting the motives<sup>2</sup> of sensuality, ambition, resentment, &c."—But saying, that certain motives will produce certain volitions, seems something like Sir Isaac Newton's second law of motion, the change of motion is proportional to the moving force impressed; to which, objection has been rightly<sup>3</sup> made, as being an *identical* proposition; because the force can only be known à posteriori, by the change of motion. Waving formal definition, it is easy to conceive the mind *acted upon*, without considering it as acting; the *Will* as *passive*, without thinking of its activity.—*Virtue* is not excluded by this way of viewing the mind; for that consists in calling up good motives, so as to overpower the bad ones: and it implies a *character*, which is something fixed: *rewards* and punishments move the mind, and are proposed on purpose that they may do so; *conscience* acts as both reward and punishment; exhortations, and all the parts of education, move the will, and occasion good volitions. The will itself must be supposed to exist, because it is constantly impelled; and therefore a necessary action is still a voluntary one.—If any one evaded his duty, on pretence that he was a machine, he must be punishable for his inconsistency, as he would not cease, on that pretence, to secure his property and provide his sustenance; and his very evasion would bring on evil, which would act as a motive to reformation.—Our familiar use of the word *motives* shews, that we really do admit all this, whether we recognize it in systematic form, or not.

Let

<sup>2</sup> Hartley, Vol. 1. p. 501.

<sup>3</sup> Dr. Powell's M. S. Lectures.

Let not any one think, that *I* am particularly a favourer of the hypothesis of Necessity; I am, in truth for *both* Freedom and Necessity, according to the explanation before <sup>b</sup> given; from which, I think, it appears, that they do not interfere with each other: and may and do exist together: both hypotheses seem capable of admitting virtue and moral discipline. The phenomena of *freedom*, or the train of thoughts arising in that system<sup>c</sup>, arise from the *Agent's* feeling himself free to chuse: the phenomena, or train of thoughts in the system of *necessity*, arise from the *Spectator's* observing how a man chuses, and according to what rules: and from expecting, on a footing of experience and probability, that the same causes will produce the same effects. From whence it follows, that the *language* of Freedom is that, which the *Agent* naturally uses; the language of *Necessity* that, which most naturally occurs to the *Spectator*.—It seems as if it should be remarked, that there is a possibility of some kind of deception in that internal feeling of Liberty, which we never dispute. *Brutes* do not *kill themselves*; yet I should think it highly probable, that the *Lion*, could he speak, would tell us, he *could* tear and kill himself as well as he can his prey; only he *will* not: the necessitarian says, he *cannot*, because he has no *motive*. In like manner, when a *Hen* gathereth her chickens under her wings; she would say, she *chuses* to do so, for their good; the necessitarian would say, that *instinct* compells her to gather them; or *causes* her choice; and that only just till the brood can take care of itself. There is also to be remarked a considerable degree of *regularity* in the choice made by  
*men*;

<sup>b</sup> Introduction to Part II. Sect. v.

<sup>c</sup> Book III. Chap. xv. Sect. ix.

*men*: else indeed what could be depended upon? what order, government, union, could be maintained? this regularity is much less perceived by the *Agent* than by the *Spectator*: therefore, when we speak of the part of each individual, we speak, with him, the language of Freedom: when we speak of men *collectively*, and of disposing or *governing* them, we speak, with the *Spectator*, the language of Necessity. But, if a man would be perfectly free from difficulty, he must learn to pass from one conception and language to the other, with ease and readiness. This will be confirmed if we consider, as accurately as possible, what it is that we really do know of a *volition*. I should think, nothing more than this:—several objects of choice offer themselves; each displays its peculiar advantages; we chuse one; or one *is* chosen; for our ideas are so faint, that we judge chiefly from the *effect*. There *must* be choice; and the *Will* must be *influenced*; the volition may be seen in either light. When we *describe* it, or its effect, in *words*, we do it by *comparison*; we compare it to weighing, commanding, impelling, or something which happens in common life.—On the whole, disputes on the subject of liberty and necessity, however numerous they may have been, may be pronounced vain and idle: as much so as if you was placed within a *spherical surface*, and I without it, and we were to enter into abstruse mathematical arguments on the question, whether the surface between us was *concave* or *convex*: in my situation it is convex, in yours it is concave.

We may therefore close the present objection with observing, that, though the scriptural doctrine of Grace did favour the scheme of necessity, it need occasion no aversion to the Scriptures in any man of a philosophical mind, on that account;  
but

but that the truth is, the Doctrine of Grace is only a small *part* of what is contained in the Scriptures; the language of the whole, taken together, is always the language of *Nature*, and therefore varies with occasions and views of things.

The Philosopher should remember, that *Heathens* have referred even virtues to Divine Agency; as we shewed in the second Section of this Article.

L. Having then finished our Proof, direct and indirect, we come to that matter, which was *reserved*: the referring of *evil* to the Agency of the Supreme Being. Evil may be ascribed to God as the matter of his *Decrees*, or as infused into the *mind*. Decrees belong to the seventeenth Article; all influence on the mind, to the present.

The first thing to be mentioned is, God's giving men over to a *reprobate Mind*: we have several passages, in which something occurs to this purpose.—Rom. i. 24. 26. 28. may be reckoned the principal; but others may be seen: Matt. vii. 6. —1 Cor. xiv. 38.—2 Tim. iii. 13.—Rev. xxii. 11.—It may be permitted to add Ecclesiasticus iv. 19.

Whatever fault there may be in these texts, it is not to be charged upon *Christianity*: because the Author of *Nature* gives men over to a reprobate mind, and all we want to prove is, that Christianity comes from the Author of Nature. The more a man indulges any appetite, the stronger it grows; artificial or unnatural cravings perpetually gather strength, till recovery from vice becomes *desperate*.

In this case, a man is commonly called an *abandoned* sinner. To defend this Rule of God's Government, is the business of natural religion. But we may observe, by the way, that, as *Man* gives up attending,

attending, when he has lost all probability of success, it cannot seem unnatural to him, that God should do the same. In man indeed this sometimes happens because the quantity of his attention is limited; but that is not always the case. At least, we may conceive, that a sort of punishment will probably be effectual on man, which falls in with his received notions and practices. And there can be no impropriety in punishing drunkenness by thirst, or gluttony by immoderate<sup>d</sup> cravings: nay, it must tend to increase mens caution about the beginnings of all illicit indulgencies, and therefore to keep the mind in a state of Purity.—Then, I do not imagine, that any man is ever totally irrecoverable from vice; only that it is morally impossible, not to be expected, that some should recover. Nor is the scripture to be so understood as if God ever gave men over in any other sense but as it may be said, that God gave a drunken man over to sottishness, or a prodigal to profusion. Men get into bad habits in the common way, and then these habits, considered as a part of God's Government, are properly *referred* to God, as in some sense their *cause*. So the Gentiles got into habits of vice, natural and unnatural; when that became a *past event*, it might, when set in a proper point of view, be referred to the Supreme Being<sup>e</sup>.

Some persons seem to have a notion, in some way of *theory*, that God's *Grace abandons* some wicked men; and that, without Grace, they  
cannot

<sup>d</sup> This is called by Turretin, making a Sin the Punishment of a Sin.

<sup>e</sup> Psalm lxxxi. 12, 13. But my people would not hear my voice, and Israel would not obey me; so I gave them up unto their own hearts' lusts, and let them follow their own imaginations.

cannot possibly recover. But this I should call unwarrantable speculation: it is as if there were some act of God *previous* to the worst degree of wickedness, which we could distinctly ascertain, and which put it out of man's power to *avoid* that wickedness; but there is no such thing: till men confine themselves to referring *past* events to the divine agency, they will ever get wrong. Suppose the *fact*, that a man was *become* thoroughly wicked, and then there would be no impropriety in describing his *state* as one in want of the Grace of God; but, in that case, piety would attend as much to the *recovery* as to the *fall*. Again, suppose the *fact*, that a man has made a strong *effort* to rouse himself from his spiritual stupidity; let him be said to have been *awakened* by the grace of God; it is right, pious, and not untrue: but to think a man out of<sup>f</sup> the *possibility* of reformation, because his *actual* profligacy may be ascribed, indistinctly, to his being deserted by the divine Grace, is to pervert and mistake the language of scripture, and to forget the manner, in which it was originally introduced and applied.

Not but we might refer unfavourable events, though arising from faults or vices, to God, in certain *respects*, when it would excite good *sentiments*: for there is no evil, of any kind, which is *out* of the reach of God's Government; none which he does not behold as within the system of things, which he has appointed; none therefore which may not be referred to him, when viewed in that light. But what is evil in some respects, can generally be seen to be good in other respects. If a robber is about to kill me, and a friend of mine, in my defence, kills

<sup>f</sup> Sect. xviii. from Racovian Catechism.—Also end of Sect. xx.

kills him, I may thank God for the *event*: but not as an act of homicide, only as a deliverance. If a *Tyrant* acts as a *scourge*<sup>2</sup> in the hand of God, his tyranny may, on some occasions, be mentioned as owing to God; not as tyranny, but as punishment. —In almost any evil, a reference may be made to God, when the purpose is to make it felt, that the most profligate cannot throw off God's Government: that, lawless as they may feel, though they may do themselves and others harm within certain bounds, yet that they are limited in doing mischief; and that God is able to turn even their wickedness to the forwarding of his grand inscrutable designs in the government of the universe.

In short, the *good* arising out of evil is generally the thing referred to God, when our imperfect language seems to refer to him the evil at large.

Something has been already<sup>b</sup> said of the phraseology of the *Jews*. We may add, that they seem to have referred more events to the agency of *Spirits* than we do now. As most men have a general belief of the existence of intelligent beings between Man and the Supreme Being (nothing can be more narrow-minded and unphilosophical than to deny their existence) and yet as we know nothing particular of their agency, it is no wonder, that men have run into very different degrees of ascribing events to it. At the revival of learning, about the time of the Reformation, many more references were made to *Satan* than are at present<sup>c</sup>. If our form of indicting criminals were  
now

<sup>a</sup> "His scourge the Tyrant."

POPE.

<sup>b</sup> Sect. III. and XX.—Also end of Introduct. to Part II.

<sup>c</sup> The following paragraph appeared in a newspaper in 1791: it may tend to illustrate our present remark.—The damage, considerable



now new, we should not find it said, that each committed his crime at the *instigation* of the *Devil*. I only mean to suggest, that this matter, of referring events to spirits, is, in a great measure, *arbitrary*; and therefore the *Jews* might refer many events so, and our Saviour might comply with the custom. I should think this enough to account for several things in scripture, and particularly for the expression a *Spirit*<sup>k</sup> of *slumber*; or stupidity.

God is sometimes said to *blind* men, as to their understanding, and to *harden* them, as to their Heart<sup>l</sup>. But this, surely, does not imply any *act* of the Deity, which should be allowed by man *before* the blindness or hardness is acknowledged as a *past event*. Even Calvin<sup>m</sup> observes, “Nec tamen sequitur reprobos, propterea quòd indurantur a Deo, a seipsis *non* indurari.” So far from it, that it is often an *indifferent* matter, which mode of expression is made use of, *God’s hardening* a man, or his *hardening himself*: only *one fact* would be described, though both expressions were used: namely, a  
man’s

siderable as it is, which has been done to the church at Rainham, in Kent, sinks to nothing when compared with what happened at the church of St. Julian’s, in Shrewsbury, about the year 1500. when, as their own Doomsday Book stateth, “the divelle dyd put his clawe upponne the clapper of the great bell, and from his clawe there yssued a flame of fyre, which dydde melte yverie bell in the church, threwe the spyer upponne the grounde, and meltydde moche of the brasse worke candyl styks,—because an holie and righteous Monke hadde in a sermonne spoken tauntinglie offe his power and auctoritte upponne earthe!”—“Thus did our pious and philosophic ancestors solve an *electric cloud*.”

<sup>k</sup> Rom. xi. 8. from If. xxix. 10.—I suppose πνευμα means a *Person* here. The Holy Spirit has several names in a similar Form. See Parkhurst.

<sup>l</sup> Πωρος signifies *blind*, also an *hard* substance; hence παρωρειν may be translated to blind or to harden; See margin of Rom. xi. 8. and Hesychius.—But in John xii. 40. we have τετυφλωκεν for οφθαλμους;—πεπωρωκεν for καρδιαν.

<sup>m</sup> Opuscula, 12mo, p. 314.

man's doing some act of wickedness, which may be ascribed, after it is committed, to human agency or divine, as you wish to excite an abhorrence of the *fault*, or *gratitude* to God for bringing incidental good out of that fault. *Pharaoh* was perverse and tyrannical, in not suffering the Israelites to depart out of his dominions: if you speak of this as a *fault*, Pharaoh hardened *his own heart*; if as a part of *divine government*, to which the Jews ought to be gratefully attentive, you say *God hardened* his heart; that is, by granting him respite: both forms are used in scripture<sup>n</sup>; but neither implies, that Pharaoh's obstinacy did not arise as that of obstinate men commonly does<sup>o</sup>. There are about four passages, in which it is said, God *will* harden; but *no new fact* is implied: nor is any fact to be conceived, but "he *shall* <sup>p</sup> follow"—"they *shall* follow."—In like manner, the *numbering* of the people is, in one place<sup>q</sup>, ascribed to *God*, in his anger; and in another to *Satan*: the first belongs to the subject of God's *Government*, as the context shews, (though the marginal reading is, "Satan"); the last, to the subject of David's blameable *distrust*. The difference has no relation to the *head*, but only to the *heart*: that is, the different modes of expression do not give different information,

<sup>n</sup> Exod. viii. 32.—ix. 7, 12, 34, 35. The forms seem to be used almost *indifferently*; compare ix. 16. with 17.—Yet we have no authority for saying, 'God hardened *my* heart'—that would promote *Sin*.—It seems to me, that the phrase had grown so *familiar*, that it got to be tossed about, and used in any *tenues*. St. Paul uses it, but to *Jews*; and maintaining the sovereignty of God, against the impertinent claims of Jews, to *election*, &c.—We *modern Christians* have no business to use it.

<sup>o</sup> Quos Deus vult perdere prius dementat. Did God harden the heart of Pharaoh more than he hardened the hearts of Vespasian and Titus?

<sup>p</sup> Exod. xiv. 4, 17.

<sup>q</sup> 2 Sam. xxiv. 1.—1 Chron. xxi. 1.

*information*, but only excite different *feelings*. If God is spoken of as suggesting a punishable act, it is as *punishment*, which, as a part of *good* government, demands our devout admiration; if Satan suggests a punishable act, it is as *sin*, which should excite our abhorrence.

LI. Having finished what was *reserved*, we come to our *Application*: consisting of the same parts as in the preceding Articles.

We are first to see how near an Article of *natural religion* will approach to that before us; supposing us to take care, that we say nothing unauthorized. —One who was not a Christian might profess as follows, after what was professed under the preceding Article;

‘The condition of man, as described under the preceding Article, is such, as would make it *extremely difficult* for men even of the more virtuous sort, to enter into the *plan*<sup>r</sup> or *association* there proposed, for amending and improving our moral principles; it is a thing, indeed, to be deemed visionary, and beyond rational expectation. If it should be accomplished in any instance, he who finds himself in so happy a state, would have reason to think it a great  *blessing*, and to *thank* Providence for having conducted him into so desirable a situation. His *virtues* might be expected to flourish there, and his *disposition* to improve continually. He must, however, be careful to see even these improvements of *conduct* and *principle*, in a *right light*. He must not grow *proud* of them, but still look up to Heaven with a *grateful* heart, and continually *ascribe*, with *warm feelings* rather than with *precise ideas*, all his improvements, both of disposition and conduct, to the gracious influence of him, who, being the fountain

fountain of light, illuminates the human<sup>s</sup> mind with the rays of his divine wisdom; and, being a God of purity, gives to man, when well disposed, a taste and relish for whatsoever things are pure.’

LII. Turn we now from the Heathen to the *Christian*.—In what sense can he give a solemn *assent* to the tenth article of our Church? in the following;

‘The condition of Man, as described under the preceding article, is such, that even men of distinguished characters for probity and virtue, cannot be expected to *convert themselves* to so pure and perfect a Religion as Christianity.—This is not said, in order to prevent their *attempting* it; no, it is only the suggestion of experience and *probability*.—Let them exert themselves as much as possible: let them strain every nerve to escape from the slavery of sin:—But, if they succeed, the scripture shews, in many places, that they ought to *thank* God, and give him the glory of their conversion.—In the community of Christians, their conduct may become more *acceptable* to God; but even here, when they do anything which is good, it appears from scripture, that they are to *thank* God, not only for the *action*, as far as it was really good, but also for the *disposition* which led to it.’

LIII. *Mutual concessions* may be mentioned, but so much of what has been said has been calculated to settle controversy, that they need not be dwelt upon.

*On our part*, some good might perhaps be done by altering the *form* of our Article, so that the doctrine contained in it, should not seem to make our endeavours useless, till we knew, that we had  
sufficient

<sup>s</sup> Leland's View, vol. 1. p. 24, 4th edit. referred to in Sect. 11.

sufficient assistance. The Article would pretend less to *Theory*, if the *conversion* and other *effects* were mentioned *first*, with some words of scripture about our refusing evil and *choosing* good, and something promoting *diligence*, and if then we were directed to look up to the divine assistance as a *cause*; as a cause of something seen and experienced. And it might suit some men better, without omitting any essential doctrine, if the reference to our first Parent was made faint<sup>t</sup> and indefinite.

As to the part of *our Adversaries*, it really seems as if every Christian might be expected to assent to our Article, when modified in the manner, which has been described<sup>u</sup>; because no *Heathen* would refuse to assent to any parts but those, which belong to Christianity *at large*, or to Christians as Christians.—The referring should indeed be some way shewn to require no precise ideas.—But, if our Christian brethren, with whom we wish to coalesce, were to scruple assenting, they might, in religious worship, allow us to use devout forms in speaking of God as of him “from whom all holy *desires*, all good *counsels*, and all just *works* do proceed:” and might agree to some extensive forms of doctrine, in which it should be declared, that, as the doctrine of *Grace* ought not to prevent men’s *choosing* and *endeavouring*, according to the best of their abilities; so neither ought the doctrine of *free-will* to prevent men from being *humble*, and giving God the Glory on every occasion.

LIV. *Improvements*

<sup>t</sup> “Whenever we do, or design, anything good, we should give God the Glory; *especially* because of our hereditary depravity.”—Would this express every thing essential in our tenth Article?

<sup>u</sup> Dr. Powell shews, that disputants have differed less than they appeared to do, on our present subject.—Discourses, p. 299.

LIV. *Improvements* will chiefly consist in seeing, whether these things<sup>x</sup> are so: Whether in natural religion, or metaphysics, circumstances confirm what we have said of *Liberty* and *Necessity*: Whether texts of *scripture* can be *classified*, as we have imagined, into language of the *Agent*, and language of the *Spectator*: Whether, and how frequently, heathen authors ascribe virtue to the Deity.

For a *conclusion*, I would adopt the conclusion of Dr. Jortin's first Dissertation<sup>y</sup>: as from that he seems to have had the same feelings with myself, or some of the same, though he does not appear to have analyzed his feelings so as to establish regular *principles*, upon which his notions could be supported.

<sup>x</sup> Acts xvii. 11.

<sup>y</sup> "Thus do the doctrine of divine Grace and the doctrine of free-will, or human Liberty, unite and conspire, in a friendly manner, to our everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith, and humility; the second, to awaken our caution, and quicken our diligence."



## ARTICLE XI.

## OF THE JUSTIFICATION OF MAN.

WE are accounted righteous before God, only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, by faith; and not for our own works or deservings. Wherefore, that we are justified by faith only, is a most wholesome Doctrine, and very full of comfort, as more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification.

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1. In passing from the tenth Article to the eleventh, we pass from the *Closet* to the *Tribunal*; from the *principles* of action of each individual, to his *trial* at the judgment-seat of Christ.

We begin, as usual, with *History*.

The notions of the *Jews* are those of the greatest importance to us; because it was in arguing concerning them, that the Apostles laid down all those positions, on which the various doctrines concerning Justification have been founded.—Two things seem most worthy of notice; their notions of their *hereditary* privileges, and of the sanctity of *character* resulting from a strict conformity to their ceremonial Laws.

They persuaded themselves, that God could not hate or condemn the children, when he had shewn such favour to the Fathers: this notion is expressed

with some foolish extravagance, as may be seen in several<sup>a</sup> authors.

They had a notion of a *perfect character*, formed by a constant attention to niceties of the Law.—Not only, I suppose, the written Law, but the oral, or traditional.—This was, probably, a character which, in every instance, admitted of faults, or moral defects; but it was one, to which the Jews looked up with an habitual reverence and admiration; insomuch, that whoever approached to it, had his moral foibles overlooked.—A person of this character had the title of צַדִּיק; or of Chasidim, from חַסִּיד benignus, pious; the word used in Proverbs<sup>b</sup> for the holy man.

II. I do not give any History of *Heathens*, in respect of this Article; only I may mention, that Bp. Sherlock<sup>c</sup> makes *Faith* to be the principle of *natural Religion*; that is, reliance on God's assurances of future invisible good.—It is not likely, that Heathens should have occasion to speak much about any opposition between external actions and internal religious principles.

III. We may come then to Christians.—At first it is probable, that Christians went on in simplicity and godly sincerity, doing their duty, and looking up to God and Jesus Christ for their reward: so that any mention of Faith and works in the primitive writers would be accidental; and it would be practical, rather than speculative. I see there is a passage in the first Epistle of Clemens Romanus, which is to our purpose: Archbishop Wake translates it thus,—“And *we* also” (compared with the Sons of Abraham) “being called by the same will

<sup>a</sup> See Nicholls on the Art. and Michaelis's Introd. Lect. Sect. 129, 130. quarto.

<sup>b</sup> Prov. xi. 17, “the merciful man.”

<sup>c</sup> Discourses, Vol. 1. Disc. 14. on Heb. iii. 12. p. 369.



will in Christ Jesus, are not justified by *ourselves*, neither by our own wisdom, or knowledge, or piety, or the *works* which we have done in the holiness of our Hearts; but by that *Faith*, by which God Almighty has justified all men from the beginning<sup>d</sup>." Polycarp mentions, in an artless manner, some who are gone to Heaven, "in Faith and righteousness<sup>e</sup>."—It seems needless to search for more instances.—Dr. Nicholls produces two good passages, one from Basil, the other from Macarius; but they were considerably later. It seems as if Christian virtue had at first been plain, simple, and unaffected; but afterwards, more ostentatious: when it became so, there was more need of lowering the value of works, and insisting on the self-denying pretensions to reward founded on the merits of Christ.

IV. The *fifth century* we have found very busy about original sin and Grace, but it was not equally so about *Faith* and good *works*. The writers of that age opposed divine to human agency; but did not contend much about the different parts of human agency, when contrasted with each other. Not but we frequently meet with the terms, Faith, works, Justification; but what is said of them soon slides into something about Grace or Predestination. Thus Augustin says, "non opera, sed fides inchoat meritum," &c.—but then he is speaking of those, "quos *elegit* Deus."—(De Predest. Sanct. cap. 3. Ed. Ben.) *Justifying Grace* was more the topic than justifying *Faith*; that is, justifying Faith considered as the gift of God.—(Eph. ii. 8.) The eleventh Canon of the sixth Session of the Council of Trent, may give some idea of what I mean, "Si quis dixerit, homines *justificari* vel solâ imputa-  
tione

<sup>d</sup> Sect. 32. Wake.<sup>e</sup> Sect. 9. Wake.

tione justitiæ Christi, vel solâ peccatorum remissione, exclusâ *gratiâ*, et caritate, quæ in *cordibus* eorum per spiritum sanctum diffundatur, atque in illis *inhæreat*; aut etiam *gratiam*, qua justificamur, esse tantum *favorem*<sup>f</sup> Dei; anathema sit." Augustin seems<sup>g</sup>, from Rom. xxviii. 30. to have settled in his mind, that, as *vocation* preceded *justification*, and vocation was a part of divine agency, so must justification be also; which, with St. Paul's other expressions in the same passage, would make him refer the whole to Predestination.

In his book *de Spiritu et literâ*, he enters upon a formal discussion of the *Law of works* as opposed to the *Law of Faith*; but, at bottom, it is all a proof of the necessity of Grace. His book *de fide et operibus* seems written in order to obviate some errors *actually* prevailing, about *baptism* being sufficient, though those, who were converted and baptized, continued to lead wicked lives.

And what Vossius mentions in his Pelagian History about Faith, chiefly relates to the subject of Perseverance, and therefore belongs to the sixteenth Article.

v. The *Schoolmen* have their niceties on our present subject, as well as on others. A few specimens may be seen in Nicholls; but the part, which will be most interesting, is that which shews, that, before the Reformation, the Romanists were more moderate about the doctrine of good works than at the Reformation. Indeed so they have also been since.

vi. But the principal æra, since the complete publication of Christianity, in the History of the doctrine

<sup>f</sup> Does not this seem the opposite to Dr. John Taylor's idea of the sense of *χαρις*? Art. x. Sect xviii.

<sup>g</sup> On the 5th Psalm; and to Simplicianus 1st Book and 2d question; quoted by Nicholls.

doctrine of our eleventh Article, is that of the *Reformation*. *Good works* had then got to imply particularly, founding monasteries, giving or bequeathing money for masses, prayers for the dead<sup>h</sup>, or for shrines, &c.—that is, in short, good works had got to signify commutations for sins, and supports of superstition. These works must be depreciated, or reformation could not be effected.—And what so likely, in the heat of dispute, as that the Reformers should say very strong things against the strict *merit* of any kind of good works, and should extoll, in an unqualified manner, the necessity of founding all pretensions to reward, on the merits of Christ?—some of the Reformers are thought to have gone too far in this way; and their adversaries probably represented them as going farther than they really went.—Du<sup>i</sup> Pin, in his compendious History, gives this account of Martin Luther. “Upon this principle, that man is justified by Faith alone, Luther advanced forty propositions more on the 26th of April, wherein he carried the matter so far, that he took the boldness to maintain, not only that good works are not necessary for salvation, but that, how good soever they might appear, they were mortal sins; that man has no Liberty; that all works done without Grace are sinful; that invincible ignorance is not excusable, and that the involuntary motions of concupiscence are<sup>k</sup> sins.”—On this matter, I feel myself

<sup>h</sup> Our last Homily (or part) on *Good works*, throws contempt on these, and ends with shewing what are really good works.

<sup>i</sup> Vol. 4. p. 16.

<sup>k</sup> One may see here the ground-work of some of our Articles, though the expressions are those of an Adversary. Art. XIII. puts heathen virtues on the footing of Sins. Man's having no Liberty, or his will requiring divine assistance to make him choose

myself most inclined to observe, that the Reformed have departed so much from the rigour of their doctrine about Faith, and the Romanists from theirs about good works, that there seems now very little difference<sup>1</sup> between them. Happy were it if the same could be said with regard to all other subjects! But, with a view to our Article, we must attend more to opinions held at the time of the Reformation, than to those held at this time.

VII. I know not that we can see the notions of the *Romanists*, at the time of the Reformation, better any where, than in the acts of the Council of Trent. Some of the set of Canons before<sup>m</sup> referred to, belong to our present Article. The 9th and 12th Canons are most immediately our concern. They are so cautiously drawn, and with such limitations, that it seems hazardous to dispute about them; in the former, Will is opposed to understanding; in the latter, the word *qua* is ambiguous<sup>n</sup>. However, they would be useful to the Romanists in *seeming*, at least, to oppose the reforming *innovators*.

#### VIII. The

choose rightly, comes into the tenth Article.—And the sinful nature of vicious sentiments, or *concupiscence*, into the ninth.—That a man may suffer by not being a Christian (including in the word suffering, loss of happiness) though he has no opportunity of becoming one, Dr. Balguy forcibly maintains.—Perhaps if Luther said, that good works are not necessary for salvation, he might take good works in the technical sense just now mentioned, for commutations for sins, and supports of superstition.

<sup>1</sup> Burnet, p. 162, 8vo.—Principles and Practices, p. 75.—In which last work, p. 73, mention is made of *Sacramental Justification*; for which see afterwards Art. xxv. Sect. II. latter end.

<sup>m</sup> Art. x. Sect. XIII.

<sup>n</sup> My idea is, that the Romanists, at the time of the Reformation, held, that works *are* meritorious; but that they were *made* so by the merits of Christ.—Is the difference important? or is the distinction one, which can be made by the human understanding?

VIII. The Church of *England*, at the time of the Reformation, was, as usual, sober, candid, and moderate. The *Necessary Doctrine* gives much the same idea of Justification with our Article: and that the notions it contains are, on our present subject, to be accounted *reformed*, appears by what is said in the part relating to Good Workes, against “munkes, friars, nunnes, and suche other.”—The part relating to *Justification*, as we may judge particularly by the conclusion of it, seems to have been composed with the same general design as that concerning *Free-will*; namely, to *retain both* the doctrines, which are opposed to each other, without attempting a formal reconciliation between them. Which agrees with what a very<sup>o</sup> sensible writer mentions as the design of the Homily referred to in our Article; it “gives” says he, “no occasion to a reader, who considers the whole with attention, either to magnify too highly the efficacy of Faith, or depreciate too much the necessity of good works.”

Our *Reformatio Legum* says, “Nec illi sunt audiendi quorum impietas salutare et in sacris scripturis fundatam justificationis nostræ doctrinam oppugnant, in qua tenendum est, non operum momentis, justitiam hominum collocari.”

IX. The Calvinists and Arminians have held such opinions on our present subject as might be expected. But it did not enter into the famous *five* Articles or points. The Arminians are said not to have been quite uniform and ingenuous with regard to Justification by<sup>p</sup> Faith.

X. *Antinomians*

<sup>o</sup> Supposed to be Bishop Green of Lincoln.—Principles, &c. p. 69 p. 66.-73. deserves well to be read: might very well be read at Lecture.

<sup>p</sup> Mosheim, Index, Arminians.

x. *Antinomians* have been of different ages and countries; and we have<sup>9</sup> already had occasion to speak of them more than once.—Justification by Faith is one doctrine, by which they are most distinguished. Luther has been called an Antinomian, though he writes against them.—They relied so on Faith, as to undervalue morality.—Their doctrines, at least, have had that appearance; and it has been said, that their Teachers have been thought to discharge the whole of their duty, if they inculcated the Necessity of *Faith*, and displayed the Benefits of the New Covenant.—The manner, in which they express themselves, may be seen in a review of Dr. *Crispe's* Sermons by Geree: the Epistle to the reader will be sufficient<sup>r</sup>. Some of those, who have been called *Methodists*, have ascribed great efficacy<sup>s</sup> to Faith.—But we shall meet with Antinomians again under some of the subsequent Articles.

xI. “The *Anabaptists*<sup>t</sup> revived the Pelagian Heresy by preaching up the natural powers of free-will; and thence ran into another dangerous extreme of confidence in their own sufficiency, teaching, that they might deserve heaven by their own righteousness.”

xII. Our doctrine may be traced from the Reformation down to the present Century.—The *Puritans* always wished to depart farther from the Church of Rome, than the generality did; and one doctrine, in which they thought this desirable, was *Justification* by Faith. They were constantly labouring

<sup>9</sup> Art. VII. Sect. III. and Art. X. Sect. XII.

<sup>r</sup> From this Epistle to the Reader, it appears, that some high Antinomians required *nothing* on the part of Man; not even *Faith*. The work here mentioned being now no longer famous, I may as well say, that it is in Sidney College Library, T—5—38.

<sup>s</sup> Principles, &c. p. 57.

<sup>t</sup> Ridley's Life, p. 344.

labouring to answer this end; and, in the time of Charles I. they got into power. They were not, however, able to get their notions kindly received by our nation at large. They had thrown every thing into confusion; their manners were unpleasing; and their doctrine itself disgusted plain reasonable people. The Restoration came on; nothing was more natural than running into the opposite extreme: for some ascribed even the political confusions, previous to the Restoration, to the great stress laid on the doctrine of Justification<sup>u</sup> by Faith: on the idea, that it lessened men's esteem for Virtue, and made them easily give up any duty, of the man or the citizen, when they were earnest in any pursuit, where such duty stood in their way.

Nevertheless, though the Restoration was in 1660, men did not fairly get into the opposite extreme until the beginning of the 18th Century. The stiff zeal of the sectaries was first softened by those eminent men, who were called *Latitudinarian*<sup>x</sup> Divines, from shewing the contending parties, that they were narrow-minded, and quarrelled more about words than sense. These men met with unmerited abuse, as men are very apt to do, who think for themselves, and adhere to no large party: ere long, Faith came to be refined away into nothing: nay, at length, an attempt was made to prove the perfect coincidence between Christianity and *Reason*, by shewing, that our Religion was only a *republication* of the Law of Nature.— This attempt was made by a<sup>y</sup> Clergyman, an eminent orthodox Divine, but gave occasion to Dr. Tindal's

<sup>u</sup> See Bp. Warburton on the Holy Spirit, p. 317. 12mo.

<sup>x</sup> Hales, Cudworth, Baxter, &c. — This taken from Warburton on Grace, p. 316. 321. 12mo.

<sup>y</sup> Warburton on Grace, p. 319.

Tindal's celebrated Deistical book entitled "*Christianity as old as the Creation*, or the Gospel a republication of the Law<sup>2</sup> of Nature."

XIII. I will close this History with mention of the *Socinians*. In the Racovian Catechism, there is a Chapter on *Faith*, and another on *Justification*. In that on Faith, there is a division of Faith into two kinds, *saving*, and *not saving*. The latter means mere *assent* or belief of Truth; the former includes *obedience*<sup>2</sup>. In the chapter on *Justification*, we have these words, "Per fidem in Christum consequimur justificationem:" and the definition of justification seems to give the same idea with our Article. The rest relates to the Justification of those, who lived before our Saviour. The *modern* Socinians differ much from us with regard to what is called the doctrine of *Atonement*, which is intimately connected with our present doctrine, or may be called a part of it; but, as we propose making that the subject of an *Appendix*, we may defer making any Historical remarks upon it for the present.

XIV. After the History comes the *Explanation*. And first, we must take notice of the *Title*; "*Of the Justification of Man*."—The sense, in which *Justification* is taken here, seems sufficiently ascertained by the first words of the Article, "*we are accounted righteous*:" justification is being accounted righteous: but it would be better to get a more enlarged idea of a word so much used in Scripture: the word admits of several different senses; all that we have to do is to see how they are *connected*: what Mr. Hume says of Association of ideas in general, seems true of connexion of the different senses of

<sup>2</sup> See an account of it in Leland's View, Vol. i.

<sup>2</sup> This is like the beginning of our *Homily* on Faith—2d, part.



of the same word in particular; they are connected by *resemblance*, *contiguity*, and *causation*.—There may be some doubt which sense is the primitive, but, that once ascertained, the rest may be traced<sup>b</sup>. The primitive sense of the word *δικαιοσύνη* seems to be *goodness*, or *benignity*, of *temper*: and this being the principal ingredient in *Virtue*, when spoken of in the complex, or at *large*, *δικαιοσύνη* takes the sense, (as *goodness* does), of *Virtue*, in the complex; or, according to the language of our Translation, of *Righteousness*: which seems to mean, *ideal perfection* in *Virtue* in general; as *δικαιός* seems to mean the *ideal model* of a virtuous *man*. A word, which signifies a disposition, may easily come to signify an *instance* of that disposition; we speak of *kindness* as in the mind, and as an actual favour; this is a sort of *causation*. But, under the Mosaic dispensation, rewards being conferred immediately, whoever received a favour from God, must be conceived in the light of one *accounted worthy* of it; that is, *righteous*;—hence *δικαιός* might signify, to confer a *favour* upon, or to account *righteous*; and *δικαιῶσις*, and *δικαιοσύνη* might denote either *favouring*, or *righteousness*, or *justification*<sup>c</sup>.—Thus *Rahab* was said to be justified, when she was delivered from the calamities of a siege; *David* was justified<sup>d</sup>, when he was delivered from his persecutors. *Man* is justified, either when delivered from the *slavery* of *sin*, and put in a *way* of obtaining happiness under the Christian Religion; which is sometimes called being *saved*<sup>e</sup>; or when,

<sup>b</sup> We traced the senses of the word *Spirit* under the fifth Article.

<sup>c</sup> See Taylor on Romans; Key, Chap. 16.—Also Principles and Practices, &c. p. 44. about *Rahab* in particular.

<sup>d</sup> In David's case, *δικαιοσύνη* is generally, or always, translated *Righteousness*.

<sup>e</sup> Locke on Ephes. ii. 8.

when, at last, his *salvation* is fixed for *eternity*. As these two instances of the Justification of Mankind have been sometimes confounded, and the confusion has occasioned dispute, Divines, and our Church<sup>f</sup>, have called the admission into Christianity our *first* justification, and our salvation after death our *final* justification.

The word δικαιωσις, the Greek for Justification, occurs more frequently than the English reader is aware of, it is so often translated *righteousness*.—Jer. xxiii. 6. “The Lord our righteousness,” might be expressed, the Lord our *justification*: but it seems often a *doubt* which <sup>s</sup> word should be used.

But, though there may be occasions, on which it is useful to distinguish between a *first* and a *final* Justification; yet there may be others, on which the distinction may be *neglected*; as, I think, it may in the *Title* of our Article; so that Justification may be considered as being accounted righteous, on *any* occasion whatsoever, or without reference to particular occasions. And in this general view it seems to retain its *forensic* sense.

Justified is opposed to *condemned*, Prov. xvii. 15.—Matt. xii. 37.—Rom. viii. 33.—Which agrees with what has been said: being condemned is being accounted unrighteous.

xv. “*We are accounted righteous before God:*” this is not the same as saying, we *are* righteous. If, indeed, we are *made* righteous by the righteousness of Christ, we may, or must, be *accounted* righteous;

<sup>f</sup> See Necessary Doctrine, &c. Article of Justification.—Where there is mention of *increasing* our justification, and of being *restored* to it.—Taylor (on Romans) uses *first* and *final*.

<sup>s</sup> See Taylor’s Paraphrase on Rom. iii. and other parts of his work. In *Latin*, we should be aware, that the word *justitia* varies its senses, so as to resemble, in some measure, those of δικαιωσις.

righteous; but it may not be certain, conversely, that, if we are *accounted* righteous, we must be *made* so. The doctrine, that the merits of Christ become actually *our* merits, or *his* righteousness *our* righteousness, is what Mr. *Ludlam* denies, in his Essay on Justification, against Mr. *Hervey* and others.—*Imputed* righteousness<sup>b</sup> is opposed to *inherent*: but righteousness may be *imputed*, though at last we are only *accounted* righteous; but then it is not a personal quality<sup>i</sup>.—“*Righteous*” means perfect in our<sup>k</sup> obedience.

XVI. “*Only for the merit of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ;*”—We must remember the word “*only*,” when we come to, “*justified by Faith only;*” as we cannot be justified by *two* things, and by *each* of them *only*. “*For the merit,*” in Latin, *propter*. “*The merit of Christ;*”—this is more general than sacrifice, death, satisfaction, or atonement: a person who *merits*, does more than *satisfy*. However, the death and sacrifice of Christ are expressed in the second and thirty-first Articles.

XVII. “*By Faith.*”—What do we mean by *Faith*?—Reliance on the promises and engagements of another; but sometimes *Fides*<sup>l</sup> means *Fidelity*, which is a principle of observing our *own* promises and engagements.—And why may not Faith, when any one enters into an agreement, or Covenant, imply *both* these? both *confidence* in others, and *honesty* in ourselves?—it is with a disposition compounded of these, that every man of honour enters into every engagement; and that is what

<sup>b</sup> Taylor’s Key, Chap. 16.

<sup>i</sup> Of this a farther account will be given in the Appendix to this Article, Sect. xx.

<sup>k</sup> Locke’s Reasonableness, &c. Works, Fol. Vol. 2. p. 474, 476, 477. quoted by Jonathan Edwards—Sermons 12mo. p. 80.—See Taylor, p. 120. Note; from Theognis.

<sup>l</sup> ΠΙΣΤΙς, in Greek, seems to have the same sense. “ΠΙΣΤΙς ἐπιτιθεῖται, fidem dare, jurare,” Demosth.—ΠΙΣΤΙς πειρασθεῖς “fiduciam promissorum firmare,” Xen.

what I should call the *right disposition* for any agreement. I consider *Faith* as most usually, and most properly, understood in this sense: the disposition of an honest man entering into any contract, or other business.

“By Faith”—in Latin, *per fidem*, and afterwards, “*solâ fide* :” we must particularly observe, that it is not, *propter fidem*; but it was “*propter meritum Domini, &c.*” because this shews, that the two things opposed are, the *merit* of Christ, and our good *works*; we are justified on account of the former; we are *not* justified on account of the latter: therefore *Faith* has nothing to do in the opposition: to say, we are justified *by Faith, and not by works*, is to say what the Article does not warrant. Why then, it may be asked, is any mention of Faith introduced?—Because Man is justified on being admitted into the Christian Society, or covenant (to take that instance); and he is not admitted into it as an *inanimate*, or as an *irrational* being, but as *Man*; and therefore he must have the *disposition* of an human being, in order to his admission: he must have that *fidelity*, which every plain man has on entering into *every* society; or on taking upon himself any set of obligations. God accounts man righteous for one reason, not for another; this is all the *part of God*; man has no part to act: unless *accepting* be deemed a part. Faith, indeed, is sometimes seen in the light of *Virtue*; but, if it was *here*, man would be justified *for* his Faith, not *by* it—Our *Homily* expresses these things fully and clearly<sup>m</sup>. Mention of *Faith* could not be wholly *omitted*, because it is so frequently said in *Scripture*, that we are justified by Faith.

XVIII. “*And not for our own works or deservings.*”—In the tenth Article, *two sorts* of good *works*

<sup>m</sup> See Book of Homilies, 8vo. p. 15. 20. 22. 23.

*works* were mentioned, *natural* good works, and good works *acceptable* to God, or *Christian* virtues; which sort is meant here? I suppose, either; as the mind happens to be attending to the first, or the final justification.

But it appears to me, from the whole Article, as far as we have gone, that, before we can rightly apply the doctrine of this Article, we must be *supposed* to have been in a course of “*well-doing*,” according to the best of our opportunities; the meaning seems to be the same, as if it had been said, ‘*though* we exert ourselves as much as any persons in our situation can be expected to do; yet, *after all*, we must be, at our trial, or in the eye of divine *Justice*, considered as righteous, not on *account* of our actions, but on account of the merit of our Lord.’ The words of the Article, taken without this supposition, would mean, that the most wicked man possible is accounted righteous; which is absurd.

If this be true, we may observe, as under the preceding<sup>n</sup> article, that, in *practice*, we are to set about leading virtuous lives, with great earnestness, and on the best principles in our power; just as if all depended on *our own* diligence and discretion. And that it is not till *after* we have pursued our Christian course for some time, that we are either to *look back* on the assistance we have received, or *forward* to the judgment which we are to undergo.

XIX. “*Wherefore*,”—this word enables us to compare what went before it, with what comes after it:—and warns us to see there be no inconsistency.

“That we are justified by *Faith only*,” solâ fide;  
this

<sup>n</sup> Art. x, Sect. xxxv.

this expression, from what was just now observed, must mean the same with being justified *for* (propter) the merit of Christ. *Faith only* is evidently a *technical* expression, but we have found a way of ascertaining its true signification. In our *Homily*, the expression is sometimes, "*only Faith*," which seems better, as having a more technical sound: and it is the same in the Article of 1552. In the second part of the Homily on Salvation, it is shewn, that such a mode of expression was in use amongst the ancient *Fathers*. And the *meaning*<sup>o</sup> of it is said to be, "*freely, without works*,"—according to an expression of St. Paul: and the meaning of, "*without works*," is declared to be, not that good works are to be *omitted*; but that they are not to be thought the *meritorious* cause of our *Justification*.

xx. "Is a most *wholesome* Doctrine."—This expression implies, that different doctrines were maintained at the time; and that our Church fell in with those, who held, that men are justified by "*only Faith*;" that is, fell in with the *reformed*.

This doctrine is declared *wholesome*, as tending to prevent vain-glory, and as generating humility; as inducing men to give themselves up<sup>p</sup> wholly to God, as exciting their devout affections; as making them grateful to God, and kind to all their brethren, the partakers of his protection. The Doctrine is not said to be "*certain*," as in the Article of 1552; yet the former part of our Article affirms its *truth*.

This doctrine is also said to be "*very full of comfort*," as making us *members* of the Christian religion,

<sup>o</sup> P. 19. 8vo. Salvation 2d part. — better p. 22. 8vo. third part.

<sup>p</sup> Third part on Salvation, end.

religion, and so giving us better *hopes* of the favour of God, than we could otherwise have: as shewing us how God makes us “his dear children, brethren unto his only Son, our Saviour Christ, and inheritors for ever with him of his eternal Kingdom<sup>a</sup> of Heaven.”

XXI. “*As more largely is expressed in the Homily of Justification.*”—This is a part of our Article, which seems to afford us Liberty, when it is compared with the Article of 1552. In that, men were required to profess the Doctrine of Justification, “*in that sense* as it is declared in the Homily of Justification.” So that the whole *Homily* became an *Article*. By the present Form, we are only called upon to declare, that the Homily expresses the doctrine more *fully* than the Article; which we might declare, even though we thought, that the Homily contained some things, which we did not approve.

But one difficulty remains the same; namely, to determine what is meant by “*the Homily of Justification* :” no Homily is extant, or ever was, in our Church, bearing that title. Some have thought, that the Homily “Of the *Salvation* of all mankind<sup>b</sup>,” in three parts, is the composition meant: or the second and third parts of that Homily<sup>c</sup>. *Salvation* is nearly equivalent<sup>d</sup> to Justification. But my idea of *Justification* as a title of declarations of Faith, is taken from the Canons of the sixth Session of the Council of Trent. Under *Justification* are included all the doctrines of ten of our Articles, beginning with the ninth. Now, in our first Book of Homilies (and what we want must

<sup>a</sup> Homily of Salvation, near the end.

<sup>b</sup> Bennet on the Article.

<sup>c</sup> Principles and Practices, &c. p. 67.

<sup>d</sup> Taylor on Romans, p. 116.

must be in the *first* book, because the Article of 1552 refers to it), after an introductory one, as it were, on reading the Scripture, come four on the subjects treated at Trent under the Title of Justification; *Human Misery, Salvation, Faith, and Good works*.—These may be called doctrinal, but that which follows about Love, or Benevolence, or charity, is *practical*; and so seem the rest. The same subjects do not recur. There is a short Preface on Good works in the second Book, but it is only to introduce a practical discourse on Fasting. My idea therefore is, that the compilers of our Article meant, by “the Homily of Justification,” these *four*: which may be called *eleven*, (a long Article!) as the first is in two parts, the rest in three, each. Ridley<sup>u</sup>, in his life of Bishop Ridley, says, that our church referred to the Homily, lest the short expressions of the Article should occasion their being thought *Lutherans*<sup>\*</sup> in saying we are justified by only Faith. He thinks, that “the Homily of Justification” included all that I do, except the Sermon on the Misery of Mankind. He does not give any reason for his opinion in this point; nor does any other writer that I remember<sup>y</sup>.

XXII. We come now to the *Proof*.

The Article before us seems, in reality, to contain but one proposition, ‘*We are justified by only Faith;*’

<sup>u</sup> Book v. Sect. vii.

<sup>\*</sup> Those who professed Justification by “only Faith,” have been called *Solifidians*.

<sup>y</sup> *Salvation* means so much the same with *Justification*, that I should scarcely dispute with any one, who judged the expression of the Article, “the Homily of Justification,” to mean only the Sermon, in three parts, entitled “Of the Salvation of all Mankind.” See the end of the first part on Good Works, where the Thief would have *lost* his *Salvation*; which expression might be compared with some in the Necessary Doctrine about losing *Justification*.



*Faith*;' but the expreffion "only Faith," or "Faith only," implying a negation of *works*, we might perhaps as well take two propositions, the one *negative*, the other *affirmative*.

1. We are *not* accounted righteous before God for our *own* works.

2. We *are* accounted righteous, when at all, for the *merit* of *Christ*: or, we are justified by *Faith*.

The proof of these propositions given *here*, can scarcely be more than a specimen of what is to be found in the Scriptures; it may be *sufficient*, but it cannot well be *full*. A person, to see the full proof, must read the Epistles to the *Romans* and *Galatians* entire, and that of St. *James*; and must study their *scope* or tendency; and that of several other parts of Scripture. *Taylor's Key* to the Apostolic writings, would be of great use to such an one; we cannot well do more than select a few texts.

XXIII. We are not accounted righteous before God, for our *own* works.

What has been said under the ninth Article is sufficient<sup>2</sup> to shew this. And we may examine Luke xvii. 10.—Rom. iv. 4, 5.—Rom. xi. 6.—Eph. ii. 9. and other passages of like import.—Phil. iii. 4. 9.

Our Homily<sup>3</sup> seems to me to describe well the imperfection of our principles, affections, and services.

*Salvation* is spoken of in Scripture as the *Gift* of God, as opposed to *debt* or *wages*: we may consult John xvii. 2.—Rom. vi. 23.—Eph. ii. 8.—1 John v. 11<sup>b</sup>,

XXIV. It

<sup>2</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxx. the proof.

<sup>a</sup> Page 12. 8vo. Second part on Misery of Man.

<sup>b</sup> I had not seen the *ninth* Book of the Divine Legation of Moses, when I wrote this.

XXIV. It is the same thing, at least in the sense of our Church, whether we prove, that we are justified on account of the *merit of Christ*, or that we are justified by *Faith*:—both however are *true*.

We are restrained in our proof of Justification through the merit of Christ, by our plan of reserving the doctrine of atonement for an Appendix: we may, notwithstanding, refer to Rom. v. 18, 19. before<sup>c</sup> mentioned.—Phil. iii. 9. and Heb. x. 17.

Justification by *Faith* is expressed in a great number of texts. Mark xvi. 16.—Acts x. 43.—Acts xiii. 39.—Rom. v. 1.—Rom. iii. 28.—31. Gal. ii. 16.—Gal. iii. 11, 12. 26.

xxv. I shall leave the remaining part of the proof to each person's private reading, for the reason already assigned; and shall proceed to some indirect proof, or to answer a few *objections*.

xxvi. Is there not a *confusion* in the texts now alledged, between the *Law of Nature* and the *Law of Moses*? or between the *Works* enjoined by those Laws? It seems to me, as if an observation made under<sup>d</sup> the seventh Article would be a sufficient answer to this difficulty. The Epistle to the Romans may prove, that neither Jew nor Heathen could be justified by works; and the Epistle to the Galatians more particularly, that the Jew cannot be justified by his works, which he performs as a Jew; but this can make no difference as to the proposition, that Justification is *gratuitous*. Both Epistles must, of course, by the circumstances in which they were written, have the first justification principally in view: but, if our works

<sup>c</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxix.—See also Taylor's Key, p. 45, bottom.

<sup>d</sup> Art. vii. Sect. iii. When Luther is called an Antinomian.

works fall short of perfection, the same reasoning is applicable to *final* justification. The general form of the argument is this; Men are sinners, therefore cannot be accounted just, without an act of *mercy* in the Judge of the World.

XXVII. Is not our doctrine contrary to that of *St. James*? who<sup>e</sup> says, “can faith save him?”—no; the most that can be allowed is, that the reasoning of *James* is intended for different *circumstances* from that<sup>f</sup> of *Paul*; or that it is intended to supply what common sense would always supply, if no evasion of duty was in view. But I doubt whether even so great a difference as that need be allowed between these sacred writers. Let us suppose them to confer.—*Paul*. We are justified by Faith.—*James*. Will he be justified, who does no good works?—*Paul*. No, I did not say that; I have said, the wicked will be *punished*.—*James*. You did not mention *works* with Faith?—*Paul*. No; but I plainly meant to address myself to Jews and Heathens, and to declare to them, that, when they *had performed* what they called good works, their eternal salvation must still depend upon the divine *Mercy*: to those, who profess to *neglect* good works, I have said *nothing*.—*James*. Then we agree; or, at least we do not disagree. You say, such works as Jews and Heathens have been found to perform, cannot save them: I say, *nothing* will save them, if they do not strive to live well<sup>g</sup>.

Whatever

<sup>e</sup> James ii. 14.

<sup>f</sup> Art. ix. beginning of Sect. xxxviii.

<sup>g</sup> This dialogue relates only to some *individuals*; but the texts about the sinfulness of men, relate (as under the ninth Article) to men taken *collectively*. All men were concluded under Sin; therefore, notwithstanding the virtues of some individuals, (who themselves erred and were imperfect) *Men* could only be justified by *Faith*.

Whatever may be thought of this Dialogue, it seems very probable, that some Christians had taken advantage of Paul's expressions about Faith, to evade their duty, and had pleaded, that Faith was<sup>h</sup> sufficient to save them. This was a pernicious perversion; Paul might be easily seen to have improvements in *virtue* chiefly in view.—Therefore James corrects the abuse; and in doing so<sup>i</sup>, artlessly and warmly, runs into some expressions seemingly opposite to those of Paul.

Dr. Taylor says, that St. Paul speaks of the *first* justification, and St. James of the *last*, or *final*.—This may be true in<sup>k</sup> *fact*; that is, St. Paul speaks of persons *becoming* Christians. St. James of persons *already* Christians; but I think what they *both* say might have place in *both* situations. In both, good works are to be aimed at; in both, good works are incapable of justifying.

The most striking interference between St. James and our Article is in the use of the expression, “*Faith only*;” both would say, it signifies ‘Faith *without works*’; but in James ii. 24. it means the Faith, as far as it can be called Faith, of a *wicked* man; in our Article it means Faith, or an honest principle, at any time, without *antecedent* works *perfectly* good. In James, you look *forward* from Faith, as claiming an unmerited reward; in the Article, *backward* as *having* put us where we *are*: though with a view to see the effect of faith, in both cases.

When Faith is spoken of as *producing good works*, the disposition of the faithful may be the same, as when

<sup>h</sup> I think it appears from Augustin de Fide et Operibus, that people did the same in his time.

<sup>i</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxxviii. beginning.

<sup>k</sup> One passage in James looks as if he *might* address an *unconverted Jew*.—“Thou believest that there is one God.”—Though this *might* be said to a converted Jew.

when it is spoken of as *justifying* men; yet it is seen in a somewhat different light: after an honest Christian has accepted Justification, he proceeds to *action*.—Even St. James seems to use it in this sense, though the persons he argues with had Faith only in a low degree, and of a mean sort; or rather, calling themselves Christians, they took for granted, that they had Faith, because they had consented to be baptized.—St. James's expression is, “though a man *say* he hath Faith.” (ver. 14.)<sup>1</sup>.

XXVIII. Does not Scripture frequently ascribe salvation to *Virtue*, or good works? as in Matt. xxv.—Rom. ii. 7.—Acts x. 35.—Yes, all this business of admitting men, by favour, into a religious society, is to purify a people zealous of *good<sup>m</sup> works*. When our Saviour declared the general judgment, his Dispensation was not ripe for our doctrine: though even then, one who did good, was promised a reward as if he did it to Christ:—but the doctrine of justification by Faith will never supersede<sup>n</sup> plain declarations of rewards and punishments

<sup>1</sup> Paul tells a man, our Lord likes *fruit-trees*: the man shews the Lord a parcel of vile trees, some cut down, all *dead*; the Lord takes no pleasure in them:—How could you be so absurd? says James: common-sense might have told you, that Paul meant good *bearing* trees. You must have some *bye-interest* to make you do such a foolish thing. With this idea, read James ii. 14, &c. to the end of the chapter. . . Abraham was justified by *Faith*; but not by Faith that disclaimed *acting* well. So of Rahab.—St. James seems to mean, by being justified by works, *not* being justified *without* works:—he says, “can Faith save him?”—that is, Faith *without* works; or *exclusive* of virtue. His subject is not, properly, *Faith*; but something pretending to be Faith, which *excludes* virtue. He commends Abraham's Faith, because it was *not* such as he was speaking of.

<sup>m</sup> Titus ii. 14.

<sup>n</sup> In the account of the General Judgment, the scene, or situation of things, is quite different from what it is when Justification

ments for virtue and vice. Declarations of what we are to *do*, must always be more wanted than statements of the grounds, on which we are to claim reward after we have done well. The more particular mode of our justification is chiefly to be declared, when men shew vain-glory about their brilliant actions; when they seem to intend to dazzle by noble, great, generous strokes of conduct: when they swell and grow irregular, and neglect internal principle.

Much the same may be said of Rom. ii. 7. It contains a general declaration of what may be called the result of our Theory. Taylor<sup>o</sup> speaks of it as declaring our final Justification; which must always be conceived as depending upon our *works*, while we *look forward* to it with a view to *action*; though, when we are actually *tried*, and so *look back* upon our conduct, we must acknowledge, that it cannot be the meritorious cause of our salvation.

As to Acts x. 35. it means no more than that worthy men of every nation will be *admitted* into

fication by Faith is spoken of. All the world is seen collectively; men of all times: and right conduct is supposed to imply right principles. In teaching Justification by Faith, the situation supposed is, that some particular people have made wrong claims to eternal happiness, which are to be rectified and corrected: this is temporary; if these mistakes are set right, all things return into their old train: and Judgment proceeds upon conduct.

Dr. Taylor speaks of Matt. xxv. as not belonging to *Christians* in particular. See on Rom. Key, paragraph 178.—God might go on as long as he pleased, saying, Virtue shall be rewarded, without mentioning why, or how:—there is no contradiction in revealing more *particulars*.

This subject will be more fully treated under Art. xii. in answer to the last objection. Sect. xxv.—Bp. Warburton has something on Matt. xxv. in the ninth book of his *Divine Legislation*: Works, Vol. 3. quarto. p. 697.

<sup>o</sup> Key, p. 125.

into Christianity :—as Bishop Sherlock <sup>p</sup> has fully shewn.

XXIX. Is not the doctrine of Justification by Faith remote from our common notions of things? and on that account disadvantageous to Virtue? and even to Revelation, by prejudicing men of *philosophical* minds against it? No; our Doctrine is not at variance with *common life*; for it is exemplified in different sorts of *institutions*. If we were to take, for instance, *military* institutions; *Faith*, or the right disposition, would be a *military spirit*, with a sense of *honour*: unformed men are admitted, get into a course of *discipline* and improvement; become *heroes*; and though imperfect, get *rewarded*, through *favour*; having exerted their military spirit in a series of gallant achievements.—They can, at no time, *claim* admission or reward as a strict *right*; but must always be *endeavouring* to deserve it. They would, at any time, be laughed at if they said, that their having been *inlisted* was a reason why they should be *idle* or disorderly.—And a man might be favoured by his Sovereign, if patronized by an Officer of *merit*, especially one intimately connected with the Sovereign.—And so in other Institutions.

Neither is our doctrine unfavourable to *Virtue*. Nothing can promote virtue more than right disposition and sentiment <sup>q</sup> in the *Heart*; or than entering into good institutions and *associations*: anything

<sup>p</sup> Vol. 1. Disc. 12.

<sup>q</sup> Indeed actions are only virtuous as they arise from virtuous principles. A man, who gives alms to the poor only from fear, or from ostentation, is not charitable. What Mr. Erskine mentioned as a maxim, in pleading about Juries and Libels, may, by a parity of reasoning, be applied to our purpose; the maxim, *Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea*, cannot be more just than, *Actus non facit bonum, vel pium, nisi mens sit bona, vel pia*.

thing may have a few bad effects incidentally, but good institutions are likely to be useful to virtue upon the whole.—Indeed we have no right to interpret Scripture but with a view to the circumstances, for which each passage was intended; that is, with a practical view; so as to promote humility on a review of our past conduct, without remissness as to our future exertions.—Can a real philosopher object to anything planned in such a manner?—Besides, it has before been<sup>r</sup> observed, that, when it is said, Virtue cannot justify us, it is *supposed*, that we have exerted ourselves to the utmost.

xxx. I will not propose more objections, but proceed to our *Application*.—And first our Article of *natural religion*.

‘ So imperfect are our virtues, that it is in vain to think of claiming rewards as a *debt*, on a footing of *justice*. I will *strive* and *hope* to attain them; but if I am so happy, I will acknowledge them as *given*, in *mercy*. My most important business here is, to acquire, by the help of God, an *honest principle*; with that to *enter* upon *plans* and *associations* for promoting religious and moral improvement. And afterwards *constantly* to improve and purify my principle, and make it the *source* of Virtue.—This must be the most *salutary* method of proceeding; this must afford the greatest ease and *security* to my mind.’

xxxI. A Christian might say thus;

‘ I must aim to do my best, and I may *hope*, in some way, to attain happiness; but, whenever I conceive myself on my *Trial*, either for admission into Christianity here, or for final bliss hereafter, *Scripture* assures me, that I can make no *claim* on a footing of *strict right*. I may be saved; but, if I  
am,



am, I must ascribe my Salvation to God, through the *Merit* of his Son. No more is left for *me*, than to *accept* the bounty, with such a disposition as will make me exert all my powers to act well in future. I adopt this method cordially, as one best adapted to make my *principles* uniformly good, and give me reasonable hopes of eternal happiness.'

XXXII. *Mutual concessions* need not here take up much time.

To *Romanists* we might make our Article more acceptable by softening some expressions seemingly tending to *Antinomianism*, and by strengthening expressions tending to encourage *Virtue*, and the hopes of its *rewards*.

To *Socinians* it might perhaps be less exceptionable if we used '*as Christians*,' instead of, for the *merit* of Christ; or interwove some *scriptural* expressions.

From *Romanists* we might expect a concession, that *actions* can only be good when performed on good *principles*: and we might wish them to be attentive to the difference between *ideal* and *actual*, when speaking of perfection and imperfection; and to own, that we mean to adopt no System but that, which best promotes *Virtue*.

From *Socinians* we might expect, that, as we agree in ascribing Salvation to *Divine Mercy*, they would indulge us in professing something indistinct about the *methods* of that mercy, and the *means* which it chuses to employ.

XXXIII. The principal *improvement* here, must consist in investigating the real intention of St. Paul and other sacred writers, when they introduce any mention of justification: this will include the circumstances and notions of the persons addressed.

I should

I should apprehend, that, when writers treat of Divine Justice and Mercy, they scarcely attend enough to the manner, in which the human mind acquires its more particular ideas of the Nature and Attributes of God. How it begins from *Man*, according to what was explained in the *Introduction*<sup>s</sup> prefixed to the *ninth Article*.

<sup>s</sup> Sect. VIII.



## A P P E N D I X

### TO THE ELEVENTH ARTICLE.

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#### ON THE DOCTRINE OF ATONEMENT.

I. **W**HY the Doctrine of Atonement is made a separate subject, will best appear when we have treated of it.—I will begin, as in each entire Article, with some *historical* remarks: taking first a *short* historical view of the whole subject; and then selecting out a few æras.

A short account<sup>a</sup> may be the following: Before the Reformation, this Doctrine was left to arise naturally from Scripture, as occasion required: at the Reformation, it began to be made a means of depreciating the merit of Popish good works, as was the whole doctrine of Justification by Faith: on this account the Romanists made what opposition to it they could, consistently with their notions of the *Mafs*, which supposes the Death of Christ to have been a real *sacrifice*. They misrepresented it perhaps sometimes; but they were the occasion of its becoming more *definite*, by charging the reformed with bad *consequences* arising from it; or from what they conceived it to be: which naturally brought on *explanations* and arguments in its defence.—During the time when all men were set on thinking for themselves, by the Reformation,

the

<sup>a</sup> Barnabas makes the Sacrifices of Judaism to be *types* of the Christian sacrifice,—See his Epistle, Sect. 7, 8.

the *Socinians* arose: and their general principle being, to reduce all things to the level of *common sense*; to throw out of religion every thing *strange*<sup>b</sup> and extraordinary, they have been constantly endeavouring to give all those texts of Scripture, on which we found the very wonderful Doctrine of Atonement, an ordinary construction; and to prove, that *Repentance* is all that is necessary for the remission of sins; and that the Death of Christ was not properly a *Sacrifice*, but only what he suffered in, order to give men such an *Example*, and such a *Proof* of his Mission, as could not be given by a common departure out of Life.—The Socinians have not kept precisely and invariably the same notions, from their rise to the present time; but this may suffice for a general account of them; in opposing them, some particular solutions have been hazarded, which the most rational and enlightened of the present age have discountenanced; so as greatly to *simplify* the Doctrine of Atonement; and leave the redemption of Mankind, through Christ, as a scheme of Divine Wisdom to be *accepted* by man, rather than *understood* in its particulars.

11. Having taken this general view, we may mention, at least, a few particular *eras*. That the *Heathens* had *sacrifices*, is well known; Dr. Balguy, in his preface to his Father's tract on *Redemption*, maintains, that they were always feasts or entertainments given to the Gods: and Dr. Priestley, in his History of the corruptions of Christianity, maintains the same. Archbishop Potter (Vol. 1. p. 210). shews, that the Heathens had

<sup>b</sup> Dr. Priestley's words might be their motto; "Let us not then look for *mysteries* where no mystery is, and obscure the beautiful simplicity of the Gospel, &c."—11th Letter to Dr. Price, (p. 157.)

had *expiatory* sacrifices, or reconciliatory ; but angry Beings may sometimes be appeased by a good Feast.

The *Jews* had sacrifices, by divine appointment: *sin-offerings*, or trespass-offerings, of the *expiatory* kind; *peace-offerings* for benefits, received or expected. We may add the *paschal* sacrifice, a settled commemoration. I feel a doubt about admitting all these to be *Feasts*, as so much stress is laid upon the *blood*: (Lev. xvii. 11.—Heb. ix. 22).—the shedding of which would be quite an accident, if animals were killed merely to *prepare* them to be offered. An animal killed for food and not used, would be a present equally valuable. Some indeed were allowed to offer something *inanimate*; but this seems to have been a case of *necessity*. With respect to *Christians*, in the present subject, the age of the *Pelagian* controversy may be joined to those before it; and we may remark of them jointly, as before of the earlier ages, that writers express themselves *artlessly*, without any view to controversy, or system; that occasionally, they extol either the efficacy of *Faith* in Christ's *Death*, or of *Repentance* and virtuous *conduct*: insomuch that both the defenders and the opposers of the Doctrine of Atonement, may find passages in them to their purpose; just as they may in the Scriptures themselves.—Any expression was taken, in the times now meant, which seemed most natural; as *sacrifice*, *ransom*, *price*, &c. even *satisfying* the divine *Justice* occurs amongst the ancients as a thought, topic, *illustration*; though it was not occupied, as it were, by the public, and so made what we should call a *doctrine*. The resemblance, or notion, of *redeeming* or *ransoming*, has been carried so far, as to make the

° Priestley's Hist. Corr. i. 249.

the ransom to be spoken of as paid to him, who held man in bondage, that is, to *Satan*.—We have moreover, amongst the ancients, some marks of *diffidence*<sup>d</sup> concerning some points; these shew, that the *difficulty* of the Doctrine of Atonement was acknowledged; and that men were *sincere* in what they did profess.

Instead of quoting authorities, I will refer to the *Catholicus consensus* prefixed to the *Corpus, &c. Confessionum*<sup>e</sup>; to our *Homilies*<sup>f</sup>; to *Nicholls* on the Article as before, and to *Wall* on Infant Baptism<sup>g</sup>.—We must not expect that particularity in the ancients, which we find in the moderns; the ancients were as particular as was needful in their case; and it would be unreasonable to conclude, that they were not in possession of a doctrine because they had not examined it very minutely: As unreasonable, as to conclude, that a man was not in possession of a plant, because he had not examined it with a microscope.—Dr. Priestley, in his *History of the Corruptions of Christianity*, brings some authorities against the opinion, that the Fathers were in possession of the Doctrine of Atonement; let them be weighed against those to which I refer; to my judgment it seems, that the balance would turn in our favour. He takes into that doctrine some particulars, which are not now maintained by our ablest writers.

He observes, that our doctrine is not “in any ancient *summary*<sup>h</sup> of *Christian Doctrine*.”—We might observe, that *Christian remission of sins* is in the Creeds; which can scarcely be expressed in more words,

<sup>d</sup> Hieron. ad Pammachium et Oceanum de erroribus Origenis; quoted in Warb. Div. Leg. B. 9. Introd.

<sup>e</sup> Geneva, 1612.

<sup>f</sup> On Salvation, 2d Part.

<sup>g</sup> Chap. 19. Sect. 9, & 12.

<sup>h</sup> Hist. Corr. Vol. 1. p. 221.

words, without introducing some scriptural expression to our<sup>i</sup> purpose; but it is enough to answer, there was *no need* of more particulars in short confessions of Faith: Doctrines are introduced into Creeds only when *wanted*<sup>k</sup>; and every doctrine of every Creed has something human in it: a Creed is an human composition, for purposes of convenience, which are subject to the judgment of *Man*.

If larger confessions of Faith are to be blamed for having doctrines not found in the smaller; why may not the smaller be blamed for having more than is contained in a doxology, or in the short confession used at Baptism in primitive times? Dr. Priestley does indeed say<sup>l</sup>, that our doctrine was wanted; it might have been opposed to the *Docetæ*, who denied the reality of the Body of Christ, and therefore, in some sense, of his Death. But I believe, they would have maintained, that something took place when Christ apparently died, which answered all the *purposes* of death. And it does not seem so natural for those who opposed the *Docetæ*, to dwell on a doctrine, certainly very difficult, which had not been particularly discussed, as to have recourse to topics concerning the Incarnation, which had been more fully debated<sup>m</sup>.

This *kind* of reasoning on Dr. Priestley's work might be extended far beyond our limits:—I will only observe farther upon it, that I hold it unfair to take every commendation of good works, or of repentance, as an argument against the Doctrine of Faith

<sup>i</sup> See Corpus, &c. Confessionum, on the Apostles Creed.

<sup>k</sup> Art. VIII. Sect. I.

<sup>l</sup> Page 226.

<sup>m</sup> See Catholicus Consensus, p. 125, column 2, whence it appears, that the doctrine was *held* by Tertullian and Irenæus, though not *analyzed*.

Faith in the merits of the Death of Christ. Those who hold the Doctrine of Atonement, imagine that they feel as warmly the beauty and excellence of virtue, as either Romanists or Socinians.

III. The *Schoolmen* seem rather to surpass, or go beyond others, in the orthodox doctrine, than to differ from them. They commonly used those names for the different sorts of *Causes*, which have since been found convenient; according to which Christ is called the *meritorious* cause of our Salvation. We have before<sup>n</sup> referred to a few specimens.

IV. Some have conceived merit, not only in the Death of Christ, but in that of the *Martyrs*:—they thought perhaps, they were only using a just or laudable parity of reasoning; but we have no right to conclude by analogy from a singular case; we know too little of the counsels of God, with regard to that stupendous event the death of his Son, to determine, that any other event is of like nature with it. Besides, the expressions of scripture are against our putting any man on the same footing with the Son of God; as will be shewn hereafter. Nevertheless we may remark, that, whoever made the Death of the Martyrs meritorious, must have pre-supposed the Death of Christ to have been such: their notion was an *extension* of our Doctrine of Atonement.

V. But the æra of the *Reformation* is the principal. The Reformed<sup>p</sup> churches at that time, as now, had different Confessions of Faith; but they are easily compared by means of the harmony prefixed

<sup>n</sup> Art. XI. Sect. v.

<sup>o</sup> See Fulke's *Rhemish Test. Index Martyrs.* (on Col. i. 24) Also Dr. Priestley's *Hist. Corr.* Vol. 1. p. 229.

<sup>p</sup> The order here would be better thus; Age of Reformation, Romanists,—Reformed churches in general; England in particular.—Original Socinians.



fixed to the Corpus before mentioned. I have compared nearly all of them, and find myself most pleased with the two presented to the Emperor Charles V. ; the Augustan, and the Argentinensis<sup>q</sup> : but, what is more to the purpose, they differ in nothing which seems essential, as to the Doctrine of Faith in the merits of Christ ; only in some fancies, as it were, or hypotheses ; as about the *scene* of Christ's sufferings, about their being *judicial*, &c.—So good reason had Bishop Warburton for calling our present doctrine the great Gospel-principle of Protestantism<sup>r</sup> at the time we are speaking of.

VI. We should here take notice, not only of the opinions of the reformed, but of those of the *Romanists* : they are chiefly to be had from the acts of the Council of Trent. The sixth session contains some Canons about Justification, as we have already seen ; but I do not perceive, that any of them mention the *sacrifice* of the death of Christ. The tenth Canon affirms, that men cannot be justified without the *Justitia, δικαιοσύνη*, righteousness, of Christ, “per quam nobis *meruit* :” and adds, that we do not become formally righteous by the righteousness of Christ :—But the Canons of the twenty-second Session, about the *Mafs*, acknowledge, not only the merits and righteousness of Christ, but the *Sacrifice* of his Death upon the Cross : as do also the Decrees preceding the Canons :—but I do not see anything in the expressions very remarkable.

*Dr. Nicholls*, on this Article, refers to a Book<sup>s</sup>, which I have not seen ; and concludes from it,  
that

<sup>q</sup> Argentoratum seems to have been a *Diocesis* ; Argentina, the capital city of Alsatia.

<sup>r</sup> On the Holy Spirit, p. 326.

<sup>s</sup> “ Sacerd. Rom. Ven. 1575.”

that the Offices of Baptism and Visitation of the sick had once, in the Romish Church, some expressions about the merit of Christ, which have been since *expunged*. As to the merit of Christ as affecting Christians, the Romanists seem to have held, and probably hold still, that, though we are not formally righteous, yet we *deserve* Salvation by the *merit of Christ*, that is, they are against imputed *righteousness*, but for imputed *merit*. This is expressed briefly in the *Rhemish Testament*, on Col. i. 12. "We are not only by acceptance or imputation *partakers* of Christes benefits, but are by his Grace made *worthy* thereof, and deserve our Salvation *condignely*." On the 24th verse of the same chapter, Protestants are represented as, "under pretence of Christes passion," taking "away the value of all good deedes."—See also on Rom. viii. 18.

The church of England held, at the time of the Reformation, the same doctrine, which it holds now; though perhaps that doctrine had not then been considered so particularly, as it has been since. I will read to you, in confirmation of this opinion, a few passages out of the Article of Justification in the *Necessary Doctrine*, and out of some of our first *Homilies*, especially that on the *Misery of Mankind*.

VII. The *Puritans* <sup>t</sup> wished Reformation to be carried farther than it was; and so opposed Popish doctrines very strenuously. Their writings, as I remember, express the efficacy of the death of Christ forcibly.—But I refer to *Ludlam's Essay* on the doctrine of *Satisfaction*, p. 67.

VIII. *Fauslus Socinus* thought <sup>u</sup>, that Christ had such interest in Heaven, that he could get his disciples

<sup>t</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xii.

<sup>u</sup> Priestley, Hist. Cor. i. 273.

disciples freed from punishment. He considered *Redemption* as deliverance from the *guilt* of Sin, by good Laws and precepts, tending to *reform* us.—The Racovian Catechism supplies us with the arguments of the early Socinians, in the chapter de Morte Christi. The death of Christ, we are told, was chiefly for the sake of his Resurrection; our orthodox opinion, “*fallax est et erronea et admodum perniciofa*”<sup>x</sup>. Some theory is given of the divine Justice and Mercy, but, in general, the same arguments are used there, which have been since used by the modern Socinians, though no notice is now taken of their being old.

Against Socinus, *Grotius* published his work, called, *Defensio Fidei Catholicæ de Satisfactione Christi*, to which *Vossius* writes a short Preface, telling us, that *Grotius* was the *first*, who had written on the subject, so as to make it his proper business: yet the doctrine is called *Catholic* in the title. *Vossius* speaks of *Grotius* as having been induced to write, by Socinus’s having held errors *vetustati minus notos*, and by his having gone upon general principles of *morality*. The work is reckoned, I think, worthy of *Grotius*, though not perhaps defensible in every particular: it seems in some respects an instance of the orthodox having taken ground untenable.

The *Family of Love* make the shedding of Christ’s *blood* to mean, the shedding of the Spirit in the hearts of the faithful<sup>z</sup>.

IX. We may now pass on to *modern times*.—Bishop Butler, in his *Analogy*, has been of great service

<sup>x</sup> Page 177.

<sup>y</sup> A short account of the contents see in Apthorp’s *Lectures on Prophecy*, Vol. 2. p. 73.

<sup>z</sup> Rogers on the Article.

service in shewing, that our doctrine is not liable to any solid *objection*. Bishop Warburton has ably defended it, by shewing, that the command given to Abraham to sacrifice his son implied a proper sacrifice of Christ for the redemption of mankind<sup>a</sup>. Mr. *John Balguy*, father of the justly celebrated Dr. Thomas Balguy, has published a treatise to prove, that the *sufferings* of Christ should be reckoned as *merits*, and that God gave the Salvation of mankind to his Son as a *reward* of those merits.—Dr. Thomas Balguy has republished this tract, with a preface of his own, which is, like every other thing of his, well worth considering: the reader will see, that he calls himself an *advocate*<sup>b</sup> rather than a *judge*.

Dr Taylor, in his book on the Epistle to the Romans, looks upon the *Blood* of Christ as meaning his *obedience* and *goodness*; and upon the worth of Christ's death, as being of a *moral* kind:—See his *Key*, Chap. viii. and his *Note* upon Rom. iii. 25.

This is not saying, that Christ died *only* for an *example*; and for *confirmation* of his mission; (though he uses the words pattern and confirmation, page 269.) nor is it holding, that God's *natural placability* will make him always accept of Repentance. Though, therefore, we have called Taylor a *Socinian* under the ninth Article, he does not seem to agree with the modern Socinians on our present subject.

Locke is said by *Michaelis* (Introd. Lect. Sect. 133, end,) to have been prejudiced against the doctrine of the Atonement: but he seems by no means a Socinian: what he objects to (Note on Rom.

<sup>a</sup> Div. Leg. B. vi. Sect. v. Consult also Book ix. which proves the Sacrifice of *Christ* to be *real*.

<sup>b</sup> End of Address to the Reader.

Rom. iii. 24.) is rather the doctrine of *Satisfaction*, or the notion that in Redemption by Christ an *equivalent* is strictly paid.

Mr. *Hervey*, the pious and eloquent writer of the *Meditations*, has written a discussion, in the way of *Dialogue*, on the subject of Atonement; the characters who debate are called *Theron* and *Aspasio*: in this, he runs into more *particulars* concerning the *manner*, in which God is induced to forgive men for the sake of the sufferings of Christ, than seem, to some judgments, within the reach of human comprehension. On this account, he has been attacked, in a formidable manner, by Mr. Wm. *Ludlam*, the celebrated mathematician and mechanic.—By reading Mr. *Ludlam's* Essay, a thinking man may be led to reflect on the subject, in a proper manner. His friends Dr. *Powell*<sup>c</sup>, Dr. *Balguy*<sup>d</sup>, and also Dr. *Ogden*<sup>e</sup>, seem to be of the same opinion with himself; we are only to hold, they think, that the sufferings and Death of Christ are a *medium*, through which God, in his infinite wisdom and goodness, is pleased to confer forgiveness of sins on the race of man; but they conceive, that it is not for us to examine minutely into the particular *way*, in which this plan appears to the divine mind: it is not our business to carry our opinions farther than *Scripture* and *experience* authorize; or to form any notions, but such as result immediately from comparing the *word* of God with his *works*. And I am mistaken if this does not, in a little time, prove the *settled* opinion of improved and enlightened Christians.

I conclude these historical remarks with observing, that the *Moravians* dwell almost constantly, in their Sermons and Hymns, on the sufferings of Christ:

<sup>c</sup> In his last Charge.

<sup>d</sup> Page 200, 201.

<sup>e</sup> Second Sermon on the Articles of Faith.

Christ: and that some of those called *Methodists* have said such *bold* things of the efficacy of the Christian sacrifice, as to occasion some danger<sup>f</sup> to good works. Yet I believe this danger to be in a decreasing state: some who have written with great calmness and rational argument against Socinians, on the subject of Atonement, have been considered as, at some time, attached to Mr. Wesley. Writers who use the bold expressions here meant, may be called *Antinomians*, to whatever sect they belong: the examination of *Dr. Crispe's*<sup>g</sup> Sermon would afford us instances of a *continued language*, referring all spiritual excellence and advantage to Christ.

*Jonathan Edwards* has published a discourse on Justification, which is written with ability, and could scarce fail to improve any attentive reader.

x. Having finished our History, we come next to the *Explanation* of some *terms*, which are commonly used in speaking of the efficacy of the death of Christ (sometimes including his *sufferings* and his *virtues*) on the Salvation of Mankind.

xi. Let us first take the word *Atonement*, as that is now made a principal term, and the *name* of the whole doctrine, in which we differ from the Socinians as to our present subject. The meaning of it seems to be, an act which God is pleased to accept *in lieu of punishment*; when an Atonement is made, God is supposed to view the person, on whose account it is made, in the light of an *offender*, and to be appeased by the act, as a magistrate is by some fine or imposition, when he forbears to execute the rigour of the law.

Dr.

<sup>f</sup> See Letter to Mr. B—e from Academicus, p. 56. 58, and 61, &c.

<sup>g</sup> Mentioned Art. xi. Sect. x.

Dr. *Priestley*<sup>b</sup> says, that Atonement means, making any person or thing *clean*, so as to be fit for divine *worship*: and that does seem to be its *particular* meaning in several places; insomuch that, in the LXX, we sometimes find καθαρίζω and ἁγιάζω, when we find making *atonement* in the English; but, under the Jewish law, a person might appear in the light of an *offender* on account of *uncleanness*; and, though he had committed no very distinguished sin, he might, if he was going to perform any religious service that required particular purity, make an *atonement* for his *general* imperfection: which notion agrees well with the prayer of David, “Who can tell how oft he offendeth? O *cleanse* thou me from my secret faults!”<sup>k</sup>—I do not see how *cleansing*, as the *primitive sense* of making Atonement, can agree with ἐξιλασμομαι, which is the word most commonly used for making an Atonement, and which has no relation to uncleanness, except as an *offence*. This Author affirms too, that “Guilt, in a moral sense, is never said to be atoned for by any sacrifice:”—but we read of *Sin-offering*, and Atonement for<sup>l</sup> *Sin*; and, not to examine particulars, we read that the *annual* Atonement was made for “the errors of the people.” The word is ἀγνοημάτων, which contains an idea of sinning through *ignorance*; and may mean, the offences of persons not hardened, or void of good principles: but those are the Sins, which are supposed to be pardoned even on the *Christian* scheme as well as the Jewish: Sacrifice does not, in any religion, take away all punishment whatsoever: those, who are truly *penitent* for past sins, are put upon a footing with those, who have

<sup>b</sup> Hist. Cor. 1. 193.

<sup>l</sup> Exod. xxix. 36, 37.

<sup>k</sup> Ps. xix. 12.

<sup>l</sup> Heb. vii. 27. with marginal references.

See also Heb. ix. 7. and compare Heb. v. 3. with Lev. ix. 7.

have sinned *inadvertently*: they are not void of good *principles*. Under the *Mosaic* religion, where every thing was connected with divine *worship*, sins struck men most in the light of rendering offenders unfit for divine *worship*;—"the Priest shall make an Atonement for you to cleanse<sup>m</sup> you"—from what?—"that ye may be clean from all your *Sins* before the Lord." *This* idea of sin cannot be equally strong under the *Christian* dispensation; and we may see, that it is not, on a comparison between Judaism and Christianity, if we read the concluding verses of the ninth Chapter to the Hebrews, and a few of the first verses in the tenth.

Atonement occurs only once in our English New Testament; Rom. v. 11. where, as Dr. Priestley rightly observes, it might have been *reconciliation*, the Greek word being *καταλλαγή*. Indeed I am, at present, *at a loss* to see what could lead our translators to the word "Atonement," in this place, as reconciling had repeatedly occurred in the preceding verse. Though I believe the translators knew more of the matter than I do, or than Dr. Priestley does.

XII. The next term which occurs, is *Propitiation*: it occurs only *twice*, in Rom iii. 25. and 1 John ii. 2. In the former place, the original is *ἱλασμενιον*, in the latter, *ἱλασμος*.—*ἱλασμος* seems to require no particular consideration; it signifies that person or thing which appeases, or renders propitious; that Christ is such a person, it belongs to our *proof* to shew; the *meaning* of such a definition, whether the proposition implied in it be true or false, is no way obscure.

But we shall scarcely have an adequate idea of *ἱλασμενιον*, without looking into the Old Testament ;

<sup>m</sup> Lev. xvi. 30.



ment: the word is properly an *adjective*, used as a substantive, by having one understood; *ἐπιθεμα* is that substantive: The LXX use the expression<sup>n</sup> *ἱλασθριον ἐπιθεμα*; and the Hebrew has *כפרת*, from *כפר* to cover, for the same thing, taking the name rather from *ἐπιθεμα*, which in Greek is sometimes left out. The thing referred to, is called the *Mercy-seat*; the nature of which will be best seen in Exod. xxv. 17. 22.—and *ἱλασθριον* is rendered *Mercy-seat*, Heb. ix. 5.<sup>o</sup>—It does not seem to have been the *Lid* of the Ark, but a plate of pure gold laid loose upon the lid, which was also of pure gold. (In Exod. xxv. compare ver. 11. & 17.)—Both Locke's and Taylor's Notes on Rom. iii. 25. deserve to be read: and the way to understand how *Christ* is a *Propitiation* in this sense, is, to consider the *purposes* of the *Mercy-seat*, the *כפרת*, the *ἱλασθριον*, in the *sanctum sanctorum*, under the Mosaic dispensation; and then to think how our blessed Lord answers all similar purposes<sup>p</sup> under the *Christian*.

We see, that *Propitiation* and *Atonement* are nearly *connected*: *ἱλασμομαι* comprehends them both.

XIII. *Reconciliation* seems to be the *effect* of *Atonement* or *Propitiation*; and is sufficiently clear when men are considered in the light of *offenders*; or, under Christianity, as children of *wrath*, or concluded under *Sin*. Or as *enemies*, Rom. v. 10.

XIV. We have already had occasion to speak of *Sacrifice*: *Oblation*, or offering, seems only a more comprehensive term, including every thing presented to any Deity.—We shall have occasion to speak

<sup>n</sup> Exod. xxv. 17.

<sup>o</sup> See an engraving opposite to the title-page of Parkhurst's Hebrew Lexicon; where other passages are referred to.

<sup>p</sup> This is well expressed in Taylor's Note on Rom. iii. 25.

ſpeak hereafter of the difference between proper and *figurative* ſacrifices. We may obſerve here, that, in every proper ſacrifice, *blood* is ſuppoſed to be ſhed; or *Life* taken away. *Sacrifico* does not imply that in its *etymology*, only to perform ſacred *rites*, and to do ſacrifice  $\kappa\alpha\tau'$   $\epsilon\chi\omicron\chi\eta\nu$ ; but  $\theta\upsilon\omega$  in Greek, and  $\text{הָבַל}$  in Hebrew, ſignify to *kill*, in general, as well as to ſacrifice: which of theſe two is the *primary* ſignification, is not of importance in our preſent buſineſs.<sup>a</sup>

xv. We frequently meet with mention of *vicarious* ſuffering and puniſhment; or puniſhment by *ſubſtitute*; which may be intelligible without explanation: but, as I have aſked myſelf whether I ſaw clearly what it meant, I may mention it to others. If a man ſold himſelf to *ſlavery*, in order to ſet another at liberty, (his Benefactor, ſuppoſe, or his Prince, or Parent), his *ſufferings*, as a ſlave, would be vicarious.—If a *deſerter* was going to be ſcourged, and another ſoldier (his brother, or friend,) offered to be ſcourged for him, and the offer was accepted, his *puniſhment* would be vicarious.—But a perſon may prevent the puniſhment of another, and even by *ſuffering*, and yet that ſuffering not be vicarious.—Suppoſe the Deſerter's brother had, by getting maimed, and receiving wounds never perfectly curable, ſaved a citadel, or the life of a Commander, and was to ſolicit for a remiſſion of the Deſerter's puniſhment, urging, that he wanted no gold or ſilver for his paſt ſervices, but only that his brother ſhould that once eſcape pain; if his petition was granted, he would *relieve* another, and, in a good meaſure, by his

<sup>a</sup> Luke ii. 24. The offering of the Birds is called a Sacrifice,  $\theta\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha\nu$ , but that was in lieu of a Lamb, as appears from Lev. xii. 8. and Reland ſays (Ant. 3. 1. 1.) the Jews do not allow  $\text{הָבַל}$  to be applicable to Birds. In ſuch a caſe, the ſenſe of  $\theta\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$  might be extended.

his *sufferings*; but yet he could not be said to suffer *vicarious* evil, or punishment: his brother's escape might be conceived as owing to his *merits*, or to be given him as a *reward*.

XVI. *Punishment* is evil inflicted by *authority*, in consequence of an *offence*<sup>r</sup>. But any *evil* is called a punishment in some views; because evil often operates as punishment, in deterring from bad conduct. But evil seems to be called punishment especially if it arises from any faulty *conduct*;—delirant Reges, *plectuntur* Achivi.

XVII. *Redemption* is buying anything back again: it is also delivering from confinement, generally from *slavery* or *captivity*, by payment of something valuable, to him who holds in bondage the person redeemed. That which is paid is called a *Ransom*, in Greek *Λύτρον*.—Redemption seems to be primarily used (as far as respects the matter before us) for rescuing the Israelites from *Ægyptian* bondage; and afterwards it is *applied* to rescuing *Christians* from the bondage of *Idolatry*. The *Deity* redeems without actually and literally *paying* a ransom; God is always said to use any *human* means, when<sup>s</sup>, if Man had accomplished the same end, it would have been by those means.—And thus the Deity may *purchase* as well as *redeem*.

XVIII. *Salvation* may be mentioned, though it does not perhaps very frequently occur in disputes about the doctrine of Atonement. *Saving* seems to imply *evil* or *danger*, from which a person is made safe. The *Israelites* were *saved*<sup>t</sup> from the *Ægyptians*; and, in like manner, *Christians* are *saved* from the *evils* of *Heathenism*, and from its spiritual

<sup>r</sup> See Ludlam's 2d Essay, p. 25.

<sup>s</sup> Introd. to 2d Part of Articles, Sect. VIII.

<sup>t</sup> Taylor on Romans, Index, *Saved*.

spiritual *dangers*. In the times of Christ and his Apostles, men were said to be *saved*, who were *converted* to Christianity, as has been observed before<sup>u</sup>; and “*eternal*<sup>x</sup> *salvation*” may be understood to mean, securing from eternal *evils*, or giving a *security*, which shall continue for ever. “*Eternal*<sup>y</sup> *redemption*,” bears a like sense. Both phrases, being in the Epistle to the Hebrews, have a reference to the History of the *Jews*.

XIX. A term much in use in discussions about the Atonement, is *satisfaction*. It seems sometimes to mislead; let us reflect on what passes in our minds, and perhaps we may perceive *how*—Although we acquire our ideas of the qualities of God by ascribing to him human qualities, enlarged and purified, yet we may sometimes be *misled by words* and sounds: we may ascribe qualities to him without properly enlarging them, or duly clearing them from imperfections. The doctrine of *Satisfaction* implies, that God *must* execute *justice*; so we call inflicting punishment. God has said, “Thou shalt not steal.”—a man steals; his punishment, we say, and truly, is *just*—justice is a good quality, therefore a perfect Deity has it for an attribute: therefore the offender *must* be *punished*. No resource? why, yes; a corporal punishment may be *changed* into a *Fine*; and A may bear the fine, which B has incurred: why not even a personal punishment?—Whichever is punished, the heinousness of the crime is published, and the terrors of Justice displayed; all men, even B himself, may abstain from stealing in future, as carefully as if B had suffered: in short, a man may be punished by *substitute*, and then Justice will be *satisfied*; *satisfaction* will be made, there will be an

<sup>u</sup> Art. x. Sect. xxix. and Art. xi. Sect. xiv.

<sup>x</sup> Heb. v. 9.

<sup>y</sup> Heb. ix. 12.

an Atonement to appease the Divine wrath.— Thus are some men's thoughts apt to run on; and thus is the *Doctrine* of Satisfaction established; but, I think, some expressions in the train are taken as meaning more than they really do mean. This step is not enough attended to: "his punishment is *just*;" it really means no more than that it would *not* be *unjust*, if it was to be inflicted; the offender would have no reason to *complain*; but, because it is not unjust, is it therefore *necessary*? not necessary to be inflicted by the *Deity*, that we know of; an human Magistrate may be guilty of some sort of injustice by letting offenders escape; but he would not be called unjust to the offenders; his injustice would be against the public, or the prosecutor, who are under his protection.—Then, the expression, "*Justice is a good quality*," is capable of misleading: it is certainly good to infringe no man's *rights*; and in Governors and Magistrates it is good to resist *corruption* and partiality, and do nothing from private interest or *favour*: It is good to act with *steadiness* and fortitude, though threatened by combinations of wicked men; to be uniform in executing laws, though after a long *interval*: but, though justice is good in all these views, it does not follow, that an all-wise judge must *necessarily* inflict punishment on *every offender* for every offence. We cannot speak of Justice so abstractedly, as to say universally, *Justice* must be satisfied; though in some situations, and with some views, the expression, 'Justice shall be satisfied,' may not be improper: as when it means, that, notwithstanding some particular escapes, punishment still may be *expected* by all who offend.— Indeed, nothing now said, in order to shew that men are misled by sounds about Satisfaction, ought to afford any encouragement to any *offender*;

when punishment is only *not unjust*, he has reason to *expect* and to *dread* it: and he will certainly *feel* it, as far as infinite wisdom directs that he should: whilst we stand in the light of men *liable* to punishment, we should be careful not to reason ourselves out of an apprehension of just punishment; though, in studying the divine nature, we should be equally careful not to tie up the administration of the Governor of the world, by the imperfection of our human *language*; by fancying a proposition universally true, when it is but true in certain circumstances. If it seems good to the Deity, he may accept of Atonements of very different kinds, and for very different sorts of offences.

The word *satisfaction* is twice used in Numb. xxxv. namely, in verses 31. & 32. in the sense of which we are now speaking, or in one very near it: the Greek word is *λυτρεω*<sup>z</sup>.

xx. The doctrine of satisfaction, the notion of *satisfying* divine Justice, conceived to be under the necessity of punishing rigorously the sins of mankind, brings on what appears to me a still more difficult doctrine; I mean that of *Imputation* of sin to Christ. If God must punish because he is just, he can only punish *guilt*; Christ is to be punished for the sins of the whole world; therefore he must be *guilty* of them: yet he was perfectly *innocent*; he was the *Lamb* without<sup>a</sup> spot; he “did<sup>b</sup> no sin,” he “was in all points<sup>c</sup> tempted like as we are, yet without sin.” How are these things to be reconciled?

<sup>z</sup> Bp. Warburton says, Satisfaction “carries in it the ideas of a debt *paid* and *accepted*,” i. e. unites the ideas of *Redemption* and *Justification*. Div. Leg. B. 9. Vol. 3. p. 684, quarto.— In this sense it may be useful sometimes, if not perverted.

<sup>a</sup> 1 Pet. i. 19.

<sup>b</sup> 1 Pet. ii. 22.

<sup>c</sup> Heb. iv. 15.

ciled? by a word<sup>d</sup>; Christ is to have *real* guilt, but not *inherent*, only *imputed*. In truth, when one comes to examine this matter of *imputed* guilt, it seems to be merely *nominal*. It is a something wholly inconceivable, and only spoken of in order to keep the Theory of *satisfying* divine Justice intire and compact: though, as far as I can judge, that theory which cannot be supported without terms, out of which all meaning must be thrown<sup>e</sup>, should answer some *useful* purpose.

I will not trouble you with any farther *Explanation*: indeed some of the terms now explained are not in our eleventh Article; but, if they are in any of the others, or in our Liturgy, or Homilies, that is enough. The doctrine of Atonement is both introduced into the *second* Article and the *thirty first*; but, as the former treats of the *Incarnation*, and the latter of the *Mafs*, I would not enter upon that doctrine under either of them, nor anywhere but here; and therefore I would explain here any terms, which they may contain. In our communion-office, the prayer of consecration contains several of our terms; but I look upon the number as intended (not as in a law-deed, to bind and confine, but) to give scope and liberty to the mind: and also to guard against the doctrine of the continual sacrifice of the<sup>f</sup> *Mafs*.

XXI. We come now to our *Proof*: but what is it which is to be proved? my idea is this; we all  
*fall*

<sup>d</sup> "Thus we find perfect innocence and real guilt united in Christ." Ludlam on Satisfaction, p. 105.

<sup>e</sup> B. III. Chap. x. Sect. vi. — Imputed righteousness is mentioned Art. xi. Sect. xv. The theory is, good Christians have imputed righteousness, though not inherent: yet imputed righteousness is *real*; and yet we are really *guilty*: that is, we have inherent guilt. If all this is only to support our popular notion of *Satisfaction*, it might as well be set aside.

<sup>f</sup> Ludlam. . . Append. to Satisfaction.

*fall short* of doing our duty, therefore the *Law*, which enjoins it, serves finally to *condemn* us; the *Christian* Religion comes in to our relief; it does not abolish the *Law*, for that is divine, and adapted to make human nature happy; but it forms us into a *Society*, so beneficial, that every member is furnished with the *means* of obtaining eternal happiness after death: his hopes are not to be founded on the improbable supposition, that he will act so, "in all points," as to *claim* eternal happiness on a footing of *Justice*:—if he acts from the *fundamental principle* of the Christian Society, he will be finally happy, notwithstanding he may at times continue to fall short of satisfying the law. Yet he is always to consider God, not as acting arbitrarily, but as the rewarder of *Virtue* and the punisher of *Vice*; in which *character* it pleases his infinite wisdom and goodness to give this inestimable privilege to Christians, in a manner perfectly *gratuitous*, with some view to the sufferings, the conduct, the *merit* of his Son, who is perpetual head of this Society.

§ We should now form one short *proposition* out of this statement of the case. It might be something like this;

XXII. God will make sincere Christians eternally happy, notwithstanding some imperfections of theirs, on account of the merits, the sufferings, and the *Death* of Christ.

The number of texts, which may be brought in support of this proposition, is extremely great; my wish is, to produce them *all*; because every addition

§ Here I first consulted, hastily, the ninth Book of the Divine Legation of Moses: but I had first written, though not correctly, the substance of the remainder of this Appendix.—Whatever references to that Book have already appeared in these papers, were added afterwards.



tion to the number must strengthen the proof; and each sacred writer must corroborate the testimony of the others; but I fear you will have already thought me somewhat prolix:—on the whole, I will confine myself to a *selection*; in making which, we must keep in mind what has been already quoted under the eleventh Article.

Consult If.<sup>h</sup> liii. 4—6.

Matt. xx. 28. } life a *Ransom* for many.”

Mark x. 45. }

John i. 29.—Behold the Lamb of God.

— xv. 13.—Lay down his Life for his friends.

Acts iv. 12.—No other name whereby, &c. and *Salvation*.

— xx. 28.—which (Church) he hath purchased with his own *blood*.

Rom. iii. 23—26.<sup>k</sup> —and the sense arising from making *δικαιος* mean mild, candid; (I scarce know which sense to prefer; but our doctrine stands firm upon either.)

Rom. v. 6—10.—died for—justified by his blood —reconciled.

— vi. 23.—eternal Life through Jesus Christ.

1 Cor. i. 30.—who of God (*απο Θεου*) *δικαιοσυνη, αγιασμος, απολυτρωσις*.

— viii. 11. } — for whom Christ died—with

— xv. 3. } Rom. xiv. 15.

2 Cor.

<sup>h</sup> Here see Pearson on the Creed, p. 74, folio.—Taylor on Romans, Note, on Rom. iii. 25.

<sup>i</sup> It might be better to take more proofs out of St. John's Gospel; as John iii. 14—18. —also ver. 35, 36.—Chap. iv. ver. 42.—Chap. x. ver. 15, 28, 29.

<sup>k</sup> With the note in Short Defence of the Doctrine of Atonement, p. 33.

2 Cor. v. 18, 19.—and reconciling.—made him  
*Sin.*

Gal. i. 4.—gave himself for our Sins.

Ephes. i. 7.—redemption through his blood.

—— ii. 16.—reconciled by the Cross.

—— iv. 32.—God, for Christ's sake, hath forgiven you.

1 Tim. ii. 6 —gave himself a ransom for all.

Hebrews entire: but particularly Chap. ix. ver.  
26. 28. and Chap. x. 1—14.

1 Pet. i. 2. On this text, I presume to differ from Taylor<sup>1</sup>: I make *five* distinct things:—1. Christians are fore-known.—2. chosen.—3. sanctified by the spirit at Baptism:—4. walk in *virtue*.—5. “*And*” finally are *justified* by the “sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ.”

1 Pet. i. 19.—precious blood of Christ, as of a Lamb, &c.

1 John i. 7.—the blood of Jesus Christ *cleanseth* us from all sin.

Rev. vii. 14.—wash—in the blood of the Lamb.

Abraham's sacrifice of his son was mentioned in a former part of our system. Here I must close our *direct proof*; though I do it reluctantly, as every omission prevents our doctrine from being seen in its full force and extent.

XXIII. I now proceed to *indirect* proof; or to the solution of some few *objections*.

XXIV. It is urged, that our doctrine is not laid open in the *Old Testament*, or in the *Gospels*, or in the *Acts* of the <sup>m</sup> Apostles.—How it should be expected in the *Old Testament*, though our doctrine were

<sup>1</sup> On Romans, Note before cited, on Rom. iii. 25.

<sup>m</sup> Priestley, Hist. Corr. Vol. 1. p. 154, and following.

were true, I cannot imagine<sup>n</sup>; it is shadowed forth by *types*, and seems to be intimated by *Prophecy*<sup>o</sup>; nay, it will be difficult to account for God's appointing *Sacrifices* amongst the Jews, except we suppose some end in view relative to Christianity; to that dispensation, which was to extend to all mankind. For the Jews, or Israelites, were to be kept as much separated from Idolatry as possible; this was the grand purpose of their existence as a People; was it not very strange, that the principal part of their ritual Religion should be the same with that of Idolaters? on our supposition, this is intelligible; on the Socinian hypothesis, it does not appear so.

With regard to the *Gospels* and *Acts* of the Apostles, it cannot be said, that they contain no *traces* of our doctrine; we have already referred to several passages which contain some: more might be mentioned; for every account of *Christian* remission of Sins, differs from remission through the mere natural essential *placability*<sup>p</sup> of the Deity.

But it seems certain to me, as has been before repeatedly observed, that Christianity was intended to be opened *gradually*; that converts were at first to be treated as “Babes in Christ,” and fed with *milk*; and not with strong<sup>q</sup> meat till afterwards:—  
taking

<sup>n</sup> Dr. Priestley says, the *general principles* of our doctrine might be expected to appear in the Old Testament.—Display of *Justice*, and abhorrence of *Sin*: are not *these* in the Old Testament? see Deut. xxxii. 35.—Psalm xxxix. 11.—v. 5. &c. &c. Also Psalm xciv. 1.—But, I see, the Racovian Catechism says, (p. 181. De morte Christi) God is not represented as *just*, but as *angry*; I hope, at least, His anger is just.

<sup>o</sup> If liii. 4—6.

<sup>p</sup> Hist. Corr. Vol. 1. p. 152.—Famil. Illustr. p. 48.—Cat. Racov. p. 180.

<sup>q</sup> 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2. with marginal references.

taking this thought along with us, we must feel a pleasing admiration at finding, in the Acts of the Apostles, an *intermediate* degree of distinctness; something between the intimations of the Gospels, and the full declarations of the Epistles.—Of the 25th Chapter<sup>r</sup> of St. Matthew I have said something already<sup>s</sup>; it is not likely, that the doctrine should be explicitly declared there, or in the Parable of the *Prodigal Son*; or in anything delivered before the Death of Christ, the event principally to be dwelt upon; the *foundation* on which the doctrine was to be built: a sketch might be drawn, but the superstructure could not be built before the foundation was laid. The Parable of the Prodigal Son was calculated to obviate the envious prejudices of the Jews, against admitting the Gentiles to unite with them in one common Religion; it was not natural to introduce our doctrine into such an Apologue. Nor was it wanted in order to declare, that each man was to expect<sup>u</sup> *mercy* in proportion to the mercy he shewed; that might be declared even *now* without entering into the doctrine of Atonement.—In Eph. iv. 32. we have, “even as God, *for Christ’s sake*, hath forgiven you;” which opens an additional motive to forgiveness, but not an essential one: perhaps still more motives to forgiveness may appear hereafter; that would not prove the invalidity of those we now have. Our Saviour’s expostulations were chiefly intended to beat down Jewish prejudices by each man’s natural feelings and *affections*; any topic occasioning *perplexity* would have defeated his purpose.

xxv. Suppose

<sup>r</sup> Hist. Corr. i. 160.

<sup>s</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xxviii. this will also be mentioned again, Art. xii. Sect. xxv.

P. S. See Warburton’s Works, quarto, Vol. 3. p. 699, bottom.

<sup>t</sup> Hist. Corr. i. 159.

<sup>u</sup> Hist. Corr. i. 159.

xxv. Suppose something be said, in the Gospels, about the merits and death of Christ, yet does not the general *tenor*<sup>x</sup> of the Scriptures shew, that God will pardon “sinners *freely*” “whenever they truly *repent* and reform their lives?”—In the first place, God will pardon sinners *freely*, if he pardons them when they cannot *claim* pardon<sup>y</sup> as a matter of strict *right*: he may annex a *condition* to a pardon, and yet it may still be *free*: else indeed *repentance* could not be requisite: it is no more absurd to speak of a free pardon on account of the merits of Christ, than of a free pardon on condition of repentance. Repentance, I doubt not, always avails something in the sight of God; but can it bring men to the same state in which they would be if they had continued *innocent*<sup>z</sup>?—does *experience*<sup>a</sup> shew this; or rather, is not the Socinian idea of the sufficiency of repentance mere *hypothesis*? at least, can repentance be supposed to merit or procure an *eternity* of happiness?—As to the New Testament, I think we may observe, that Repentance is most spoken of *before* the Gospel-scheme gets opened; that, when it is fully opened, there is most said of *Faith*: the *Acts* we find here again an intermediate link, where repentance and faith are sometimes joined, sometimes mentioned separately. Indeed, when one is mentioned, the other is *implied*: this Mr. *Locke* has<sup>b</sup> observed; and his observation agrees with some remarks, which  
we

<sup>x</sup> Hist. Corr. Vol. i. p. 156.—168.—Fam. Illustr. p. 48.

<sup>y</sup> Div. Leg. Book ix. p. 636, 4to. but better in p. 650.

<sup>z</sup> Dr. Balguy's Pref. p. vi.

<sup>a</sup> Powell's Third Charge, p. 346. mentioned Book i. Chap. xix. Sect. xiii. Div. Leg. Book ix. rather *against* this, in some sense.

<sup>b</sup> Reasonableness of Christianity; Works, Vol. 2. p. 630, 631. quoted by Jon. Edwards in his Sermons, 12<sup>o</sup>. p. 125.

we have made about *partial*<sup>c</sup> *causes*, and divine and human<sup>d</sup> *agency*: so that repentance may avail through Christ, though Christ be not mentioned; and certainly, men may be exhorted to repent, even on a footing of natural Religion, without any conclusion being rightly drawn against revealed.

xxvi. It is moreover said, supposing Faith in Christ requisite for eternal happiness, as well as repentance, yet do we not make *too serious* and lofty a matter of God's conferring benefits for *Christ's sake*?—in support of this objection our adversaries<sup>e</sup> refer to

Gen. xxvi. 24. I will bless thee, &c. for Abraham's sake.

Exod. xxxii. 13. Remember Abraham, Isaac, and Israel thy servants, &c.

Deut. ix. 27. Remember thy servants Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, &c.

Nothing very great is implied, say the objectors, in these expressions; why should we entertain so high an idea of similar ones in the New Testament about Christ?—The passages alledged seem to establish the *general principle*, that God may confer benefits on a number from respect to the merit of *one*: how high our notions shall be, must depend on the greatness of the person, and the importance of the benefit.

The distinction which Abraham had enjoyed in the sight of God, afforded Moses a good topic in pleading for the Israelites: the better on account of the covenant actually subsisting. I should be unwilling to admit an argument against Faith, taken from the attention paid to the "Father of the faithful."

<sup>c</sup> Introduction to Part II. of Articles, Sect. viii.

<sup>d</sup> Art. x. Sect. xli.

<sup>e</sup> Famil. Illustr. p. 53.

faithful.”—All representations of God’s conferring benefits for the sake of Christ, must be inadequate; yet we see the principle in common life.—You do good to the son of your *Benefactor*, for his Father’s sake: and sometimes a *Society* receives benefit as such: so that each member is benefited merely because he is a member. If a *regiment* is honoured, each recruit enlisted into it shares in the<sup>f</sup> honour. It is not therefore difficult to conceive, that the merit of Christ may benefit every member of that society, of which he is the Head.

Nor is it necessary, because God forgives *man-kind* “for Christ’s sake,” that he should never shew any favour to any *individual* for the sake of worth in some one, on whom that individual depends, or with whom he is connected. The divine goodness shewn to the race of Abraham is no argument against the Redemption of the world by Jesus Christ.

xxvii. Suppose it were right, that we should profess Faith in Christ; yet, when his death is called a<sup>g</sup> *sacrifice*, are we not, say the Socinians, to consider the expression as *figurative*, or *metaphorical*? in the same manner, I suppose, as when the Apostle says, “but to *do good* and to communicate forget not; for with *such sacrifices*”<sup>h</sup> God is well pleased?”

I have considered this<sup>i</sup> matter, but I own, I *dare* not

<sup>f</sup> See a Letter under Art. ix. from the Duke de Fitzjames to the French Monarch; dated 11th Jan. 1791, about the *Irish* Regiments having behaved honourably for generations. The *Swiss* were body-guard to the French King, on account of some service formerly done.

<sup>g</sup> Famil. Illust. p. 48—Hist. Corr. Vol. i. p. 182, &c.

<sup>h</sup> Heb. xiii. ver. 15, 16.

<sup>i</sup> At the time here spoken of, I was not aware of Dr. Ogen’s two sermons on the death of Christ, as prefigured by the Jewish sacrifices:

not say, with<sup>k</sup> Taylor, that the blood of Christ, means *only* his *obedience* and goodness; though, at the same time, I would not affirm, that *without* the *moral* part, the blood would have availed. I take the following method: I suppose a teacher to come into the world, with supernatural powers<sup>l</sup>; to be diligent in instructing, to be opposed, and put to *death*: I suppose, after his death, his followers to represent it *in all lights*, which could convince and persuade; I can imagine them to preserve some drops of his *blood*<sup>m</sup>; but I cannot conceive persons, in such a situation, to use expressions which would come up to the strength of those found in the New Testament. Would they talk of the shedding of their teacher's blood as *sacrificial*? of its cleansing the world from *all sin*? would they find out some slaughters of brute animals, which had been instituted, and carried on for *centuries*, so as to *prepare* the world for the death of this *one man*? to suppose such language, when not grounded on reality, is to give up all good sense in these followers; and it is to suppose pretensions wholly incredible. And if this language could be used of the blood of one man, why not of the blood of *others*? if there can be anything in the character and rank of one man to give propriety to such expressions, will the Socinians allow it to be applied to Jesus? they would have Jesus a mere man, and yet

sacrifices: when I first saw them (after writing on the subject) I was alarmed to perceive, that he had divided those sacrifices in a different manner from mine. However, after reading the Pentateuch with care, my alarm goes off. Dr. Ogden's two sermons are, notwithstanding, excellent.

<sup>k</sup> On Romans, Key, Chap. viii. Note on Rom. iii. 25.—See Lev. xvii. 11.

<sup>l</sup> Hist. Corr. Vol. 1. p. 172.

<sup>m</sup> The blood of St. Januarius, the patron Saint of Naples, is preserved in that City, and miraculously liquefied once a year.



yet they would suppose expressions to be used concerning him, so as they cannot be, with propriety, concerning the ordinary death of any mere man.

It is urged, that, as some metaphors are used with regard to the death of Christ<sup>n</sup>, we cannot tell when the scripture-language is proper, when metaphorical: this variety may sometimes occasion difficulty: as may appear from our explanation of terms: there is, no doubt, a figurative *creation*, a figurative *resurrection*, *ascension*, &c. but does this prevent our believing, that there has been a *real* creation and resurrection? we sometimes find God called our *Creator*, sometimes a *rock*, or a *shield*; we know, that the first is *not* a metaphorical name, and that the others *are*; it might require many words to mark out the manner, in which the mind makes the distinction, especially in some nice cases; but, in this case, every one must own, that it is easy to make. Nor does it seem difficult to distinguish between *sacrifice* in Heb. ix. and sacrifice in Heb. xiii. ver. 15, 16.—The latter being metaphorical, and very different from the former, seems to *imply*, that the former is *proper*.

In one sense, however, it seems as if there might be some kind of *comparison* in calling the death of Christ a sacrifice; but, though every metaphor is a comparison, every comparison is not a *metaphor*. It may be called a sacrifice by way of *accommodation* and condescension to our conceptions; in the sight of God it may be something, of which we have no idea; the nearest representation to the truth which *we* can comprehend, may be, that it is a *sacrifice*; but, if that is the case, it must be deemed, by *us*, a *real* sacrifice as far as we understand it; its effects similar to those of a real sacrifice,

sacrifice, though higher than we can fully conceive.

On this account, it cannot be said, *either* scriptural expressions must be interpreted figuratively or literally; if literally, they “enforce the belief of proper vicarious punishments,” if figuratively, “they will not oblige us to believe the Doctrine of Atonement in any sense:” we must “abandon all *middle opinions*.” For, if my idea is right, it may be impossible to ascertain the degree, in which the sacrifice of the death of Christ is called so in the way of *comparison*; and therefore *middle opinions* may be very *rational*. We may conceive the scriptural expressions neither to be wholly metaphorical; nor yet to be literal in the same degree, as when an ordinary human event is described.

The sacrifice of the death of Christ is most fully treated in the Epistle to the *Hebrews*; this therefore has had its authority<sup>p</sup> called into question, though it is sometimes quoted in the same manner<sup>q</sup> that we quote it, by the same person who at other times depreciates it.—But, when we say a doctrine is *scriptural*, we mean, that it can be proved by those books, which are now commonly understood to be canonical: and there can be no greater compliment paid to a doctrine, than to shew, that, in order to remove it, you must take away some part of Scripture. It has been sufficiently shewn, that the author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* did consider the death of Christ as<sup>r</sup> a *real sacrifice*, and Christ as a *real Priest*<sup>s</sup>.

If the death of Christ was a real sacrifice, was it *sin-offering*, or *peace-offering*, or what? there seems  
to

• Hist. Corr. Vol. 1. p. 277, 278.

<sup>p</sup> Hist. Corr. 1. 183.

<sup>q</sup> Ib. 1. 179.

<sup>r</sup> Short Defence, p. 10.

<sup>s</sup> Ib. p. 15. and partic. 16.—Hist. Corr. 1. 184.

to be no necessity, that it should correspond precisely to *any one* sort; it might be prefigured by them *all*, and so correspond to them all, in one respect or other; as Bishop *Cleaver*<sup>t</sup> observes that the Sacrament does, which was instituted as a commemoration of it.—It might be a *sin-offering*, as atoning for the sins of the Christian church; it might be a *peace-offering*, as supplicating future benefits; and we know, that Christ as “our *Passover* was” sacrificed for us.”—Dr. *Priestley* says, that, if Christ “had died as a proper *expiatory*<sup>x</sup> *sacrifice*, it might have been expected, that he would have died on the *day of expiation*,” but, according to our account, this was no way needful; Christ “our *Passover* was sacrificed for us” at the time of the *Passover*; and, though the annual atonement might eminently prefigure his death, yet inferior and more frequent sacrifices seem to have<sup>y</sup> prefigured it also.

When I have tried to think without prejudice on this subject, I have found myself attending to the difference between the death of Christ and a common sacrifice of a brute animal, in this respect; a common sacrifice *originated* from the owner of the animal; that is, from him who was to be *benefited*; either as *offender*, or as receiver of positive *good*, as the sacrifice was a *sin-offering* or a *peace-offering*; whereas the death of Christ did not originate from the person to be benefited, but from Christ (under compact<sup>z</sup> with his heavenly Father) the *Victim* and Priest, or from the “*wicked*<sup>a</sup> hands” who

<sup>t</sup> Two Sermons on the Sacrament, p. 15, 16. and see Dr. Balguy's 7th Charge.

<sup>u</sup> *Eph.* 1 Cor. v. 7.

<sup>x</sup> Hist. Corr. Vol. 1. p. 194.

<sup>y</sup> See Heb. ix. 13, 14.—x. 11.

<sup>z</sup> John x. 18.

<sup>a</sup> Acts ii. 23.

who put him to death<sup>b</sup>. This I mention, not as explaining the subject, but as a *difficulty*, which has occurred to my mind. Dr. *Priestley* has much the same thought. Yet one sees, that Brutes, and things inanimate, *could not* offer themselves to atone for others: if we suppose, that a *man* (who was properly such, as being in *his own disposal*;) by being sacrificed, in any case, *could* atone for another, or that a man should “lay down his life for his<sup>c</sup> friend,” we must suppose him to offer *himself*, or not suffer<sup>d</sup> at all: what man could *ask* such a favour of “his friend?” *Moses*<sup>e</sup> offers to devote *himself*, and *St. Paul*<sup>f</sup> seems willing to be held as a *curse* for the Jewish people; but could they have been *requested* to do this? That Christ *did* offer himself *voluntarily* seems<sup>g</sup> clear: yet, you may say, he did not *compel* the Jews to kill him; they killed him “with *wicked hands*,” no; but he *permitted* them to kill him, when he might have saved<sup>h</sup> himself.

The permission is also to be ascribed to his heavenly Father.—Still it occurs to a thinking mind, that his death was *foretold*; and the thought brings difficulty along with it; difficulty perhaps insuperable; but not peculiar to this subject; no more belonging

<sup>b</sup> Hist. Corr. 1. 187.

<sup>c</sup> John xv. 13.—Rom. v. 7.

<sup>d</sup> There have been *human sacrifices*, in which the victims did not make *voluntary* offers of their lives; but these were *prisoners*, or slaves, or something (Potter 1. 218.) considered as being wholly in the power of the sacrificers; as having *no will of their own*. *Children* have passed through the fire to Molech (Lev. xviii. 21. & xx. 2.) Micah vi. 7.

Our proposition, on this account, might as well be *limited* to persons who are in their *own disposal*: that idea is essential to *devoting*: but it seems implied, in speaking of a *man*, that he must be a free Agent. In Div. Leg. B. ix. there is something about human sacrifices.

<sup>e</sup> Exod. xxxii. 32.

<sup>f</sup> Rom. ix. 3. as an *ὄνασμα*.

<sup>g</sup> John x. 18.—Heb. vii. 27.

<sup>h</sup> Matt. xxvi. 53.

belonging to the death of Christ, than to any other voluntary action, whilst we are considering it as foreseen by the Deity: we do not know how God foresees, or influences, and so foretells, any voluntary action; but, in all predictions, man's usual freedom of acting, and choice, is supposed and taken for granted. And if, in this way, we reduce the death of Christ to the class of ordinary voluntary actions, though we may not understand their nature, the difficulty with respect to the death of Christ, as being a voluntary act foretold, is wholly obviated<sup>i</sup>.

Another thought which has occurred to me, while I have been reflecting on this subject, is this; *suppose Christ had not died*, what would have been the consequence?—if he had done every thing else as he did, but at last yielded to the agony, which he suffered in his human nature, and had avoided death?<sup>k</sup>—this seems a case, of which we are not competent judges:—*facts* must first happen, and then man can look *back* upon them, and form some judgment of them, by reason or analogy; but man cannot *suppose* facts, especially of an extraordinary sort, acts of the divine government, and judge what *would have* arisen from them. Yet we cannot conceive, that, if Christ had

<sup>i</sup> Phenomena of *Nature* are *solved*, when they are reduced to a class of ordinary events; though many things remain inexplicable after the solution. Something of the same sort was said with relation to the doctrine of the *Trinity*, —Art. 1. Sect. VIII.

<sup>k</sup> If any one says, that this question had better have been omitted, I answer, I should be of the same opinion if men, who think deeply about religion, would never discuss it. But as I believe it occurs to many thinking men, and often does harm, it seems best to prevent such harm, as far as possible. The solution here given is not particular, but general: or may easily be made so.

had avoided death, his *merit* would have been either so great or so evident as it now is: and then the Jewish sacrifices, in that case, what would they have been? like the heathen; acts of piety, not wholly unnatural in times of ignorance, with some tendency to quiet the conscience, and draw forth some religious sentiments; but, in themselves, in the eye of reason, foolish and absurd: continually aiming at that, which they could not possibly effect. “For it is not possible, that the blood of Bulls and<sup>1</sup> of Goats should take away sin.” But consider these sacrifices as a part of a religion, which was but to be *temporary*, whose end was to *prepare* mankind to receive a dispensation *rational* and *universal*, and they themselves become *rational* and *important*: and whatever first proves them to be important, proves itself to be so likewise: in this light, the Epistle to the *Hebrews* is *inestimable*. I have before<sup>m</sup> observed, that the Jewish religion cannot but be true: can that religion be false, which makes those parts of it, that at first sight seem weak and idle, to appear firm, wise, and worthy to be ordained, in their particular season, by the counsels of the supreme and all-perfect Being?

XXVIII. Upon the whole then, in what light are we to think, that the merits, the sufferings, and the death of Christ, appear in the sight of God? Of this only we can be perfectly certain, that we cannot attain to an adequate conception of the matter: all that we can say is, that there is nothing *incredible*, nothing *inconsistent* with what we know of the *word* or *works* of God, in the account, that the Heavenly Father may regard Christ as a good

<sup>1</sup> Heb. x. 4.

<sup>m</sup> Book I. Chap. xvi. Sect. viii. Part vi. or Vol. I. p. 199.—See also Book IV. Art. vi. Sect. viii. & ix.

good and virtuous being; and may look favourably on frail and sinful men, *on account* of his having *taught* them, and *suffered* for them; and on account of their being formed into a *society*, of which He is the *Head*. And lastly, that he may regard the *Death* of Christ, as something which *we*, as far as we are able to conceive the Nature of it, should *call* a *sacrifice*; though the sacrifice of the SON OF GOD, must be an event, great, transcendent; above the reach, not only of our comprehension, but even of our imagination.

XXIX. In former Articles, and in that to which our present disquisition is an Appendix, we have proposed, as an objection, this question; will not the doctrine in hand tend to disgust plain *thinking* men, and men of philosophical minds? this objection is not less suitable here than on former occasions.

We may conceive a person of this description, to say, ‘Surely this matter about men’s being made eternally happy on account of the Head of our Religion, is folly and weakness: one man die to save others; how groundless the expectation!—the *innocent* punished for the guilty; and that by the immediate appointment of the *Deity*! who could make men happy by a single word, *in a moment*, whenever he pleased; without such a cumbersome *apparatus* of Instruments!’

1. The idea of one man’s dying to deliver others from destruction or evil, is congenial to the human mind, in a state of<sup>n</sup> simplicity. *Curtius*<sup>o</sup> leaped into

<sup>n</sup> The story of *Iphigenia* would not have been made a subject for the *Drama*, if spectators, auditors, readers, had not been likely to be affected by it.—The story of *Corefus* and *Callirhcä* shews the same principle with that mentioned by the High Priest of the Jews.

<sup>o</sup> Liv. vii. 6.

into the gulf for that purpose: we have already mentioned Moses and St. Paul; and we find the High Priest of the Jews rebuking the Council for not recollecting this truth: "it is expedient for us, that one man should die for the<sup>p</sup> people, and that the whole nation perish not." He spoke this, indeed, as High Priest, and his speech was prophetic; but to his hearers it would, at the moment, appear as an instance of an acknowledged maxim.—I do not say, that a person may not devote himself through enthusiasm, and without reason; indeed reason cannot justify such devoting, in affairs divine or human, but on the known acceptance of him, who has the power of remitting punishment: but still I should be cautious of declaring, wholly and peremptorily, against a mode of expiation, into which men, in different ages and situations, seem to have been led by a *natural sentiment*.

The *Decii* devoted themselves. See Kennet's *Antiquities*, Index *Decii*; or Book iv. Chap. viii. p. 198.—with a passage about them from *Juvenal*, Sat. viii. 254.

2. The *innocent* punished for the guilty:—this is a palmary<sup>q</sup> objection:—After observing that the sufferings of Christ were *voluntary*, I would ask, what this objection really *means*? Does it mean, that a doctrine cannot be of God which implies, that a worthy man suffers, and that wicked men derive good from his sufferings? surely that happens commonly, in the course of God's Government of this world: and that inconvenience, which frequently occurs under the Divine Providence, cannot prove any dispensation, under which it does occur, not to be divine.—What was said  
under

<sup>p</sup> John xi. 50.

<sup>q</sup> Famil. Illustr. p. 51.—Butler's Anal. Part ii. Chap. v. p. 253, 12mo.



under the ninth Article on<sup>r</sup> the 18th Chapter of *Ezekiel*, might be recollected here. But, when it is said, that the innocent are *punished* for the guilty, we are apt to be misled by words. Punishment, in the strict<sup>s</sup> sense, implies *guilt*; consequently, in that sense, it cannot be said, that the *innocent* are *punished*; nor is it true, that worthy men have evil inflicted on them by *authority*; as no one can have authority to inflict evil on innocence; in all cases, therefore, where it is said, that the innocent are punished for the guilty, punishment must be taken in its *popular* sense, and mean no more than *suffering*. The innocent, then, *suffer* for the guilty; this still rather gives a wrong idea; because it is not the Law of God's Government generally expressed, but only a particular case of that general Law. The Law seems to be, properly, *Men suffer for one another*: sometimes the more worthy for the less worthy; but sometimes the less worthy for the more worthy: which shall suffer, seems partly accidental. It is plain enough, that whatever<sup>t</sup> *unites* men is beneficial to them; and common sufferings must tend to union, as well as common enjoyments: but this need not be insisted on here: we are not justifying the ways of the God of Nature, we are only endeavouring to shew, that what happens according to the Doctrine of *Atonement*, happens *also* in a course of *Nature*.—Christ's suffering for mankind is certainly no more contrary to *Justice*, than a *Soldier's* stepping before his comrade, or commander, in battle, and receiving the deadly stroke of the enemy; though Christ died, "*the just for the unjust*."

3. A<sup>s</sup><sup>r</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxxviii.<sup>s</sup> Sect. xvi.—Ludlam, Essay 2d. p. 25.<sup>t</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxx.<sup>u</sup> 1 Pet. iii. 18.

3. As to God's making men happy when he *pleased*, without the *intervention* of suffering, or of a Mediator; it admits of little or no doubt: as far as we have any idea, he certainly could: and, if he had done so, we could have found no fault. But neither ought we to make any difficulty, if he has made use of *intermediate steps*. It is perfectly agreeably to the course of *Nature*, that this should be done, and therefore doing it might be the effect of the divine wisdom.—As Bishop Butler<sup>x</sup> and Dr. Taylor<sup>y</sup> have written well on this matter, I will read you a passage or two from their writings.

And it has been generally thought, that we may go one step farther than saying, that we ought to make *no objection* to God's using instruments in effecting our Salvation; according to some thinking men, we may venture to say, that the Christian dispensation, by representing God as using means, points out more strongly the *importance* of virtue, and the danger of vice, than an unconditional pardon would have<sup>z</sup> done. “This,” says Bp. Butler, “has never yet been answered, and is I think plainly *unanswerable*.”

xxx. I will mention no more objections singly; but it might not be amiss here, as under the second Article, to mention a few *cautions*, each of which would enable a reader of controversy to solve several objections. Indeed the same which were there mentioned, might be equally useful here; and I can scarcely conceive, that any one, who  
had

<sup>x</sup> Analogy, Part ii. Chap. v. beginning.

<sup>y</sup> On Romans, Key, Par. 150. Some of the arguments here proposed are urged and illustrated in my Poem on *Redemption*.

<sup>z</sup> Dr. Balguy's Pref. to his Father's tract, p. vi.—Bp. Butler, Anal. 2. 5. towards the end.

had attentively applied those cautions to the cases, by which they are exemplified, could want any farther directions about them.—I will therefore content myself with a very few instances. The first, second, and third cautions I will pass over, though they might possibly be of some use with regard to our Saviour's sufferings, and the dignity of his character; but I will mention, as an instance of the fourth, about partial quotations, what Dr. Priestley<sup>a</sup> says of the *Scape-Goat*, that “The phrase *bearing sin* is never applied in the Old Testament, but to the scape-goat :”—whereas those, who examine *farther*<sup>b</sup>, will find this observation not well founded:—any more than the affirming, that our doctrine is not delivered in the *Gospels*, or Acts of the Apostles.—After what we have seen cited from Scripture about Justification by Faith, it may appear strange to be told, that the Apostles never once “directly assert the insufficiency<sup>c</sup> of our good works alone to entitle us to the favour of God and future happiness.” Had any one read such an assertion, and examined no farther, how would he have been deceived!

The fifth caution may be kept in mind, though there does not seem to be so much occasion for it here as under the second Article: it is indeed often applicable with regard to metaphorical expressions, but of these we have spoken separately. The argument of our adversaries here meant, is this; because a certain word bears this sense in this passage, it cannot bear another sense in another passage.—Any one might try the sense of “*for*<sup>d</sup> us,”

<sup>a</sup> Famil. Illust. p. 51.—Hist. Corr. i. 203.

<sup>b</sup> Short Defence, p. 75, 76.—*Barnabas* has something about the scape-goat being a *type* of Christ.—Epistle, Sect. 7.

<sup>c</sup> Hist. Corr. i. p. 165.

<sup>d</sup> Hist. Corr. i. 199.

us," as equivalent to, "on our account,"—"for our benefit." Or the sense of *bearing* our sins, for taking them away by *reforming* us: any one may ask, whether it is natural to say, that Christ *reformed* us "in his<sup>e</sup> own body, on the tree."

The sixth caution concerning the particular views, wishes, prejudices, of those who are adduced as authorities, may always be usefully kept in mind, while we are reading controversy.

Of the seventh caution, I will give an *instance*.—Read first 1 Cor. i. 12, 13.—with 1 Cor. iii. 5. and then *substitute* the name<sup>f</sup> of *Stephen*, or any other martyr, for that of Christ, in the expressions concerning the efficacy of Christ's death; and you will perceive how unscriptural they will appear.—Yet we are told, that the Quakers have held, that "the blood of Christ was no more than the blood of any other Saint<sup>g</sup>."

What was just now said about Christ's *bearing* our sins in his own body, on the tree; implied a substitution.

XXXI. I have now done with Proof of every sort. If we keep up our method, we shall make some kind of *Application*; consisting of a form of *assent*, mutual *concessions*, and hints about *improvements*.—A form of *assent* can only be a declaration of the truth of the *proposition*, which we have been endeavouring to prove. But we might see whether any similar proposition would hold good on principles of *Natural Religion*. Might not an *Heathen* profess something of the following sort? referring to his declaration under the preceding Article?

‘Howsoever

<sup>e</sup> 1 Pet. ii. 24.

<sup>f</sup> Short Defence, p. 23.

<sup>g</sup> Leslie's Works, Fol. Vol. 2. p. 195. and quoted in Jones's Preservative, p. 26.

‘Howsoever I may labour to form my principles, I must not neglect the religion of my *Country*, whether its ordinances consist in *Sacrifices*, or in any other modes of worship. It is a *relief* to the mind merely to *attempt* to expiate Sin; though I feel the *imperfection* of sacrificing Brutes. —I have read of people’s *devoting* themselves, in order to save others from destruction; I know of no instance in later ages, and all undertakings of such sort must be *vain*, unless they are known to be *ratified* by Heaven: But, if any such thing should ever take place, I should feel the plan as one *consolatory* to my mind, as acknowledging the importance of Virtue and the danger of Vice; and I should embrace it far as lay in my power.’

xxxii. The *Christian* might make his profession in some form like that before used; ‘I believe, that God will confer eternal happiness on all sincere Christians, notwithstanding some imperfections of theirs, with a great regard to the merits, the sufferings, and the death of Jesus Christ.’

xxxiii. If we consider what mutual *concessions* might be made by contending parties, we may conceive, that each might contribute something towards a coalition.

We, possibly, might compile some *scriptural Forms*, which we might use in a literal sense, our adversaries in a metaphorical one.—We might acknowledge, that of the Counsels of Heaven, with regard to the grounds and *reasons* of the Redemption of the world, we *know*<sup>b</sup> *nothing*:—and that some kind of *comparison* is implied even in what we call *literal* accounts of the Christian Sacrifice.

<sup>b</sup> Dr. Balguy, p. 201.—Butler’s Anal. p. 250, 12°. Part ii. Chap. v.

Sacrifice. Comparison is not very remote from *Metaphor*.

Our *adversaries* might allow us some use of those expressions, which we *dare*<sup>i</sup> not wholly give up. Surely they might bring themselves to own, that our Salvation has *some* reference to the merits of our spiritual Lord, the Head of our Body. I know a Socinian, who will use that language freely; one, who has shewn his sincerity by giving up his clerical profession and collegiate establishment.

Both parties are proceeding in *one*<sup>k</sup> way, though they may be helped forward by different *motives*. —Both own the *Mercy* of God; both ascribe to it the salvation of Mankind; though we suppose it to use some *Means*, which they do not: but of these means our ideas are so indefinite, as to produce propositions nearly unintelligible; the nature of which, we know, is such, as to diminish greatly the difference between affirmative and negative<sup>l</sup>.

XXXIV. As to *improvements*; when men differ much on any subject, it is always to be hoped, that some *new views* of the principles, or fundamental parts, of that subject, will finally bring about an agreement. In the present subject, perhaps something might be done by giving still more attention than has been given, to the nature of *Sacrifices*, Heathen and Jewish. It seems as if we ought to go entirely upon *Facts*, and not suffer ourselves to run into anything, which can properly be called an *Hypothesis*. In this cautious

<sup>i</sup> Warburton on the Holy Spirit, p. 339. (near end).

<sup>k</sup> “ See that ye fall not out by the way.” Gen. xlv. 24. this was said by Joseph to his Brethren.

<sup>l</sup> Book III. Chap. x. Sect. ix.

tious conduct we should be much assisted by attending to the *errors*, into which Divines have already run, who did not ground their researches on *experiment*; in which we include, knowledge of the written *word* of God, as well as of his *works*.



## ARTICLE XII.

## OF GOOD WORKS.

**A**LBEIT that Good Works, which are the fruits of Faith, and follow after Justification, cannot put away our sins, and endure the severity of God's judgement; yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ, and do spring out necessarily of a true and lively Faith; insomuch that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known, as a tree discerned by the fruit.

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1. We have already said many things, which might have been said under this Article. Whatever is said of *Faith*, has some relation to good works; they are often opposed to each other, and always connected. As I shall endeavour to avoid repetition and tautology, the *History* of this Article will be short; though I mean to observe the same method as in the preceding.

This Article was not amongst those of 1552; it was added in 1562; in order, probably, to recommend the Reformation to many rational and worthy persons, and to check some mischiefs, which had been growing in the preceding ten years.—Indeed it appears, that the Reformers, Calvin and Luther, had said some harsh things<sup>a</sup>, which wanted softening,

<sup>a</sup> See Nicholls on the Article: he quotes from *Luther de Lib. Christ.*—And from Calvin, *Inst.* 3. 14.



softening, though they have been softened in most of the Confessions of the Reformed. Mr. *Ridley*, in his *Life of Bishop Ridley*<sup>b</sup>, speaks of the “wild conclusions of some *Solifidians* and *Antinomians* :”—also, of the Antinomians’ unoperative Faith, and “the *Gospellers*’<sup>c</sup> fond persuasion of being in God’s favour without works.”—And we find it an expression of the times, that “*carnal*<sup>d</sup> *Liberty*” was to be apprehended from a wrong notion of the doctrine of Justification by *Faith alone* : and those who ran into abuse of carnal liberty, seem to have been called *Libertini*<sup>e</sup>.

II. It is not till very lately, that I have read the ninth Book of the Divine Legation of Moses. —The idea contained in it, is something like this: Man was first in a state of nature and under *natural religion* ; this was before he was placed in *Paradise* : during that time, his good moral conduct, or obedience to *natural law*, might get him a reward, though not an *eternal* reward; his *soul* was formed *capable* of separate existence, after death ; and his *Reason* made him *accountable* ; but his hopes of futurity must be *indefinite*. His *repentance* might restore him to favour.—But in *Paradise*, he was under *revealed religion* : and his peculiar obedience was to a *positive* duty given in *addition* to moral duties: at least, the *peculiar reward* of his situation, which was *Immortality*, depended on his abstaining from the *forbidden fruit* ; forbidden, not by *natural law*, but by *positive injunction*. On his disobedience, he was *sent back* into

<sup>b</sup> Page 345. & 352.

<sup>c</sup> Gospellers mentioned before, Art. x. Sect. xii.

<sup>d</sup> Ridley’s *Life*, page 351.—Homilies p. 20. octavo. (2d on Salvation).

<sup>e</sup> Mosheim, Cent. 16th. 3. 2. 38.—Strype’s *Annals*, Vol. 2. p. 451,—Dickinson’s *Letters*.—Contents of Baxter’s 11th Conference in his *Catholic Theology*, B. ii.—*Libertine* is one of the persons of the Dialogue.

into his state of *nature*, and every thing was as *at first*: at length the *Jewish* dispensation prepared the way, and Christianity, “in the fulness of time,” followed. Again man was under *revealed* religion; again his reward *Immortality*; a *free* gift, which was to follow on his *Faith only*: thus faith was enjoined, but by a *positive*<sup>f</sup> injunction;—yet this free gift of Immortality was not to be bestowed on all indiscriminately, though they professed the Faith; there was a requisite *qualification*, that is, *Virtue*, or *good works*:—thus Justification by *Faith* was *founded* on *Virtue*, instead of opposing it. I fear I scarcely do justice to this system, but to have some idea of it will be useful to us.

III. It may be proper to have some notion of the manner, in which some persons usually called *Methodists* have expressed themselves with regard to good works; I will read a passage or two for that purpose.<sup>g</sup>

IV. It does not seem needful to go *farther* into Historical remarks, on the present Article. I will, therefore, come to the *Explanation*.

V. “*Albeit that*,”—these words imply a connexion with the *preceding* Article; and, as it seems to me, an apprehension of *danger* from it: a *fear*, lest it should be understood, that, because Faith is the principle, or disposition, which a person has when he *enters* into the society of Christians, and by which therefore he becomes *interested* in the merits of Christ, and *benefited* by them, lest, I say, it should be understood, that a mere sentiment is all that is required of a Christian.

VI. “*Good*

<sup>f</sup> Faith is a *natural* principle, I think, *supposing* Christianity: but Christianity *not* being natural, Faith, its fundamental principle, may be called *positive*. I see not, however, that Bishop Warburton had this idea.

<sup>g</sup> Letter to Mr. Berridge;—or *Principles* and *Practices*, p. 56. 58.

VI. “*Good works*”—we have had *two sorts* of good works before; *natural*<sup>b</sup> and *Christian*<sup>i</sup>: and in the thirteenth Article, we have “*works*,” without the epithet “*good* :”—the good works here meant are of the *Christian* sort. This is implied in the connexion between this Article and the preceding:—which connexion says, or implies, that although *Christians* are justified by Faith, *they* must not neglect *Virtue*.—we find these works, on a solemn occasion, called “*works*<sup>k</sup> of *Grace* :” and, in the *Necessary Doctrine*, “*works of righteousness* :”—where these good works are opposed to good works of *penitents*; and “*all* the good workes of a *true Christen* man” are divided into *three branches*, according to the exhortation of St. Paul<sup>l</sup>, that we should live soberly, justly, and devoutly;—that is, in the practice of duties towards God, our neighbours, and ourselves. — The good works here spoken of, admit of various *degrees* of goodness; some may be nearer to perfection, some farther off. — In some texts of scripture, absolute perfection seems to be intended; but then that is *ideal* perfection, something to be *aimed at*; of which we shall speak hereafter: at present, the idea seems to be, of good qualities not beyond the reach of *probability*, of actions *popularly* called good; not inconsistent with some *sins* which are to be “*put away* :” such actions as are called “*of themselves unworthy, unperfect*<sup>m</sup>, *unsufficient*.”

Under

<sup>b</sup> Art. x. Sect. xviii.

<sup>i</sup> Art. x. Sect. xxxiii. and Art. xi. Sect. xviii.

<sup>k</sup> By a dying Papist, Dr. Redman.—See Ridley, p. 351.

<sup>l</sup> Titus ii. 12.

<sup>m</sup> Necessary Doctrine, under *Good Workes*.—Homily, p. 12. octavo.

Under these good works are comprehended good *sentiments*<sup>m</sup>—Faith, Repentance, “inward spiritual workes, mocions, and desires, as the Love and feare of God<sup>n</sup>,” &c. As, under the ninth Article, bad sentiments were put upon<sup>o</sup> a footing with *bad* actions.

VII. “*Which are the fruits of Faith*”—these words only seem to be a farther description of *Christian* good works:—the comparifon will occur again, between good actions as fpringing from Faith, and fruits from a tree.

VIII. “*And follow after Justification;*”—this expreffion has feemed fomewhat difficult; but it means no more than the preceding expreffion, to characterize *Christian* good works: our being *admitted* into Christianity, is fometimes called our being *justified*, becaufe it was fometimes called fo by the *sacred writers*, and becaufe, on our admiffion, we are put into a *state* of justification; into a *way*<sup>p</sup> of being eternally happy, if all things go on well; we are faid to be, even *then*, *saved*<sup>q</sup>.—But as we may lofe our way, and not be “accounted righteous” at the day of judgment, or *finally*, this justification at admiffion is fometimes diftinguifhed, when there is need of diftinction, (and not elfe) by the name of our *first* justification; and the other, our being accounted righteous at the day of judgment, is called our *final* justification. This has been mentioned<sup>r</sup> before, but  
may

<sup>m</sup> “Keep the commandments:” *loving* God is the first and great *commandment*. The fecond is Love of *Man*. On thefe *commandments* hang all the Law and the Prophets.

<sup>n</sup> Nec. Doct.

<sup>o</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxx.

<sup>p</sup> This feems to be expreffed, Titus iii. 7. “Being *justified* by his *Grace*, we fhould be made *heirs*, according to the *hope* of eternal Life.”

<sup>q</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxxii. — Art. x. Sect. xxix. & Art. xi. Sect. xiv.

<sup>r</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xiv.

may be repeated usefully, both here, and in the next Article<sup>s</sup>.

That this account agrees with the language used at the time of the Reformation, a few instances will be sufficient to prove.—The *necessary*<sup>r</sup> *Doctrine*, speaking of Christian good workes, calls them such as “men truly *justified*, and so continuing,” do work: “workes of righteousnesse in *Christ*, whiche he cannot do, *afore* he be *justified*.” In the Article of Justification *Baptism* is mentioned, as the way “by the whiche God hath determined that man beyng of age and commyng to Christendome shuld be *justified*.”—In the *Homily* on Salvation (third part) it is said, “Our office (officium, duty,) is, not to pass the time of this present Life unfruitfully and idly, *after* that we are *baptized or justified* :” and in that on *fasting* (one of the *second* book of Homilies)—“Good works go not before in him, which shall afterward be justified, but good works do follow *after* when a man is first justified.” This is taken from *Augustin* de fide et operibus. And immediately afterwards, good works are spoken of as “*testimonies* of our Justification<sup>u</sup>.”

There is the more need of this account of justification, as some of our Christian brethren seem to conceive it as giving them a title to *eternal* happiness, which cannot be *forfeited*. All justification must be ascribed to the *Grace* of God, in some sense ;

<sup>s</sup> Justification, between the first and the final, supposed *variable*; sometimes increasing, sometimes decreasing; there are several expressions to this purpose in Cranmer's *Necessary Doctrine*. It is not paged; but in the Articles on Justification and good workes the passages are easily found.

<sup>r</sup> There are two passages to our present purpose in Ridley's Life, p. 347.

<sup>u</sup> Also see Jon. Edwards, p. 32.

sense<sup>x</sup>; and the Grace of God is connected with the influence of his *holy spirit*; hence an idea seems to have been formed out of all these things, that when we are received into the divine *favour*, we are *inspired*, and so informed or *assured* of our acceptance. And the inspiration is, I believe, called *justifying Grace*<sup>y</sup>; and is made equivalent to *Regeneration*, or *Conversion*: I imagine, that all this is a good deal owing to our seldom, if ever, using the word Justification as it is used in our Article and Homily, as synonymous to *Baptism*<sup>z</sup>.

It may perhaps bear a doubt, whether all the Article, so far, is not a mere *subject*, or *nominative case*: as if it had been said,—‘Although *such* good works *as* are the fruits of Faith, and follow justification, cannot,’ &c.—if this be right, there is not here any *assertion* or proposition, that good works *are* the fruits of Faith, &c.—Bennet and Veneer make that a *Proposition*. There is no authentic copy of the Articles; on that account, conjecture may have the freer scope. In the *Latin*, in Bishop Sparrow’s collection, and Bishop Burnet’s copy, there is no comma after “*Bona Opera.*”—“*Bona opera quæ sunt fructus fidei,*” &c.—The more I look at the Article, and compare the beginning with the end of it, the more I am inclined to this construction: and no one, I believe, has any right to censure my adopting it.

IX. “*Cannot*

<sup>x</sup> 1 Cor. vi. 11. We have washing, or *Baptism*, *sanctification*, (or being set apart as sacred) *justification*, and *inspiration*, all together.—But these words mean nothing more than *Baptism*, with the *privileges* which attend it, supposing men to do their part faithfully.

<sup>y</sup> This expression is used Art. xi. Sect. iv.

<sup>z</sup> For *conversion*, see opening of Letter to Mr. Berridge, Principles, &c. *Regeneration* sometimes is equivalent to *Baptism*: as in Art. ix. Sect. xxiv. the Methodistical notion of *Regeneration*, see Principles, &c. p. 30.

IX. “*Cannot put away our sins,*”—the Latin is *expiare*: this implies, that the Christian is *liable* to sin, a truth which has been disputed; it has been in some measure proved under the ninth Article<sup>a</sup>, and will occur again under the fifteenth and sixteenth. This expression also marks the *imperfection* of Christian good works, in the notion of our Church, as before.—Yet it is conceivable, that some persons might understand by the sins here spoken of, sins committed *before* admission into Christianity.

X. “*And endure the severity of God’s Judgment;*”—when we regard the effects of our good works on our *past* offences, we look *backwards*; when we think of their effects on our *future* life, we look *forwards*. In the former case, we perceive sins distinctly; in the latter case, we see that it is *possible*, in *theory*, that we may avoid each sin, and therefore all sin; but it is so *improbable*, that we have no expectation of any man’s being so perfect; and therefore we say, popularly, speaking from our *feelings*, that it is *impossible*<sup>c</sup>. A man’s whole life is judged together.—“The *severity* of God’s judgment,” means, “judgment without mercy<sup>d</sup>”;—actions might not endure that, which might be favourably received on a footing of *candour* and *indulgence*.

XI. “*Yet are they pleasing and acceptable to God, in Christ*”—“*pleasing,*”—we may apply to this word, what has been said concerning the *displeasure*<sup>e</sup> of God. Actions may be *pleasing* to one in authority, which cannot *acquit* an offender. Humanity

<sup>a</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxxii.

<sup>b</sup> Something like this, Art. xi. Sect. xviii. end.

<sup>c</sup> Art. x. Sect. xxv. and before that; as Art. ix. Sect. xii. and xxxv. end.—and Introd. to second Part, Sect. iv.

<sup>d</sup> James ii. 13.

<sup>e</sup> Book i. Chap. xix. and Art. ix. Sect. xxii.

manity in a robber, shewn in restraining his associates, must be pleasing to a Judge, though the offender must still be considered as a robber.—We have had “good works *pleasant* and acceptable to God”—in the tenth Article<sup>f</sup>; meaning the same thing with “pleasing and acceptable,” in this.

“*In Christ*”—on account of Christ, for his *sake*.—in Eph. iv. 32. we have, “for Christ’s sake;” in the original, it is εν Χριστῳ.

XII. The rest of this Article must be read *together*: Indeed, I know not whether the Article might not be said to *end* here.

“And do spring out necessarily of a true and lively Faith; insomuch that by them a lively faith may be as evidently known, as a tree discerned by the fruit.”

It was before said, that good works “are the fruits of Faith;” whether that is *proposition*, or *definition*, it would be idle and unmeaning to say,—‘the fruits of faith spring out from faith, as fruits from a tree;’ the compilers of our Articles were men of sense, and of improved minds: they would not use such language; nor shall we get the *true sense* of the Article till we avoid it.—Let us then suppose the main part of the Article to come to an *end* with the words, “pleasing and acceptable to God in Christ;”—and the rest to be *added* in order, at the same time, to apologize for the addition of this twelfth Article, and to forward the end and design of adding it. The meaning of the last sentence might then be, ‘What is here expressed, was in reality *implied* under the preceding Article; for, if *Faith* be taken for that honest<sup>g</sup> vital *principle* which,

<sup>f</sup> “Acceptable and pleasant to God,” Hom. on Faith, first part, p. 27. 8vo. top.

<sup>g</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xvii.



which, in common sense, it must be taken for, it must *of course* produce the *works* which are here required;—however, lest hypocritical men should make *pretensions* to a principle of true Christianity, which they really have not; it seems best to *obviate* such pretensions; and to declare, not only that virtue is acceptable to God, but that no man<sup>h</sup> must *pretend* to be a Christian who neglects it: that if any one has a true Christian Faith, it will be sure to work by<sup>i</sup> Love, and to shew itself in virtuous habits of every kind. God can know a right faith intuitively, but man can only judge of its reality and its nature, by the works which it produces.’ “I will *shew* thee” (says St. James ii. 18.) “my faith by my works.”—If we take the words in this light, it seems to me, that the different parts of the Article are rightly connected together, and form one legitimate logical whole. —Christian works, though *imperfect*, are *pleasing* to God; we must not *neglect* them, because we are justified by *Faith*: indeed our Faith itself will not be what the Scripture supposes, if we do.

XIII. Perhaps this may appear more plain, if we take notice of a few particular expressions in the sentence.

“*Necessarily*,”—does not in itself seem to imply a *strict* or absolute necessity; but only what we call necessity in a *popular* sense<sup>k</sup>;—if there is a right Faith, virtue will spring out of it in the *common course* of things; yet so as to allow of some variety of

<sup>h</sup> See opening of Homily on Faith, 3d part, p. 32, octavo.  
—“No man should think that he hath that lively Faith,” &c. and 2d. part, p. 30, 8vo. every man must (by this criterion) “examine and try *himself* diligently,” &c.

<sup>i</sup> Gal. v. 6.

<sup>k</sup> How common this sense is, has been lately seen under Sect. x. by the number of instances there referred to.

of *degrees*, and of some *failures*. In the affirmation a *comparison* is contained: as therefore “a tree planted by the water side, that will bring forth his fruit in due season<sup>1</sup>,” is liable, for a time, to miss producing its proper fruit; and the description is only intended to correspond to the ordinary state of things, to that on which we *act*; so it is with Faith.

XIV. What Faith is, we have before<sup>m</sup> defined; but what, you may ask, is “a *true* and *lively* Faith?”—why nothing more than Faith, without any epithets: *true*, or *real*, is only used when people are likely to call something faith, which really is not such; which no plain honest man would conceive to be meant when we argue about Faith; no man, who had a common understanding, and was free from all design, and perverseness.—“*Lively*” is the word, which was used at the Reformation for *living*, in opposition to *dead*. “A *lively* sacrifice,” in our communion office, is opposed to the offering of a *dead*<sup>n</sup> victim. One might say, a *true* and *lively* tree, as well as a true and lively Faith; but every one would think the epithets superfluous, in speaking about *fruit-trees*<sup>o</sup>, or any trees where growth and produce was implied; and would be apt to cry out, ‘how could you *imagine* that I meant, by a *fruit-tree*, one that was cut down, and fit only for *fuel*<sup>p</sup>?’

In

<sup>1</sup> Psalm i. 3.

<sup>m</sup> Art. XI. Sect. XVII.

<sup>n</sup> The sentence is taken from Rom. xii. 1.—where the word is “*living*.”

<sup>o</sup> See the Note about reconciling St. Paul and St. James, Art. XI. Sect. XXVII.

<sup>p</sup> A Gentleman’s Porter in London, who used to send parcels into the country, with a bill, put in one of his bills of parcels, the article, “A *live dog* :” the epithet *live* was voted superfluous, because no one would think of having a *dead* dog sent by a waggon into the country. — And the epithet *lively*, or *living* would

In our *Homily*<sup>a</sup> of Salvation, "*lively*" is opposed to "*dead*;" "That faith, which bringing forth" either evil works or no good works, "is not a right, pure, and *lively* faith, but a *dead*, devilish, counterfeit, and feigned faith."—The epithet "*devilish*" is used in reference to that fine verse of St. James, "the Devils also believe;—and tremble."

xv. "*Discerned*"—to discern, is to see the *difference*;—a tree may be "*discerned* by the fruit," should mean, one may tell whether a tree is a *vine* or a *fig-tree*, by its bearing *grapes* or *figs*. According to this, one should judge of the *kind* of principles which a man has, by his actions; but the *Article* only seems to intend to say, that you shall judge whether a man has a *living* or a *dead* faith by his doing good works, or *no* good works: as you may judge whether a tree is *alive* or *dead* by its bearing or *not* bearing; so that one need not conceive *two kinds* of trees, but only one kind; one tree *dead*, and another *alive*. Indeed the Latin word for discerned is only "*judicari*;" and the corresponding word about Faith, "*known*."

xvi. I put an end to this explanation by observing, that, as a tree may bear fruit *unequally* in different years, or even sometimes *miss* bearing, without being *dead*, so we may perhaps conceive even a *lively* faith to be not wholly inconsistent with some *inequalities*

would be equally superfluous when joined to Faith, if hypocrisy had never made it useful. Our first Homily on Faith mentions "the living body of a *Man*:" if any one who promised to send *twenty men*, sent twenty *dead men*, he would scarcely be thought to have fulfilled his promise. This, though not the thought of the Homily, is implied in the last verse of the second Chapter of St. James's Epistle.

<sup>a</sup> Third part, p. 23. 8vo.—See also opening of Hom. on Faith; 2d part, and p. 30.

*inequalities and deficiencies.* Yet most *usually*, fruit-trees bear fruit; and illustrations by comparison go upon the ordinary course of things.—So this comparative excuse must not be carried too far.

XVII. We come next to our *Proof*, the first business of which is always to see what *propositions* will want proving.

1. Good works of Christians cannot put away or expiate past sins.

2. They cannot endure *judgment*, on a footing of strict *Justice*.

3. They are “*pleasing* and acceptable to God.”

4. The ground on which they are so, is a regard in God to *Christ*.

5. When *Faith* is enjoined in Scripture, it is supposed productive, or *vital*; as much as when a *man* is commanded to do anything, he is supposed to be *alive*.

XVIII. Good works of Christians cannot put away or expiate past *sins*. This seems self-evident; or, no reason can be assigned why they *should*: suppose an *hundred* good actions, could they make any man innocent, who had committed murder, robbery, adultery, &c.? most wicked men perform many actions, which are innocent, or even useful: even a robber robs but *seldom*.—Besides, those actions of Christians, which are called good works, are in fact *imperfect*, and are allowed to be so.—And moreover, remission must be an *act of God*; we cannot see how it can be the *immediate* effect of human *actions*: when they are instrumental to our remission, it must be because they are *made* so by the Divine *Goodness*.

XIX. Good works of Christians (such as are commonly called so) cannot endure *judgment*, on a footing of strict *Justice*.

If all men have sinned, and Christian good works cannot expiate sin, this must follow: for a man's *whole* life will be judged *at once*.

But, under the preceding<sup>r</sup> Article, we have already shewn, that we are not accounted righteous before God for our own works.

The judgment here spoken of is understood, I imagine, to be made with a view to *eternity*; now whatever some men may think our good works deserve, no reasonable man can think, that they deserve an *eternity* of *supreme happiness*. This is farther insisted on by Bp. Warburton, in the ninth Book<sup>s</sup> of his Divine Legation.

xx. The good actions of Christians are *pleasing* to God.—

This is our *principal* proposition, under the present Article.—But, in proving it, I would not confine myself to those texts, which mention Christian virtue merely as *pleasing* or acceptable to the Deity; I would also mention some of those, which represent it as the *great<sup>t</sup> end* of the Christian dispensation: for it is evident, that whatever accomplishes the main purpose of Christianity, must be pleasing to him from whom it proceeded. We may add, that those actions which God *rewards*, must be acceptable to him: and so must the *opposites* to such as he *punishes*.—The best and *fullest* proof of our present proposition, that I know of, is in *Taylor's Key* to the Apostolic writings; it begins at Paragraph 167, and extends to 288.—All that I can now do, is to select a few of the plainest texts, such as shew themselves to be to our purpose without any comment; and conclude with his conclusion:

<sup>r</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xxiii.

<sup>s</sup> Page 630 4to.

<sup>t</sup> There is, indeed, another great end of Christianity, which ought never to be overlooked: procuring *forgiveness* of sins; without which Virtue could not attain its reward.

sion: though I would recommend a *full* consideration of the Proof to each *student*, that he may be the better prepared not only for preaching Christian Virtue, but for reading the arguments of Antinomians, and of those who favour the Agency of God on the human mind in the greatest degree.

That *our Church* does *allow* Virtue to be the *main end* of Christianity, seems true. In the *Necessary Doctrine*, &c. the part on *Good Workes* begins thus; “*All* preachynge and learnynge of the worde of God in Christis church, ought to tende to this ende, that men maie be induced, not onely to *knowe* God, and to *beleve* and *truste* in hym, but also to honour and *serve* hym with *good woorkes*,” &c.—And our *Homily*, second part on<sup>u</sup> Faith, says, “*All* Holy Scripture beareth witness, that a *true lively* (the epithets of our Article) faith in Christ doth bring forth good works.”

But to come to our *Selection*.

Matt. v. 16.—Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your good works.

—— — 20.—except your *righteousness* shall exceed the righteousness of the Scribes, &c. ye shall in no case enter into the Kingdom of Heaven.

—— vii. 21.—*doing* the *Will* of God is greatly preferred to calling Christ Lord.

—— — 23.—Christ tells the workers of *iniquity*, that he never knew them; even though they had *prophefied* and wrought *miracles* in his name.

The

The *parables* of the Virgins, Talents, &c. aim to promote good *works*.

Luke i. 75.—gives a *general* idea of *Christians* as serving God in holiness and righteousness.

In the Acts of the Apostles, the thing proclaimed on great occasions, on eminent publications of Christianity, is, God sent Christ to bless you in turning away every one of you from his *iniquities*.

Acts x. 2.—Cornelius, representing the Gentiles, is commended as devout, giving much *alms* to the people, and performing the duty of prayer.

—— ver. 35.—religion and *righteousness* are *accepted*.

—— xvii. 30, 31.—the Athenians are taught, that under Christianity men are to *repent*, and to be judged in righteousness.

—— xx. 21.—the Ephesians are instructed to unite *repentance* towards God with *faith* towards Jesus Christ.

—— xxiv. 16.—St. Paul declares to Felix, that his principal aim is, to have a *conscience* void of offence.

—— ver. 25.—He reasons publicly to Felix on *righteousness*, *temperance*, and a future judgment.

—— xxvi. 18. 20.—He solemnly tells Agrippa, that his commission was, to turn men from the power of *Satan* unto *God*; to call upon them to *repent*, and to do *works* meet for repentance.

Rom. vi. 4. 22.—We are persuaded to walk in newness of *Life*; to have our fruit unto *holiness*.

Rom.

Rom. xii. 1.—We are to make ourselves a *living* sacrifice, (Liturgy, *lively*,) holy, *acceptable*.

1 Cor. vi. 20.—Christ hath bought us with a price; and therefore we are to glorify God in *Body* and Spirit.

— xv. 58.—We are to be stedfast, unmoveable, always abounding in the *work* of the Lord: our *labour* will not be in vain.

2 Cor. ix. 7.—God *loveth* a chearful giver.

Gal. v. 6.—Faith is to *work* by *Love*: or benevolence.

— vi. 9.—We are not to be weary in *well-doing*; with future *reward*.

Ephes. iv. 24<sup>x</sup>.—The Christian character (the new man) consists in *righteousness* and *holiness*.

Phil. iv. 8.—Enumerates the qualities of *virtuous* actions; with warm feeling.

1 Theff. ii. 4.—We are to perform moral duties, not as *pleasing* men, but God.

— iv. 7.—We are called (or made *Christians*) unto *holiness*.

1 Tim. i. 19.—Without *Conscience*, we should make shipwreck concerning *Faith*.

— v. 8.—He that neglects to provide for his *Family* (*οικουοι*) has denied the *Faith*, and is worse than an Infidel.

2 Tim. ii. 19.—Every one that nameth the name of Christ must depart from *iniquity*.

Titus

<sup>x</sup> In Eph. ii. compare verse 9, with verse 10. the one against reckoning on works, particularly before becoming a Christian; the other against neglecting them afterwards.



Titus ii. 14.—The *end* of Christ's death was, to *redeem* us from iniquity, and consecrate a set of men zealous of good *works*.

— iii. 8.—Believers must be careful to maintain good *works*; *profitable* to mankind.

Heb. x. 24.—Christians must stimulate one another to benevolence and good *works*.

— xiii. 16.—With Beneficence God is well *pleased*.

— — ver. 18.—The proof of a good *conscience* is, a resolution to *live honestly* in all things.

James ii. 14.—26.—Is capital; celebrated; but should here be read carefully.

1 Pet. ii. 20.—Patience in the cause of Virtue is *acceptable* with God.

— ver. 24.—Christ died on the Cross for a *moral* purpose; that we should be dead to *sins*, live to righteousness.

2 Pet. i. 5.—We are to add to our *Faith Virtue*.

1 John iii. 8.—Christ's *purpose* was, to destroy the *works* of the Devil.

— ver. 22.—Christians do things *pleasing* in the sight of God.

Though we have made only a *selection*, yet our proof, that Christians are to be virtuous, and may *please* God by being so, is abundant. Nevertheless, it is to be observed, that each Christian is not to pursue what he may call Virtue according to his own *fancy* and caprice; without rule or order; without authority; without social regards; without attention to the Scriptures. Our service is to be a "*reasonable service*," (Rom. xii. 1.) which  
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it certainly cannot be if we neglect the word of God.

xxi. The ground, on which the good works of Christians are pleasing to God, is a regard to the *merit of Christ*. (εἰ Χριστοῦ).

In the preceding Article<sup>y</sup> we have proved, that we are *justified* by Faith, or by the merits of Christ: and in the Appendix<sup>z</sup> we have shewn the efficacy of the merit, sufferings, and death of Christ in removing out of the way our *transgressions* and imperfections, so that they shall not act as impediments to our avoiding the displeasure, and gaining the favour of God; yet perhaps something might be mentioned, which affirms more directly, that our good works are accepted through Christ. If, indeed, we are *accounted righteous* through his merits, that is *sufficient*<sup>a</sup> for our purpose; yet a few passages may *confirm*, and *illustrate*.

Whenever any good is mentioned, which arises from the virtues of men, considered as members of the Church of Christ, or, as it may be expressed, as *members of Christ*, that good must be ascribed to a regard, in God, for Christ. Thus, as we are *branches* of a<sup>b</sup> *vine*, our fruit would be of no value but on account of the stem, to which we are united. And *members*, or limbs, have their proper<sup>c</sup> useful functions, through their union with the *Head*, from whence the Nerves proceed. The *endearing* connection marked out Eph. v. 25—33, should not be overlooked. See also Eph. ii. 20, 21, the idea of a *building*.

Again, those virtues which we practice in *imitation* of Christ, must be supposed, when they are accepted,

<sup>y</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xxiv.

<sup>z</sup> Appendix to Art. xi. Sect. xxii.

<sup>a</sup> Jonathan Edwards speaks to the same purpose: page 70. on Justification.

<sup>b</sup> John xv. 4.

<sup>c</sup> Eph. iv. 15, 16.

accepted, to be accepted on his account : to this purpose we may consult Matt. xi. 29.—Eph. v. 2.—1 Pet. i. 15.—ii. 20, 21.—1 John ii. 6.—iii. 3. and other texts of Scripture. Indeed such conduct as these texts prescribe is something more than mere imitation : it is putting ourselves upon a footing truly Christian.

There are several texts, which speak of Christians as *created* unto good works *in Christ*, or *ordained*, &c. that is, of Christians as *intended* to be holy or virtuous : these works must be accepted ; how ? surely through Christ. See Rom. viii. 1. 29.—Gal. v. 6.—Eph. i. 4. 6.—Eph. ii. 10.—Eph. v. 8, 9.—Phil. i. 11.—Titus ii. 11. 14.

Christ is called the *Author of Salvation* unto all them that *obey* him.—Heb. v. 9.—(Captain, in Heb. ii. 10.)

Rom. xii. 1. must be understood of acceptance on a *Christian* footing, from the argument.—and see Rom. xiv. 17, 18. He that in righteousness, &c. “ *serveth Christ, is acceptable to God,*” &c.

Our *thanksgiving* and *praise* seem accepted through Christ, Eph. v. 20.—Heb. xiii. 15.—1 Pet. ii. 5.—And both thanks and services in general, Col. iii. 17.

In Matt. xxv. 40. Acts of beneficence, as they are virtually *done to Christ*, must, surely, be accepted by his Father, on his *account*.

Not to multiply passages<sup>d</sup>, I will only refer to 1 Cor. xv. 58.—Col. iii. 17, 24. and recommend — 2 Pet. i. 11. with what goes before, to consideration ; particularly ver. 5.

I conceive this set of texts to be *important*, on account of their tendency to give our *good principles* a right *direction* : to put our *virtues* upon a right *footing* ; to make us continually act with *Christian*

<sup>d</sup> See Homily on Faith, 3d part, latter half.

*tian views*, and consider ourselves, not as separate *individuals*, which too many are apt to do, but as connected with other Christians, and with the *Head* of the Church.

XXII When *Faith* is commended in Scripture, it is supposed to be productive of good works.

This is expressed in several of the texts quoted under the third proposition; Matt. vii. 23. — Acts xx. 21. — Gal. v. 6. — 1 Tim. i. 19. — Titus iii. 8. — 2 Pet. i. 5. — and in the second chapter of St. James's Epistle: but our proposition is frequently *implied*<sup>c</sup>, where it is not expressed. Sometimes the term *Faith* is not made use of, but some *other word*, importing much the same thing. As in 1 John ii. 3—6. From comparing 1 John v. 1. with 1 John iii. 9. one may *infer*, that *Faith* doth not commit *Sin*. The *Faith* spoken of in Heb. xi. may not properly be *Christian Faith*: of whatever *sort* it be, it was abundantly *productive*. Hebr. x. 22—24. is to our purpose; because *Faith* is mentioned as affecting, first the *Heart*, and then the *actions*.

XXIII. I here put an end to *direct* Proof; but it may be proper, as before, to take notice of a few *objections*.

Is there no impropriety in calling works *good*, which are acknowledged to be *imperfect*? I see not that there is; to speak so, is only to use *popular* language, which the sacred writers themselves do. Anything may, in such language, be called *good*, which excites *approbation*: and all actions are approved, which are better than might have been *expected*; or as well. As arts advance, we ap-  
prove

<sup>c</sup> As in St. Paul's account of Abraham's Faith, Rom. iv. 1—3.  
—See St. James's comment; James ii. 21.

prove, what may hereafter disgust us; and the same is true of *Morals*, and *Virtue*, or *good works*. At no stage of the progression could it be said, that a man's virtues could, in strictness, *justify* him; yet one man's conduct is greatly preferable to another's; and so may be his condition after death<sup>z</sup>.

—The Deity may, at any time, *accept* our crude and imperfect virtue; something in the same way in which a parent accepts a faulty *drawing* from his child, if it has been done with a good *intention*, and is tolerable for the youth's time of *Life*, and *opportunities*. Such imperfect, unformed, good qualities, a parent accepts as a parent, from a *family* principle; not as a *Judge*; or, at most, as a Judge free from *severity*. The *intention* must be deemed the main thing; *actions* are good as expressing good<sup>h</sup> *affections*. God is called “the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, of whom the whole *Family* in heaven and earth are named”—(Eph. iii. 15.) and Christians are sometimes called *Brethren* of Christ.—(Heb. ii. 11.)

XXIV. Another objection we may take as proposed by *Dr. Priestley*<sup>i</sup>. Some, he says, define Faith “by its *effects*.”—“In *figurative* language, which conveys no *determinate* ideas, and therefore leaves the mind in great uncertainty, whether it be possessed of it or not.” This seems to be an objection levelled at several of the reformed churches.—As to ourselves, we have<sup>k</sup> given a plain definition of Faith, free from any figure, metaphor, or comparison; nor did our definition turn upon the *effects* of Faith. We have, indeed, spoken of its effects as  
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<sup>f</sup> Homo homini quid præstat! TER,

<sup>g</sup> Ludlam's Fifth Essay, p. 14.

<sup>h</sup> Ludlam, Essay vi. p. 33.

<sup>i</sup> Hist. Corr. 1. 264.

<sup>k</sup> Art. XI. Sect. XVII.

of use in *practice*, to enable a man to judge, not what faith *is*, but whether in fact he *has* the Faith meant in scripture, or not; and, one would think, no method of scrutinizing our principles, would be more agreeable to the *Socinians*, or tend more to relieve their “uncertainty.” We use Virtue also, or the effect of Faith, as an help in judging whether any *other man* has Faith; at least, so far, as to determine, that no man must be allowed to have Faith, if it produce *no* good effects.

This method leaves a man in no *uncommon* uncertainty about his own principles: In order to know whether he has benevolence, *loyalty*, &c. or deceives himself about them, he must follow the same course.

It is true our Article *compares* Faith to a *fruit-tree*, and good works to the fruit; but there seems to be high *authority* for such a comparison; as it is made repeatedly by<sup>1</sup> our Saviour himself. The vegetable, or vegetative life, answers to the *principle*, and the *fruit* to the *conduct* arising from that principle. The intention of the compilers of our Article in adopting this comparison, seems visible enough; it is to convict *hypocrites* of dissingenuousness; and the similitude proves, that all, who pretend to faith without being virtuous, are as dissingenuous as one who promised to send a dog, and sent a *dead dog*; or a *fruit-tree*, and sent one cut down, and deprived of all its power of vegetation. —A comparison, so introduced, is an *argument*; because neither the similarity of the cases can be denied, nor the dissingenuousness in the case introduced.

It

<sup>1</sup> Luke vi. 44. referred to in Homily on Faith, third part, p. 34, octavo. — John xv. 2. — See also Matt. vii. 20. — xii. 33. — xv. 13.

It will seldom happen, that we need go deeper than this; yet, to say the truth, we may sometimes be driven, by obstinate cavilling, to descend one step farther. If a man will not be contented with the rational account now given, but will still persist in saying, you take your *idea* of Faith, not from *Faith itself*, but from some *effects* of what you describe and define; the answer *then* must be, *all active principles*, such is the confined knowledge of man, may, in some cases, oblige us to have recourse to their *effects*, merely to describe or define them.—What is *Gunpowder*? at first we only, in answer, define gunpowder by its *ingredients*; Nitre, with a little Sulphur and charcoal: this will generally serve to describe, or define, gunpowder. But suppose you try this composition, and it makes no *explosion*?—then you say, immediately, this is not *right* gunpowder: what? did it not answer to your definition? I do not care how it was mixed, says a plain man, but I am sure, that is not right gunpowder, which will not go off when you touch it with fire. And some inquisitive spectators might go farther, and say, perhaps the *nitre* was not *right* nitre, nor the *sulphur* right sulphur, &c. and then our difficulties multiply upon us. Here is, no doubt, a perplexity; we have not determinate ideas; but yet the perplexity is one, under which we should make ourselves very *easy*, as a matter of speculation; and for practice, we should contrive the best *methods* we could, to *cure* our gunpowder; but we should never rest contented till it had its usual *effects*. Nor is there any good reason why perplexity should occasion greater uneasiness, if we were obliged to quit our definition of Faith, and say, this is not *right* faith, because it has not the right *effects* of Faith.

xxv. It may be asked, does not the doctrine of our church make *virtue* to be only of *secondary* importance? I may answer in the negative. Under the tenth Article it was shewn, that though Christian virtue is to be ascribed to divine assistance, yet we are not to <sup>m</sup> wait for that assistance, but to aim immediately at the best of conduct, with the greatest earnestness.—And under the eleventh it was shewn, that when it is said, we are not justified by our works, it is supposed<sup>n</sup> that we have exerted ourselves, and been diligent to come as near perfection as possible. By Bishop Warburton's account, justification by Faith only<sup>o</sup>, has its very *foundation* in good works. And how can virtue be better *secured*, than by a man's acting from Christian principles? In proving the doctrine as *we* profess it, we have shewn, that a main *end* and design of Christianity, was to restore and improve *Virtue*.—The other main end is, to effect remission of sins, in order that our improved virtue might be effectual in procuring eternal happiness. The latter may indeed be conceived as comprized in the former.

Can any one mean, that the dignity of virtue is lowered because we cannot be *justified* by it, but only can do things “*pleasing* and acceptable to God?” what can be higher in its nature than pleasing God? the all-perfect Being! that Being by whom we were created and redeemed! by whom we are perpetually preserved, and sanctified!—what ideas and feelings must any one have, to murmur as if his virtue was not sufficiently honoured, when it is capable of effects, which may be described in such a manner!

But

<sup>m</sup> Art. x. Sect. xxxv.

<sup>n</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xviii.

<sup>o</sup> Art. xii. Sect. ii. and Div. Leg. Book ix. Vol. 3. page 689, quarto.



But lastly, I would ask, will not, after all, our *Sentence* at the day<sup>p</sup> of *Judgment*, depend upon our *works*? The *Scripture*<sup>q</sup> declares it will, and therefore it will; but is such declaration agreeable to our theory of Justification by *Faith*? This is a question, which seems to have occasioned some trouble to several<sup>r</sup> advocates of Justification by Faith only; therefore I will hazard an observation or two upon it.

When it is said, our sentence will depend upon our *actions*, actions must include the *principles* or affections, by which they are performed: the same action may proceed from benevolence and selfishness, or ostentation; from piety and hypocrisy.

The merits of Christ supply imperfection; but imperfection admits of *degrees*; the merits of our Lord do not supply in such a manner as to make all men, who are imperfect in very different degrees, to be upon the *same footing*. I make these two remarks chiefly to prevent our proceeding under the influence of wrong notions.

*Faith* must produce *good works*: without recurring to the scriptural proof just<sup>s</sup> now given, we must think, that, if a man has an honest principle of doing his own part, and an ingenuous confidence in God, it must impell him to action. One cannot conceive such a principle to exist in a Christian, and not to set him upon good works.—It seems therefore much, or entirely, the same thing, in a general view, whether *Faith* is to be rewarded,

<sup>p</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xxviii. and Appendix to Art. xi. Sect. xxiv.

<sup>q</sup> Rom. ii. 6—11. &c.—Matt. xxv. 31—46.

<sup>r</sup> See Jonathan Edwards on Justification, 95. 101.—Dickinson's Letters, particularly, p. 315.

<sup>s</sup> Sect. xxii.

rewarded, or *Virtue*. And any difference will be rather a difference of modes of expression, than of doctrines; rather of *words*, than *things*. Nay, if it should sometimes occur, in *Scripture*, that we are to be rewarded for Faith, and sometimes, that we are to be rewarded for works, there would not necessarily be any inconsistency; any more than there would be in saying, at one time, peace was effected by *Bravery* and military skill; and, at another, peace was effected by the demolition of a *Citadel*; or, to keep to morals, in saying, at one time, a man was rewarded for his *generosity*, and saying, at another, that he was rewarded for his *generous actions*: whenever one of these things was *said*, the other would be *implied*. Faith is the key to Virtue, and to reward: for it admits men into the society, of which Christ is the Head; the natural effect of which is, both to make them virtuous, and to gain a superior reward for every particular degree of Virtue. The *Key* may often imply the treasures, to which it gives admittance.

All then that we have to see is, that it may, on some occasions, be reasonable to use the language, that virtue, or good works, will be rewarded, rather than that Faith will be rewarded. To say, that different *degrees* of *Faith*, or of a faithful principle connecting us with Christianity, will be rewarded, cannot be so *popular* a way of talking, as to say, that men will be rewarded according to their *conduct*, or morals; this latter is what we continually experience; it falls in with our common notions and apprehensions; and as the sacred  
writers

\* See general elements about *partial causes*, Introduction to Second Part, Sect. viii. Also Locke's Reasonableness, &c. Works, Vol. 2. p. 630, 631. quoted by Jon. Edwards on Justification, page 125, and Short Defence of Atonement, page 45, Note.

writers suit these, we must expect to find them using such language. A youth binds himself to a master, with a right *disposition*; how do men try or settle, whether he is a good apprentice? by determining whether he *behaves* well.

It may be more proper to say, that works will be rewarded, at the Day of Judgment, than that Faith will; because that Judgment is to be *witnessed* by men and angels. They cannot discern degrees of Faith, but they may, in some measure, judge of works; at least much better than of Faith: they do it every day.

In the *present life*, it would be more *useful* for men to say, and feel, that their actions must come into judgment, and produce their happiness or misery, than that only their *Faith* would be considered: A man would more easily deceive himself about his Faith, than about his actions; he would not be so good himself, nor do so much good to others, if the trial of his *actions* did not dwell upon his mind. I do not mean, that a man must never examine his *motives*; even they will be better examined, if actions are performed in a spirited manner, and so we reason from *experiments*.

We once spoke of a military<sup>u</sup> spirit as being, in some respects, analogous to Faith. More must not be concluded from illustrations than is intended by them: all we aim at is, to make the thing understood, which we illustrate by comparison; earthly things will not correspond with heavenly, in all particulars.

A man enters into a regiment with a true military spirit, and a sense of *honour*: the Commander of it performs some great and useful exploits; the regiment, as a body, receives honour; the man is  
more

<sup>u</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xxix.

more likely to behave well for being admitted into such a body; and more likely to be well rewarded for any particular degree of merit. If indeed he proves a coward, he may be shot; but if he distinguishes himself as a good soldier, he may be rewarded; *for what*, in such case, would reward be said to be conferred? for his *spirit* or his *actions*? it might be for *either*; but if one was expressed the other would be *implied*.

In *Scripture*, it seems most natural to speak of man as to be tried for his *actions*, when *all mankind* are in view, and\* the subject is natural religion: (then expressions should fall in with notions and feelings of all mankind:) but as to be tried for his *Faith*, when there is a danger of a particular set of men being too proud of some Revelation, and of some holiness presumed to result from it: —or when they are called into a new society, separated from the world, and made a *peculiar people*, merely through *favour*.

Jonathan Edwards describes<sup>y</sup> the rewarding of good actions, as *real*; but their “*rewardableness*” as being a consequence of Justification: that is, *after* men are justified, by admission into the Christian covenant, one privilege of that Covenant is, that their good actions are proper objects of reward. And the fitness of such a covenant, of our being *so* justified, arises from hence; that such a covenant will promote *Virtue*. This may be *safe* ground; I scarcely feel it *firm* enough.

The *Necessary Doctrine*, and other writings which favour<sup>a</sup> Justification by Faith only, speak of the  
day

\* Art. xi. Sect. xxviii.

<sup>y</sup> On Justification, page 100.

<sup>z</sup> This is a word, which Baxter *wishes* to use; but it seems to him too far from custom. — Catholic Theology.

<sup>a</sup> See Dickinson's Letters, page 315.

*day of Judgment* as that day, in which “every man shall receive according to his *workes*.”

xxvi. I will mention no more objections; therefore we now proceed to our *Application*: consisting, as before, of forms of *assent*, according to *natural* religion and *revealed*; of mutual *concessions* of contending parties; and of hints relative to *Improvements*.

On a footing of *natural religion*, a man might declare something not unlike our present Article, in the following terms; referring to what had been<sup>b</sup> declared before.

‘Although my improved conduct cannot but continue *imperfect* in the sight of God, notwithstanding my care to *purify* my *principles*, and engage in virtuous *associations*; although it be still incapable of *expiating* my former offences, and of standing a *severe* judgment; yet can it scarce fail of being *pleasing* to my indulgent and merciful heavenly parent: the more so, on account of the *measures*, which I have taken to improve myself: However, what is the real *value* of those measures, I can only judge with safety, from my *actual* improvements.’

xxvii. A *Christian* might assent in some such form as this:

‘Although, as was *before* intimated, the better sort of actions which I perform under the Christian covenant, as a member of Christ, that is, from *Faith*, cannot *expiate* my past offences, or stand in judgment, supposing God rigidly just and *severe*: yet, I trust, they are *pleasing* and acceptable to his goodness; not so much for themselves, as from a regard to my Lord and leader, his beloved Son. Imperfect as they are, I must rely on them to hinder me from deceiving myself about my *Faith*:

I must

I must never imagine, that I possess that sacred principle, as I ought to possess it, unless it be continually productive of good affections and virtuous conduct.<sup>c</sup>

XXVIII. We come next to *mutual concessions*.—It is much to be suspected, in disputes on Faith and works, that men have not perfectly understood each others expressions; and that they have not differed in reality, so much as in *appearance*.<sup>e</sup>

The *Romanists* and *Protestants* give different accounts, not so much of the efficacy of Christ's merits, as of the *manner* in which those merits become efficacious. The *Romanists* seem to hold, that our actions<sup>d</sup> *have* real strict merit, but that they receive that merit from Christ: we seem to hold, that our good actions have *not* any real strict merit, but that they are accepted *as if* they had, through Christ. Does this amount to more than that they conceive merit to be conferred on our actions *here*, we at the Day of *judgment*? a point perhaps at present beyond our knowledge.

In like manner, though some say, that men are justified by Faith *and* works<sup>e</sup>, and others mention only Faith, yet all these may have much the same meaning; as the latter do not exclude works, but will even call them *necessary*.<sup>f</sup>

Even the *Methodists*, who say such strong things against *works*, seem, the generality of them at least, to make a good life a *necessary*<sup>g</sup> condition of Justification at the last day.

But what is to be said of the *Socinians*? do not they reduce all about Justification to mere *natural Religion*?

<sup>c</sup> See conclusion of Jonathan Edwards on Justification.

<sup>d</sup> Rhemish Test. Rom. viii. 18.

<sup>e</sup> Ludlam, Essay v. page 16.

<sup>f</sup> Jonathan Edwards, p. 97, 98, &c.

<sup>g</sup> Principles and Practices, &c. page 52. 56, of the first Letter.

*Religion?*—Dr. Priestley affirms, that “nothing is requisite to make<sup>b</sup> men”—“objects of his (God’s) favour, but such moral conduct as he has made them capable of;” but then he *seems* to own, just afterwards, that he cannot “*at present*”—“explain all particular expressions in the Apostolical *Epistles*, &c.” “In *time*” he hopes to “be able, without any effort or *straining*, to explain” them all. All we can ask for therefore *now* is a *suspension* of hostilities; but what, from an adversary, can be more full to our purpose than such expressions, if we really mean to draw the doctrines of our religion from *Scripture*?

XXIX. Nothing now remains, except the subject of *Improvements*: but it seems best to defer that subject till we have examined the thirteenth Article.

<sup>b</sup> Hist. Corr. i. 279.



## ARTICLE XIII.

## OF WORKS DONE BEFORE JUSTIFICATION.

WORKS done before the grace of Christ, and the Inspiration of his Spirit, are not pleasant to God, forasmuch as they spring not of faith in Jesus Christ, neither do they make men meet to receive grace, or (as the School-authors say) deserve grace of congruity: yea, rather for that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done, we doubt not but they have the nature of sin.

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1. This Article has so harsh a sound, that I wish to be indulged in a few words by way of *Preface* to it. Something of the kind of thought, which it contains, seems to be required, in our body of doctrines, as resulting from the preceding Articles. From the ninth Article it appears, that men, as men, are in a state of enmity to God, and that their propensities are such as are likely to carry them into actual sin. From the eleventh and twelfth it appears, that *Christians* are released from that state of enmity, that they are no longer under condemnation, collectively; that they have assistance given them for the performance of good actions; and lastly, that, though their better sort of actions are still imperfect, they are accepted as pleasing to the supreme Being, on account of the relation



relation in which the Agents stand to the Head of the Christian Society, who has obeyed and suffered and died for them.—If then men are under displeasure, and even Christian virtues are only accepted through Christ, what must be the consequence with regard to *Heathen Virtues*? they cannot recommend themselves, on account of the unhappy situation of mere men; they have nothing to recommend them; can they, then, be accepted as pleasing to God? must they not appear to Him *faulty and deficient*?

If the preceding Articles be right, this consequence seems unavoidable. But then another thing is to be considered:—*Sin*, of any kind, can only be declared to *men*, or laid before them, for two purposes:

1. In order that they may *punish* it:
2. In order that they may *avoid* it:

In the present case, we can have no concern with *punishing*, because we cannot judge of the merits and demerits (“I speak after the manner of men”) of the Heathens, in any manner which could qualify us for such a business: we are then to leave the Heathens, properly so called, to God: “how shall they believe on him, of whom<sup>a</sup> they have not heard?”—we are to receive the notice of the sin mentioned in our Article, as those whose concern is to *avoid* it.—Thus we see, that the declarations, which the Article contains, must be supposed to be addressed to those, who are *nominal Christians*, or who have *opportunity* of weighing the evidence, which Christianity offers in its own support. To these alone, indeed, *scriptural* arguments can be proposed.

Both parties therefore, those who *make* the declaration of the Article, and those *for whom* it is made,

<sup>a</sup> Rom. x. 14.

made, ought to be *Christians*, (as Augustin and the Pelagians were); or at least to be within *reach* of reasonings and representations *from Christians*.—Indeed scriptural authority may be alledged to those who are not Christians, thus; we Christians affirm such and such things concerning our religion: we have such and such arguments in our favour; we *warn* you not to neglect to examine those arguments. Dr. Balguy puts this kind of warning with great force in the former part of his ninth Sermon.

I hope these two observations will make us think this thirteenth Article rational and pertinent: nay, it cannot but appear *important* also, we read a part of Dr. Paley's<sup>b</sup> Charge; and a few passages out of Dr. Balguy's ninth Sermon, and Mr. Ludlam's Essay on<sup>c</sup> Justification.

I now proceed to *History, Explanation, Proof, Application*, as usual.

II. *History*. In the *Apostolic Fathers*, I do not perceive any expressions, which strongly mark the imperfection of *Heathen Virtues*. They seem to write to *Jewish* converts, making use of authorities out of the Old Testament. We have not any thing, that I remember, (but I have not lately read them with care) addressed by them to *Heathens* as persuasives to conversion. And probably they had not many of those *nominal Christians*, for whom our Article seems calculated: those whom they had to deal with, would be either *real* Christians, or professed Heathens. *Justin*<sup>d</sup> *Martyr* and *Tertullian*<sup>e</sup> expose the imperfections of heathen worship and heathen Philosophy, and describe the superior worth of Christianity; but what was wanted,  
in

<sup>b</sup> Page 15. 21, quarto.

<sup>c</sup> Near the end.

<sup>d</sup> Cohortatio ad Græcos, A. D. 140.

<sup>e</sup> Apologia, A. D. 200.

in order to draw forth sayings exactly to our purpose, was that kind of person, to whom the writings of the *New Testament* might be alledged as authority, and who, at the same time, thought heathen principles of morals all that he need cultivate.

The conclusion of *Ignatius's*<sup>f</sup> eighth Section of his Epistle to the Ephesians, might be read; as also *Irenæus's* application of Rom. xi. 24. jointly with John iii. 5, 6. or 1 Cor. xv. 50.

Dr. *Nicholls*, on this Article, tells us, that *Clemens Alexandrinus*<sup>g</sup> was the *first*, who highly extolled heathen virtues and heathen Philosophers. It appears to me, from the passages produced, that Clement did not mean anything inconsistent with our doctrine: that he meant only to justify the ways of God to man; or to illustrate revealed truths. He uses expressions more strong than could have been prudently used after controversy was started; such as, that *Philosophers* were to Heathens, something analogous to *Prophets* amongst the Jews; and that Philosophy *justified* the Heathens; but then he is speaking only of the times *before Christ*; he was not saying, that the same thing would hold good *under Christianity*.—*Chrysostom*<sup>h</sup> was much later; he lived after controversy on our subject had arisen; yet he says<sup>i</sup>, that it was enough for Heathens to know *God* (meaning that *Idolatry* must always be bad) but *now*, (in Chrysostom's time) they ought to know *Christ*.

This is not commending heathen virtue in comparison of Christian; it is only saying, men should *now* be Christians, though before the coming of

<sup>f</sup> Veneer quotes this passage, and that from Irenæus Adv. Hær. 5. 10.—Welchman also has these passages, but the student would do best to consult the Fathers themselves.

<sup>g</sup> A. D. 194.

<sup>h</sup> A. D. 398.

<sup>i</sup> See Nicholls on the Article.

of Christ they could not be so; God is good at all times, and to all men; Christians are justified by Faith, but Salvation, such as natural religion bestows, could only be given to Heathens according to their obedience to the law<sup>k</sup> written in their *Hearts*.—This only amounts to much the same with what Dr. Paley<sup>l</sup> says; “they will be accepted, together with those who are instructed in the Law, and obey it.”

Dr. Nicholls gives, as opposed to these passages from Clement of Alexandria and Chrysostom, some from Cyprian and Jerom. They say, that *heathen Virtues*<sup>m</sup> are not, or might not be, *right* virtues; as, for instance, heathen *patience* was, or might be, *apathy*, stupidity, &c.;—heathen fortitude, rashness; heathen prudence, cunning; and so on; <sup>n</sup> I only mean to shew the general nature of the remark. Let us be *chaste*, says *Jerom*, by *Faith*; that is on *Christian* principles; and, in like manner, *wise*, *brave*, *temperate*. This I take to be exceeding good sense; and worthy of our most attentive observation. It might be partly the result of experience; but we can see, that the bravery of a robber only enhances the injury he commits. If all the virtues of human life were performed from Faith, meaning the Christian principle of action, the man who performed them, would approach much nearer to the character of the ΔΙΣΚΑΙΟΣ, or perfectly virtuous<sup>o</sup> man, than any one who attempted the same on Heathen principles: and this seems

<sup>k</sup> Rom. ii. 15.

<sup>l</sup> Charge, page 17.

<sup>m</sup> Cyprian, A. D. 248. de con. patient.—Jerom, A. D. 392. on Gal. iii.

<sup>n</sup> Augustin mentions the prudence of the avaritious, with a reference to Hor. Ep. i. i. “per mare,” &c.—The justice and fortitude (Cardinal virtues) of *Catiline*, with a reference to Sallust’s account of him.

<sup>o</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xiv.

seems to be the idea, which some of the Christian Fathers had, when they used the expression of the Prophet, several times quoted in the New Testament, “the Just, *δικαιος*, shall live by his Faith:” shall *conduct* himself *through life* on that principle<sup>p</sup>. St. Paul seems rather to apply the saying of Habakkuk as meaning, that the Just shall enjoy *eternal* life through his Faith: his Faith shall *save* him.—(Luke vii. 50. or xviii. 42.)

III. I mention next the age of the *Pelagian Controversy*, the fifth century.—We have seen<sup>q</sup>, that the Pelagians were against the doctrine of the necessity of Grace for acting well: in arguing on this doctrine, they<sup>r</sup> used a plea, which led to the subject now before us. Why, they urged, should we have internal assistance, in order to our performing good actions, when some of the *Heathens*, who had no such help, performed such great exploits, and displayed such admirable virtues?—they instanced in Fabricius, Fabius, Regulus<sup>s</sup>, Scipio. The orthodox Augustin, always vigilant, replied, that the Heathens were not virtuous as a Christian ought to be; that, if they performed actions good in their kind, they performed them *ill*; from inferior *motives*; not with a view to the *Glory of God*, &c. their conduct, though well meant, was, in strictness, deficient, *faulty*; nay, considering the nature of perfect Christian virtue, it might even be called *sinful*: what there was of good in it, might indeed lessen future punishment<sup>t</sup>, or even procure temporal rewards; but could by no means have the effect of Christian  
virtue

<sup>p</sup> Hab. ii. 4.—Rom. i. 17.—Gal. iii. 11.—Heb. x. 38.

<sup>q</sup> Art. x. Sect. v.

<sup>r</sup> Vossii Hist. Pelag. Thesis x. of Lib. 3. part 2.

<sup>s</sup> Aug. Contra Julianum, Lib. iv. Sect. 17. Ed. Antv.

<sup>t</sup> Vossius, page 677.

virtue to gain *eternal* happiness. If that great end could be effected by the Religion of Nature, if mere *men* could attain to perfect righteousness; then Christ died in vain.

Whoever wishes to examine more minutely into this controversy, may consult *Vossius's* *Historia Pelagiana* before-mentioned: the third part of his third book is on this subject, and is entitled, "*De virtutibus Gentilium*." I have consulted the fourth Book of Augustin's work *contra Julianum*, but I do not find myself always satisfied with the reasoning of that great Father, or with his application of texts of Scripture. Dr. *Priestley* has a<sup>u</sup> short passage, which may be read. I will only add a few expressions from the ancients, which may serve as an *History* of that particular expression, which seems so harsh, and with which our Article concludes, about heathen virtues having the Nature of *Sin*.

Jerom concludes his passage on Gal. iii. with these words, "sine quo (Christo) omnis *virtus in vitio est*." Augustin<sup>y</sup> says, "illud quod *minus est* quam debet, ex *vitio est*."—And, to Julianus, "negare non potes eum *peccare qui malè quodlibet facit*."—One might read Vossius's contents of his 12th Thesis, lib. 3, part 3. And under it Bellarmin's account of Augustin's taking *Sin* in a *large sense*, as meaning, whatever has not all the perfection, of which it is<sup>a</sup> capable.

iv. We will next take notice of the *scholastic* ages; and, as the "*school-authors*" are particularly mentioned in this Article, I have before<sup>b</sup> said, that

<sup>u</sup> See also a little, page 667, Fol.

<sup>x</sup> Hist. Corr. i. page 300.

<sup>y</sup> Ep. 29, ad Hieron. quoted by Nicholls on Article xv.

<sup>z</sup> Ad Julianum lib. 4. Sect. 30. Ed. Antv.

<sup>a</sup> Vossius, Fol. p. 680.

<sup>b</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xi; and Art. x. Sect. x.

that I would here give some account of them.— They have been the *admiration*, and now seem to be the *jest*<sup>c</sup> of Europe. I wish, at least, to speak of them without copying the language of any age. —The *Scholastici* used to mean *Rhetoricians*, who declaimed<sup>d</sup>, not about business, but for improvement. —They were *εν σχολη*, in *leisure*, as opposed<sup>h</sup> to the hurry of real causes; but the word, from denoting declaiming Rhetoricians, came to signify *Barriers*, or *Advocates*; yet it seems to have had its primitive meaning when *Charlemagne* instituted Seminaries of Learning, in Monasteries and Cathedrals, and *Schools* properly so called: only the *Scholastici* extended the subject of their instructions to<sup>e</sup> *Philosophy*; which they refined and made complex by eagerly improving one another, and especially by commenting upon *Aristotle*<sup>f</sup>: and then they mixed this *Philosophy* with *Christianity*; applying it particularly to the set of subjects now before us. A very subtle *Logic* was necessary, in order to carry on very subtle disputes in *Metaphysics*.

I have mentioned *Charlemagne*, who died A. D. 814, at the age of 72; but the *origin* of scholastic divinity, like that of other things which sprang up in times of ignorance, is very obscure and uncertain. *Three periods* are mentioned<sup>g</sup>; its *Infancy*, its *Maturity*,

<sup>c</sup> See Warburton, quarto, Vol. 3. page 630.—Dr. Balguy, page 193. 330.

<sup>d</sup> Those who *taught* Rhetoric, used, at one time, to be called *Sophistæ*: such were Libanius, &c.—Eunapius wrote the *Lives* of Philosophers and Sophists.—*Sophist* is sometimes an *Artist*, in almost anything; or a Philosopher, &c.

<sup>e</sup> Scholæ Philosophorum. Cic.

<sup>f</sup> Dr. Balguy, page 330.

<sup>g</sup> In the *Encyclopédie* may be found several things here said of the Schoolmen.

*Maturity*, and its *Old Age*. Its *Infancy* may be dated early in the twelfth Century; *Lanfranc* died in 1089, and *Peter Lombard* in 1164; and they are said to have lived in its infancy. Its *ripe age* may be said to have begun in the year 1220, and to have continued to the time of *Durand* of St. Porcian, (who died in the year 1333,) or, we may say, an hundred years; and its *Old age* may be said to have begun from 1320, and to have ended, with *Gabriel Biel*, in the 15th Century. It might be expected, that a kind of learning much admired, should produce other authors after this time, whilst the admiration continued:—*Suarez*, who died in 1617, is reckoned a schoolman; he is very voluminous in his comments upon those who went before him.—But it may be as well to mention one or two names, in particular.

*Peter Lombard*, called Lombard from his being born at Navarre in Lombardy, wrote a small book of *Sentences* compiled from the Fathers, on different points, in a manner adapted to reconcile their seeming differences: from whence he was called the *Master of the Sentences*:—The number of folios which have been written upon this book is astonishing; itself only a small quarto. Peter was particularly eminent at Paris; where he was preceptor to the Royal Family, one of whom declined the Archbishopric of Paris in his favour.

We may next mention Thomas, commonly called *Thomas<sup>h</sup> Aquinas*, because he was of the noble family of the Counts of Aquino near Naples, which family has produced some famous Generals:

He

<sup>h</sup> Thomas Aquinas died in the year 1274, at the age of 48; his native place Aquinum was the same as Juvenal's; whence Juvenal is called Aquinas by the writers of his Life: see before, Art. x. Sect. x. — See also the third Satire of Juvenal, near the end.



He is often called, in books, *St. Thomas*<sup>i</sup>. He lived in the thirteenth Century, in the middle, or ripe age, of Scholastic learning. He was very highly esteemed, and called at Paris *Doctor*<sup>k</sup> *Angelicus*: his *Summa Theologiæ* is accounted by the Authors of the *Encyclopédie* (or by some persons, whose judgment they think worth recording), a capital work of its kind; yet they are not reckoned great favourers of Theology, such as it has been in general.—Though he travelled much, and taught every where, and only lived to the age of 48, he has left works which fill eighteen volumes folio, and which shew such intensity of thought, as to make it very probable, that they were all written with a mind on the full stretch.

Lastly, we may mention *Suarez*: though he died so late as 1617, yet I am more inclined to mention him than to dwell longer on the times before him. He was a Spaniard, of Grenada, a Jesuit, a teacher of Theology, and usually reckoned among the Schoolmen, notwithstanding the time in which he lived. We have his works in twenty-three volumes folio, abridged by Noel in two volumes folio. He was reckoned to state opinions well: but, though he wrote against the Reformation, in defence of Popery, yet his book on that subject was burnt at Paris by the common executioner, as encouraging Sedition and Rebellion.—There are five volumes folio of his works, in which are forty-three Dissertations, all on the third part of the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas.

I will mention no more facts relative to the Schoolmen; but some were necessary as a ground for some

<sup>i</sup> Thomas a Becket is also sometimes called *St. Thomas*.

<sup>k</sup> Titles of this sort were given to several Schoolmen.—Durand was *Doctor Resolutissimus*. One Schoolman was *Doctor Irrefragabilis*.

some judgment concerning their merits. My idea is, that they have shewn great intellectual powers, and that they did not run into all their disquisitions without some view to utility; that is, they wanted very nice distinctions, in order to keep their ideas from running together, and in order to explain all the acts of the mind without leaving anything to the judgment of common sense.—Thus all their distinctions might be founded in nature, yet they might be too minute to be really useful:—men may explain a thing, and yet the explanation shall be more burthenfome to the mind, than one less full and perfect would be, which left more to the quick operations of reason and sense. If a man was to describe, with the greatest possible minuteness, a common act of vision, he must become very abstruse and hard to understand: If he undertook to describe all the properties of the different surfaces, of which the surface of an human body consists, he might pass his whole life in the work, and do little good; or, on the whole, do harm.

A man may write with some view to clearing up things, and yet may run into an intolerable multiplicity of words; especially if he runs on in an analytical method, and indulges himself in prejudice and hypothesis. The Categories of Aristotle used to be studied for Bishoprics; any one may now easily form his own judgment on that work from consulting Mr. Harris's Philosophical Arrangements.

I would not have it understood, that I think researches are to be given up the moment we find ourselves at a loss to perceive particular uses to which they may be applied: if speculation only enlarges the mind, and strengthens its faculties, it may be continued for a time; though only so long

as reason and experience dictate that it will be useful upon the whole. As some bodily exercises shew, to our surprize, what the Body is capable of, so may some mental exercises do with regard to the mind; and both may point out the way to improvement. It is not clear to me, that we should at this time have had such reasoning powers as we have, if no great efforts, no passionate exertions, had been made by the *Schoolmen*<sup>1</sup>.

v. But to proceed with our History. We may, for anything I recollect, pass on to the age of the *Reformation*. Let us begin with the *Romanists*.—Under the eleventh Article<sup>m</sup>, I read a passage from a Popish Historian, in which *Luther* is introduced as affirming, that “good works,” “how good soever they might appear,” “were *mortal sins*.”—I suppose *Luther* must mean good works of *Heathens*. In the sixth Session of the Council of *Trent*, the seventh Canon anathematizes those, who say, that all works done before Justification, however performed, are really *sins*; but the first canon affirms, that no man can be *justified* either by works of Nature, or of the Law of *Moses*, without divine Grace by *Jesus Christ*. (By the way, can those works be otherwise than faulty, by which a man cannot be accounted righteous?) In the decree preceding the Canons, which expresses doctrines, with reasons on which they are grounded, all merit in those, who are candidates for Justification, seems fully disclaimed; in the fifth Chapter, we have “*nullis eorum existentibus meritis* :” in the eighth, “*nihil eorum quæ justificationem præcedunt*,

<sup>1</sup> Dr. *Waterland* gives an idea of the *Schoolmen* in his account of the Argument à priori; his notion is also mentioned in his life, in the *Biographia Britannica*.

<sup>m</sup> See Art. xi. Sect. vii. et Du Pin. Compend. Vol. 4. p. 16.

præcedunt, five fides, five opera, ipsam Justificationis Gratiam promeretur.” Nor do I see any distinction of merits into different sorts; but it is found in the works of Cardinal<sup>n</sup> *Cajetan*, who was a great Ambassador and Divine at the time of the Reformation: and in the *Rhemish* Testament on Acts x. 2, we find mention of *congruity*: I imagine what our Church opposes, may be found in this passage; “Such workes as are done before Justification, though they suffice not to salvation, yet be *acceptable preparatives*° to the Grace of Justification;”—he adds, “such workes preparative come of Grace also; otherwise they could never *deserve* at God’s hand, of *congruity*, or any otherwise, towards Justification.”

The *reformed* churches in general, I think, agree with the Church of England. In the twentieth Article of the *Augustan* Confession, we have “*nec placent Deo opera secundæ tabulæ, nisi fides accedat, quòd propter Christum placeat hæc inchoata et imperfecta obedientia.*”

Mr. *Hume’s* account might be introduced here, of Cranmer’s framing the Articles; Mr. Hume understands our Articles to mean, “that no Heathen, however virtuous, can escape an endless state of the most exquisite misery<sup>p</sup>.”

With regard to the Church of *England*, the *Necessary Doctrine* does not seem to enter much into our present subject. In the part relating to Good works, it describes moral acts, done without faith in Christ, as what it does *not* profess to treat of;  
yet

<sup>n</sup> This Cardinal’s name was Thomas de *Vio*: he was born at *Gaicta* (not far from Naples), and was afterwards Bishop there.

<sup>o</sup> In our tenth Article we have, “cannot turn and *prepare* himself.” See the explanation, Sect. xxv. of that Article.

<sup>p</sup> Hume’s Hist. 4to. Vol. 3. page 334. 1st Ed.—the passage is quoted by Gilpin, page 159. of his Life of Cranmer.

yet adds, by the way, that they are good in their *kind*, and sometimes followed with *temporal* rewards, though not available to the attaining of everlasting life. In our *Reformatio Legum*, we find an intention to proceed against those, who hold, that by free-will alone, without any other special *Grace of Christ*, men may live<sup>a</sup> well. In the life of Bishop *Ridley*<sup>r</sup>, it is observed, that our *Homilies* deny the value of “those specious works, apparently good, but done without Faith, in opposition to the *Anabaptists*.” The place where this subject is mentioned, is the first part of our Homily on Good Works. In general, I respect, sometimes admire, our Homilies; but I know not whether the expressions on the present subject, are not somewhat too strong<sup>s</sup> for me; though they may be chiefly borrowed from Chrysostom and Augustin. —Yet the expressions of Jonathan Edwards seem stronger than those of our Homily; he talks of man being “*infinitely* guilty”—“beheld of God as infinitely the object of his displeasure<sup>t</sup> and wrath, or *infinitely* hateful in his eyes.” And *Antinomians* must of course be inclined to speak harsh language against the virtues (so called) of mere men. *Baxter*, in a Dialogue<sup>u</sup> in his *Catholic Theology*, introduces a *Libertine* or *Antinomian*, saying, “They (the wicked) must be *first* made *godly*, (that is, made *Christians*;) and the heart renewed, that the *Life* (or conduct) may be amended.”—And “without Faith it is impossible to please God, or do anything which is not *abominable* to him.”—The famous Antinomian *Dr. Crispe* gave an odd turn to virtue before justification; instead of disputing whether

<sup>a</sup> De Hæresibus, cap. 7.<sup>r</sup> Page 345.<sup>s</sup> Homily on Good Works, Part 1.<sup>t</sup> On Justification, page 31.<sup>u</sup> Page 258. 260.—See Art. XII. Sect. 1. of this.

whether well-meaning men had any title to Justification, he dwelt upon justifying the *wicked*; as wicked; “while\* they were in the most desperate devillish condition of all,” &c.—this is one way of ending all dispute about men’s deserving “Grace of congruity.” It may perhaps have been intended, not only to edify and comfort, but (as Bayes says) to “elevate and surprize.”

VI. With regard to the *Socinians*, we have lately seen<sup>y</sup>, that God’s favour is, according to them, to be obtained “in all situations” by moral conduct. The *Racovian Catechism* affirms<sup>z</sup>, that Justification by Faith has no concern with the times before the coming of Christ.—Mr. *Graham* holds<sup>a</sup>, that good works are of *themselves* acceptable to God; but I do not know whether he makes any distinction between works done before Justification and after it.

VII. I may here close my historical remarks, and proceed to *Explanation*.

The *title* is, “*Of Works done before Justification* :” that is, works done before a person acts as a member of the Christian covenant : this will sufficiently appear from what was<sup>b</sup> said under the *twelfth Article*, about works which “follow after Justification.” Several phrases may express our becoming Christians, because, if all goes on in due course, as planned, several things take place at that time : but we shall come to some of these phrases very soon.—From the title, we pass to the Article.

#### VIII. “*Works*”

\* See Gerees Epistle to the Reader; not very far from the end.—Sidney Coll. Library, T—5—38.

<sup>y</sup> Hist. Corr. Vol. 1. p. 279.—Art. XII. Sect. xxviii.

<sup>z</sup> Page 212.

<sup>a</sup> See Short Defence of Atonement, page 38.

<sup>b</sup> Art. XII. Sect. viii.

VIII. "*Works*"—again<sup>c</sup> we ask what *kind* of works may be here meant? the answer is, the same kind which is called in the tenth Article our own "*natural good<sup>d</sup> works*;"—the epithet "*good*" is indeed here omitted; but the same kind of actions must be meant: no one would require to have it declared, that heathen *vices* are not pleasant to God; or the actions of Heathens in general; without distinction into well and ill-meant.—It seems not improbable, that the epithet "*good*" has, in this Article, been purposely omitted by the compilers, in order to avoid the seeming contradiction, which there would be in affirming, that *good works* have undoubtedly the nature of *Sin*.—If we connect this Article with the preceding, we see the *two sorts* of good works, Christian and heathen, compared with each other; the former declared to be *pleasing* to God, the latter *not* pleasing: *both imperfect in themselves*; but the former pleasing "*in Christ*," the latter not pleasing, because seen *only in themselves*.

I do not think, that, in strictness, our Article represents heathen good works as *displeasing* to God.

IX. "*Done before the Grace of Christ*"—another phrase for before becoming Christians:—we find this used in the Acts of the Council of Trent, Session vi. Canon 1. it may be preferred here to other equivalent phrases, as opposed to what has been sometimes called<sup>d</sup> the *first grace* of God; that assistance, which he may have been pleased to give to Heathens.—We have seen something near this phrase as used by Dr.<sup>e</sup> Redman. In Scripture, it  
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<sup>c</sup> Art. XII. Sect. vi. and places there referred to.

<sup>d</sup> Art. x. Sect. xxviii.

<sup>e</sup> Art. x. Sect. xliii. from Jortin's six Dissertations, p. 84.  
—See also Art. x. Sect. xix.

<sup>f</sup> Art. XII. Sect. vi. or Life of Ridley, p. 351.

is well known, the phrase used in our Article occurs; as we conclude our public prayers with, "the Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ," &c.—(2 Cor. end.)

x. "*And the Inspiration of his Spirit*"—this phrase seems to me equivalent to the last:—there was, no doubt, some reason for adding it. The "Spirit<sup>s</sup> of Christ," at least, is a scriptural expression. Perhaps *Grace* might seem too *general* a word, as meaning *Favour*, of any kind; help, *external* as well as *internal*.—But we can see, that both this phrase and the last give, by intimation, some *reason* for a doctrine, which may seem harsh; that they tend to take off, or to soften prejudices against it. As our inability to please God before we become disciples of *Christ* is the thing to be impressed, those expressions of scripture, which have the nearest relation to Christ, must be preferable to all others; both in point of propriety and utility. Afterwards, in the sixteenth Article, *receiving the Holy Ghost* is spoken of without any mention of the Spirit being the Spirit of Christ.

Our explanation might be confirmed by *comparing* the Title of the Article, with the part of it already mentioned: from such a comparison it must appear, that "Works done before Justification," must mean the same with, "works done before the Grace of Christ, and the Inspiration of his Spirit."

These two phrases, expressing the ratification on God's part, of our admission into Christianity, might seem particularly proper; more proper than *Baptism*, as the Article is chiefly intended for *nominal* Christians; that is, for those, who had been baptized, but did not act on *principles* properly Christian: such persons do works after *Baptism*,  
which



which are on the same footing of works *before Justification*; or works after becoming *nominal* Christians, and before becoming *real* Christians.

In *different Confessions* of Faith, or different authors, we may expect to find this same thing expressed in a variety of phrases. Persons not yet become real Christians, may be called the *unregenerate*<sup>b</sup>, or in Latin, *irregeneriti*<sup>i</sup>, and *non-renati*<sup>k</sup>; their *state* may be called that before justification, or before *Vocation*:—or the justified may be called *converted*<sup>l</sup>.

In *Scripture*, we find the same variety: consult 1 Cor. vi. 11.<sup>m</sup>—Titus iii. 7. (where our being put into a *way* of Salvation, is expressed by “*Heirs*” and “*Hope*”:)—in Eph. ii. 8, we have *saved*; in Heb. vi. 4. *enlightened*, (from whence those who had been Catechumens and were completed Christians, used to be called *Φωτισζόμενοι*,)—*Vocation* and *called* are common,—chosen, or *elect*.—See Taylor’s Key, Chap. vi. or a short expression<sup>n</sup> in Paragraph 167.

All said against such good works as we have described, must apply to well-meant actions in a state of *Apostacy*, a fortiori. Works before attaining to a state of Justification must, at least, be as pleasing to God, as works after renouncing such a state.

XI. “*Are*

<sup>b</sup> Baxter, Cath. Rel. p. 258.

<sup>i</sup> Vossii Hist. Pel. l. 3. part 3. *versus finem*.

<sup>k</sup> Ellis on the Article. <sup>l</sup> Art. XII. Sect. VIII.

<sup>m</sup> Art. XII. Sect. VIII.

<sup>n</sup> Taylor seems to mistake (Key, Chap. vi.) in some degree, when he makes *regenerate*, &c. &c. apply to *all* Christians, good and *bad*; I think some terms are used so as to seem to include the *bad*, only because it is taken for *granted*, as a matter of course, that the *internal* dispositions will answer to the *external* signs and professions.—Titus iii. 7. “*Heirs*”—“*hope*,”—belong to *all* Christians in this way.

XI. “*Are not pleasant to God*”—they not having the property, which make Christian good works pleasing. Of the meaning of the word “*pleasant*” enough was said under the twelfth Article.—Perhaps some persons might be willing to allow, that certain actions are *not* pleasant to God, who would not call them *hateful* or offensive to him.

XII. “*Forasmuch as they spring not of Faith in Jesus Christ*”—here is a particular reason openly assigned, why heathen virtues are not pleasing to God: the consequence is, that, if we thought the same for *other reasons*, such opinion, though it might be just, would not belong to this *Article*;—and, if we did not admit *this reason*, our admitting the opinion upon other reasons would be insufficient.

XIII. “*Neither do they make men meet to receive Grace*”—the *Grace* here meant must be the same with that before mentioned, the *Grace of Christ*, or that given peculiarly to Christians.

“*Meet*,” signifies proper, *fit*:—in Cooper’s Thesaurus it is English for *aptus*; as *meeteness* is for *congruentia*; and *aptus* and *congruus* are used, seemingly, as synonymous:—*fit* implies a sort of *coincidence* of different things, as of a key with the wards of a lock, and so does *congruus*: the *fitness of things*, which, with some, is the criterion of Virtue, seems the same with *congruity* or *propriety*. Cooper lived in the time of our Queen Elizabeth; in the same reign in which our Articles were published.—In some sense I should think, that a man who meant well, would be more *fit* to receive Christianity, than one who lived ill; but the idea of the Article seems to be, that a man, by living what might be called well, under *natural religion*, would not be, on that account, a *fit object* for God to confer the benefits of Christianity upon, in such sense, that if  
God

God did *not* confer Christianity upon him, he might be *blamed* as missing or overlooking a fit object. If a man is a *fit object of charity*, some blame is always supposed to rest upon us if we do not relieve him. A fit object of Charity, would, in the language of the Article, be called, one *meet* to receive Alms.—This observation will be confirmed by the next.

XIV. “Or (as *the school authors say*)” — this seems to make the expression, “*meet to receive Grace*,” equivalent to that which follows, “*deserve grace of congruity* :” the one expression *popular*, the other *scholastic*.—The latin does not mention “the School-authors;” instead of, “as the School-authors say,” it has, “*ut Multi vocant* :”—but the English and Latin are equally authentic.

“*Deserve Grace of congruity*”—I used to want a *comma* after “Grace;” the words sounded as if “Grace of congruity,” was some *kind of Grace*, instead of, deserving “Grace, of congruity,” being a *way of deserving* Grace: other people may not have been so simple°. A man may deserve any thing either *ex condigno*, or *ex congruo*; either of (to use the preposition “of” in the old sense) *condignity*, or *of congruity*; that is, either of *strict right*, or according to all *fitness* or *propriety*. A *servant* deserves his *wages ex condigno*; he may deserve a support in *sickness* or old age, *ex congruo*, “of congruity<sup>p</sup>.” Sometimes instead of *ex congruo*, the phrase,

° Whilst I was revising this for the press, in November 1796, I accidentally met with some popular Sermons on the thirty-nine Articles, by *Boys*: as I remember, he seemed to want the *comma* here mentioned.—And I have fancied, that Bp. *Burnet* did not rightly conceive the meaning of the words under explanation in the present Section; or indeed the meaning of the thirteenth Article at large.

<sup>p</sup> I do not find this distinction in Peter Lombard; I see it frequently mentioned in Thomas Aquinas’s Summa; but I do not readily find a *definition* of it.

phrase, "*ex proportione*," is used; and then some *dispenser* of rewards and emoluments is conceived to give them in *proportion* to the merits of different men.

We should consider what idea we have of a man, who does *not grant* that, which is deserved, "of congruity," as fit, or proper. We certainly always *blame* such a person: nay, his conduct excites our *indignation*: we conceive him as denying that, which he would have been compelled to grant, if *Laws* could have been made to suit all circumstances: and his *mean evasion* of the spirit of the Laws, by the imperfection of the Letter, increases our disapprobation and abhorrence.

xv. "*Yea rather*"—is best understood by the Latin, *imò*—*nay*; the word *rather* sounds more *comparative* than it is here. When it is said, that a thing is *rather* this than that, the meaning may be, that it is *not either* one or the other; but here the word *rather* does not prevent the assertion, which follows it, from being *absolute*.

xvi. "*For that they are not done as God hath willed and commanded them to be done*"—here is another *reason* openly assigned, to which the observation before<sup>a</sup> made is applicable. Of any particular *man*, it can scarce be said, that he does things differently from what God has commanded, if he has never *received* the command, nor had a power of receiving it. In strictness, a servant may do contrary to what his Master has commanded, though *he* has received no command; has not heard of the orders which were given out; but this must be through *ignorance*: the servant, in that case, is not thought to be at all concerned with what the Master has ordered. God *winks*<sup>r</sup> at ignorance, when it is *involuntary*, though he may reward,

<sup>a</sup> Sect. xii.

<sup>r</sup> Acts xvii. 30.

reward, in the highest degree, those who both *know* his will and *do* it.

XVII. “*We doubt not but they have the nature of Sin.*”

The *History* of this expression, already given, will serve, in some sort, for an *explanation* of it; but something must be added.—The same kind of expression has occurred<sup>s</sup> in the ninth Article: concupiscence was said to have the *nature* of sin, because it comes of sin, and leads to sin: that is, it is distinguishable from sin, strictly so called.—“*We doubt not,*”—odd as it may seem, this expression, and others resembling it, imply some *doubt*: we do not use such expressions in things quite free from doubt.

*Sin*:—ἀμαρτανειν, means, aberrare, to miss a path, or a *mark*: we may be said to sin whenever we miss the right path which would lead to the mark; whenever we deviate from *Rectitude*; though ever so *little*. In Hebrew מִטָּה has the same significations; it implies an *aim*, natural or moral. But when we have continued a while in rectitude, and *apostatize* from it, no *mark* is then supposed to be in view; *deviating* is then expressed<sup>t</sup> by מַעַל;—and going *beyond* bounds, that is, *transgressing*, is expressed by פָּשַׁע: whenever we do *any* of these things, in ever so small a degree, we<sup>u</sup> *sin*: *mere man*, especially as described under the ninth Article, must be continually doing some of these.—Indeed every one, who falls short of *perfect virtue*, may be said, in strictness to sin; which in fact every man does;  
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<sup>s</sup> Art. IX. Sect. XII. XXIII. XXVI. XXX.

<sup>t</sup> See Parkhurst's Lexicon under מַעַל.

<sup>u</sup> In *English*, we use *deviating* and *transgressing* in both a *natural* and *moral* sense: have we nothing like ἀμαρτανειν? to *miss* a mark and *miss* our duty? I have done nothing *amiss*? is this used chiefly in *negative* phrases?

for *established* virtue, though it may *approach* nearer and nearer to perfect virtue, has, in no country, hitherto *reached* it; nor perhaps ever may. No wonder we should miss a *mark*, if we do not *see* perfectly where it is placed. This *gradual progression* and advancement towards moral perfection, seems acknowledged by Christianity: as appears from Phil. i. 9, 10.—Phil. iii. 13.—2 Pet. end. Even *Christian* virtues have, in *themselves*, “the *nature of Sin*,” for they are confessedly *imperfect*; only they are *accepted* through Christ, (as before, Sect. VIII.)

Some sins are called *venial*<sup>\*</sup> *sins*: some actions, owned *wrong* in certain respects, are *rewarded*.—If you saw a child pick a pocket, though he thought little or no harm, you would own the action had “the *nature of Sin*,” and would influence him to *desist* from such conduct. Cyrus’s giving the longer cloak to the taller boy<sup>†</sup>, had the nature of sin: and so had the *Spartan’s* exposing his child, and the *American’s*<sup>‡</sup> destroying his Parent.—Every action is *rewarded* according to rules of *established* virtue, however faulty.

Indeed the Sin, of which heathen virtues have the nature, cannot be sin of every kind; it can only consist of abuses of the *moral faculty*. Actions *well intended*, cannot be wrong but by some wrongness in that faculty. Well-meaning men will often be wrongly *informed* “concerning the nature and *consequences* of human actions;” they will often have wrong “*objects* of approbation and

\* 1 John v. 17. Εἰν ἁμαρτία ἢ πρὸς θάνατον.

† Xen. Cyrop. Book 1. page 24. 8vo.

‡ Robertson’s History of America. The custom of destroying an infirm child, with religious ceremonies, is still prevalent in the East Indies.

and disapprobation<sup>a</sup>;" and will often approve and disapprove in wrong *degrees*; either too much or too little. In any of these cases, their actions have the *nature of sin*;—but if any one reflects, that these are the kind of faults, of which our Article treats, he will not feel much shocked at its *harshness*.

While men continue under the influence of a misinformed or perverted moral faculty, even involuntarily, their *actions* may be said to have the nature of sin, however God may be pleased to accept their *Persons*; but, if they continue in such a state *voluntarily*, when they might avoid it, their case must be much worse: and we have supposed our Article to be, properly, aimed at such. Considering what has been *done* and *suffered*, in order to make men act on Christian principles, refusing to act upon them, is not only presumption, perverseness, and rebellion, but hardness of heart and ingratitude.

Let then the brilliant actions of the Heathens be applauded, when such applause will best warm the human heart to virtue; but the real nature of their imperfection must be fully exposed, whenever the applause due to them makes men negligent of higher and purer principles than those on which they were performed. But we must not forget, that we are now only explaining: however let our explanation close here.

XVIII. We come now to our *Proof*:

The matter of the Article may be divided into *three propositions*, which need not be proved very fully, this Article being a *Corollary* from the ninth and two following; as was shewn at the opening of it.

I. Christians

<sup>a</sup> Dr. Balguy's M. S. Heads of Lectures in Morality, Part 3. Chap. 2.

1. Christians ought not to consider *Heathen* virtues as, in strictness, pleasing to God; because such virtues have not that right *Christian* principle to recommend them, which is intended for all mankind.

2. Good actions, popularly so called, of men not yet admitted into Christianity, cannot *entitle* them, even on a footing of propriety, to such divine assistance, as may effect their admission.

3. The good actions of mere men, who have no connexion with Christianity, may, in strictness, be considered as having the nature of sin; because they do not answer perfectly to the *Will*, or to the *Laws* of God.

xix. In the first and third propositions, the *Reasons* make part of the propositions, according to what was laid down in the Explanation.

It will be owned, that while we are speaking of strictness, those actions which have the nature of sin, cannot, in themselves, be pleasing to God; therefore if we prove the third proposition, the first will be proved of course. And in the explanation of the word "*pleasant*" (Sect. xi.) we have already given the reason suggested by the twelfth Article; and have spoken to the same purpose in the Preface to this Article. Only we may keep in mind, that, as Christianity is intended for *all mankind*, it must seem a *failure*, and be, if one may so speak, a kind of *disappointment*, whenever men are not influenced, in their actions, by a Christian principle. Let us now take the *second* proposition.

xx. Good actions, popularly so called, of men not yet admitted into Christianity, cannot *entitle* them, even on a footing of propriety, to such divine assistance as may effect their admission.



The benefits of the Christian covenant are always represented in Scripture as matter of *mere favour*: this has been sufficiently shewn<sup>b</sup> before; *Taylor*<sup>c</sup> shews it more at large. On a footing of common reason, one may say, that, if good actions, performed under natural religion, can claim any reward, they can only claim the *rewards of natural religion*: surely not an *eternity*<sup>d</sup> of supreme happiness.

Again, to say that a man *deserves* any thing, is the same thing as to say, if he has it not, the person, from whom he deserves it, is unjust, or acts improperly: shall God be considered as *culpable* because he does not bestow inestimable blessings on certain imperfect moral agents? nay, because he does not bestow them on some, who might obtain them, by observing the gracious conditions which he is pleased to propose!

xxi. The good actions of mere *men*, who have no connexion with Christianity, may, in strictness, be considered as having the *Nature of Sin*: because they do not answer *perfectly* to the *Will*, or to the *Laws* of God. If the ninth Article is just, this proposition must be so too: If men are all, as men, concluded<sup>e</sup> under sin, their actions must have the nature of sin: and what was said of the *Φρονιμα σαρκος* not being subject to the Law of God<sup>f</sup>, must still hold good<sup>g</sup>. Indeed it was scarcely possible to *explain* what was meant by Heathen Virtues having the Nature of Sin, without giving reasons for our present proposition: only we may now add, that  
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<sup>b</sup> Art. xi Sect. xxiii.

<sup>c</sup> *Key*—prefixed to Romans, Par. 167—169. page 58.

<sup>d</sup> Art. xii. Sect. xix.—Warburton Div. Leg. Book ix. page 630, quarto.

<sup>e</sup> Gal. iii. 22.

<sup>f</sup> Rom. viii. 7. Art. ix. Sect. xxvi.

<sup>g</sup> Life of Bp. Ridley, page 346, from Necessary Doctrine.

the *Will* of God can be satisfied with nothing short of *perfect virtue*: and that his *Laws*, or commands, must enjoin perfect virtue, though it is by experience that mere man gradually finds them out.

XXII. But perhaps it is not so much to our purpose to consider the good actions of those, who are involuntarily mere men, as to take notice of the virtues of those, who are *Heathens by choice*.—Yet that their conduct must have the nature of sin, has been<sup>h</sup> already observed, and indeed is self-evident<sup>i</sup>. Mr. Ludlam concludes his Essay on Justification with some expressions much to our purpose<sup>k</sup>; and Dr. Balguy's ninth discourse is well worth taking into our proof; as well as the part of Dr. Paley's Charge before-mentioned<sup>l</sup>; and the passage of Bishop Warburton's Doctrine of Grace, mentioned at the same time.

Whoever acts from *lower motives* when he can act from higher, must *offend* the Deity: this every man does, (we are now taking the divine authority of the Scriptures for granted) who prefers principles merely *moral*, to *Christian* principles. It is, no doubt, on many occasions, praise-worthy to act from a desire of esteem, and of feeling satisfied with ourselves; from a sense of honour and decency, from a sentiment of benevolence, or from<sup>m</sup> a veneration for the sanctity of the Laws; but whoever considers the Nature of Christian Faith, must surely regard it as a much *higher* principle than these; especially when acknowledged as of an original immediately divine: its views take in all time, past and future; it cannot be exerted with-

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<sup>h</sup> Sect. xvii.

<sup>i</sup> John ix. 41.

<sup>k</sup> See also page 13.

<sup>l</sup> Sect. i. where all these are referred to.

<sup>m</sup> See Diderot's Dedication of his *Père de Famille*.

out sentiments of the most tender affection, the most ardent gratitude, and the most exalted admiration.

The *Duellist* has, no doubt, some virtuous feelings, of fortitude, abhorrence of injury, and delicacy about reputation; he is willing to brave death in defence of honour: *Chivalry* made men pitiful<sup>n</sup> and courteous; made them give honour to the woman as to “the weaker<sup>o</sup> vessel;” and whoever has the true spirit of Chivalry possesses some qualities, which are nobly amiable: but, when fine sentiments, or fine qualities, are maintained, or applied, in a manner differing widely from that, which “*God hath willed and commanded*,” they have not the effects of Virtue; nay, may be considered as *faulty*, in themselves, or as having the nature of *Sin*.

Though this may be a sufficient proof of our proposition, I would wish not to close it without a few passages of *Scripture*: the more, as some texts are used, even by *Augustin*<sup>p</sup> himself, which do not seem to me, to have weight in the present question.—Heb. xi. 6. seems to relate to *natural religion*<sup>q</sup>, and to imply, that no Christian can reasonably object to Faith being made the principle of Christianity, because it must be the principle of *all* religion. Rom. xiv. 23. appears, from the context, to mean, that, in doubtful cases, it is wrong to do any thing which one *thinks wrong*, though it may be right for another to do the same thing if he things it right: and *Titus* i. 15. seems to express much the same thought; all things are innocent, generally speaking, in him who, from habit,

<sup>n</sup> 1 Pet. iii. 8.

<sup>o</sup> 1 Pet. iii. 7.

<sup>p</sup> Ad Julianum, lib. iv. Sect. xxiv. Edit. Antv.

<sup>q</sup> Art. x. Sect. xxxix. & Art. xi. Sect. 11.

habit, acts innocently; though this, like most general expressions, implies some tacit limitations; else indeed, in this sense, it would rather make against our proposition, than for it.

As these texts are introduced with a view to eating things, *indifferent* by nature, they should not be understood without some reference to that; though it be a general fact, that a good mind is so far a compound of good purposes, that a good man acts well generally without thinking of it; and, in like manner, a bad man acts ill: even when the better principles of a bad man exert themselves, they produce something wrong, (like the fortitude of a robber); nay, his *moral* faculty shews itself in some perversion or excess. But our present Article does not treat of a bad man, only of a virtuous one.

But I will now produce a few texts, which seem to have real weight.—Matt. x. 15.

John iii. 17, 18. 36.—John vi. 28, 29.—Acts xvii. 30. for we never are said to *connive* at that which is not faulty.—Acts xx. 21.—Rom<sup>r</sup>. i. 18.—1 John iii. 23. and v<sup>s</sup>. 17. where ἀδικία “unrighteousness” may be<sup>t</sup> a negation of δικαιοσύνη, righteousness, or perfect<sup>u</sup> virtue. Bishop Burnet uses Rom. vii. but the sense of that Chapter does not seem agreed upon.

If it be proper to take in actions done in a state of *Apostacy*, we must add, Heb. vi. 4—6. & x. 26. 38. and xii. 16, 17.

XXIII. Having finished our direct proof, we may now propose an *objection* or two.

XXIV. Some

<sup>r</sup> Rom. viii. 1. *implies*, that there *is* condemnation to those who are *not* in Christ Jesus.

<sup>s</sup> 1 John iii. 4. might also be read.

<sup>t</sup> 1 Pet. iii. 18. we find Christ called δικαίος (χρῆστος) ὑπὲρ ἀδίκων, the just for the unjust.

<sup>u</sup> Art. xi, Sect. xiv.

XXIV. Some will be ready to ask, Is not the doctrine that Heathen virtues have the Nature of Sin, a *cruel* one, with regard to a great proportion of mankind? And is it not contrary to Rom. ii. 14. 27.?—We might express this more fully, by asking, Can the unshaken honesty of *Aristides* have the nature of sin? or his patriotic co-operation with his enemies for the public good? what shall we say of the unremitting beneficence of *Titus*? or the youthful continence of *Scipio*?—When the pious daughter fed her ancient parent from her breast, was not the act *pleasing* to our father who is in heaven? But what shall we say of *Socrates*! who almost copied by anticipation him, whom we have for an<sup>x</sup> example.? who laboured to bring life and immortality to light, who suffered in the cause of pure religion; and who employed his last hours in speaking favourably to his accusers? to those, through whom he suffered an unjust Death? The answer is; this objection relates to those, who were *Heathens unavoidably*; you say, that virtuous Heathens, who were Heathens *involuntarily*, will be happy: I do not say they will not<sup>y</sup>: may they be happy!—some parts of scripture seem to say, that men shall not be condemned<sup>z</sup> for being Heathens, who have not heard of the Gospel; how much they may<sup>a</sup> *miss* I know not; nor is it my business to determine: but they may<sup>b</sup> *miss* Christian Salvation. *Actions* may be wrong<sup>c</sup>, and yet the *Agents* may be made happy. We men say,

<sup>x</sup> Notice should be taken of 1 Cor. v. 13. that *God* is the judge of Heathen virtue, and on his judgment all may rest secure.

<sup>y</sup> 1 Pet. ii. 21.

<sup>z</sup> Mark xvi. 15; 16.—Rom. x. 14.

<sup>a</sup> Luke xii. 48.

<sup>b</sup> Rom. x. 13.

<sup>c</sup> Sect. xvii.

say, of one another, sometimes, ‘what that man did, was not the right *thing*; it was not the etiquette, it was not attentive, &c. but the man meant no *harm*, I like the *man*; had one done the same, who had enjoyed more advantages and *opportunities*, I should have certainly *resented* it:’ in like manner, might not the Deity take notice, that Heathen worship is *Idolatry*, &c. that every *sin* however run into, makes confusion, and retards the advancement of the general happiness; but that a *Parent*<sup>d</sup> may *accept* what a *Judge* might not *pardon*?

Most thinking<sup>e</sup> men seem to allow, that *natural* virtue may meet with *some* rewards; and why may not the benefits of the *Christian Sacrifice*, of “the lamb slain from the foundation<sup>f</sup> of the world,” extend, in some degree, to those, who lived virtuously *before* the Incarnation of Christ?

St. Paul says, (Rom. ii. 14. 27.)—“*When* the Gentiles, which have not the Law, do by nature, the things contained in the Law, these, having not the Law, are a law unto themselves.” And he tells the Jews, that the Gentiles, *if* they fulfil the Law, shall *judge* them. But it does not seem to be plainly affirmed, either that the Gentiles have a *perfect law*, or that they *act perfectly* up to that law, which they have: they were “a law unto themselves;”—but would that be a *perfect law*? they acted conformably to it in some things, and “*when*” they did so, they were to be commended; and they then *judged* the Jews, as *any* ignorant good man judges any learned wicked man:—*Sodom* and *Gomorrhah*

<sup>d</sup> Art. XII. Sect. XXIII.

<sup>e</sup> Sect. III. about Augustin, and Art. XII. Sect. XIX. about Warburton; and Art. XIII. about Necessary Doctrine Sect. v.

<sup>f</sup> 1 Pet. i. 19, 20.—Rev. xiii. 8.

Gomorrah were *preferable* to those, who rejected sacred<sup>s</sup> truths; that is, who chose to act on *lower* principles than they might have had to act upon; but Sodom and Gomorrah were not *spotless*; nor even *accepted* by God in his mercy.—Dr. Balguy speaks not as if he thought the Gentiles certainly blameless, on account of St. Paul's saying, *when* they do the things contained in the law; though he speaks indulgently; "*When* they, who are strangers to the Gospel of Christ, fulfil the precepts of the Gospel, they will doubtless, *in some degree*, be intitled to its privileges, and *share* in its rewards."

xxv. An objector might say, is it not somewhat strange that Christians should be required to supersede the *finer principles* of human action?—I do not see, that they *are* required to do so: I do not understand, that men, by becoming Christians, cease to be *men*: they acquire a new *ruling* principle, as men do in every new state, but every ordinary principle may co-operate with it. The Christian principle must be the *supreme*; but every principle of *Virtue* may act, in subordination to it.

According to what was<sup>h</sup> before observed, from the ancient Father, let us be just, prudent, brave, temperate, by *Faith*.—Compare Phil. iv. 8, with the principles before<sup>i</sup> enumerated, and no material difference will be found. In other parts of Scripture, inferior motives to virtue are occasionally recommended, though no where insisted on as *new*.—*Praise* is proposed<sup>k</sup> as an incitement; the powers of *Conscience* are<sup>l</sup> described; and Jesus himself is said to have increased in *favour*<sup>m</sup>. In each condition

<sup>g</sup> Matt. x. 15.—Dr. Balguy, page 158, alludes to this.

<sup>h</sup> Sect. 11.

<sup>i</sup> Sect. xxii.

<sup>k</sup> Rom. xiii. 3.—1 Pet. ii. 14.

<sup>l</sup> Matt. xiv. 2.—John viii. 9.—Rom. ii. 15.—Heb. xiii. 18.

<sup>m</sup> Luke ii. 52.

tion of life, I say, there is a *ruling* principle; but with it, *secondary* principles mix and assimilate; the *justice* of the *soldier* mixes with his ruling principle of *honour*, and becomes more noble than the selfish and niggardly honesty of the lower tradesman or mechanic. Suppose then honour, decency, love of order, harmony, beauty, to be in a Christian mind; would they degenerate? God forbid! no soil could suit them better.

In fact, I rather fear, that some, whose minds have been intent upon the higher parts of Religion, whose devout affections have been much inflamed, have neglected the plainer moral duties: but this only shews, that all our affections must be guided by reason and conscience<sup>n</sup>; such neglect is wilful, and blameable; but no more to be laid to the charge of Christianity, than the fanatical follies of the Crusaders, or the pious cruelties of the Inquisition.

xxvi. In the last place, something, for the sake of illustration, may be supposed to be objected to that part of our Article, which declares, that heathen virtues do not *deserve admission* into Christianity. Let then the case of *Cornelius* be proposed, as it seems to be a sort of standing objection. Was not Cornelius made a Christian because he feared God, and worked righteousness<sup>o</sup>?—I look upon it, that the sacred Historian certainly meant to *commend*, as well as to record, his virtues; and it does not seem inconsistent with any thing which has been said, to suppose, that those virtues might be, in some measure, the *occasion*

<sup>n</sup> Here is an appearance of giving supremacy to both *Faith* and *Conscience*; but they are supreme in different ways; Faith, as an *active* principle, Conscience as *judicial*. Faith is a Commander, Conscience a Judge.

<sup>o</sup> Acts x. 35.



tion of God's dispensation to the Gentiles *originating*<sup>p</sup> from him: nay, might be a *personal recommendation*<sup>q</sup>: In conferring benefits, you may *prefer* a man for his *moral* worth, and yet the benefits you confer may be wholly *gratuitous*. You may leave your *fortune* to one, whom you *prefer* on account of his good *character*, and yet his virtues may give him no *claim*, of any sort, to your kindness.—The proper question to be asked is, would God have been *culpable*<sup>r</sup>, or would he have acted *improperly* to Cornelius, if he had not assisted in his conversion?—Every one must be too much *shocked* with the question to think any answer necessary.—The *Alms* of the worthy Centurion would have brought in good interest, if they could have purchased a *title* to *eternal* happiness!—And, if blame would have fallen on the all pure and perfect Being for not admitting Cornelius into the Christian covenant, it must now fall on him for *every* Heathen, equally worthy with Cornelius, who continues in Heathenism.

XXVII. I will not propose any more objections, but proceed immediately to our *Application*, consisting of the same parts as before.

On a footing of *natural religion*, a man might, referring to his former declarations, say something of this sort;

‘I am now in an improved state; if my *improved* actions are only *pleasing* to God, in any degree, because they are recommended by the measures which I have taken, I ought to consider my *unimproved* actions as *not* pleasing in his sight. I thank Providence for the opportunities afforded me; they were wholly *gratuitous* and *unmerited*; if I

now

<sup>p</sup> See Ludlam's 5th Essay, page 15.

<sup>q</sup> Art. x. Sect. XXVIII.

<sup>r</sup> Art. XIII. Sect. XIV. end.

now content myself with such virtues as I practiced before I enjoyed them, my best actions must be worse than they *need* be; their imperfections must on that account become less excusable; though, in truth, if I conceive what they would be, supposing God to express his perfect *will*, and publish his all pure *commands* without reserve, I may fairly say, that, in their present state, they, at best, are not only imperfect, but *faulty*.\*

XXVIII. On principles of *Christianity* the declaration might run thus;

‘ If the virtues I practise *since* I became a *Christian*, are *only* acceptable to God *in Christ*, those which I practised *before*, ought now to be looked upon, by me, as *not* acceptable; for want of something out of themselves to recommend them.— That *they* should give me any *claim* to the transcendent benefits of Christianity, it is absurd to suppose: those benefits are mere matter of *favour*; nor could I have *blamed* any one, if they had not been conferred upon me. Now I am a Christian, my righteousness must exceed that of my natural state; nay, I must constantly keep in mind, that my virtues (as they would be called) in that state, having no way to get rid of their faults and imperfections, must, in the eye of the all perfect Being, appear to have the nature of *Sin*.’

XXIX. With a view to *mutual concessions*, we must consider with whom we have any difference of opinion on the subject of our present Article. We may have dispute with those, who are shocked at our seeming to deny Salvation to Heathens†, with Romanists, and lastly, with all those, who lightly esteem our notions of acting as Christians; be they called *Pelagians*, or *Socinians*; or be

\* See Sect. v. about Mr. Hume, &c.

be they, without name, only *nominal* Christians, or unbelievers.

With regard to those, who condemn our seeming rigour to *Heathens*, I should hope we had made them sufficient concessions, under the first objection, to prevent any dispute.—And the Romanists, I should hope, would be contented with what we have said in our explanation. I do suppose, that Luther, in opposing error, had expressed himself too strongly; but our church is always moderate and rational: to convince all moderate and rational men of that, she need but be rightly *understood*.—As to the third class of adversaries, who content themselves with acting as what they would call virtuous *men*, without acting as *Christians*, to them we have no concessions to make: we have reasoned with them in order to make them acknowledge, that it cannot be an indifferent matter whether such a dispensation as the Christian is neglected or not; and in the preceding Article we gave a pretty copious account of the texts, which mark out true Christians as united to their *head*, and as acting in the capacity of members. Here we must rest the matter: the affair is as much *practical* as speculative.

xxx. We have then only remaining the subject of *improvements*. It seems as if the *language* of the Article might be made more *perspicuous*; and, perhaps, if the *Scholastic* expression were now omitted, no great harm would ensue; though it does refer to certain remarks made by our adversaries.—The *construction* also of the Article seems as if it might admit of some Improvement; as the middle proposition, about meriting Grace, separates two, which are nearly alike in meaning.

But the improvements of the Article are not so important as those to which it *leads*.

It tends to make men act as *Christians*: to relieve them from the state of *criminals* in the sight of God, and to set them in the light of *adopted Sons*: to make the idea of what Christ taught, did, suffered; of the *Society* which he formed, and continually supports, not only an idea acknowledged, like others, when particularly attended to; but the ground of their *habitual* purposes, views, and behaviour.

It unites the *Christian* with the *man*; revealed religion with *natural*. It arranges things so, that *Faith* shall have the *superiority* intended it; but that *Reason*, *Conscience*, love of praise, and every finer sentiment of the human mind, shall have free scope, and full encouragement.

It effects that, in the natural connection, sometimes rivalry, between *virtue* and *religion*, neither shall be neglected; and, by pointing out the manner in which their provinces may be defined, it prevents them from *interfering* with each other, so as to cause confusion. Affording to *virtue* the office of a *guide*; and making *Religion* to act as a *motive*, or *incitement*; so that religion shall not degenerate into blind zeal, nor virtue into cold worldly selfishness<sup>t</sup>.

All things seem in *progression*; I will conclude this Article with submitting to your consideration two passages of scripture, as pointing out the way to improvement, the one in *Virtue*, and the other in *Religion*.—Phil. i. 10. seems to acknowledge the gradual improvement of our *moral* faculties; join to it the preceding verse, and that which follows it, and consider them all together. 1. We have *Αγαπη*, now most usually called *Benevolence*, the *source* of good actions: this must produce much praiseworthy conduct; but it may grow *wild* and disorderly. 2. We have next, therefore, *επιγνωσις*, a  
knowledge

<sup>t</sup> See Dr. Balguy, page 204.

knowledge of “the nature and consequences of human” actions.”—This may occasion too great *coldness*; we have therefore, 3. In the third place, αἰσθησις, an improved *sensibility*. These together may generate a right *moral faculty*; εἰς το δειμαζειν ἡμας τα διαφεροντα, so that we “may approve things that are excellent.” When we have got so far, we must be aware of *hypocrisy* and *self-deceit*; *sincerity* is then important, and an *inoffensive* disposition: we must aim at being εὐκρινεῖς καὶ ἀπροσκοποι:—let the disposition, thus formed, then proceed to *action*: our good qualities, whether respectable or amiable, will grow upon us, and produce *fruits* in abundance, both of natural virtue, and Christian righteousness; we shall be πεπληρωμενοι καρπων δικαιοσυνης τῶν δια Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ: and, at last, our character will assume a *celebrity*, and will flourish εἰς δοξαν καὶ ἐπαινον Θεοῦ.—Let any one make this the subject of a Sermon: I never yet have; but it could not fail to produce a discourse interesting to all rational Christians.

The passage, pointing out the way to improvement in *Religion*, is the conclusion of St. Peter’s *second Epistle*.

“Grow in Grace, and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.”—On this I have discoursed before this University.

<sup>u</sup> Dr. Balguy’s MS. Heads of Moral Lectures, Part 3. Chap. 2. referred to before, Sect. xvii.

## ARTICLE XIV.

## OF WORKS OF SUPEREROGATION.

**V**OLUNTARY Works besides, over and above God's Commandments, which they call Works of Supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogancy and impiety: for by them men do declare, that they do not only render unto God as much as they are bound to do, but that they do more for his sake, than of bounden duty is required: whereas Christ saith plainly, When ye have done all that are commanded to you, say, We are unprofitable servants.

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1. The *History* of this Article need not be long; especially as the subject of it is so connected with the subjects of the twenty-second Article.—The Romanists wish to find something of the notion of Supererogation in the fifth Century, particularly in the works of Augustin; but what he says wants one essential, the *transfer* of merits. Bishop Porteus, in his brief confutation of Popery, extracted, in a good measure, from Archbishop Secker, (Part ii. Chap. viii.), says, that *Indulgences*, except as mitigations of Ecclesiastical censures, were not “known for at least 600 years, perhaps much longer;”—Works of Supererogation might be much longer still before they were definitely taught. I have a memorandum of their appearing

ing *first* in the twelfth Century; that Century, in which the Popes established their Sovereignty; and in which the remission of certain sins<sup>a</sup> was reserved to the Pope and Bishops; but, when I looked last into *Forbes*, he did not give me a distinct idea on this head:—I suppose distinct knowledge is not easy to be had, and the matter is not important; so I am not accurate about it. Mosheim places the rise of the doctrine of Supererogation in the thirteenth Century, which will be authority enough for us.

The principal thing to be observed is, that the Romanists spoke of Christ as having suffered, (independently, I think, of the redemption of mankind) more than he *needed* to have suffered, and therefore part of his *merits* might, according to them, be considered as laid up in a *treasury*:—Now in whose *disposal* should this treasure be, but in that of the *Church*? and who should act *for* the Church, but its earthly Head, the *Pope*?—But not only Christ had a superabundance of merit, but some of the most eminent of the *Saints*; they might have enjoyed this world innocently; therefore all their self-denial and voluntary suffering, was so much *more than innocence*; it was *merit*; and merit which might be *transferred* to poor ordinary, sinful Christians: such was the merit of performing acts of supererogation.

The spiritual treasury of merits, thus amassed, was sometimes said not to have the power of delivering from *eternal* punishment, but only from that temporary *Purgatory*, of which we shall have occasion to speak something *hereafter*<sup>c</sup>; yet it is  
thought,

<sup>a</sup> Dupin's Compendium, 12th Cent. last chapter.

<sup>b</sup> See 13th Cent. Part 2. Chap. 3. Sect. 1.—or octavo, Vol. 3. page 242.

<sup>c</sup> Under the twenty-second Article.

thought, that, in the minds of the common people, eternal punishment and temporary, being both after death, were sometimes confounded; and that such confusion was rather encouraged<sup>d</sup>.—But how was any one to get any of this treasure to be applied for his own benefit? by *Charity*, either done in his life-time, or by will; “Charity<sup>e</sup> shall cover the multitude of sins;” charitable bequests must by no means be discouraged; they would generally be larger than charitable presents; some expedients must be found to make them efficacious: Here was great scope for *traffic*, or sale of spiritual goods for temporal; and the *abuses* run into were so great, as to occasion the beginning of the *Reformation*: the Council of *Trent* itself made decrees against them: yet candour must remember, that the gains arising were not applied to the enriching of private individuals; chiefly to the enriching of some religious *Order*: and some, probably, to advancing the honour of Religion.

The Council of *Trent* seems to avoid the term Supererogation, though it calls *Indulgences* “cælestes Ecclesiæ<sup>f</sup> *thesauros*.”—This conduct favours the idea, that the Romish Church rather wishes to have the doctrine of Supererogation believed by the *people*, than precisely *taught* to all men of improved minds.—The Rhemish Testament, which was intended for those who understood English and not Latin, speaks<sup>g</sup> plainly. “Holy Sainctes, or other vertuous persons, may in measure and proportion of other mens necessities and deservings, allotte unto them, as wel the *supererogation* of their *spiritual* workes, as those that abound in *worldly* goods,

<sup>d</sup> See Bishop Porteus, Part 2. Chap. 8.

<sup>e</sup> 1 Pet. iv. 8.

<sup>f</sup> End of twenty-first Session.

<sup>g</sup> On 2 Cor. viii. 14. and see Index, under *Works* and *Counsels*.



goods, may give almes of their superfluities, to them which are in needessitie.”—The *necessary doctrine* seems to have adopted *reformed* notions in this particular; for here Reformation began; it uses the *text*, (Luke xvii. 10.) which is in our Article; and exhorts men to keep continually *advancing* in virtue; and represents them, the farther they advance, as being the more *indebted* to God for his Grace, which enabled them to advance. It also represents our duties as being enjoined, not for any benefit to God, but merely for our *own<sup>h</sup> good*.—The third part of our *Homily* on Good Works, turns to ridicule the *Lamps* always running over, the markets of merits, the works of overflowing abundance, of supererogating Papists: and by so doing, shews how necessary it was, at the time of the Reformation, to expose the corrupt practices and superstitions of the Romish Church, to the *People*; and to declare against such corruptions in the new body of doctrines.

As the subject of works of supererogation is intimately connected with the subjects of Article xxii, you may ask, why is it placed *here*? Because it is in the midst of Articles, which shew the absurdity of it; and even on the principles of the Romanists themselves. It relates to the actions of *individuals*, and to their being accepted and rewarded by the Deity.

II. We may now proceed to *explanation*. The chief thing to be explained is the *title*, “*Of works of supererogation*.”—*Rogare legem*, is to propose a law, or *ask* the *people* whether it may proceed: *Erogare*, is properly to make a law, or an order, for paying any sum out of a public *treasury*; but the

<sup>h</sup> Of good works; not very far from the end: the pages are not numbered.

the word is used also for *paying*, or laying out.—In Luke x. 35, *προσδανῶν*, to spend over and above, is translated, in the Vulgate, by *supererogo*; which, as one single word, does not seem perfectly *classical*, though it might be really in *use* at Rome; but that is the case with several expressions, taken from common life, which are found in the Vulgate<sup>1</sup>. Now here are *two acts* of beneficence mentioned, as done by the good Samaritan; one definite, the other indefinite; the definite, giving two denarii; the indefinite, saying, “*whatsoever* thou spendest more, quodcunque supererogaveris, when I come again I will repay thee.”—The Fathers, in pressing duties, determinate and indeterminate, though not belonging to acts of beneficence, had sometimes recourse to this passage of Scripture. I do not wonder at their dwelling on anything so excellent; they would compare definite commands, or prohibitions, to the two pence<sup>k</sup>; and things left to *expedience*, to the unlimited order of the Samaritan:—and sometimes, (perhaps more frequently) *any commands*, though not very definite, such as *duo præcepta caritatis*, (the love of God and man, I suppose,) to the sum paid, and mere *advice*, such as St. Paul sometimes gives, to the indefinite commission.—Hence the famous distinction of *Precepts* and *Counsels*, præcepta et consilia; or *commands*

<sup>1</sup> Book I. Chap. ix. Sect. viii.

<sup>k</sup> See Nicholls on the Article.—I see in Cave's Hist. Lit. that one part of Fulgentius's 2d Book ad Monimum, is, *de S. Pauli Supererogatione*.

Monimus had been puzzled about Augustin's comparison of Paul's *advice* 1 Cor. vii. 25. to the unlimited commission, “quodcunque supererogaveris,” &c.; especially when he compared that comparison with others, arising out of the same passage, by Ambrose and Optatus; he applies to Fulgentius to reconcile them; Fulgentius labours at it; but I have not examined nicely: he says, interpretations *will* be different; but I find no idea of *transferring* merit.

*commands* and <sup>1</sup> *advice*.—An ordinary good Christian, the notion is, obeys all *Precepts*; but he must be something great and extraordinary, who aims at *Counsels*; which are sometimes called *evangelical perfections*. He who obeys precepts, will have *some reward*; but he who obeys *counsels*, will be rewarded much more nobly. He who *disobeys precepts* (I speak as a Romanist) will be *punished*; but he who does not comply with *Counsels*, will suffer no punishment, merely on that account.

I see nothing farther to explain. The word “*arrogance*” may arise from the idea of man’s being sinful, and yet pretending to dispose of the rewards of God; “*impiety*,” from the idea of our being *indebted* to God, and yet making him, as it were our debtor. Our church says nothing, in this Article, of the merits of Christ; but only of the merit of *human creatures*<sup>m</sup>.

III. We may therefore immediately begin upon our *Proof*. I do but perceive *one proposition*, but it must be framed with a view to the sense of Superelevation at the time when our Article was made: “which they *call* works of Supererogation”—call so, at *this time*, say our Reformers.

‘We may not suppose any one man to have so much merit, that some of it can be transferred to lessen the punishment of another man.’

This

<sup>1</sup> See 1 Cor. vii. 6. 25, 26, 40.—also 2 Cor. viii. 8, 10.—In the Vulgate, de Virginibus autem *præceptum* Domini non habeo; *consilium* autem do, &c. *Counsel* is an English word for *advice*, which cannot be said to be antiquated: Gay says, of Courtiers,

They give you good *counsel*, themselves to defend.

<sup>m</sup> “Voluntary works *besides*, over and above,” &c. Could one see an instance of this use of the word “*besides*,” in any author about the time of the Reformation? the word *besides* occurs in Art. xx; but, if it has the same force here as there, it is a preposition as usual, and the words “*over and above*” are synonymous to it, or explanatory of it.

This might be left as proved by the eleventh, twelfth, and fifteenth Articles. If we are not justified by works, we cannot be *more* than justified by them. If our Christian virtues are in themselves imperfect, and are only accepted through Christ, we can have no merits in our *disposal*. If all men are *sinners*, they want all their merit for themselves, and more than<sup>n</sup> all. In the Lord's prayer, we desire God to forgive us our trespasses. We are commanded to love God with *all* our heart; to do *all* to the glory of God; can we do more?—we are bought with a<sup>o</sup> *price*; have such persons any *services* to give away?—There is no abiding place, where we may stop as though we were<sup>p</sup> already perfect, and say, here I am, I need make no further advancement in virtue; we are to press *forward*; we are to *run* so<sup>q</sup> as to obtain; to *strive*<sup>r</sup> to enter in at the strait gate.—And, as we must take our idea of works of Supererogation, from the practice of the Romanists at the time of the Reformation, we may reason from the human commandments as censured in the New Testament, in Matt. xv. 9. and Col. ii. 18. 20—23. to the still more foolish and corrupt human commandments of the Romanists; I think our Homily reasons thus with great force<sup>s</sup>.

#### IV. The

<sup>n</sup> Ludlam's 5th Essay, page 10.

<sup>o</sup> 1 Cor. vi. 20.

<sup>p</sup> Phil. iii. 12, 13, 14.

<sup>q</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 24. where the context is in our favour.—See Locke's Paraphrase and Contents.

<sup>r</sup> Luke xiii. 24.

<sup>s</sup> Although Hammond gives a favourable interpretation of εὐλαβησικία, Col. ii. 23, (which it may bear), yet that does not affect the *scope* of the passage, Col. ii. 20—23, which is against superstitious restraints on natural Liberty, imposed by man. My idea of the passage, after reading Hammond, is this; If ye be dead with Christ from [Jewish ordinances] worldly elements, why do you dogmatize, as if you still lived in the world [under such slavish ordinances]? [why do you dogmatically

IV. The proofs of the eleventh, twelfth, and fifteenth Articles are proofs of this Article; if, after such proofs, any difficulty remains, it will be best cleared up by answering *objections*. Bishop Burnet concludes his exposition with saying, “the thing is so plain, that it has no sort of difficulty in it.”—But it seems to me, that an acute Romanist might give us some trouble; if not so as to affect our opinion, and hinder our assenting to the Article, yet so as to perplex us about extricating it from all confusion, and setting it clear of snares and entanglements. Let us then suppose such an one to make the following objection :

Can a man do nothing beyond bare duty? is all virtue to be measured by rule and compass? are no noble effusions, no generous exertions, to be encouraged? are we to aim at nothing great, nothing graceful?—It will be more easy to examine these questions, if we proceed methodically; suppose then the objector to say, to the same purpose, take a man, that you would *just not blame*; cannot another *excell* him? may not you coolly esteem and like the first, and feel much towards the other; love, approbation, high esteem, admiration? And yet, if the first be innocent, he must have merit enough; has not then the other *more* than barely enough? and what could he do better with some of it than *transfer* it?—A man may have more interest sometimes than he wants for introducing himself

dogmatically enjoin,] touch not, taste not, handle not, [meats, and wines, and women]; all which [prohibitions] turn to corruption, by abuse, [to unnatural indulgences], according to the injunctions and teachings of [superstitious] men; which [abstinences] have an *appearance* of prudence, in the way of voluntary religion, and humility, and mortification of the Body; but have no real tendency to bring about any honourable [and well-regulated] gratification of the bodily appetites.—This phrase will be of use in Art. xxxii. Sect. xviii.

himself to an advantage; he may have interest enough to be able to introduce a friend.

And does not common *language* shew, that this is common reason?—*Praise* is not bestowed, nor *rewards* conferred, on those, who merely perform their *duty*. And it is so common to say, such a man *gave more*, or *did more* than he was under *obligation* to do, that we must look upon common language, as establishing or implying the distinction between *precepts* and *counsels*.

Nay farther, does not *Scripture* confirm the same thing? does it not make use of *praise* and *reward* as incentives? does it not exhort or advise some men to do more than men *need* do?—as in the case of him, who was to *sell*<sup>†</sup> *all* he had and give to the poor:—and of *St. Paul*, who *preached gratis*, foregoing the stipend to which he had a<sup>u</sup> right, (for *St. Paul's* example is to us as exhortation;) and who himself gives *counsel*<sup>x</sup>, where he will not give *precept*; to which last instance may be joined the favourable mention of those, who “made themselves *Eunuchs*<sup>y</sup> for the kingdom of Heaven's sake.”

If we can answer this objection satisfactorily, we have nothing more to fear from our present Article: it is partly of a *moral* nature.—We must allow, that one man may be only just free from blame, yet an object of calm esteem and benevolence, whilst another, who is compared with him, may be much admired: let us give these two characters names; the former is *A*, the latter is *B*.

First,

<sup>†</sup> Matt. xix. 21.—Luke xviii. 22.

<sup>u</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 12—18. of which Mr. *Locke* says, (Contents to Sect. v.) in the person of *St. Paul*, “I do not content myself with doing barely what is my *duty*.”

<sup>x</sup> 1 Cor. vii. 25.

<sup>y</sup> Matt. xix. 12.

First, when A and B stand thus compared, A may be really *less worthy* than B; yet that may not be the reason why he is less admired; nor does it follow, because he is not blamed by man, that he is *innocent* in the sight of God; in such sort, that he must escape punishment: nor, because B is *admired*, can we infer, that he has any merit to *spare*. Nor that, if he had, he could *transfer* it, or any man for him:—But this must be expressed more at large.—The reason why A is not *blamed*, is, because he does what is prescribed in a *definite* manner, or performs *determinate* duties: men find it, generally speaking, inconvenient, or wrong, sometimes impracticable, to blame any who perform those duties, the circumstances of which can be particularly marked and insisted on; hence it is *habitual* to confine blame to violation of such duties:—and, in like manner, it is habitual to *praise* only the performance of *indeterminate* duties; it being always evident, that they may be evaded by any one, who wishes to evade them, and wants principles:—add, that if a man performs indeterminate duties, such as beneficence, forgiveness, gratitude, &c. with any *danger* to himself, or in any *unexpected* manner, a pleasing *wonder* heightens moral approbation; so that, though a man neglected some determinate duties; (for people are often *generous*, who are not strictly *just*), yet if he overpowered blame, by the force of these more pleasing sentiments, he might be admired, and applauded.—But though A, the harmless or blameless man, is generally treated as *innocent*, by man, yet he will not be so by his own conscience, or by “God the<sup>z</sup> judge of all,” if he neglects indeterminate duties, which he has opportunity of practising; if he never gives, or forgives:—though there-  
fore

fore he may not be blamed by man, he may be *punished* by God: consequently nothing can be grounded on B's being better than A is; whereas the objector supposed, that A was *innocent*, or had merit *enough*, and B more than A. Nor, because B is *admired* by man, has he therefore any merit to spare; he may be *punishable* for neglect of determinate duties, or even of indeterminate;—his obedience is *imperfect*, though it may be *striking*; and so he would tell you *himself*: What military Commander, of real merit, would say of himself, that he had done more than his duty?—Yet such an one might say of an *inferior* officer, whose merit was much below his own, that *he* had done his duty; but this would mean only, that he had done all which could be *demanded* of him:—it is here worth observing, that *language varies*, when a man speaks of *himself* and of *others*. But, if the obedience of B, the admired character, is confessedly *imperfect*, if he may be *blamed* by God, who knows all his circumstances, can he have any merit to spare?—nay, suppose that *both* A and B get some reward, yet may they not be susceptible of reward in different *degrees*? and may not God reward them in *proportion* to their real merits?—When B has got a certain reward, he is not *full*, incapable of receiving more.—As to a man's having interest to introduce a *Friend*, that is founded on no general principle: in different *cases* in common life it depends so very much upon particular circumstances, that no argument can be deduced from it.

Secondly, though A may be only just not blamed, and B may be admired, yet it is possible A may be *as good* a man as B, or much *better*.—Suppose A regular, industrious, frugal, kind to his neighbours in a plain way, not diminishing his  
power



power of providing for his family; suppose B generous, but beyond his fortune; brave, willing to sacrifice any advantages, to encounter any dangers for his fellow-creatures in distress; A might only just escape blame, and B be generally admired; and yet I should hold A's the better character.—But, suppose A this sort of plain benevolent man, and B a *Simeon Stilites*<sup>a</sup>: how great then would be the difference in point of admiration in favour of B, (taking a proper age to judge) in point of real worth, in favour of A!—No man, who aims at extraordinary merit, can pursue one thing, without neglecting another: his worth must depend on the value of what he neglects. A canonized Saint has generally left substantial duties to ordinary men; these would be less admired than himself, but might often have much more real worth.

The best plan then is, to set each man on watching what opportunities of doing good his station affords, without neglecting anything, which is really more valuable than what he aims at; and on *exerting* himself to the utmost in *improving* such opportunities. As he went forward, he would see perpetually *new openings*, which would occasion *new exertions*. How much better is this than turning a man's attention on the misguiding distinction between precepts and counsels! fit only to make men idle or vain!—If men are indolently disposed, the distinction between precepts and counsels

<sup>a</sup> See Middleton's free Inquiry, p. 165.—A passage translated from Theodoret.—Suppose a dialogue was composed, after the manner of *Lucian*, between Simeon Stilites knocking at the gate of heaven, and St. Peter, as porter, keeping the keys of heaven: Simeon might bring our A, and, taking his own admission for granted, desire an *inferior* place for poor A, on account of his (Simeon's) merits; Peter might examine both; order A to be admitted to a good place, and order Simeon to be kicked down into the nether parts, &c. &c.

fels will make them rest in determinate duties; if more active and ambitious, it will make them arrogant, as if they were doing what even God could not require.

But our objector refers to common *language*, with regard to *Praise*, *Reward*, and doing *more* than a man is *obliged* to do; as favouring the distinction between precepts and counsels: this part of the objection is, in effect, already answered. Praise and reward are not, amongst men, proportioned to real worth; but depend upon what we *expect*<sup>b</sup>; which depends upon what we are *accustomed* to.—We praise nothing that is *common*, however *useful* it may be; and how much soever we praised it when it was *uncommon*: and reward is praise carried into action. We *blame* a breach of any common rules of conduct, because that is a shock and disappointment to us.

When we say, a man gave *more* than he was *obliged* to give, we generally mean, that he gave more than the petitioner could have demanded, or than the Magistrate could have insisted on. Perhaps a man, of whom we should say this, did not give so much as he was under obligation to give, in the judgment of *God*, who knew all his circumstances. If a man wants to have distinct ideas, when he hears it said, such a man gave more than he needed to give; he will always ask, more *in whose judgment*?

A man may be conceived to give so much, that God will reward him (Prov. xix. 17.); he may give more, God may reward him more; he may give more still, God may reward him *less*; because he neglected something, in the last instance, to which he was more strongly obliged. We are to aim at a maximum of good, upon the whole.

*Precepts*

<sup>b</sup> Art. XII. Sect. XXIII.

*Precepts* and *counsels* seem only to differ as *duties determinate* and *indeterminate*; the general reason why a direction is made a counsel rather than a precept, or an indeterminate duty, rather than a determinate one, is, because circumstances are so variable, that a calculation of them must be left to the Agent: but this is nothing to the essence of duty; nor to the judgment of *God*.

It must be owned, that a man is sometimes blamed for neglect of indeterminate duties; but that is when they are very common, and the evasion of them gross. But, even in these cases, they are blamed more by the rash and censorious, than by the candid and considerate: and what is faulty in such blame, is not to be made the ground of objection here.

We should never forget, that *language* is secretly guided by convenience<sup>c</sup>, and use. Praise and blame, on that account, as well as on account of what was mentioned before, seldom mark the real worth of actions. Babes in Christ, and 'tis the same in morals, must have milk, and not strong<sup>d</sup> meat. A discreet Pastor thinks what he may blame with *success*; if he succeeds at first, he will venture farther; and sometimes he finds difficulty; for encouragement makes some men remiss, others it quickens; blame revolts some men, though it corrects others; and the same kind of thing tends to fix the standard of blame and praise in the world at large.

I cannot quit the subject of language without repeating, that, when I am speaking of *others*, *duty* means, what I can *claim*; when of *myself*, it is, what I can *do*.

v. Our

<sup>c</sup> Introd. to second part of the Articles, Sect. iv.

<sup>d</sup> 1 Cor. iii. 1, 2.

v. Our objector alledges, that *Scripture* encourages the distinction between precepts and counsels; that is, encourages the notion, that a man may, in many cases, do more than he is *obliged* to do. To this part of the objection, relating to *Scripture*, no general answer seems necessary, except, that the language of *Scripture* is *common* language<sup>e</sup>. What is said therefore of *praise* and *reward* in *Scripture*, must be interpreted as it is in common life. The particular *instances* alledged from *Scripture* certainly deserve some answer;—*Why* our Saviour told the young man, who wished to be his follower, to *sell all* he had, and give to the poor, I think no man may be able perfectly to see: the case was evidently *extraordinary*, and such as no man should copy, except he was able to make the proper<sup>f</sup> allowance for difference of circumstances: was any one to do the same *now*, he might be “worse than an<sup>g</sup> *Infidel*.” —There is an *appearance*, that the young man was *too sanguine*; wanted to *undertake* what he would not have had the resolution to *persist* in to the *end*; this is a temper of youth; and our Saviour might mean to convince him, that he was *unfit* for what he aimed at; and might require that sacrifice of him, without which he would have been a troublesome disciple, if not an Apostate<sup>h</sup>; —but, if I was to make an hundred conjectures, I should end with saying, that it is not probable that we should see the *whole* wisdom of our Lord’s proposal.—St. Paul preached gratis; but there is no<sup>i</sup> appearance that he thought God was his  
debtor

<sup>e</sup> Intro. to second Part, Sect. xii.

<sup>f</sup> Book i. Chap. xi.

<sup>g</sup> 1 Tim. v. 8.

<sup>h</sup> This passage of *Scripture* is considered again, Art. xxxviii. Sect. vi.

<sup>i</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 12—18.

*debtor* on that account: having an opportunity of doing credit to the Gospel, he did it; but his reason for speaking of his motives, was, that his disinterestedness was turned against him by a rival party; and he was even said not to be a true<sup>k</sup> Apostle, because he had not the stipend of one.—Had Paul accepted a stipend, no *man* would have blamed him; but yet if he had neglected any opportunity of furthering the Gospel, he might have had blame from God, or a less reward.

What belongs to voluntary abstinence from *marriage*, for the sake of promoting the interests of Religion, may be deferred to the thirty-second Article: the passages are generally urged on our present subject, and therefore are mentioned here; but what is said on other passages may sufficiently, for the present, obviate difficulties relating to them.

*Barbeyrac*, on Grotius de Jure, &c. 1. 2. 9. has a long note on the distinction between Precepts and Counsels.

VI. The expression, “*Charity shall cover the multitude of sins*,”—seems to me to mean, that, as all rules of Virtue are only modifications of benevolence, or charity: where we want *rules*, if we act from the fundamental principle, Benevolence, as well as we can, we shall be excused for any mistakes, which we may run into:—it is probable, that we run into many faults every day; but they are undistinguished faults, unnoticed; the *crowd*, the herd, “the *multitude* of sins;” or what the Psalmist calls, our “*secret*<sup>1</sup> *sins*,” as opposed to such as are “*presumptuous*.”

VII. I will now venture to proceed to our *Application*; though it does not seem necessary, in treating

<sup>k</sup> Locke on 1 Cor. Section v. Contents.

<sup>1</sup> Psalm xix. 12, 13.

treating the present Article, to detain you by forms of assent.

As to mutual *concessions*, I will read you what *Dupin* says<sup>m</sup> on the Article. There does not seem to be much hope from it<sup>n</sup>. *Baxter*, in his *Catholic Theology*, which is all reconciling, declines the attempt to reconcile Papists and Protestants in those doctrines, which have in view the accumulation of *wealth*.—Something might possibly arise from the different senses, in which we use the word *duty*, when we speak of *ourselves*, and *others*: the popish doctrine is of the duties of *others*, the Saints; our Article runs in the name of the Agent; and speaks of duties as done to *God*.—We are by no means against voluntary exertions; we think every such exertion will have its adequate reward;—the more the better, so long as the greatest possible good is aimed at upon the whole; so long as we neglect no stronger obligation for a weaker.

*Improvements* seem to depend much on settling, in each case, the comparative worth of ordinary life and extraordinary exertions: and something might result from reducing indeterminate duties to determinate<sup>o</sup>.

<sup>m</sup> Mosheim, Vol. 6. 8vo. page 77, being Append. 3.

<sup>n</sup> Would not Dupin be tolerably satisfied by what is here said; that good Christians must exert themselves beyond what is required, in some sense?

<sup>o</sup> *Inns* have reduced the indeterminate duty of *Hospitality* to a determinate bargain: and services, which might once have canonized a Saint, may now be compensated by the stipend of a missionary.



## ARTICLE XV.

OF CHRIST ALONE WITHOUT SIN.

CHRIST in the truth of our nature, was made like unto us in all things, sin only except; from which he was clearly void, both in his flesh, and in his spirit. He came to be the Lamb without spot, who by sacrifice of himself once made, should take away the sins of the world: and sin, as Saint John saith, was not in him. But all we the rest, although baptized, and born again in Christ, yet offend in many things; and if we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.

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I. We begin, as usual, with *History*.

There are *two subjects* in the Article, the *purity of Christ*, or his perfect freedom from Sin:—and the *sinfulness of man*.

II. It is scarcely to the purpose to mention, that the *Jews* calumniated our Lord, as a man gluttonous and a wine-bibber, as a sabbath-breaker and a seditious person; because the character of Christ, with which we are concerned, is that which results from a view of his whole conduct.

Some very ancient Christians have been accused of speaking slightly at least, if not slanderously, of their Lord and Saviour; but, as we have not any of their writings, and those who accuse them,

wrote some time after them, generally speaking, and not in the most candid and dispassionate manner, I will not dwell upon opinions so faintly described and imperfectly proved. The best account I know of them is in *Lardner's* posthumous work.—We have before<sup>a</sup> said, that the *Socinians* look upon Christ as *peccable*.

The passage quoted by *Welchman* from *Irenæus*, is to our purpose; its original meaning must have been to oppose the *Docetæ*.—*Tertullian's* passage is rather curious, and particularizes the right *kind* of sins; allowances being made for difference of *manners* in different ages and countries: it leads us to the *second subject*, the *sinfulness* of man.

III. We pass on to the *Pelagians*.—In consequence of their slight notions of original sin and divine grace, when the orthodox exclaimed, how *sinful* men are! they extolled the freedom of man's will, and maintained, "that a man may be without sin, "keep God's commandments easily", if he will"—What they urged in defence of their opinion was so specious, that it perplexed the mind of *Marcellinus*, a Nobleman of Carthage, who wrote to Augustin on the subject. Not that this was the only subject, on which he consulted him; we have three books, written by Augustin, *De Peccatorum meritis et remissione, et de Baptismo parvulorum*, addressed to Marcellinus<sup>c</sup>; the second is to our present purpose, and of that I will read you the *contents*; and perhaps a passage or two. Augustin speaks on the same subject in other works; and Jerom in his writings against the Pelagians.

<sup>a</sup> From Priestley's Letters, page 101.

<sup>b</sup> Wall's Inf. Bapt. page 166, 4to. from Jerom.—See the original (in Jerom, or) in *Append.* to tenth Vol. Op. Aug. page 55.—where are many things on this subject, as well as on other parts of Pelagianism.

<sup>c</sup> Aug. Opera, Vol. 10. beginning.—Argument of 2d Book.



Pelagians.—Leporius, whose recantation we have<sup>d</sup>, had leaned towards the Pelagians. They represented the orthodox as saying, in effect, when they called all men certainly sinful, that the commands of God are *impossible*; which the Papists charge upon *Luther*<sup>e</sup>, as they do the doctrine, “that *invincible ignorance* is not excuseable;” a doctrine, I fancy, connected with this Article; as making a *cause* of doing wrong *actions*, however unavoidable, a species of *Sin*.

IV. The council of *Trent*, in eighteenth Canon of Session vi. declares against *impossibility* of keeping God’s commands; though in the tenth Canon it says, that men are not formally *righteous*. The twenty-fifth Canon is against saying, that Christians sin *venially*, at least, even in their good works: but then it is supposed, that eternal punishment is held to be merited by such venial sin, of itself.—The account of the *Virgin Mary* may be noticed; the Romanists reckon her<sup>f</sup> void of sin; Bishop Burnet thinks, the scriptural expressions rather imply some imperfection in her:—some have gone so far,

<sup>d</sup> See Sirmond’s collection, or *Opuscula varia*.—Gennadius’s memorandum prefixed, is more useful than the Recantation itself; which is declamatory, and about several more important things: this Recantation is mentioned in Jortin’s 2d Dissertation, page 88.

In the Appendix to the 10th Tom. of Op. Augustini, p. 86, there is a short quotation from this Recantation; from whence it seems, that Leporius’s error had been rather on the *first subject* of this Article, making Christ man in the most *extended* sense; saying, he bore the *suffering* as a mere man; without *divine help* of any kind. This was indeed implying also, that a common man does his difficult duties without divine help.—In Sirmond’s Edit. this passage is page 20.

<sup>e</sup> Dupin’s Compend. Hist. Cent. 16. Chap. 6. page 16. and Berti’s compendium, Vol. 2. p. 153, 154.

<sup>f</sup> Trent, Session 5, end of decree about original sin.—Rhem. Test. on Col. i. 24.

far, we are<sup>g</sup> told, as to say, that St. *Francis* performed every command of God; but as Dupin<sup>h</sup> makes no objection to this Article, we will say no more of the Church of Rome<sup>i</sup>.

v. The two ideas of sinless perfection, which are most to our purpose, may as well be mentioned without regard to *time*; I mean those of the *mystics* and *Antinomians*. So much has been said of both these sets of Christians before<sup>k</sup>, that I may confine myself to the ways, in which they have conceived themselves *free from sin*. The *mystics* became free from sin by the intimate *union* of their souls with God and Jesus Christ; the *Antinomians*, by having all their sins *laid upon Christ*.—The mystical enthusiast does not purposely do any thing which we should call wrong; the Antinomian does things *wrong* in themselves, but they are *right* because he, a true Christian, does them; inasmuch, that if he was to *steal*, the crime commonly called theft, would in him lose its criminal nature. But let us say a word or two about each of these, *separately*.

Men may be *mystics* in different *degrees*; I have been told, from respectable authority, that the Arminian Methodists, known better as disciples of *John Wesley*, have a class, or rank, or small society, which is called *the select band*; the members of which are supposed to be in a state of *perfection*: they do not indeed like to join the word “*sinless*” with perfection; they like best to say, they are “*perfect*”  
in

<sup>g</sup> Rogers on the Article.

<sup>h</sup> Mosheim, octavo, Vol. 6, page 77.

<sup>i</sup> Luther considered the Papists and *Anabaptists*, as the *Pelagians* of his age; and might be too warm against them. And our Article might be intended to soften matters.—See Life of Ridley, page 344, 345. referred to in Art. XIII. Sect. v.

<sup>k</sup> Book III. Chap. xv. Sect. xi. is partly on Mysticism; for the Antinomians, see Art. vii. Sect. iii.

<sup>l</sup> I John iv. 18.

*in Love.*”—Baxter mentions some Enthusiasts, who conceive “a certain height of holiness,”—“a state of *sinless perfection*, attainable “in this life<sup>m</sup>.” He speaks of Origen and Macarius amongst the ancients, and of “some later Papists,” as having favoured the conception.—The *Familists*, before<sup>n</sup> mentioned, seem to have gone deep into it<sup>o</sup>.

VI. *Antinomians* have held, that Christ, having fulfilled the law for them, has taken away *Sin*:—their name of *Libertines*<sup>p</sup> was from their using carnal liberty, I think, as well as from their doctrine having that tendency; and probably something of this sort has occasioned some of the ancients to be accused of holding all actions to be *indifferent*<sup>q</sup>.—Baxter says, it is “the known opinion of the Antinomians<sup>r</sup>,” that “God seeth no sin in his people; the guilt falls on Christ.”—These he calls afterwards<sup>s</sup> “*Libertine Doctrines*,” as synonymous to Antinomian.—In Dickinson’s<sup>t</sup> Letters, an Antinomian reasoner says, “If he (a Christian) be united to Christ, and interested in his righteousness, he is perfectly righteous; and if he be perfectly righteous, he cannot be sinful.”—Picart mentions<sup>u</sup> some Moravian *Anabaptists*, who  
“omitted

<sup>m</sup> Pamphlet on Perseverance, 3d opinion; p. 4. & 5.

<sup>n</sup> Art. VII. Sect. III. & VII.

<sup>o</sup> Baxter, *Ib.* conclusion.—Fuller’s Church History, 9th Book, p. 113.—*Myselficism* was an object of attention to the *Reformers*: see Art. VII. Sect. III. referring to Art. xix. of 1552, and Reform. Legum. de Hæresibus, cap. 3.

<sup>p</sup> Art. x. Sect. xx. and Art. xii. Sect. I. and Art. xiii. Sect. v.

<sup>q</sup> Lardner under Basilides, Sect. xiii. Trent, Session vi. Canon 9.

<sup>r</sup> On Perseverance, page 12.

<sup>s</sup> Page 40.

<sup>t</sup> Page 350.

<sup>u</sup> Quoted by Rutherford, Charges, p. 55.—See also Art. VII. Sect. III. and VII.

“omitted this part of the Lord’s Prayer, *Forgive us our trespasses*,” &c. because being regenerated, they esteemed themselves to be without sin.”

The “Brethren and Sisters of the *free Spirit*, as described by Mosheim\*, seem to have the nature of both Mystics and Antinomians.

When we spoke of *hardening*†, &c. we quoted some expressions about God being the Author of *all thoughts*.

VII. From History, we proceed, as usual, to *Explanation*.

The *title* of 1552 is somewhat different from ours. “No *man* is without Sin but Christ alone.” It turns our thoughts to the sinfulness of *man*, which seems the *proper subject* of the Article; and at the same time it shews us the *ground* of the question, whether Christ was not, in any way, sinful; namely, his having the nature of *man*‡.

VIII. It seems proper to observe how much of our Article is taken out of *Scripture*. Christ “was made like unto us in all things, sin only excepted,” may be looked upon as taken from Heb. ii. 17. and iv. 15, united.—“The *Lamb* without spot,” is from 1 Pet. i. 19.—“Who, by the sacrifice of himself, once made,” is from Heb. ix. 26. and other passages.—“Should take away the sins of the world,” is from John i. 29.—“and sin was not in him,” is from 1 John iii. 5.—“baptized and born again in Christ,” may be conceived as taken from John iii. 3, & 5. joined. “Offend in many things,” is from James iii. 2.—and the rest from 1 John i. 8.

IX. It

\* Cent. 13. 2, 5, 9, 10, &c.

† Art. x. Sect. xx.

‡ *Leporius*’s error seems to have turned on something connected with this.—See page 19, 20 of his Recantation, Ed. Sirmond.

IX. It might be doubted whether our Article does, in strictness, affirm that Christ was not *peccable*: it certainly affirms, that he *did not sin*; which seems to amount to much the same: if sin had been in his propensities, he would “seemingly” have committed it sometimes, as we do, so many are the openings to sin; but this we cannot thoroughly understand.

X. “*All we the rest*,” implies the *human* nature of Christ: it is calling him one of the human species, though distinguishing him as alone free from sin.

XI. “*Baptized and born again*,”—means, having gone through external forms of admission into Christianity, and having the suitable disposition; so that Baptism<sup>a</sup> shall have its proper effect.

XII. The only thing remaining, of explanation, is settling the *kind of sins* here spoken of, which all Christians have in common. Dr. Overal<sup>b</sup> says, “*Articulus xv. de quotidianis et communibus peccatis tractat, quæ omnibus regeneratis communia sunt; in quibus offendimus omnes, salvâ tamen gratiâ, nec ab eâ recedentes.*”—The beginning of the sixteenth Article, about every *deadly* sin—*willingly* committed, does give countenance to this opinion; so does the text from St. John, as well as that from James, which Bishop Overal has quoted; we deceive ourselves “if we say, that we have *no sin*,” none whatever. In the original,  
James’s

<sup>a</sup> Sometimes the outward ceremony, sometimes some *privilege* is used to express admission into Christianity; which of these shall be preferred, depends on circumstances: here it seems best to use *both* expressions.

<sup>b</sup> Short account of the five Points according to the Church of England; in a Vol. with *Fur prædestinatus*.—Dr. Overal was a moderate man: Regius Professor at Cambridge, Dean of St. Paul’s, Bishop of Litchfield; then of Norwich, in 1618, seemingly for one year only.—Not in Biographia Britannica.

James's expression is, *πολλα γαρ πταιομεν απαντες* *πταιω* is to stumble, make *trips*, mistakes.—Yet people sin in degrees different without end; therefore we must not *exclude* more *heinous* sins from the meaning of the Article, though it will *extend* to those run into by the *best* of Christians, and may be *chiefly* meant of them.—I before<sup>c</sup> said, that, when Luther is charged with holding “that invincible ignorance is not excuseable,” the charge seems to have relation to the present Article; and some expressions in *Jerom's* Dialogue with a Pelagian<sup>d</sup>, seem to shew, that when the orthodox fathers spoke of all Christians as sinful, they meant, that the best Christians fall short of perfect, or consummate virtue, in some thing or other.

XIII. We come now to our *Proof*.—There seem to be only *two propositions* remaining to be proved.

1. Christ was void of sin.

2. No Christian is wholly void of sin.

Other propositions are certainly contained in the Article; but they have either been proved before, or are themselves brought from Scripture as proofs.

XIV. Christ was void of sin.

This has been, incidentally, proved before<sup>e</sup>. It is also proved in this *Article*, as has already appeared, under the Explanation.—I may add a text or two.—If. liii. 3—5.—Luke i. 35.—John xiv. 30.—Acts iii. 14.—2 Cor. v. 21.—Heb. vii. 26.—In the Article, we have a proof of the Purity of Christ from the *type* of him, the spotless Lamb: from  
his

<sup>c</sup> Sect. III.

<sup>d</sup> This dialogue is transferred into the Appendix of the 10th Vol. of Augustin's works, p. 55. “Ego sentio, (says the orthodox character Atticus) nullam creaturam, secundum *veram consummatamque* justitiam, (*δικαιοσυνην*) posse esse perfectam.”

<sup>e</sup> Append. to Art. XI. Sect. xx.

his being a *sacrifice* for the sins of others, which seems to imply, that he himself did not want a redeemer. The *difficulty* of his being perfectly pure arises from his being *real*<sup>f</sup> man; but he was not conceived and born<sup>g</sup> in sin; he was conceived by the Holy Ghost; and, by that wonderful expedient, he became free from what we call *original sin*; how far that contributed towards his being free from *actual* sin, we know not. Yet if, as<sup>h</sup> before observed, he was peccable, he was very *likely* to have fallen into sin.

xv. No *man* is void of sin.

Texts to this purpose have appeared under the ninth Article: but the proposition is sufficiently proved in the Article itself. It may not be amiss to add, 1 Tim. i. 15. with regard to *St. Paul*, and Luke v. 8.—Gal. ii. 11. with regard to *St. Peter*: if we look round for other authorities, we must take care not to infringe upon other Articles; not even on the sixteenth:—What has been already said, in describing Christian *good works*, about their *imperfections*<sup>i</sup>, applies here directly.

xvi. Other texts will appear in *objections*; to which therefore we may now proceed.

Against the perfect purity of the character of Christ, might it not be objected, that, when a person calls him “Good Master,” he disclaims the title of *good*, and says, “why callest thou<sup>k</sup> me good? there is none good but one, that is God.”—This seems intended by Christ to rebuke the man for flattery; how good soever *we* see Christ to have been, when we review his *whole* life; the person rebuked could not so clearly see him to be good.

<sup>f</sup> Of *Leporius*, see Sect. III. & VII.

<sup>g</sup> Psalm li. 5.

<sup>h</sup> Sect. IX.

<sup>i</sup> Art. XII. Sect. VI.—See also Homily on the Misery of Man, 2d part, page 12, 8vo.

<sup>k</sup> Matt. xix. 17.

good. But the reply might convey, and be intended to convey, a different idea to those, who knew the whole history of Christ: it might mean, ‘I if I am good, strictly speaking, and at the same time a real man; it is owing to the union of the *divine* with the human nature, in my person.’—Our Saviour probably meant, moreover, in rebuking the person who called him good, to rebuke the general practice amongst the Jews of giving flattering titles to the *Rabbis*<sup>1</sup>.

xvii. With regard to the universal finfulness of man, it has been objected, that certain persons are spoken of in Scripture as *blameless*<sup>m</sup>. It seems sufficient to reply, that, whatever *inculpatus* means in any Latin, or *αμεμπτος* in any Greek classic, “blameless” should be understood to mean in English; that is, I take it, a person not to be *complained* of; one whom you would not think of blaming, but rather of *commending*. It is common to say, ‘this is a man of an *irreproachable* character;’—‘a most *unexceptionable* man.’ We have before<sup>n</sup> explained *good works*, on principles of fact and probability, on which all language is built.—What Jerom says<sup>o</sup> may amount to much the same; some persons are called blameless, “non quòd omni vitio careant, sed ex majori parte virtutum;” which gives the *character*.

It might not be improper to look back to the *first objection* under the twelfth Article, Sect. xxiii.

xviii. Let us now take, as an objection, the Pelagian *dilemma*<sup>p</sup>. “Aut possibilia Deus mandata dedit,

<sup>1</sup> Macknight, on the place, may be worth reading.

<sup>m</sup> Luke i. 6.

<sup>n</sup> Art. xii. Sect. vi.

<sup>o</sup> I happen to take this from Augustin’s works, Vol. x. page 51.—*Appendix* (the Epistle to Ctesiphon).—Augustin’s answer to this objection may be seen in the *Corpus* or *Syntagma Confessionum*, page 116, (first paging) Col. 2.

<sup>p</sup> Jerom’s Dialogue, between Atticus and Cretobolus:—*Append.* as above, page 56.



dedit, aut impossibilia. Si possibilia, in nostrâ est potestate ea facere si volumus : si impossibilia, non in hoc *rei* sumus, si non facimus quod implere non possumus.”—My answer would be, *each* command of God is possible to be performed, but (especially considering our depraved propensities, and our standing in need of divine assistance,) the commands of God are so *numerous*, and each of them admits of so many degrees of *nicety* in the principles, and of *exertion*, in the manner of performance, that it is *extremely improbable*, that, when we come to look *back* upon our conduct, we shall not perceive something wrong, in some respect or other; so improbable is this, that, in common language, it is called *impossible*; there is no *expectation* in the mind, that it will happen: and in this sense our Lord himself says, “It is *impossible* but that offences<sup>1</sup> will come.”—We have it in our power, however, to do what is sufficient for our *Salvation*<sup>2</sup>; that is, in every thing, to *aim* at doing well;—the impossibility here spoken of does not appear at all whilst we are *resolving* upon duty; not *beforehand*; the impossibility appears only on *review*; on calculation, or retrospect. Such impossibility does not take away the universality of our *principle* of obedience; it does not put us on any footing different from those, who believe they can do their whole duty; it does not prevent our being considered, and punished, as guilty for every command, which we neglect, or violate. God sees all the variety of degrees, in which men endeavour to perform perfect obedience; and he can  
reward

<sup>1</sup> Luke xvii. 1.—See Art. xii. Sect. ix. and passages there mentioned.

<sup>2</sup> This answers Sess. vi. Canon 25, of the Acts of the Council of Trent.

reward or punish according to circumstances, be they ever so complicated.

We should now take notice of an objection on the part of the *mystic*, and of one on the part of the *Antinomian*.

XIX. The *mystic* may urge, 1 John iii. 9.—“Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin;”—which he might strengthen by 1 John iv. 17, 18; about perfect Love of God casting out fear:—my answer would be, this is a description of the Christian *character*, but not of any *Christian*: it is *theory*, not *fact*; it is what Christians must continually exert themselves to attain, but what no Christian *has* attained.—And the same distinction is applicable to other passages of Scripture: when we find ourselves exhorted to be *perfect*, &c. (though the word may sometimes be used for *becoming Christians*, compare Phil. iii. 12, and iii. 15.), we must consider the exhortation as comparative, and as pointing to *ideal perfection*; when we read descriptions of the *faultiness* of man, we must understand them as descriptions of *fact*. It also occurs in common life: Sir Joshua Reynolds has written much about ideal perfection, but he never confounds it with actual attainments. There is no one fault, which a *Painter* must voluntarily give into; yet there is no painter, who will not *find*, on looking *back*, that he has run into *faults*: and how absurd would any man be thought, who said, that he was a regular *professed* painter, and *therefore could* not paint wrongly.—The Scripture does not make a good conscience to depend on sinless perfection, but on being “in *all* things *willing* to live honestly.”—And, in ordinary life, a man is called a good Christian, notwithstanding his being obliged to cover<sup>†</sup>, with Charity, “the *multitude* of sins.”

XX. What

<sup>†</sup> Heb. xiii. 18.

<sup>†</sup> 1 Pet. iv. 8.

xx. What has just now been addressed to the mystic, may apply to the *Antinomian*.—Perhaps he might add such texts as Rom. viii. 1, 2.—Rom. viii. 33.—1 Cor. i. 30.—or Eph. v. 27.—Of the *first* some account was given under the ninth Article<sup>u</sup>, which declares that text to be not inconsistent with concupiscence, though concupiscence has the nature of sin. The rest seem to belong to the Church of Christ as a *collective Body*<sup>x</sup>, and the last, to that body in a state of *ideal perfection*.

Rom. viii. 33, &c. seems to correspond to the mention of some form of Government, or political *Constitution*; or some Colony, or scheme for promoting the welfare of some large body of men<sup>y</sup>.—Both Jews and Gentiles are admitted into Christianity; what a glorious situation! people so situated can come to no real *harm*: who shall *accuse* them? that God who justifies them? Christ who laid down his life for them?—how idle must be the *fears* of people so protected! what are temporary *persecutions* to *them*?—all powers, of any real importance, are on their side!—this, at least, is the situation, which providence deigns to allot them: they may perversely neglect its advantages, or abuse them; be that upon their own heads.<sup>z</sup>—This is all expressed, or implied, in the passage; what a pity that folly should make anything out of such noble reasoning inconsistent with rational Religion and Virtue!

xxi. In this last place, this question may be proposed; if all men are sinful, shall none be *happy*<sup>a</sup> hereafter? “the wages of Sin<sup>a</sup> is Death.”  
—Nothing

<sup>u</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxxii.      \* Art. ix. Sect. xxx. & xxxii.

<sup>y</sup> See Locke on Rom. viii. 33, &c.

<sup>z</sup> Acts of the Council of Trent, Canon 25, of Sess. 6.

<sup>a</sup> Rom. vi. 23.

—Nothing has been proved here, which is inconsistent with the declaration of the twelfth Article, that Christian works, though imperfect in themselves, shall be *accepted in Christ*. God, on account of his Son, may reward men with happiness inestimable, if they have been habitually “willing in all things to live honestly;” though he may see in them some failings and infirmities.—If any difficulty remained after this, it might be lessened by what was said under the thirteenth<sup>b</sup> Article, about Christian virtues having the Nature of Sin<sup>c</sup>.

XXII. Having given a direct proof of our Article, and farther illustrated the meaning of it by answering a few objections, I come to the *Application*.

As to Forms of *Assent*; we might, in *natural* religion, declare, that there is a *character* of *ideal perfection*, to which no one has ever in fact attained; and to which it is very unlikely, that any one ever *will* attain; so unlikely, that men, who speak from their feelings, would speak of such attainments as *impossible*. A *Christian* might express the sense of our Article, thus:

‘Christ was a real *man*, yet free from *Sin*: the seeming inconsistency is removed by attending to his supernatural conception; and his purity is proved not only by words of Scripture, but by the *types* which prefigured him, and by his being a *victim* for the sins of other men.’

‘Other

<sup>b</sup> Art. XIII. Sect. xvii.

<sup>c</sup> One is apt to think *Horace’s* candour about poetry natural, and to hope for the same about *actions*.

Verùm ubi plura nitent in carmine, non ego paucis  
Offendar maculis, quas aut incuria fudit,  
Aut humana parùm cavit natura,

‘ Other men, though become Christians, may be considered as, in some degree or other, sinful : nay it is to be expected, that they always will be so. Not but the ideal *character* of the Christian is pure ; and no man must *allow* himself in any sin whatever ; yet such are our propensities, such the number of openings to sin ; that, amongst the best, the *fact* answers, and is likely to answer, to the general declaration of Scripture ; that all Believers frequently *stumble* in their Christian course ; and that it would be hypocrisy, or self-deceit, for any one to say, that he has no sin whatsoever.’

XXIII. *Mutual concessions* need not occasion much difficulty between orthodox and *Pelagians*, as they seem to differ very little. Pelagians own, that no man is<sup>d</sup> free from sin ; Orthodox only say, they *cannot* be, as speaking the result of experience. — Orthodox say, that Christians may have only *venial* sins ; Pelagians say, venial sins are<sup>e</sup> no sins at all. — This will apply to more *modern* Pelagians, Romanists, Anabaptists.

As to *Mystics* and *Antinomians*, I fear we must not attempt any *rational* compromise with them : they come under the observations, made under the seventh Article<sup>f</sup>, about illiterate sects. What Baxter says, may be applied to them ; “ they are obscure teachers,” — “ that shun the clear disclosure of their minds<sup>g</sup> : ” — Dr. Balguy’s expressions seem also applicable to them<sup>h</sup> ; — “ Unfortunately the parties concerned are most of them out  
of

<sup>d</sup> *Cretobolus* says, “ non dico hominem *esse* sine peccato, quod tibi forsitan impossibile videatur, sed *posse* esse si velit ; aliud est enim *esse*, aliud *posse* ; *esse* quærit *exemplum* — (so that he never pretended to know an *instance*), *posse* ostendit imperii veritatem. — Page 56. Append. Op. Aug. tom. 10.

<sup>e</sup> Nicholls on the Article.

<sup>f</sup> Art. VII. Sect. III.

<sup>g</sup> On Perseverance, p. 4.

<sup>h</sup> Page 106. Disc. 6.

of the reach of rational conviction. They who appeal to their senses, instead of their understandings, are only to be *pitied*, not confuted."—Yet the notions of such must be *examined*, for the sake of those, whom they disturb and perplex.

XXIV. I will not dwell upon *Improvements*.—Perhaps more attention to the difference between the *ideal Christian*, and the real one, might have its use<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Something might be here urged about the *consistency* of Christ's conception in "the virgin's womb," with his character; and about the improbability of Fishermen forming such a plan, or drawing such a character.



## ARTICLE XVI.

## OF SIN AFTER BAPTISM.

NOT every deadly sin willingly committed after Baptism, is a sin against the Holy Ghost, and unpardonable. Wherefore the grant of repentance is not to be denied to such as fall into sin after Baptism. After we have received the Holy Ghost, we may depart from grace given, and fall into sin; and by the grace of God we may arise again, and amend our lives: and therefore they are to be condemned, which say, they can no more sin as long as they live here, or deny the place of forgiveness to such as truly repent.

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1. Although this Article treats only of the conduct of Christians, when they fall into sins of some *moment*, yet this subject has been seen in such different lights, that one single series of historical facts will not be sufficient. I will however endeavour to make *two* answer our purpose; at least as principal:—the first, relating to those who do not allow the *efficacy of repentance*; the second, to those who reckon that true Believers are made to *persevere* immoveably in their state of Grace, or Justification, by the assistance of God, in consequence of the divine promise. Some have used the word *Implacabiles* for the former, and to that has been opposed the word *Impeccabiles*; whether for those

who hold the *notion*, as well as for those who are supposed never to sin, may perhaps seem doubtful<sup>a</sup>.

II. I begin, as the Article does, with those who deny the efficacy of *Repentance*; that is, when the sins committed have been heinous. In most, or all ages, men of severe tempers have inclined to this.—Clemens Romanus<sup>b</sup> indeed speaks as a moderate man amongst us would do now: Welchman has part of the passage to which I would refer, and he has some others from very ancient Christians:—But *Montanus* was severe enough:—He lived in the second Century, about 170, and therefore perhaps I might have passed him<sup>c</sup> over, had not the great Tertullian become, in old age, his disciple. In Tertullian's Book *de Pudicitia*<sup>d</sup>, there are some very severe expressions; *mæchia* he calls *immundabile vitium*; he compares men who sin, to some discoloured stones (as I understand him) in an house infected with the *Pestilence*, which must be taken out and thrown intirely away:—he calls the *repentance* of a Christian a *second* repentance, the first having been before Baptism, and says, that a *second* repentance cannot be valid.—And the Montanists in general “did not allow the Church the power to forgive great sins after<sup>e</sup> Baptism.”

Novatus, or Novatianus, (I follow Lardner in giving these two names to one person) is placed in the year 251: He was a Presbyter of Rome. He formed the Sect of *Novatians*, “*nolens* (says Jerom) *Apostatas*

<sup>a</sup> Forbes xii. 9. 10. Instruct.

<sup>b</sup> Ep. ad Cor. Sect. 7. & 8, —Wake's Translation.

<sup>c</sup> According to what was said, Art. xv. Sect. 11.

<sup>d</sup> See cap. 20.—Grotius (on Matt. xii. 13.) has some good passages from Tertullian, &c.

<sup>e</sup> Lardner's Heretics, Montanists, Sect. 8.—Works, Vol. ix. page 489.—See also Vol. 2. page 376.



Apostatas fuscipere pœnitentes.”—He did not allow those, who had sacrificed during the persecution, to be received again into the communion of the Church; but he did not deny that *God* might forgive them, though he thought the Church had no right to do so.—His severity, however, was not confined to this particular offence; the Novatians did not allow the Church to pardon *mortal* sins, or such as were particularly *heinous*, committed after Baptism. Some ancient <sup>f</sup> authors use the expression *mortale peccatum*, some *majora* or *graviora* crimina. The Novatians were, on account of their strictness, called Καθαροί, and Mundi, which Lardner translates<sup>g</sup>, *Puritans*.—Lord King<sup>h</sup> mentions, from Augustin, *three kinds* of repentance, the first, before Baptism; the second, what was called *daily* repentance, which accompanied the daily confession of sins in prayer; and the third, repentance for more heinous sins, such as were sometimes called *mortal*; the instances are murder, sacrilege, &c.—The Novatians allowed the two first sorts of repentance, but not the last.

Severity has probably varied, and appeared in different ways. Lucifer Bishop of Cagliari (capital of Sardinia) thought, that, when Priests apostatized, and repented, they might be re-admitted into the Church, but only as *Laymen*.

To

<sup>f</sup> See Lardner's Works, Vol. 3. page 216, &c.—See also a short expression or two, Appendix to Op. August. Ed. Benedict. Tom. 10. page 74, 75.

<sup>g</sup> Ibid. page 217.—We have before quoted Augustin's expression, “numquid perfectè de pœnitentiâ tractatum est, antequam obfisterent *Novatiani*?” Art. 1. Sect. 1v.—*Pacian*, A. D. 370, wrote against the Novatians, three Epistles, extant, in Bibl. Patrum; and separate.

<sup>h</sup> On the Creed, page 382.

To this severity is ascribed the very late Baptism of the Emperor *Constantine*, and others<sup>1</sup>.

In what manner the Fathers of the fifth Century declared against the Novatian rigour, may be seen in Lord King's History of the Apostles Creed; under "Forgiveness of Sins."

III. But for understanding our Article, I do not think that we need look out for variations; we may content ourselves with those objects, which the compilers had chiefly in view; and these, I think, were the *Anabaptists*.—Both the confession of Augsburgh<sup>k</sup> and our Homilies do refer to Novatians expressly; but their aim was, probably, to strike the Anabaptists a stronger and safer blow, by introducing the ancient Heretics<sup>l</sup>. Sleidan, in his History of the Reformation, relates, that Philip Lantgrave of Hesse, in 1535, reckons up, to the Anabaptists, near or at Munster, their doctrines; amongst others, "their denying absolution to a sinner that relapseth." And both our Reformatio Legum<sup>m</sup>, and our Homily<sup>n</sup> on Repentance imply, that some persons were troublesome in renewing Novatian doctrines *at the time* when they were composed. These might be called Novatians, as some were opprobriously called Pelagians<sup>o</sup>.

The Council of *Trent* seems not to have decreed much about Repentance after Baptism, of which  
we

<sup>1</sup> Lardner's Works, Vol. 4. p. 159.—The Donatists thought their sect so perfect, that quitting them was quitting Christianity; so they re-baptized: but of them more hereafter.

<sup>k</sup> Syntagma, page 55. Art. 11th.—Heylin Quinq. page 519.—Homily on Repentance, page 418. 8vo.

<sup>l</sup> *Sort of Novatians*, Strype's Whitgift, Book 1.—In 1562 the Convocation in England was settled thus; "in the which also is to be determined the truth of those things, which *in this age*, are called into Controversy."—See Strype's Annals for that year; Chap. xxvii. p. 282.

<sup>m</sup> De Hæresibus, cap. 9.

<sup>n</sup> Page 418, octavo.

<sup>o</sup> Art. 1x. Sect. xii.

we need take particular notice at present. — It insists on the necessity of the *Sacrament of Penance*; but that subject will occur under the twenty-fifth Article.—Some of the Reformers had held, that only want of *Faith* could throw a man out of a *state of Grace*; that is, *unmake* him a Christian in the sight of God; one may see what they meant; that, as Faith is that, by which a man *embraces*<sup>p</sup> Christianity, only the loss of that principle can render that embracing null and void: The Romanists opposed to this the doctrine, that every *mortal Sin* throws a man out of a state of Grace; meaning, probably, a state of *Favour* with God; that state, which the Holy Spirit particularly maintains and cherishes: so that a man under the guilt of a mortal sin, is not to be considered, according to the Romanists, as a person in full possession of the spiritual privileges of Christianity; he has something to *recover*. These two things are not directly opposed to each other; but they might sound as if they were. It is an obvious effect of want of *Faith*, to run into the commission of *heinous sins*.

Of the Church of *England* I have been led to say something, by speaking of the *Anabaptists* whom they opposed. And under the twelfth Article<sup>q</sup>, I mentioned, that the *Necessary Doctrine* divides good works of Christians, into works of righteousness, and works of *Penitents*: and, under the eleventh Article, that it speaks of Justification as *variable*; as capable of being increased, diminished, lost for a time, *restored*<sup>r</sup>.—In the Necessary Doctrine, several expressions occur to our purpose; but I will read only that part concerning *Good workes*, which is about acts of *Penance* when men have

<sup>p</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xvii.

<sup>q</sup> Art. xii. Sect. vi.

<sup>r</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xiv.

have been in *deadly sin*; it begins, “*Other workes there be,*” &c<sup>s</sup>.

*Burn*, in his Ecclesiastical law, under *Dissenters*, says, “The tenets of the old Anabaptists were amongst other things,”—“that sinners after Baptism cannot be restored by Repentance,” &c.—“all which were excepted out of the general pardons of 32 H. 8. c. 49. and the 3 & 4 Ed. 6. c. 24.”

*Puritans* have had a notion of making *discipline* strict; and particularly, of *excluding* scandalous livers from the Communion. The *Brownists*, a species of Puritans, thought themselves the only true Church of Christ; a notion which, when carried to an extreme, is apt to make men unforgiving.

*Fulke*, who wrote upon the Rhemish Testament, was, I think, a Puritan: he says some severe things in answer to the Rhemists on Matt. xii. 31.—“That God will not forgive the sinne against the Holy Ghost, the text is more plaine, then that with any glosse of man’s inventions, it can be obscured. That there is a sinne, which he that hath committed, cannot be renewed by repentance, the Apostle speaketh as plainly,—Heb. vi. 4, 5, 6,” &c.

IV. This might suffice for an History of the first set of men referred to in our Article, were it not for the mention of *Sin against the Holy Ghost*.—Some facts must be mentioned concerning mens notions of that sin. The foundation of all is in *three passages* of Scripture, which must be read:—Matt. xii. 31, 32.—Mark iii. 28.—Luke xii. 10.—Here is some sort of declaration of irremissibleness, and yet the sin not to be forgiven is *not defined*; and in other parts of scripture, men are said to *resist* and *quench* the Spirit, and to do *despight* to the Spirit of Grace. It is not very much to be wondered at, that men of grave and austere tempers

<sup>s</sup> Necessary Doctrine is not paged.

tempers should, in the warmth of reprimanding and warning, come to speak of all heinous sins, as sins against the Holy Ghost; especially in those, who "are not under the Law, but under *Grace*." Origen, of old, is<sup>t</sup> said to have had this idea.—But it was more common to make *any one Sin*, or *Herefy*, particularly attacked in controversy, to be this undefined and irremissible sin.—Thus Athanasius makes a denial of the divinity of Christ, to be sin against the Holy Ghost. And the Rhemists, on Matt. xii. 24. say, "The like blasphemy against the Holy Ghost is to attribute the *Miracles* done by *Saints*, either dead or alive, to the Devil."—And on Matt. xii. 31. "which Sin he committeth, that dieth with contempt of the *Sacrament of Penance*."

John Hales, at the close of his Tract upon this Sin, gives *six notions* of it maintained by the Schoolmen, one of which is *final Impenitency*<sup>u</sup>: another, impugning

<sup>t</sup> John Hales's tract on the subject, page 36. where the same is said of the *Novatians*: "they denied remission of sins to any that fell, thinking all falls of Christians to be sins against the Holy Ghost."—From Ref. Legum. cap. 9, it seems as if the Anabaptists of the times had held the same.

<sup>u</sup> See Fulke on the Rhemish Testament, Matt. xii. 31. where the Rhemists adopt the *six notions*; and say as just now mentioned; and where *Augustin* seems to say, that, if a man set himself obstinately against John xx. 22, 23. refusing or despising that *Remission*, which was entrusted to the Apostles when they were told to receive the *Holy Ghost*, and *died* in such obstinate refusal, he might be said to sin against the Holy Ghost. But by what Augustin says about *dying* in the error, it is implied, that he thought a man might *repent* during his life time, and that with effect.—*John Hales* is mentioned in *Mesheim's History*; though I do not see his name in the Index to the quarto edition, which is the only one I have by me at present. I beg leave to apologize to my readers for sometimes referring to the quarto and sometimes to the octavo edition: it has been very irksome to me to change in such a manner; but it has been a matter of necessity:

impugning the known truth. Grotius is said to have held, that it is the habitual disposition of an hardened sinner. The opinion most commonly held, I think, is, that it is ascribing the miracles of Christ, or the extraordinary works done after his death, to evil Spirits. Archbishops Sharp and Secker have written on the subject, and Macknight has something sensible in his explanation.—Archbishop Sharp contends, with great appearance of reason, for the whole sentence being only a *comparative* declaration of the punishment due to Blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, in *comparison* of other sins. But Lord King says<sup>x</sup>, the Fathers used, in repeating the Creed, to conceive “*Forgiveness of Sins*” to extend to all sins *except* that.—As I said<sup>y</sup> before, there may be a wisdom in many of our Saviour’s sayings, which we cannot yet fathom. That those, to whom he made his declaration, were guilty of the sin mentioned, may not be certain; much less can we fix it on any one else.—But our present business is *History*: let us now proceed to our *second* recital of facts.

v. *Perseverance* is a doctrine so seldom spoken of, that some may not know what it means. It is indeed properly *subsequent* to the doctrine of *Election*, and in most confessions comes<sup>z</sup> *after Predestination*; but here it comes before, probably, that every thing about *Sin after Baptism* might come into one Article. We before mentioned<sup>a</sup> it as the last of the *five points*. God is supposed to *elect* certain

necessity: at some places and times, I could only get the use of the quarto; at others, only of the octavo.—The Apology is also wanted with regard to some other Books.

<sup>x</sup> Page 384. on Creed.

<sup>y</sup> Art. xiv. Sect. v.

<sup>z</sup> It is the last of the *five points*.—See Heylin’s *Historia Quin-quarticularis*.—Whitby on the five points: and others.

<sup>a</sup> Art. x. Sect. xv.

certain men, or predestine them to eternal happiness; during their passage through this life, they are exposed to many temptations and spiritual dangers; if they are not preserved from these, and made to *persevere* unto the end, their *Election* is all in vain. And there are several passages of Scripture, which seem to *promise* such protection; and which seem to engage, that God shall effect the *Perseverance of the Saints*.

This is the doctrine, on which we are to make a few *historical* remarks.—The *Stoics*<sup>b</sup> used to hold, that a man once truly virtuous, was always virtuous. The *Jews* had high notions, that God<sup>c</sup> would never forsake his *elect*; meaning themselves.—But the early Christians do not seem to have done more than *hope* for protection and Salvation. Vossius was a man of great learning, and he<sup>d</sup> says, that, before Augustin, the Latin Fathers (the Greek ones always) used to ascribe perseverance to the *Grace* of God, (it is but a series of good works), but not to any *decree* of God.

*Augustin* joined with his Predecessors in ascribing Perseverance to the *Grace* of God; but he *added* the idea of that perseverance having, in every case, been *predetermined*<sup>e</sup>.—That all those, who are *elect*ed to go through a state of Justification to eternal happiness, will persevere in such state, seems only an identical proposition:—but some stubborn facts are apt to come in the way of this: good men do fall into sin; even those applauded in Scripture, and

<sup>b</sup> Diogenes Laertius, in his account of Zeno, Segm. 127, 128. Edit. Wetstein.—The language is just like, *Gratia amitti non potest*.

<sup>c</sup> Art. XI. Sect. 1.

<sup>d</sup> Hist. Pel. Lib. 6. cap. 11, 12, Thesis.

<sup>e</sup> This from Vossius, *ibid.* but Baxter doubts the authority; on Perseverance, page 8.—For Augustin's opinion see also Sect. xxx.

and inspired. How is this to be managed? why, says Augustin, others, besides the elect, may fall away; but they were never the *elect*, though upon<sup>f</sup> a footing with the *justified*.

This seems but trifling work, for to mere *human* eyes, according to this, some true Christians, or Saints, persevere, some fail.—I really believe Augustin meant only to frame his notions so as to neglect no text of Scripture; he hit on no better method of bringing them into one plan, and so he adopted this<sup>g</sup> method: perhaps some better may hereafter be found; but to *neglect no text* is the *honest* plan:—it is fashionable to think he went *too far*; many learned men<sup>h</sup> have thought he did not go far enough. However wrongly he might judge, his mistakes, if such they be, were probably owing to his being serious, pious, modest<sup>i</sup>, fearful of neglecting

<sup>f</sup> See de Correptione et Gratiâ. Cap. 13.—T. 10. p. 510. Sect. 40. Edit. Bened.

<sup>g</sup> This seems the more probable the more one sees the manner in which he argues on different texts. He strongly disclaimed the notion that any *individual* could know whether he had the gift of Perseverance, or was one of the elect.—He says, God does not *let* men know this, for fear they should be too *careless*.—De Corr. et Gratiâ, cap. 13. (page 510. Ed. Ben. Tom. 10.) De Dono Persev. Cap. 6. quoted in Sect. xxx.

In this way, could Augustin's Doctrine of Perseverance and Predestination do much *harm*? Is it not (as to Predestination) like that of our Church? (this again Art. xvii. Sect. v.)—After considerable attention I seem settled in my opinion, that Augustin meant only to keep *both* divine and human agency, which were to be reconciled as well as they could. He opposed the *Pelagians* in order to keep the divine agency, and the *Manicheans*, in order to keep the human agency. I do not think he *could* reconcile divine and human agency: and perhaps, in defending the one, he might sometimes, for a while, pay but little attention to the other.—And in defending *either*, he might understand some texts too *literally*. (See Art. x. Sect. xi.) That Letter to *Valentinus*, prefixed to *De Gratiâ et libero Arbitrio*, proves all this to *me* sufficiently.

<sup>h</sup> Baxter on Perseverance, page 5.

<sup>i</sup> Baxter *ibid.* page 6. quotation,



lecting any thing revealed : thus was he inclined to support, in general, the *Divine Agency*; and he probably felt, that what seemed *peculiar* to Christianity, was not to be softened in order to make way for vulgar notions and habitual prejudices of ordinary men. Then his adversaries might sharpen his temper in dispute; as he might often be fully persuaded, that they were wrong, when he was unable wholly to extricate from difficulties what he judged to be right.

Such *failures* in the perseverance of Christians, as I have mentioned, have been the great sources of *dispute*. Some have been bold enough to say, that, when Christians fall into Adultery<sup>k</sup>, or drunkenness, or commit murder, they may *persevere* all the while; not *totally*, but *finally*: Such offenders have been compared to *leaves* sprouting forth (for they are supposed to *reform*) from a trunk seemingly dead; or fire breaking out from ashes seemingly extinct. An *auxiliary* idea has sometimes been taken in, to solve such difficulties;—something of a *confirming*, has been assigned as a cause of persevering; something *subsequent* to Justification; perhaps as supplementary to election; but I would not detain you with attempts at precision in this matter. *Richard Baxter*, who seems to have been a conscientious man, and well skilled in religious opinions, has stated *twelve*<sup>l</sup> notions of Perseverance,

<sup>k</sup> See Whitby's five points, end of first Chap. about Perseverance: and Baxter, page 12—Gurtler (cap. 15. Sect. 572. page 347.) says, "Docet reformata Ecclesia, illos nominatim homines, quos Deus ex misericordiâ potenter transtulit in statum Gratia, licet quandoque a Peccato superentur et prosternantur, a Deo tamen relevari et custodiri, ut manere in peccato, in quod inciderant, et interire in perpetuum, nequeant."

<sup>l</sup> In his pamphlet, entitled, "*Of the Saints Perseverance*:" his honesty appears, page 16, 17. (the latter is noble,) and in his refusing the Bishopric of Hereford in order to adhere to his old flock at Kidderminster.

Perseverance, each held by some particular man, or set of men.—I will only, at present, observe, that as all was ascribed to *Grace*, there is a kind of *Grace* called *confirming Grace*;—the *Gift of Perseverance*.

Of *special Grace* I have spoken under the tenth Article<sup>m</sup>.

VI. But to proceed with our History.

The *Pelagians*, I believe, ascribed perseverance in the Faith, to the agent himself; or thought it, some way, in his power to persevere.—But the *Semi-pelagians* are said<sup>n</sup> to have made this distinction; they allowed, that Perseverance was so far owing to God, that men could not persevere *without* divine assistance; but they denied any one's having such assistance that he could not *but* persevere.

VII. It seems as if the idea of Perseverance as effected by God, may have been growing stronger from the time of Augustin, down through the *Scholastic* ages to the *Reformation*<sup>o</sup>, and for some time afterwards.—Those of the Reformers, who were high Predestinarians, were high in their notions of Perseverance;—we shall see more of them in the next Article. Some thought Perseverance a consequence of Election, so that the truly faithful *never* do *fall away*; it is *possible*, they would say, but it never will *happen*;—others thought it *impossible*<sup>p</sup>.—The latter, I think, were *Zuinglians*, the former, *Calvinists*.

VIII. The *Romanists* reckon, that *all* Christians may fall into sin, and even continue in sin; and,

<sup>m</sup> Art. x. Sect. XIX.

<sup>n</sup> Forbes, *Instruct. Histor. Theol.* 8. 19. 1.

<sup>o</sup> See the passage from Gurtler, "*Reformata Ecclesia*," &c. lately quoted; near the end of Sect. v.

<sup>p</sup> Baxter's 7th and 8th Opinions. —Calvin's own idea, *Inst.* 2. 3. 11.

and, as before<sup>2</sup>, that a mortal sin puts them out of a state of Grace: which state may be often lost<sup>3</sup>, and recovered.—One might consult the end of *Rom. viii.* in Fulke's Rhemish Testament, though it rather runs into the doctrine of *Assurance*. However, what Fulke says in answer, is to our purpose; “We have no *promise* that we shall be preserved from *all* sin, but only from that which is irremissible; but that we shall always persevere in the *favour* of God.”—Before we quit the Romanists, we may say, that almost all churches find some differences arise between their *members*, as to degrees of divine and human agency; this difference in the Romish Church we have mentioned under the tenth Article.

*Arminians* are commonly opposed to Calvinists.—They at first left our present subject in *doubt*<sup>4</sup>; but afterwards declared, “that the Saints might fall from a state of Grace.”—This is the opinion of the *generality* of Christians; particularly of the *Lutherans*, and, as most people think, of the *English Clergy*.

I will be the less particular about the Reformed Churches, on account of the subject of the next Article: but some notice may be taken of the Church of *England*. The *Necessary Doctrine* says, “It is no doubt, but although we be ones justified we may fall therfro, by our own free wyl,” &c.—this is in the part concerning Justification; and afterwards we are told, that we are to judge of our Election by our *persevering*: and in the part concerning Good Workes, it is said, that if, when Christians, we do not “apply our will to worke well,

<sup>1</sup> Sect. III.

<sup>2</sup> Council of Trent, Sess. 6. Canons 22, 23. and Cap. 15.

<sup>3</sup> Mosheim, Cent. 17th, 2. 2, 3, 4. Vol. 5. page 345. 8vo.—Baxter's 2d Opinion.

well, we shall *fall from the Grace of God*," &c.—Bishop Overal observes, that our Article does not determine anything about total or *final* Perseverance, but that in our Homily "*Of the declining from God*," it is laid down, that wicked Christians, after Grace received, may perish *finally*.—I do not see such an expression; but there are several of like import. And near the end of the first part of the Homily on Good Works, it is said, that the Thief on the Cross was indeed justified by Faith; but if he had lived, and had not had both Faith and works, "*he should have lost his Salvation again*."

Salvation is here as like Justification, as any where that I have seen.—(Art. XII. Sect. VIII.)

The *Reformatio Legum* declares, that they think perversely of Justification, who think, that the once justified cannot fall into sin.

*Mr. Baret's* case is briefly and clearly related by *Neal*<sup>1</sup>. A paragraph of his *Recantation*<sup>2</sup> will shew, both what he thought, and what he was ordered to think. His affair occasioned<sup>3</sup> the *Lambeth Articles*: they will occur in the next Article, but I will read the fifth now: in 1595, the Scholars of Cambridge were taught these<sup>4</sup>. In 1603, at the Hampton-Court conference of conforming Clergy and Puritans, the Agent for the Puritans "*requested, that to those words in the sixteenth Article, 'we may depart from Grace,' may be added, 'but*

*not*

<sup>1</sup> Hist. Puritans, Vol. 1. 4to. page 387. A. D. 1595.

<sup>2</sup> In a volume of Pamphlets, G—12—15, Camb. Library

<sup>3</sup> The short History of the Lambeth Articles, (in F—15—8, Cambr. bound with *Fur Prædestinatus*) seems to make the first difference at Cambridge, a difference between the Lectures of the two Professors there: Whitaker, Regius Professor, taught *Calvinism*, and Baro, Margaret's Professor, taught the opposite. — *Baret* did preach ad Clerum, &c. but he might be a follower of Baro: I am not, at this time, Master of the dates.

<sup>4</sup> Lambeth Articles, in Overal, or Neal.

*not totally nor finally:*" which, as Dr. Waterland<sup>z</sup> rightly observes, "would have defeated the whole intent and meaning of the Article."—In 1618, the Synod of *Dort* has this Article, entitled, "*Of the certainty of Perseverance.*" "That such as have once received that Grace by Faith, can never fall from it finally, or totally, notwithstanding the most enormous sins they can commit." When Oliver Cromwell was on his death-bed, he asked Dr. Goodwin, "*Whether a man could fall from Grace?*" to which the Doctor answering in the negative, the Protector replied, *then I am safe, for I am sure I was once in a state of Grace*<sup>a</sup>."

Jonathan<sup>b</sup> Edwards held lately, and other able men hold now, this doctrine of Perseverance; though it does not seem to be dwelt upon in popular discourses.

ix. It seems doubtful whether we need *separate* those who "say, they can *no more sin* as long as they live here," from the advocates for *perseverance*.—*Jovinian* is mentioned as the leader of a sect, "*qui dicunt<sup>c</sup> hominem post Baptismum nullo modo posse peccare;*" but this was not on any *predestinarian* principle. How does Jerom argue with Jovinian on this point<sup>d</sup>?—The *Mystics* mentioned

<sup>z</sup> Supplement to Arian Subscription, page 53.

<sup>a</sup> Neal, A. D. 1658. Vol. 2. 4to page 512.

<sup>b</sup> See on Justification, page 86, &c.

<sup>c</sup> See Opera Aug. Ed. Bened. Tom. 10. Append. page 75.—A confession of Faith thought to have come from some, who did not join in condemning Pelagius, &c. about the year 418.

<sup>d</sup> Jerom only proves the *frailty* and *sinfulness* of man in general, seemingly: I see no argument of Jovinian's but 1 John iii. 9. which Jerom only answers by 1 John v. end: he does not *solve* the inconsistency between a Christian's never sinning, and his being exhorted to keep himself from any fault, as Gentile worship, or idols. This error of Jovinian's is treated at the beginning of Jerom's second book against him. Bower's account of

tioned by Baxter, were perseverers; and so were the *Antinomians*; we must read a word or two more about both these, than we did under the last Article: we saw<sup>e</sup>, that they were (*foi-disant*) *sinless*; but not that they were always to *continue* so:—our Reformatio Legum notices the Antinomians, in the chapter before referred to, in these words, “aut si fortè quicquam eorum faciunt quæ Dei Legibus prohibentur, ea Deum *pro peccatis*<sup>f</sup> non accipere.”—The confession of Augsburgh condemns the old *Anabaptists*<sup>g</sup> as holding, that Christians after justification, cannot lose the Holy Spirit: and refers to others, “who think, that men<sup>h</sup> may have so great a measure of perfection in this present life, that they cannot fall again into sin.”—But the Anabaptists split into many opinions.

From all this we collect, that the Mystic, the Antinomian and the Predestinarian, hold the doctrine of Perseverance *on different principles*: The first, because he is *united* to God; the second, because his sins are all *laid on Christ*; and God sees no sin in his people: the third, because a *decree* passed in his favour, before the beginning of time.

#### x. It

Jovinian (Vol. 1. under *Siricius*) relates only *facts*; and has most reference to his Opinion, that Wives are as good Christians as Virgins are. By this Jovinian seems to have given offence: his idea about *sinlessness* seems to have been, that, when a man was become a Christian, the *Devil* could not hurt him: could not *tempt* him; so as to seduce him; but see more Sect. XI.

<sup>e</sup> Baxter on Perseverance 3d and 9th Opinions: (Art. xv. Sect. v.) the 3d is about Enthusiasts: he mentions *Weigelians*, about whom see Mosheim, Cent. 16. 3. 2. 1. 12.

<sup>f</sup> De Hær. Cap. 9.

<sup>g</sup> Art. xi.—See Heylin's *Quinq. Hist.* page 519.—Also *Syntagma*, page 15.

<sup>h</sup> I think it ought to be, “*some men*,” the Latin is *aliquibus*. The English words are, I think, Heylin's.

x. It seems as if we ought not to close our History, without taking some notice of a Christian's *assurance* concerning his *own* salvation. Such persuasion does not seem to have been entertained before<sup>i</sup> the time of Augustin, except Jovinian had something of it; but Vossius<sup>k</sup> shews, that, in the time of Augustin, several Fathers entertained it; though, from some passages, it seems as if Augustin himself had not<sup>l</sup>.—Assurance of one's own being in a state of favour with God, and in a state which will continue, may arise either in the *Mystic*, or the *Antinomian*, or the *Predestinarian* way, as was just now said of the general doctrine of Perseverance.—As an illustration of the first, one might repeat the case of the *Weigelians*; of the second, Baxter's twelfth opinion; of the third, the notion of the *Zuinglians*<sup>m</sup>, or the Lambeth Articles, or Barer's Recantation, or the Article of the Synod of Dort; and we might add, the answer of Fulke<sup>n</sup> to the Rhemists, on the conclusion of Rom. viii. which would lead us to the opinion of the Romanists, shewn in the Annotation on that passage: and that might be farther confirmed by the Canons of the Council<sup>o</sup> of *Trent*.

The Church of England does not seem to say much directly *against* Assurance; we see what is *implied* in this Article: (Sect. xxv.)—perhaps an expression

<sup>i</sup> Baxter's 2d Opinion, with authorities, page 3.

<sup>k</sup> Hist. Peleg. Lib. 6. Thesis 13. page 750. where three degrees of Faith are mentioned; the third strengthens him so, that he can fall no farther; *et hoc de se certissime sciat.*" This expression is from Gregory the Great.

<sup>l</sup> See Baxter, page 7, bottom, from De Civ. Dei, Lib. 11. Cap. 12.

<sup>m</sup> Baxter's 8th Opinion; and see Heylin's Hist. Quinqu. page 510.

<sup>n</sup> Mentioned before, Sect. viii.

• Session 6. Can. 13. and 14.

expression in the Homily on Repentance may give the true sense of the Church. "Although we"—"fall into great sins," "yet," "by repentance" and "Faith," "there is an *assured* and *infallible* hope of pardon and remission," &c.

The conclusion of the Article of *Faith* in the *Necessary Doctrine*, is also well worth reading.—It says, "but whether there be any *special particular* knowledge which man by faith (I neglect the spelling) hath *certainly* of *himself*," &c.—"cannot be found" (no such thing can be found) "either in Scripture or Doctors," (Fathers).

I think Mr. William Law, a *Mystic*, used to teach the doctrine of Assurance; and so, if I mistake not, did John Wesley, on the same ground<sup>p</sup>: if Mr. Whitfield<sup>q</sup> taught it, which I should imagine he did, it might be upon *Calvinistic* principles. I fear some teachers have spoken ambiguously on this point; at least to them that are without: perhaps it might be only speaking of assurance as not absolutely necessary in *all*. I conclude with the honest confession of Richard Baxter; but the paragraph is too long to be transcribed: it ends thus; "I never knew the man that attained any more than such a strong *persuasion*, (as he had described) mixed with some *doubtings* and *fears*: yet so far overcoming them<sup>r</sup>, as to live a peaceable joyful life."

I will close the History of this Article by observing, that it is one of those, to which, in the time of Archbishop Wake, *Dupin*, made no objection. The account is given in Mosheim's history, Vol. vi. octavo, page 77.

XI. My historical remarks have run out into some length: but I hope I have introduced nothing which

<sup>p</sup> P. S. See Dr. Rutherford's 3d Charge.

<sup>q</sup> P. S. See Rutherford, *ibid.* opening.

<sup>r</sup> On Perseverance, page 21.



which will be useless. I now proceed to *Explanation*.

We begin with the *Title*: “*Of Sin after Baptism*,” the title in 1552 was, “*Of Sin against the Holy Ghost*,” and then the Article said, in effect, the Anabaptists are wrong in calling *all* great sins, sins against the *Holy Ghost*; and therefore another Article was subjoined, which was entitled, “*Blasphemy (not of Blasphemy) against the Holy Ghost*.” In this, the sin was *defined*, and declared *unpardonable*. I am glad it was blotted out; as I should rather doubt our authority, either to make the notion of the sin quite *definite*, or to declare it *unpardonable*, in an *absolute* sense. The title stands altered by the hand of Archbishop Parker; and the reason of the alteration might be, that the subject of sin against the Holy Ghost was by no means the subject of the whole Article.

XII. “*Not every*”—this expression implies, that there *may* be some sin, which is properly sin against the Holy Ghost, and unpardonable, though “*not every*” great and wilful sin is so.

XIII. “*Deadly sin*,” or *mortal* sin; this is opposed to the sins treated of in the<sup>u</sup> preceding Article, such as the best Christians are apt to fall into; there are several other words used, which are supposed to be equivalent to deadly; as great, heinous, scandalous, notorious\*, &c.—We have already had some *Latin* words to the same<sup>v</sup> effect. The word seems to have been taken from *Scripture* and

\* The title of the 9th Chap de Hæresibus in Reform. Legum, is, “*De casu* (meaning the same as lapsu) *justificationum, et peccato in Spiritum-sanctum*.”

<sup>u</sup> Strype, 1562, Annals.

<sup>v</sup> Art. xv. Sect. xii.

\* Lord King, Creed, page 382.—Lardner, Novatus, —Works, Vol. 3. 216.

<sup>v</sup> Sect. ii.

and the *Fathers*.—See 1 John v. 16.—with which might be compared 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10. and Gal. v. 21. though the word *deadly* does not there occur. *Mortale peccatum* we had before<sup>2</sup>.—If any one asks whether I can always tell a *venial* sin from a *deadly* one, I answer, that divisions of things, and of actions, into *classes*, are useful, though it may be, in some cases, doubtful to what class a particular thing should belong. This is true of the *genera* and *species* of natural history; if you divide a set of animals into horses and asses, you will have a *mule* coming across to puzzle you, now and then; and the same *sort* of difficulty will occur in various instances, *moral* as well as natural. But the next expression should be taken in, before we proceed.

XIV. “*Willingly committed*”—in order to make a sin of the kind meant in the Article, it must not only be hurtful in its nature, but be committed *wilfully*. A man may perform an act which every one, hearing merely of the *act*, would pronounce mortal or heinous, and yet the man may not be upon the same footing with one, who commits the same act, knowing and feeling its heinousness: according to the *Necessary Doctrine*, if he does not perform it wilfully, “he loseth not the state of his Justification, but remaineth still the child of God<sup>a</sup>.” What act more heinous than *Parricide*? yet the *American* destroys his aged parent; purposely indeed, but not *wilfully*, in the sense of our Article, or *conscious* of his crime.

XV. Now let us return to our *distinction*, between *venial* and *mortal* sins. We know by experience, in every way of life, in academical life, for instance,

<sup>2</sup> Sect. II.

<sup>a</sup> I only modernized the spelling of this passage; it is in the part about *good works*: rather after the middle.

instance, that there are some smaller irregularities, which do not throw a man out of the character of a regular man, though he may sometimes suffer some degree of punishment for them; but that there are others, more gross, which occasion a temporary suspension of his academical privileges, so that it is difficult to say, whether he is, for a time, a true Academic or not. Yet mere *acts* will not make the difference between irregularity which is tolerable, and that which is intolerable, except regard be had to *circumstances* also.

If no sins or offences are made *venial*, you drive men to *despair*; if particular offences are made venial, such come to be committed freely, and without remorse; and almost any may, in some cases, be very pernicious.

You cannot, as the *Stoics* are said to have done, make all offences *equally heinous*; that would drive a man to murder, when he might have aimed only at theft. Neither can any human reasoning convince us, that *God* will make all offences equal. Nay, the scriptures speak of some men having “the *greater*<sup>b</sup> sin;” and of some who are beaten with *few*<sup>c</sup> stripes, and others with *many*.

Attempts have been made to draw the line between venial and mortal sins: but neither the angelic Doctor Aquinas, nor the celebrated Cardinal Bellarmin, would satisfy honest Richard Baxter<sup>d</sup>. Robert *Baron* gives five criteria; but they come too near fixing upon particular offences<sup>e</sup>. —Our Church acknowledges the distinction, by praying, in her Liturgy, both against “every deadly sin,” and for forgiveness of “*Negligences* and *Ignorances*.”

Permit

<sup>b</sup> John xix. 11.

<sup>c</sup> Luke xii. 47.

<sup>d</sup> See on Perseverance, page 34.

<sup>e</sup> Melancthon has written on this distinction

Permit me to give my own idea of the manner, in which this distinction ought to be made. No sins whatever ought to be considered as venial *beforehand*; but, when a man comes to *look back* upon his conduct, and finds, that he has run into some things wrong, without having been very *negligent*, and without any deliberate bad purpose, then he may hope, that what he has committed will be deemed *venial*, if his repentance be proportioned to the offence into which he has run. But if he finds, that he has been *extremely negligent*, or that he has *deliberately* given up his good *principles*, in order to indulge some unlawful passion, then he should treat his offences as *deadly*; and by an hearty repentance, with satisfaction to all whom he has injured, endeavour to restore himself to the divine favour. And, if we are obliged to judge others, we should put ourselves in each man's place, and proceed in the same manner; substituting for repentance, punishment. Such cases may have so much similarity, as to occasion some *general ideas* of a difference between venial and mortal sins; but our judgment can never be right without great regard to particular circumstances. A polite French *Abbé* would reckon sins venial, which would shock a *Puritan*.

The distinction between sins of *ignorance*, *infirmity*, and *wilfulness*, is natural, as corresponding to that between the *understanding*, the *passions*, and the *Will*; but ignorance itself may be owing to wilfulness, or passion<sup>f</sup>.

Sins of ignorance were thought<sup>g</sup> by the Pelagians, no sins; but whatever is<sup>h</sup> *corrected* by punishment,

<sup>f</sup> Bishop Saunderson, in his sixth Sermon, ad Populum, on Gen. xx. 6. page 263, and Archbishop Sharp, on Heb. x. 26. Vol. 3. have something to this purpose.

<sup>g</sup> P. 57. App. to 10th Vol. of Aug. from Jerom's 2d Dialogue.

<sup>h</sup> Art. ix. Sect. xxx.

ment, *deserves* punishment. Moralists have found it worth while to form rules for the punishment of *Negligence*.—And the *Mosaic* law has made the same<sup>i</sup> provision.—Even the Gospel, though merciful to what is done through real<sup>k</sup> ignorance, speaks of beating with few stripes the offender, who knew<sup>l</sup> not his master's will.

XVI. “*After Baptism*”—better than after being *born again*, &c. because the mark of admission into Christianity, must, in the present case, be such as all the Church could judge of.

XVII. “*Is sin against the Holy Ghost, and unpardonable* :”—We have here two predicates to the same subject, and consequently, in strictness, *two propositions*.

Not every heinous sin is sin against the Holy Ghost.

Not every heinous sin is unpardonable.

Or our words might mean, Not every heinous sin is *both* sin against the Holy Ghost, *and* unpardonable; but the *Reformatio Legum* seems to condemn *separately* those who hold, that every heinous sin is sin against the Holy Ghost; and those who hold, that every heinous sin is unpardonable.—On the whole, the true sense appears to me to be this; Not every heinous sin is sin against the Holy Ghost, *in such sense* as to come under the texts Matt. xii. 31, 32.—Mark iii. 28. and Luke xii. 10.; which, it has often been supposed, declare *some* sin to be unpardonable.

XVIII. “*Wherefore the grant of repentance is not to be denied to such as fall into sin after Baptism*.”—“the grant of repentance” is, in Latin, *locus pœnitentiæ*; and in the English Article of 1552, “the place for penitents;” the Latin the same in both.—

*Locus*

<sup>i</sup> Lev. iv. 2.—Numb. xv. 24, &c.—Deut. xix. 4.

<sup>k</sup> 1 Tim. i. 13.—Acts xvii. 30.

<sup>l</sup> Luke xii. 47.

*Locus pœnitentiæ* is used in Heb. xii. 17. and in Clemens Romanus. — (See Parkhurst's *Lexicon* under *μετανοια*,) and is by no means an unusual expression: but in our *Articles*, we may observe, that "the grant of repentance," must mean the same with "the place for penitents;" otherwise they could not both be English for the same Latin. — The meaning then seems to be, that heinous offenders may be permitted to have *some* place in the church; not the place of such as are at peace with discipline, and under no censure; but that of those, who have been in some way degraded, and are labouring to recover their former station. — And this agrees with the confession of *Augsburgh<sup>m</sup>*, the members of which church (confessedly the most like ours of any) — damnant Novatianos, qui volebant *absolvere* eos, qui lapsi post Baptismum, redibant ad pœnitentiam. There must always be supposed, in every legitimate church, a connexion between *absolution* and *remission* of sins from heaven: See John xx. 23. — Absolution is then rightly given, when there is good reason for expecting such remission<sup>n</sup>.

XIX. "After we have received the Holy Ghost," — this is another<sup>o</sup> expression for *Justification*, or becoming Christians, as described from the *internal* part, or the act of *God*. It will occasion our using a little repetition: as one wrong notion may cause several

<sup>m</sup> Eleventh Article, page 15. Syntagma.

<sup>n</sup> In the same 11th Art. of the Confession of Augsburgh, Remission and Absolution are connected in this manner;

"De Pœnitentiâ docent (Ecclesiæ apud nos) quòd lapsis post Baptismum contingere possit *remissio* peccatorum, &c. — Et quòd *Ecclesia* talibus, redeuntibus ad Pœnitentiam, impertire *absolutionem* debeat." — I suppose that *wavering* between these two things, *remission* and *absolution*, has *unsettled* the expressions of our Article.

<sup>o</sup> See Art. XIII. Sect. VII. & VIII. and places there referred to.

several errors. The corresponding chapter of the *Reformatio Legum* is intitled, *De casu justificationum*. Why any particular expression was preferred, we may not always be able to see; but the title of our Article, as was lately mentioned, was originally “Of Sin against the Holy Ghost;” and the error of the *Anabaptists* was holding, that after men had been once justified, they could no more lose the Holy Ghost. The expression<sup>p</sup>, as we have seen, is, “*Damnans (Ecclesiæ apud nos) et Anabaptistas qui negant semel justificados, iterum posse amittere Spiritum sanctum.*” And *Jovinian’s* notion was, that Baptism, (or the mysteries) impressed upon a man’s mind *good desires*; so that, after Baptism, he could *will* only good; he was<sup>q</sup> also restrained from *error*.

XX. “*After we have received the Holy Ghost, we may depart from Grace given, and fall into Sin;*”

This may be meant to be opposed to, after we are *electeds*, or *predestinated* to happiness, we may fall into sin; which would be a contradiction: our Church then says, that the *justified*, or regenerated, may fall from Grace, and recover their state; but does not say a word about the fall of any persons supposed to be *predestinated*. Grace seems to mean the *same* with Holy Spirit; only the expression “*depart from Grace,*” might be easier than, depart, fall, &c. ‘from the Holy Spirit.’

XXI. “*And*

<sup>p</sup> Sect. 1x.—Confess. Aug. Art. xi. Syntagma, page 15.

<sup>q</sup> August. contra Julianum, pages 695. 891. Tom. 10. Edit. Benedict. Jovinian, before, Sect. 1x.

<sup>r</sup> See Waterland’s Suppl. to Arian Subscr. page 53.—But *electeds* may mean, either elected to eternal happiness, or only elected into the Christian Society, in the way to eternal happiness: in the latter sense, *election*, *admission*, and *justification* are synonymous.—The Necessary Doctrine (on Justification) says, “Whan we bee ones *electeds* and admitted unto Goddis service, and have received our *justificacion* in *baptisme* or be restored thereunto by true penance,” &c.

XXI. “*And by the grace of God;*” the word “*Grace*” may seem to be often repeated; but it would not have been reckoned right to say, that a man could rise from the state of a mortal sinner to that of “a child<sup>s</sup> of God,” without ascribing such rise to the divine assistance: this is fully expressed at the close of the first part of our *Homily* on Repentance.

XXII. “*We may rise again,*” *resurgere* occurs in Vossius, and, most likely in the antients: it is opposed to *lapsus*, relapsus, casus, &c.—“let<sup>t</sup> him that thinketh he standeth take heed lest he *fall*.”—Παραπίπτω signifies, (Parkhurst) to fall away in Ezekiel, with reference to apostacy: παραπίπτω means a fall, a trespass; Adam’s transgression is called the *Fall* of Man, because denoted by παραπίπτω. The Calvinists would like better to have, ‘*must* rise again;’ as that would express, according to their language, that the justified *persevere finally*: supposing the *justified* to be the same as the *elect*, (and the difference between them has been often neglected) this change would make this expression agree with our seventeenth Article, which declares, that the elect, meaning those predestined to life, will “*at length*” “attain to everlasting felicity.”—Something turned upon this, when the House of Commons summoned to their bar, in 1625, Mr. Montague, afterwards Bishop of Norwich, then Canon of Windsor

But though our Article does not declare *for* the final perseverance of the Saints; it does not declare *against* it: “we *may* rise again and amend our lives.” This is probably, what Bishop Overal meant

<sup>s</sup> Sect. XIV. from Necessary Doctrine.

<sup>t</sup> 1 Cor. x. 12.

<sup>u</sup> See Collier’s Eccles. Hist. Vol. 2. page 736. referred to by Waterland. Suppl. Arian Subj. page 54. or see Neal, Index, *Montagu*.



meant (Sect. VIII.) by saying, *Nihil hic de totali aut finali defectione à Gratiâ explanatum est.*"

XXIII. "*And amend our lives,*" in Latin, *resipiscere*: from *re* and *sapisco*, as it were; to recover one's sense\*; one's right *mind*. The articles of 1552 and 1562 have here the same expression; they agree both in English and Latin.

XXIV. "*And therefore they are to be condemned, which say,*" condemned here means much the same as *anathematized*, which last is equivalent to "*accursed*" in the eighteenth Article: the Latin expression here is "*damnandi sunt.*"

XXV. "*They can no more sin as long as they live here:*" "*they*"—who? the persons who hold the doctrine, say not, in general, the *justified*, or the *elect* can no more sin; but they *themselves* in particular. Does not this look like a condemnation of the doctrine of *assurance*? I consider it as such. The change of *persons* in the Article, is not to be overlooked. The first part, about absolving the penitent, is all *impersonal*: in the next, *we* give our opinion of ourselves, we the orthodox, as Christians regularly initiated: in the last part, *they* whom we condemn, speak of *themselves*.

XXVI. "*Or deny the place of forgiveness*"—in Latin; "*veniæ locum denegant:*" in the article of 1552, it is, again, "*deny the place for penitents;*" the Latin of which is, *pœnitentiæ locum denegant.*—By the word *again* I refer to the eighteenth Section.

XXVII. "*To*

\* *Resipisco* is used, in Suetonius, for recovering from a fainting-fit: *resipiscentia* was coined, from μετανοια, in the time of Lactantius, (Ainsworth); there is no idea of *conduct* in either *resipisco* or μετανοω, except as far as reformation may be supposed to follow, of *course*, from recovering one's right *mind*, or reforming one's *principles*; —μεταμελομαι, to be *uneasy*, is only a *step* towards such change of mind; as has been observed at St. Mary's by Mr. Dixon of Benet College.

XXVII. "*To such as truly repent.*"—The Latin, in both sets of Articles, is, "*verè resipiscētibz;*" but the *English* in the older set is, "to such as truly repent and *amend their lives:*" which may be compared with the middle of our Article, "and *amend their lives.*"

If we compare the beginning of the Article with the end, we find a *sort* of inconsistency; in the beginning, *not every* sin is unpardonable; in the latter end, *no* sin is unpardonable. The latter notion seems the one intended, and agrees with our *Homily*<sup>1</sup>, and with *Lord King's*<sup>2</sup> account of the ancients. The former expression is evidently occasioned by the intervention of sin against the *Holy Ghost*. There is, however, no absolute *contradiction* between '*no* sin is unpardonable,' and '*not every* sin is unpardonable.'

Here then we close our Explanation, and proceed to our *Proof*.

XXVIII. From what has been said, there seem to result *four propositions*; *two principal*, each of which has one subordinate.

1. No Christian is incapable of falling into heinous sins, or of losing the favour which he has with God as a Christian.

2. No Christian is taught in scripture, that he is to be *assured* of his own Salvation.

3. No Christian, when he has fallen into any heinous sin, is incapable of recovery, if he sincerely repent.

4. Not every heinous sin comes under the texts of Scripture, which seem to condemn some sin against the *Holy Ghost* as *unpardonable*.

XXIX. No

<sup>1</sup> Homily of Repentance, latter end of first part.

<sup>2</sup> On the Creed, page 384.

XXIX. No Christian is incapable of falling into heinous sins, or of losing the favour which he has with God as a Christian.

Of this, all texts may be considered as proofs, which, in any way, imply the possibility of such falling. As *threatnings* in case of such falling, *promises* on condition of persevering, *exhortations* to persevere.

And the same may be said of all *instances* of such falling. The words of our Article seem to allow us to include the instances of *David* and *Solomon*, though they do not come properly under our proposition<sup>a</sup>: but *Peter* does; and *Hymenæus*<sup>b</sup>, *Alexander*, and *Demas*<sup>c</sup>. All the Disciples<sup>d</sup> of Christ too forsook him, and fled.—St. *Paul* had an idea of the possibility of his being a *cast-away* or *reprobate*<sup>e</sup>.

And, as Perseverance is set forth as the work of the *Spirit*, all those texts must tend to overthrow it, which speak of the actions of the Holy Spirit as influenced by *Man*; which speak of man as able to *resist*, *quench*, or *grieve* the Spirit; or to do *despite* to the Spirit of Grace. These texts must also operate against the opinion, that the Holy Spirit once gained can never be *lost*.

But I will mention some texts in particular.—Matt. v. 13.—x. 22.—Luke xxi. 36.—Rom ii. 20, &c.—1 Cor. viii. 9. 11.—xvi. 13.—2 Cor. vi. 1.—Col. i. 23 —and ii. 5, 6, 7. (or 2 Thess. ii. 3.)—The Epistle to the *Hebrews* has too many texts to be enumerated; its *general design* seems to be, to induce Christians

<sup>a</sup> It has been thought, that we might with propriety say of David and Solomon, though under the old law, that they had received the Holy Spirit, and afterwards had fallen into sin.—Baxter calls David “a member of Christ,” (on Perseverance, page 13.) and the Schoolmen seem to have had the same idea.

<sup>b</sup> 1 Tim. i. 20.

<sup>c</sup> 2 Tim. iv. 10. 14.

<sup>d</sup> Matt. xxvi. 56.

<sup>e</sup> 1 Cor. ix. 27.

Christians to *persevere*: we may mention, Heb. iii. 6. 14.—vi. 6.—x. 26. 38<sup>f</sup>.—1 Pet. v. 8, 9.—2 Pet. ii. 20, &c.—iii. 17.—Jude 20.

*Whole Churches* may be unchurched; compare Rev. i. 20. with ii. 5. These texts conclude against *impeccability*, on whatever principle it may be founded.

xxx. This may suffice for direct proof, with regard to the matter of Perseverance:—Let us take some *indirect* proof, relative to the same subject, keeping as clear as possible of the subject of the next Article, Predestination; indeed, there seems little more wanting, on the doctrine of Perseverance, than to shew how understanding men might be induced to profess it: and this is best shewn by considering their *objections* to our arguments.

They seem to have thought this doctrine suited to the *Immutability* of God: *Baxter* blames those, who of old held the *Arminian* opinion, “Yea, (he says) when they saw that this was liable to be assaulted with the absurd consequence of inferring a *change* in God, some did not stick upon<sup>s</sup> it.”—Heb. vi. 17, 18, would be added in confirmation. But those, who keep in mind our manner<sup>h</sup> of acquiring ideas of the qualities of God, will allow, that we have no right to ascribe immutability to God any farther than it implies *perfection*, or is opposed to some imperfection. And it is not for *man* to consider it as any imperfection in God to place man in a state of *probation*: nor to consider it as fickleness, to reward only during good behaviour.

<sup>f</sup> Whitby puts some of these texts together; on Perseverance, (as one of the *five points*) Chap. 2d. p. 414.

<sup>g</sup> On Perseverance, 2d Opinion, page 3.

<sup>h</sup> Introd. to 2d Part, sect. viii. and Appendix to Art. xi. Sect. xix.

behaviour. This is well expressed in the *Necessary Doctrine*, at the close of the preface, or Article of *Faith*. And the immutable *counsels* of God, as described in the passage of the Epistle to the *Hebrews*, lead only to *hope* as their ultimate end.—It is called an *anchor*<sup>i</sup> of the soul. We are told to be *sober* and *hope*<sup>k</sup> unto the end. Hope always implies a possibility of *disappointment*.

I will now give some of those *texts*, which seem the best supports of the doctrine of *Perseverance*; or *impeccability*.—Matt. xxiv. 24, may imply, that it is impossible to lead the *elect* into error: the *prayers of Christ*, Luke xxii. 32, and John xvii. 11, 15, imply, that God protects and preserves the faith of good Christians. John x. 28, declares, that Christians shall have eternal life, shall *never perish*, shall never be *plucked out* of the hand of Christ. Rom. viii. 38, 39, is to the same effect.—Rom. xi. 29, shews, that God does not give and take again. The tendency of other texts is evident: as 1 Cor. i. 8.—2 Cor. i. 22.—Gal. iv. 5.—Eph. i. 13.—iv. 30.—Phil. i. 6.—2 Thess. iii. 3.—2 Tim. ii. 19.—1 Pet. i. 5.—and 1 John iii. 9.

These texts may serve to give an idea of the manner, in which men have been induced to profess the doctrine of Perseverance. As we have mentioned them, it seems proper to endeavour to get some satisfaction amidst such contending authorities. And the more, as a due consideration of these texts will be the best introduction to the seventeenth Article, which has always been accounted particularly difficult. I will first take some notice of *each* of these texts, and then make a few *general* observations.

Matt.

<sup>i</sup> Heb. vi. 19.

<sup>k</sup> 1 Pet. i. 13.

Matt. xxiv. 24. seems to me rather to imply a *possibility* of deceiving the elect, than an *impossibility*: I speak of *natural* impossibility, not of *moral*. It implies, that *false* Christs would find much *more difficulty* in deceiving, by their specious pretences, those who were already grounded in the principles of genuine Christianity, than those who were not of any religion, which professed itself to be a completion of prophecies concerning the *true* Christ. Besides, the saying in question is itself grounded on an *exhortation* to *beware* of credulity. As to the *Prayers* of Christ, they must imply some degree of *uncertainty*; and are inconsistent with Perseverance being absolutely *promised* by God; or a *gift* quite *determined* upon. The prayer of Christ in favour of *Peter*, that his *faith* should not fail, was *before* it *did* fail; and though he rose again, and recovered his right mind, yet that was not the object of the *prayer*.

The prayer of Christ in John xvii, was for the whole body of Christians; there is no doubt, however, but that the whole *body of Christians*, as such, may depend upon having the protection of God; though that protection may not take any *individual* out of a state of *probation*. Nor, with regard to John x. 28, is there any doubt, that the *flock* of Christ is intended, *as a flock*, to have eternal life; though some individuals may be found, "like sheep," to "have gone" astray." Our *shepherd* is *strong* enough, to prevent the *wolf*, or any plunderers, from *plucking* them out of his hand; but, if he depends upon them to "know his voice," and "*follow him*," some may wander and be lost. Of the conclusion of Rom. viii. we have said something<sup>a</sup> lately. — Rom. xi. 29. relates intirely

<sup>a</sup> If. liii. 6.

<sup>b</sup> Sect. viii. and x. also Art. xv. Sect. xx.

intirely to the Jews°, who rejected the Gospel: Such was the fidelity of God, that he would still perform the promise, which he had made to their “forefathers, Abraham and his seed for ever:” but this has no immediate relation to *Christians*; and, if it is applied to Christians, it is part of an argument which declares, that any persons whatever may be cut off from the Christian covenant, if they do not make a proper use of it. A gift not being *resumed*, does not mean, that the *conditions* of it are annulled. 1 Cor. i. 8. appears to express the *general* design of the Gospel. The Corinthians had enjoyed all privileges of a Christian church in time past; and might depend on the fidelity of God for the time to come: but this does not prove, that no *conditions* were to be performed on their part; only that those conditions need not be enumerated just in that place, not in the exordium of the Epistle. The passage, on the whole, has the air of an eloquent and refined *exhortation*.—The next passage, and three others, mention the Holy Spirit, given to the converts, as a *seal* or a *pledge*. I apprehend, that, by the Holy Spirit, is meant, in these passages, the *extraordinary*<sup>p</sup> gifts of the Holy Spirit.—A *seal* sometimes

° See Locke and Taylor on the place.

<sup>p</sup> How did this act upon the *Heart*? there might be strong moral sentiments excited by the extraordinary gifts of the Spirit: gratitude, benevolence, &c.—*Devout* affection also would naturally arise: the difficulty is rather to see how any man could have supernatural gifts *without* being virtuous and pious, both before and after they were entrusted to him, than how he could be so. It is indeed *possible* for a person to abuse supernatural gifts, as we find from Matt. vii. 23.—1 Cor. xiv. 9;—but it is a thing so exceedingly strange, that we may be fairly allowed to consider extraordinary gifts of the Spirit as generally implying a disposition previously good, and as nourishing every good principle.

times is a sign of a *contract*; sometimes a *mark* set upon anything in order that it may be known to belong to a certain proprietor. A *pledge* is either a *security*, or an *earnest*, which means, a payment *in part*. Now, though the expressions of Scripture may have a mysterious and figurative sound, yet there is nothing in them, on which the doctrine of *Perseverance* can reasonably be founded. A *seal* to a *contract* does not oblige one party singly, but both *reciprocally*: so that if one party neglects conditions, the other is released. A seal, as a *mark*, does not imply, that the thing marked cannot be *alienated*, or *destroyed*, if it does not answer its purpose. A *pledge* is only a contract of the *accessory*<sup>a</sup> kind. An *earnest* engages to nothing more than to pay the *remainder* of what was engaged for; which is only to be paid if all *conditions* are fulfilled.

Gal. iv. 5. shews, that we are on the footing of *adopted* sons in the sight of God; but though adopted sons do, generally speaking, inherit fortunes, yet any one may be disinherited for ill conduct. As to Phil. i. 6. is merely a *compliment* devoutly expressed; it is evidently an effusion of Christian pastoral *affection*: nothing can be concluded from it in the way of *speculation*: the good behaviour of the Philippians was to be referred to God, and they were not to doubt of the continuance of his *protection*.

2 Thess. iii. 3. is of the same kind with some of the foregoing: it is clearly addressed to the *whole church* of Thessalonica, whatever difference of character might be found in the individuals.

And we might say of 1 Pet. i. 5, that any one, who understands the foregoing, will not find much  
difficulty

<sup>a</sup> Grot. 2. 12. 6. de Jure, &c.—Balguy 2. 3. 1. 34. MS.



difficulty in that ; but by looking back to the third verse, we see, that nothing beyond *hope* was in the mind of the sacred writer.

Of the last text, 1 John iii. 9. we have spoken before<sup>r</sup>.

Having now taken some notice of *each* text, we may proceed to a few *general* observations.

1. The texts in favour of Perseverance are of a *lofty* and mysterious nature; those against it are much more level to *human* affairs; we ought therefore to have a greater diffidence in interpreting the former than the latter; we ought to conclude, that the idea which we have of the former, cannot be an *adequate* idea; though that which we have of the latter, probably is adequate. Matt. xxiv. 24, for instance, is part of a *Prophecy*, which has been thought<sup>s</sup> to have both a primary and a secondary sense.—1 Cor. i. 8. and 1 Pet. i. 5. give some *lofty* and *faint* intimations of the *counsels* of God, such as to us must be, in a very great degree, unintelligible.

2. The texts produced by our adversaries are *eloquence*, ours are *practical* directions. Now what is intended to *move* and persuade is never to be taken so literally as that which is to be the guide of our *conduct*. Making eloquence into systems of speculation, has been the *grand cause* of error and controversy amongst Christians<sup>t</sup>; it is particularly, the way in which men of good understanding, great learning, and of a grave and pious turn, have been misled. It is observable, that several of the texts which are urged against us, are parts of *exordiums*: and Eph. iv. 30, though not an opening,

<sup>r</sup> Art. xv. Sect. xix.

<sup>s</sup> Book i. Chap. xvii. Sect. x.

<sup>t</sup> Introd. to second Part, Sections ix. xi. xii. and Art. x. Sect. xlii.

ing, is preceded by fine, affectionate, moral advice, and is rising towards the *pathetic*.

3. The texts of our adversaries have more relation to *Theory*, or what *ought to be*, ours more to *fact*, or what *is*.—This remark has been<sup>u</sup> made before.

4. The texts against us belong more to *collective bodies*, ours more to *individuals*; the effect of this has been<sup>x</sup> already shewn: When our church was delivered from the dominion of the *Pope*, it certainly was not to be expected that *each* Protestant should have all the characteristics, which belong to the *collective body* of Protestants; and each Papist all the characteristics of Popery. Some private subjects enjoy more liberty under a Monarch, than others in a free state. John x. 28.—Rom. viii. 38, &c.—and several other texts come under this remark.

5. When Perseverance is spoken of as the *gift* of God, what we have said under the tenth Article should be applied; for Perseverance is only a series of good acts, or of acts favoured as good. As therefore we were never to refer any good act to the Grace of God, till it was *past*<sup>y</sup>; so neither ought we to ascribe our *Perseverance* to God, till we *have* persevered. Whatever opinion may have been entertained of *Augustin*, this was as much his doctrine as it can be<sup>z</sup> any one's.

6. Lastly,

<sup>u</sup> Art. xv. Sect. xix.

<sup>x</sup> Art. xv. Sect. xx. with references.

<sup>y</sup> Art. x. Sections xxxv. xlii. l.

<sup>z</sup> Sect. v.—See Aug. Op. T. 10. page 546, which is de Dono Perseverantiæ, Cap. 6. Whence it appears, that Augustin said, Perseverance could not be *lost*, merely because it is absurd to say, that can be lost by any man, which you cannot know to have existed till the end of life arrives.—See Sirmond, Vol. 3. Opuscula, page 91.—Plaifere and Baxter (Persev.) have something to the purpose.

6. Lastly, interpreting Scripture more literally than other *popular* language, must always produce error. After all that has been said of Phil. i. 6, there seems no sufficient reason why it should be interpreted more literally than the proverbial expression ; ‘ a good beginning makes a good ending : ’ and “ *if it were possible,*” in Matt. xxiv. 24, should be compared with Acts xx. 16. “ he hasted, if it were possible for him, to be at Jerusalem the day of Pentecost.”

I now proceed to the *second proposition*, which is annexed to this, and, in a manner, comprehended under it.

xxxI. No Christian is taught in Scripture, that he is to be *assured* of his own Salvation.

This follows from what has been already proved. Under the fifteenth Article it appeared, that no Christian can say, at any moment, that he *is sinless* : and under the sixteenth, that no Christian is incapable of *falling* into heinous sins : the consequence is obvious, if we only allow, that without “ holiness ” “ no man <sup>a</sup> shall see the Lord ; ” which we have endeavoured to prove more at large under the twelfth Article.

To produce additional texts is no way difficult. Luke xii. 4, 5.—Rom. xi. 20.—1 Cor. x. 12.—Phil. ii. 12.—Heb. iv. 1.—xii. 28.—1 Pet. i. 7.—these may suffice ; nothing need be added in the way of *direct proof*. Let us look out for some *indirect* proof relative to the doctrine of assurance, taking the strongest proofs of our adversaries which we can find.

We must conceive one of them to urge Heb. vi. 11, and x. 22. I used to be told, that these texts were urged in making converts. Some also have

<sup>a</sup> Heb. xii. 14.

have argued thus; Christ died for<sup>b</sup> *my* sins, therefore I ought to assure myself he did not die in vain. Some have proved assurance from their own inward *experiences*: and, we may observe, as our direct proof has turned much upon *fear*, that some have said, *Fear* was not inconsistent, at least, with *perseverance*; on the contrary<sup>c</sup> *Fear* caused *perseverance*. And it has been said, that some learned and sober-minded men, free from enthusiasm, have declared, in the most credible manner, when dying, that they felt more than even a<sup>d</sup> *lively hope* of salvation.

In reply, we reason thus; the assurance mentioned in Heb. vi. 11. is only “the full assurance<sup>e</sup> of *hope*;” and it stands between two exhortations to *diligence*. Heb. x. 22. mentions the “full assurance of *Faith*,” but the beginning of the next chapter informs us, that “Faith is the substance of things *hoped* for.”—Christ died for *me*; true; so he did for the *whole world*; is the whole world assured of Salvation? that is not said. As to *inward feelings*, the scope of Mr.<sup>f</sup> Locke is, to prove, that the enthusiast *himself* has not reason to conclude that he is inspired; but supposing he had, he certainly gives no proof to any one else<sup>g</sup>. Self-deceit is always to be suspected; Jeremiah<sup>h</sup> says, “the heart is deceitful above all things:” Bp. Butler treats the subject of self-deceit in his masterly way: and what he says of it in *general*, seems applicable to  
this

<sup>b</sup> See Rutherford's 3d Charge, notes.

<sup>c</sup> Baxter on Perseverance, page 39, bottom.

<sup>d</sup> The Catholic Doctrines, &c. page 37.

<sup>e</sup> In the original, Πληροφοριαν της ελπίδος.—The Divines, to whom the Lambeth Articles were proposed by Professor Whitaker in 1595, substituted *Plerophoriā* in the sixth, instead of *certitudine*; and they wished (or some of them) to have substituted *spei* for *fidei*.—F—15—8. Cambr.

<sup>f</sup> On Enthusiasm, Hum. Und. Book. iv. Chap. 19.

<sup>g</sup> See Baxter on Perseverance, page 20.

<sup>h</sup> Jer. xvii. 9.

this particular case. Either a man is conscious of having deceived himself, or not: if he is, he has deceived himself in *some* degree; if not, he has deceived himself in a *great* degree<sup>1</sup>.

Men persevere by means of *Fear*; it does seem possible, that God may *foreknow*, that a man may persevere unto the end; and *fear* may be the *instrument* by which he perseveres; but while a man fears, he can *know* nothing of the event; except as far as he forms an *estimate* of his condition from *examining* the state of his mind, and comparing it with the *Laws* of God; to such judgment as this we have no objection; but we would not call it *certainly*.

Lastly, I will not deny the *fact*, that some men have afforded reason to believe they enjoyed, on the point of death, something beyond a *lively hope* of future bliss; supposing they really did, that is very different from its being taught in *Scripture*, as a doctrine, that *every* good Christian must have an assurance of his being in a state of Salvation, during a good part of his *life*. Good and sober men, with very few exceptions, have disclaimed<sup>k</sup> such doctrine; though as *likely* to experience the blessed influence of heaven upon their minds, as any men.

I imagine,

<sup>1</sup> As all Christians must acknowledge the influence of the Holy Spirit, the precise meaning of expressions relating to it may sometimes be difficult to ascertain: but I have understood it to be declared, with regard to *some* thoughts or feelings, though not with regard to *all*, that a man, (not *every* man) may distinguish whether they arise in his mind *naturally*, or come from the *Holy Ghost*; may say, with regard to some sentiments arising in his mind, '*this* is from the Holy Ghost.'—I mean, that I have so understood what I have heard myself; spoken in public; spoken with earnestness, and distinctness, though in the Latin language.

<sup>k</sup> With regard to Baxter, see end of Sect. x. and his Pamphlet on Perseverance, page 20, 21, and 17; and the end of this Section: For Augustin see Sections v. and x.

I imagine, that the doctrine of assurance has succeeded, as much as anything, from an idea, that those who disclaim it, refuse to the good and pious a lively spiritual satisfaction, or joy in the Holy Ghost: yet this is far from being the truth. —It seems possible, that they, who have for a length of time lived in confirmed habits of virtue and piety, may look forwards to a future life not only with comfort but with rapture and exultation; though perhaps never without some degree of diffidence, or modesty. If they have been in all things willing to live honestly, they may *trust*<sup>1</sup> they have a good conscience: if their heart condemn<sup>m</sup> them not, they may have “*confidence* toward God:” they may *taste* the good word of God, and “the powers<sup>n</sup> of the world to come, in such a manner, as to enjoy great *happiness*, without ever being out of a state of *probation*. I conclude, as before, (Sect. x.) with a sentence from *Baxter*, where he is shewing the necessity of religious *fear*, and at the same time shewing how it should be regulated. —“We teach all Christians<sup>o</sup> to contend with the utmost diligence, to get up to the highest trust, love, joy, thanksgiving and praise, as the proper evangelical excellency nearest heaven: and to get as fast as they can, above that fear which hath torment, which is cast out as love groweth perfect: and to pray and seek for the Spirit of Adoption, of Power and love, and of a sound mind, instead of the spirit of Fear and Bondage: and not to place too much of their religion in that very fear which in its season is a *duty*; much less in hurtful, sinful fear: but always, and in all things,

to

<sup>1</sup> Heb. xiii. 18.<sup>m</sup> 1 John iii. 21.<sup>n</sup> Heb. vi. 5.<sup>o</sup> Catholic Theology, part 3, page 257.

to rejoice in the Lord, with love and gratitude ; and confidently to cast all their cares on him."

xxxii. Our *third proposition* is,

No Christian, when he has fallen into any heinous sin, is incapable of recovery, if he sincerely repent.

This will seem, to most men, self-evident ; but yet there are texts of Scripture, which have led some men into a contrary opinion. Examining the true meaning of these, will be our principal business. The *direct* proof need not be long ; it will be given more for the sake of regularity, than because it is absolutely necessary.—Consult then Matt. vi. 14.—xviii. 24—32.—Luke xv. both as to the joy over a repenting sinner, and the Prodigal Son.—John xx. 23.—2 Cor. vii. 10.—Gal. vi. 1.—Eph. iv. 32.—2 Pet. iii. 9.—1 John i. 9.—Also the instances of forgiving David and Peter.—The expressions of the<sup>p</sup> Evangelical Prophet, on this head, are strong.

The chief *objections* seem to be *eight* in number ; I will mention them all, before I endeavour to answer any of them. If the difficulty of some of them detains us, it will promote candour towards such of our Christian brethren, as may seem to have encouraged needless doubts about a plain doctrine of Christianity.

xxxiii. 1. Does it not appear from 1 John iii. 9. that whoever commits sin, degrades himself to the rank of the unregenerate ?

2. Does not he, who commits one sin, according to James ii. 10. make himself guilty of *all* sins ?

3. Though repentance before Baptism be available to the remission of sins committed before Baptism, yet will a second and a third, and an endless

endless *series* of repentances, be available in like manner? *Tertullian* could not think so; and the Romanists think it so unlikely, that they make the falshood of such a notion the foundation of their Sacrament of *Penance*.

4. Does not 1 John v. 16. teach us, that it would be vain and presumptuous so much as to *pray* to God for remission of a deadly sin?

5. Are not we taught in the sixth chapter to the Hebrews, that it is *impossible* to renew to repentance, such as fall away?

6. Does it not appear from the tenth chapter to the Hebrews, that those, who *sin wilfully*, have “no more sacrifice for sin; but a certain fearful looking for of judgment?”

7. If there be so much difficulty in the recovery of a sinner, when he is not supposed to have persisted in sin for any length of time, what must be the case, when he has acquired *habits* of sinning? —“Can the *Æthiopian* change his skin, or the leopard his spots?” then may he “also do good,” who is “accustomed to do evil.”

8. Nay, does not God sometimes give men over to a *reprobate* mind? and do not they then go beyond a mere facility of sinning? are they not then *enslaved* by appetite? do they not contract unnatural cravings, and feel themselves in bondage to depraved propensities?

These objections contain some of the most difficult parts of Scripture; but supposing they could not be satisfactorily answered, they would not overthrow the general doctrine of the Remission of Sins; they might leave an awful *diffidence* on the mind, as no part of scripture should be *neglected*; but yet their effect need only be, to occasion a *suspense*, till the texts on which they are built, were fairly



fairly reconciled with others more<sup>r</sup> perspicuous and familiar.—This observation is the more applicable to these texts, as they appear to be introduced in an *extraordinary* manner, on *occasions* by no means common. But let us venture upon an artless examination of each of them.

1 Of 1 John iii. 9. an idea has been already<sup>s</sup> given; and it has also been shewn, that regeneration allows of progressive<sup>t</sup> and gradual improvement; of an approximation to the *ideal* character of him, who “doth not commit Sin.” An heinous sin may throw a man *back* in this progression, but may not throw him entirely *out* of the path, so that he shall never be able to regain it.

2 James ii. 10. does not seem to mean, that a man who commits *one* sin, is overwhelmed and lost, in the same manner as he would be if he did *nothing right*; but only, that he may be said to violate the *Body of Laws* taken *collectively*; or to be “a transgressor” of *the Law*:” and therefore is not innocent, or *blameless*, however he may *value himself* upon his *regularity* in other points. A man, who broke one of the laws of the *twelve tables*, might be said to break *the law* of the twelve tables.

If you heard any one say, such a person is a friendly good sort of man, but we cannot prevail upon him to observe *the College Statutes*; you would never suspect him of violating *all* the Statutes, but only some one or two which stood most in his way. St. James seems to have had some regular, worthy persons, who, without meaning much harm, behaved rather insolently to the

*poor*

<sup>r</sup> This plan of keeping *both* doctrines till they can be reconciled, see before; Art. x. Sections vi. xi. xlvii.

<sup>s</sup> Art. xv. Sect. xix.

<sup>t</sup> Art. ix. Sections xxiv. and xxxii.

<sup>u</sup> James ii. ii.

poor in religious assemblies, and shewed too great an attention to the *rich*; he tells them that, while they allow themselves in such conduct, they must not value themselves as if they were perfectly *blameless*.—No one, in short, must ever be allowed to say, I *will* do my duty with one *exception*, or two exceptions; he must act upon a *principle* of being “in *all* things willing” to do his duty: the *exceptions* will shew themselves soon enough, without being made *beforehand*.

James ii. 10. then belongs to those, who are *about* to do their duty, and are settling their *principles* of action; whereas *repentance* implies *retrospect*, to which the saying of James seems inapplicable: except as far as it may direct a penitent to ask himself, whether he set out with *purposely* neglecting any duty.

3. Whilst the preachers of the Gospel were making *Converts*, remission of sins *prior* to Baptism, must be the *common* theme; but yet the Christian *plan* must be, to give remission of sins, at *all* times, more easily than it could be procured on any other plan.

The prophets must foretell the Christian Dispensation with a view to the *perpetual* continuance of it: see Is. liii. 5.—Jer. xxxi. 34.—and Matt. xxvi. 28, and Acts v. 31, must have the same extensive meaning; so must all that is announced by John the *Baptist*. Indeed to “give<sup>x</sup> repentance,” must be nugatory, if it is only for sins before baptism; and so must be the institution of the Lord’s supper, considered as a “continual remembrance of the death of Christ.” Consult, moreover, Acts xx. 28.—Heb. iv. 15.—1 John i. 1, 2. and our proofs of the doctrine of *Atonement*:<sup>y</sup>—  
also

<sup>x</sup> Δέναι μετανοίαν see Parkhurst’s Lexicon, under μετανοία.

<sup>y</sup> Append. to Art. xi. Sect. xxii.

also our *direct* proof of the proposition now before us. If a Christian does *frequently* relapse, he may find it more and more difficult to recover; and he may be punishable in a greater degree; and the discipline of the church may proceed accordingly. Yet in no case is an hearty repentance, suitable to the occasion, to be deemed wholly ineffectual.

Even excommunication is only like rustication; it allows of the offender being reconciled to the Church. All we here prove is, that fallen Christians may rise again; how far a *Sacrament of Penance* may be needful for that purpose, when we have the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, must be considered hereafter.

4. The text 1 John v. 16. is *not easy*; some have thought it related to curing *diseases*<sup>z</sup> by the prayer of Faith, like James v. 14, 15.—If so, it is clear of our present subject. But, supposing it to relate to *sins*, the whole passage may have this meaning: ‘*Intercessions* may be properly “made for all men<sup>a</sup>”;’ for *lighter* offences they may be made with *effect*; but when that is declared, it must not be understood to be *expressly* declared, at the same time, that intercessions *shall* prevail in favour of all *heinous* sins. If your brother commit an heinous sin, it is not *forbidden* you to intercede for him: the case stands in<sup>b</sup> *need* of Intercession clearly; but that was not the thing *meant*<sup>c</sup>. No one can *engage*, that intercession shall procure forgiveness for *all* sins: a relapse into *Idolatry* must be attended

<sup>z</sup> See continuation of Benson: by imitators of Mr. Locke’s exposition.

<sup>a</sup> 1 Tim. ii. 1.

<sup>b</sup> My brother, Samuel Hey, is of opinion, that the words “I do not say that he shall pray for it,” may mean, ‘I need not say;’ ‘it is *evident à fortiori*.’ he adds, that he has compared other passages, like, ‘I say not.’

<sup>c</sup> Οὐ πῶς ΕΚΕΙΝΗΣ ἁγῶν ἵνα ἐρωτησῇ.

attended with great *danger*: and in *other heinous* offences, it must not be thought a matter of *course*, that prayer is to preclude a future *judgment*.’

Deadly sin therefore may be prayed for; though not perhaps effectually, if it be not *repented* of.

5. In Heb vi. the meaning of the *whole* passage must be attended to. The Apostle presses the better sort of Converts to make a gradual *improvement*; if they did not do that, they were in great danger of going back, farther and farther, till they *relapsed* into *Judaism*: this was to be prevented if possible. He urges strenuously, ‘If, instead of improving, you go back, what must be the consequence? what can possibly be *expected*<sup>d</sup>? cannot such a foretaste as *you* have had, of heavenly good, keep you in your improved state?—The whole *process* must then begin again! yet nothing can be tried, in your case, which has not already failed: how much less likely is it to succeed a second time! Christ died, rose from the dead, ascended into heaven, and became Head of the Church: all this you have felt the force of, and have applied to yourselves. If you *undo* this, what is it, in effect, but calling Christ an *impostor*, and consenting to his ignominious death! how disgraceful! to Him and to You! A *Field* has been<sup>e</sup> watered by a genial rain; if its fertility appears in *Corn*, well; the blessing of Providence is upon it, and it makes the heart of him rejoice that tilled it;—but, if only “*thorns and briers*” spring up, what a mortification! has he who tilled it, or ordered it to be tilled, any *hopes*?—any *remedy*? will he not be apt to exclaim,—’twere best to *burn* it up at once?’

Such

<sup>d</sup> For *impossible*, in the sense of ‘not to be *expected*,’ see Art. XII. Sect. IX. and Art. XV. Sect. III. with references.

<sup>e</sup> Apollos, 1 Cor. iii. 6.

Such seems to be the meaning of the argument; but it cannot be fairly applied to different<sup>f</sup> *circumstances*. Before the converts relapsed, it was a fair argument to press; *afterwards*, the Apostle would have exhorted them to *repentance*. Repentance would become more *difficult* by a relapse; but not *ineffectual*.

6. Heb. x. 26. will seem clearly to be about *wilful Apostacy*, to any one, who reads the 23d and 28th verses, (with Deut. xvii. 2—6,) and also the 32d and 38th. Indeed all the 11th and 12th chapters would confirm the notion. The *symptoms* of apostacy are first mentioned, in the 23d, 24th, and 25th verses; and then the sin itself, with its *consequences*. The Apostle's address to the converted *Hebrews*, in this alarming situation, seems to have been to this effect. 'Supposing the Christian religion true, and Christ really the Son of God, it cannot but be an heinous thing to desert Christianity. How can any one do it without treating the character of Christ in a contumelious and contemptuous manner? And how could God send his Son into the world, and permit him to suffer, and to die, if it were a slight and indifferent matter to forsake his religion? Perhaps you may build your hopes on the *sacrifices*, to which you have been accustomed; to their returning periodically; but they are at an end! "Now *once*, in the end of the<sup>g</sup> world," hath Christ sacrificed himself; but what sacrifice can be available for *Apostacy*? not the Jewish, as being superseded; not the Christian for that is despised.' Thus might an Apostle argue, in order to prevent converts from making their *Baptism* void; but such argument cannot  
invalidate

<sup>f</sup> Art. xi. Sect. xi. with references.    <sup>g</sup> Heb. ix. 26.

invalidate *repentance* whilst Baptism continues in force.

7. *Habits* do certainly add *difficulty* to repentance, but do not destroy its *efficacy*. Indeed if they entirely *incapacitated* men for repentance, there would be a case, in which a man *could not recover* his lost spiritual condition; but, in strictness, our proposition *supposes* repentance *possible*; and only affirms its being *available*. And in fact, every man *may* repent if he will; every bad moral *habit* is to be<sup>b</sup> unraveled, or dissolved, as it were, in time, and a good one formed in its place; though, in some cases, it is not to be *expected*, on a footing of probability, that this will happen; at least, in any short time.

8. The language about a *reprobate mind*, is only a referring of bad habits to the superintendence of the Governor of the world: It can therefore add nothing to the last mentioned difficulty: and it has been<sup>i</sup> treated before.

I might have mentioned the *case of Esau*, who “found no place of *repentance*, though he sought it carefully with tears;” but the *μετανοια* mentioned in that case does not seem to have been a change of mind in *Esau himself*, but in his *Father Isaac*<sup>k</sup>, whom he intreated for a blessing, in vain. Parkhurst’s *Lexicon* may be consulted on this point, under *μετανοια*.

xxxiv. We have yet another *proposition*:—Not every heinous sin comes under those texts of Scripture, which seem to condemn some sin against the *Holy Ghost* as *unpardonable*.

I need not dwell long on this; after what has been said about heinous sins being *pardonable*; especially as the notion, that all heinous sins are of the same class

<sup>b</sup> Art. x. Sect. 1.

<sup>i</sup> Art. x. Sect. 1.

<sup>k</sup> Gen. xxvii. 38.—Heb. xii. 17.

class with the sin mentioned Matt. xii. 31. has not been held by any considerable number of respectable Christians. The three<sup>1</sup> passages about this sin do, in reality, only make one; and the singularity of the denunciation makes it very improbable, that it should be applicable to *all* heinous sins.— Supposing all heinous sins were of this sort, what a great alteration must be made in scripture, before that was fully *expressed*! — The *Epistles* contain *nothing* about blasphemy, or sin, against the Holy Ghost. Nothing about it is said when those sins are enumerated, which disqualify<sup>m</sup> a man for the Kingdom of Heaven.

As, in denunciations against sins, it is generally understood, that the punishment is to take place *except* men repent; there may be no sufficient reason why the same exception should not be allowed with regard to blasphemy against the Holy Ghost<sup>n</sup>; if that be the case, the formidable text Matt. xii. 31. and its parallels, are no more against the efficacy of *repentance*, than any others. To make *final impenitence* the sin against the Holy Ghost, seems unsatisfactory, (Sect. iv.) because that is *no* sin: it is only not *deserting* sins, without distinction.

The *practical* part of this subject is, to be very *cautious* of acting as the Pharisees did, whom our Saviour reprov'd, or in any manner resembling, or *approaching* to their conduct. Though a *Christian* cannot impute the miracles of Christ or his Apostles to Demons; yet some, to whom Christianity is *daily offered*, and some nominal Christians, may shew a greater,

<sup>1</sup> Matt. xii. 31, 32.—Mark iii. 28. and Luke xii. 10. as mentioned in Sect. iv.

<sup>m</sup> 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10.—Gal. v. 21.—Eph. v. 5.—add 1 John v. 16.

<sup>n</sup> See Hammond on Matt. xii. 31.

greater, or less *attention* and respect to the proofs of its divine authority.

At length we come to our *Application*.

xxxv. The *Application* may consist of the same parts as before.

A *Form* somewhat analogous to our Article might be used in *natural* religion.

‘As it is the purpose of religious *Association* to procure a *continuance* and improvement in virtue, and as institutions ordinarily answer their ends; men may fall into a way of speaking, as if those who were associated on religious principles, would *of course* persevere in good living, and in the favour of God. And some, perhaps partly as *fatalists*, have held, that true virtue, once acquired, cannot be *lost*. Yet, such are the temptations incident to human life, that this is rather a subject of *hope* than of *certainty*. However, if a man, in such a state of improvement, *does* fall into any great sins, his only wisdom is to *repent* and amend his life.—How far his repentance may be *accepted*, he may not certainly *know*; but there is a good *probability*, that he may be *forgiven*°; and a very strong one, that his repentance may prove greatly *beneficial* to him.’

xxxvi. A *Christian* may say,

‘Christianity is an excellent plan for perpetuating virtue and happiness; yet those, who are engaged in it, must not be *secure*: each Christian may fall from the favour of God; but his fall will not prevent his regaining the divine favour, if he truly *repent*, on the genuine principles of his religion.’

xxxvii. *Mutual concessions* may take place, either with the advocates of the doctrine of *Perseverance*,

° Div. Leg. B. ix. p. 652, quarto.



verance, or with *Novatians*<sup>p</sup>. Or indeed they *might* take place with such as maintain the doctrine of Assurances, or with such as make all heinous sins on a footing with blasphemy against the Holy Ghost.

To the advocates of the doctrine of *Perseverance* we might say, that the doctrine cannot be a reasonable ground of *schism* or *dissension*, because it has never been inserted into *Creeds*<sup>q</sup>, or any confessions of Faith, which were to be used by *all* members of the Church.

We might moreover inquire, whether they and we have, in reality, such material difference of opinion between us, as may seem on first appearance?

They think, God causes our Perseverance; we say, that our Perseverance should be *ascribed* to God; though, as neither of us see his operations distinctly, it should be ascribed *indistinctly*; and we say, with their esteemed Augustin, that it should be ascribed *after the event*.

Both parties own the same *facts*: a Christian falls into wickedness; he *repents*, or he does *not* repent: if he *does* repent, we say, he has departed from Grace, but by the Grace of God he *rises* again, and amends his life:—They say he is one truly *justified*, (or *elect*ed); he was *overcome* by sin for a time, but never lost the *favour* of God; he perseveres *finally*<sup>r</sup>. If the man does *not* repent, we say, he was a real Christian, but has fallen away;

<sup>p</sup> For this *name*, see our Homily on Repentance, page 418. 8vo. and Sect. 111. of this Article.

<sup>q</sup> See Baxter on Perseverance, page 18. 23.

<sup>r</sup> If the Calvinists had not understood our *departing from Grace and rising again*, as equivalent to their *final Perseverance*, I do not see how they could have subscribed to this Article.

away; they would say, that he *never was* truly justified (or elected); but then of this they judge by the *event* as well as we.—“The house” says *Baxter*, (alluding\* to Matt. vii. 26.) “that falleth when the winds arise and the storms assault it, *was* never built upon the rock, but upon the sands.” His idea is, indeed, that something has been *different* in the good and bad, from the *beginning*; fundamentally; we cannot say, that it has *not*; but the opinion, that it has, cannot be applied to *practice*. We are *ignorant* of the beginning, therefore both parties must *exert* themselves as uncertain; as if all depended on themselves; and, if they form any *judgment* of the state of any particular men, they can only do it, by reasoning *a posteriori*; from their *conduct* as an *effect*, to the divine will as a *cause*.

As to the advocates for *Affurance*, if the “*assured* and *infallible*<sup>†</sup> *hope*” of our Homily, will not coalesce with their<sup>‡</sup> qualified and wavering *certainty*, I know not what to say. Would they accept of the expedient of the Bishops and Divines, who gave a judgment on the Lambeth Articles, and proposed substituting for *certitudo*, the original Greek word *Plerophoria* in<sup>\*</sup> Latin letters?

If time permits, I will here read *Baxter's* Prop. v. in his Essay on Perseverance, p. 16, & 17.

To the *Novatians*, of ancient or modern times, I have very little to say. Severity is *respectable*, though it be not *amiable*; concessions must depend upon the effects of it: as, on the one hand, dissembling with great sinners may seem to be treachery

\* On Perseverance, page 33.

† Homily on Repentance, p. 419, 8vo. mentioned in Sect. x.

‡ I think one may call it so; see the notes to Dr. Ruthforth's 3d Charge.

\* Mentioned Sect. VII.

treachery to pure religion, and presumption in making ourselves judges of the execution of the laws of God ; so, on the other hand, it seems a duty to aim at the greatest possible good. Severity may disappoint itself; and to proceed in reforming by a mild discipline, improving gradually, seems acting in the most rational manner; in a manner most conformable to the Spirit, the precepts, and the models of Christianity.

Those who favour the notion, that all great sins are sins against the *Holy Ghost*, in such a way as to come under Matt. xii. 31, (and parallel places) are so few in number, and so little respectable, that it seems needless to try to hit upon any compromise with them: if indeed any such persons there be, at this time.

XXXVIII. In the way of *Improvement*, one might be allowed to wish, that, in the words of the Article, all mention of sin against the Holy Ghost were omitted; which would remove the inconsistency between *not every sin*, and *no sin*.—Perhaps the doctrine of *Assurance*, should be more clearly expressed, or not at all.—And it would be best to have both *remission* of sins mentioned, and *absolution*. I will only add, that it would be a very great improvement indeed, if men would learn to construe *eloquence* rhetorically, and *popular* language popularly: but this belongs equally to the seventeenth Article.



## ARTICLE XVII.

## OF PREDESTINATION AND ELECTION.

**P**REDESTINATION to Life, is the everlasting purpose of God, whereby, before the foundations of the world were laid, he hath constantly decreed by his counsel, secret to us, to deliver from curse and damnation those whom he hath chosen in Christ out of mankind, and to bring them by Christ to everlasting salvation, as vessels made to honour. Wherefore, they which be endued with so excellent a benefit of God, be called according to God's purpose by his Spirit working in due season : they through Grace obey the calling : they be justified freely : they be made sons of God by adoption : they be made like the image of his only-begotten Son Jesus Christ : they walk religiously in good works, and at length, by God's mercy, they attain to everlasting felicity.

As the godly consideration of Predestination, and our Election in Christ, is full of sweet, pleasant, and unspeakable comfort to godly persons, and such as feel in themselves the working of the Spirit of Christ, mortifying the Works of the flesh, and their earthly members, and drawing up their minds to high and heavenly things; as well because it doth greatly establish and confirm their faith of eternal Salvation, to be enjoyed through Christ, as because it doth fervently kindle their love towards God; so, for curious and carnal persons, lacking the Spirit of Christ, to have continually

tinually before their eyes the sentence of God's predestination, is a most dangerous downfall, whereby the Devil doth thrust them either into desperation, or into wretchlessness of most unclean living, no less perilous than desperation.

Furthermore, we must receive God's promises in such wise, as they be generally set forth to us in holy Scripture : And in our doings, that will of God is to be followed, which we have expressly declared unto us in the Word of God.

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I. This being one of those Articles, against which men are apt to be *prejudiced*, I will give a *general idea* of it, by way of *Preface* or Introduction. To my own mind it does not present so many difficulties, as that which we have last considered. In speaking of it to *others*, the chief perplexity, of which I am sensible, is that arising from an endeavour to give the right value to words, which are not intended to have a precise and literal meaning.

Many texts occur in Scripture, which convey an idea of God's predetermining events; to think, that he really intends to admit us into his Counsels, is ridiculous: yet no text is to be *neglected*; what is to be done?—Draw out these texts, connect them, form them into a series: then ask, in what light are they to be considered? not as affording us any *rule* of conduct; what they tell us is concerning the part of *God*; all our *morality* must be settled *before* we meddle with any of them: as far as they can be serviceable to virtue, previously settled, we may use them, but no farther; and we only can be the judges. Nay, what they tell us of the Government of *God*, is so faint and indistinct,

indistinct, that we cannot make of it even *speculative* propositions, to be understood in a strict and absolute sense; nor need we suppose the Sacred writers themselves to have understood these texts more distinctly. They have all the imperfections which have been<sup>a</sup> described as incident to popular language, when used about things Divine.—Have these texts then no use? yes; but it is to the *Heart*, and not to the *Head*: each text was originally *introduced* in such a manner, as to produce some good and pious *sentiment*; so as to warm and raise the heart to holy gratitude, admiration, devotion; and they should always be used for that purpose, and that purpose *only*.

Suppose a man previously *good*, they will animate and comfort him; but no *bad* man must use them; they would make him *worse*; he would use them too *literally*; that is, he would *pervert* them. The applying of them must be guided entirely by the *good* they seem likely to do. This could not be the case if we *understood* the texts; if the propositions they seem to contain, were level to the apprehensions of man; then one man might use them as well as another; the bad as well as the good. Speculative truths, properly so called, are truths as much to the bad as to the good; but *instruments*, or weapons, will, in the hand of a good man, be *useful*, in the hand of a bad man, *hurtful*.

As to our *conduct*, that (our *morality* having been previously settled) must all proceed upon the *Promises* of God. All promises suppose those at *Liberty*, to whom they are made: and therefore God's promises would contradict his decrees, were what are called his decrees, strictly and properly such; and were they perfectly understood by us.—

Intimations

<sup>a</sup> Introd. to second Part of the Articles, Sect. xi.

Intimations of his decrees, or indistinct referring of events to them, may give us some idea of what God *permits*; but, in our *conduct*, we are not to do what he *permits*, but what he *wishes* to have done; in our *conduct*, we are not to study what is faintly intimated, but what is plainly expressed.

If any one was to hear this said without any reference to any Article, I should think he would hesitate little about it.—And I hope to make it appear, that our Article ought not to convey any other idea.—But to begin with *History*.

II. There is so intimate a connexion between our present doctrine and the doctrines of some preceding Articles, especially the *tenth*, that a good deal has been already said, which might have been said here. If therefore we seem to mention any persons or events without sufficient clearness, or fullness of description, it may be, because a fuller account of them has been given before.

In all ages of the world, men have had ideas of referring events to *Fate*; and Philosophers have been led from sayings of *common life* concerning fate, into metaphysical speculations. Human knowledge being very indistinct on this matter, thinking men have fallen into various opinions, or rather conceptions; but when these have been opposed, dissensions, in different ages, as springing from the same causes, have nearly resembled each other; they have varied more in circumstances than in essence. Indeed all dissensions respecting fate, destiny, &c. have sprung from different modes of adjusting the wisdom of God with the freedom of Man. Milton puts together, fixt-fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute, as causing perplexity  
even

even in beings superior to man<sup>b</sup>. The *Stoics* were fatalists; the *Epicureans*<sup>c</sup> were of an opposite turn. — *Cicero*, in his Book *de Fato*, gives some account of the different ways, in which different Philosophers reasoned<sup>d</sup>. And those ancient authors, who have related or imitated the incidents of common life, have left us passages referring events to fate<sup>e</sup> and the decrees of the Gods<sup>f</sup>.

Mr. Hume observes, that the subject “has been found hitherto to exceed all the<sup>g</sup> skill of Philosophy.”

III. The opinions of the *Jews* are peculiarly worthy of our attention, as expressions of the New Testament are accommodated to them; but they have been already<sup>h</sup> mentioned. The fifth Chapter of Maimonides de Penitentiâ is more applicable in this place, than under the tenth Article.—The phraseology of the Jews, as being remarkable for referring events to God, has been mentioned repeatedly<sup>i</sup>.—An idea always to be kept in mind is, that the *Pharisees* were a sort of Stoics, and the *Sadducees* a sort of Epicureans.

IV. The Christians *before the fifth Century* seem rather to introduce texts of Scripture, than to form doctrines out of them. They have been thought  
to

<sup>b</sup> Paradise Lost, B. 2. v. 560.—Lardner produces, Vol. 9. page 85. a passage of Agathias, which mentions as a common notion, that *years* are owing to the stars, or fate.

<sup>c</sup> Calvin calls his adversaries Epicureans, Inst. 3. 23. 8.

<sup>d</sup> In the Book de *Divinatione*, there are many things concerning *Fate*, &c.

<sup>e</sup> Homer Il. Æ. 209, 210. — Plautus, Aulularia, Act 4. Scene 10. Deus impulsor mihi fuit, &c.

<sup>f</sup> See a story of Dox and Fox in Dr. Musgrave's Dissertation on the Grecian Mythology, page 37, 38.—Consult Parkhurst's Hebrew Lexicon under [פסח].

<sup>g</sup> End of Essay on Liberty and Necessity.

<sup>h</sup> Art. x. Sect. III.—Art. xi. Sect. 1.

<sup>i</sup> Art. x. Sect. III. & L. with references.



to hold much the same opinions about Predestination, with the Arminians of later days; neither neglecting divine nor human agency. They conceived, that God elected or predestined men to future happiness, *foreseeing* their fidelity in making *a good use* of the privilege<sup>k</sup>.—But it is *Controversy*, which makes doctrines *definite*<sup>l</sup>: that is, which shews what it is that each man holds.

v. In the fifth Century, the *Pelagian* controversy, set people on thinking and examining; though Predestination was only an incidental, not the original or principal subject of that controversy<sup>m</sup>, which was, the power of Man to work out his own Salvation. *Augustin's* opinion of Predestination has been differently represented: my own idea of it is this. He took the texts of scripture, on which the doctrine of Predestination is built, in too literal a sense; but insisted on that sense chiefly because his adversaries, the Pelagians, tried to evade it, without giving any sufficient scriptural reason. He saw, that there must be *something* professed about Predestination and Election; but whatever it should be, he never meant it to interfere with the *duties* of individuals; with their *Love* of God and Man; with their *Fear* of God and themselves; nor with moral *diligence*.—(See Art. XVI. Sect. VI.) He said plainly, that no one could *distinguish* between<sup>n</sup> one of the elect and any other person; nor could any man know whether he *himself* was one of the elect or not: he held, that God left man in this ignorance, in order to make him *fear*, and to prevent his falling into

<sup>k</sup> Baxter on Perseverance, 2d Opinion.—Vossii Hist. Pel. Lib. 6. Thesis 8.

<sup>l</sup> Art. I. Sect. IV.

<sup>m</sup> Vossius, page 761. Lib. 6, Thesis 16.

<sup>n</sup> De Corr. et Gratiâ, cap. 13 —See Baxter, Persev. page 7.

into that *securitas*, of which our<sup>o</sup> Article speaks.—Whether his notions were reconcileable with each other, or not, he left men, for *practice*, just as the earlier Fathers had done; as much depending upon their *free-will*. So that it is most probable he did not, at different times, hold what could be properly called different *opinions* concerning *free-will*, but, by controversies with Manicheans and Pelagians, was led into two different ways of *expressing* himself; which is also Bp. Overall's<sup>p</sup> opinion. As he wished *both* free-will and Grace to be allowed, and Predestination as a preparation of Grace, he must, of course, defend any one of them against those, who wanted to set it aside.

His change of conception, as to the theory of Predestination, is mentioned in his Book de Prædestinatione Sanctorum, cap. 3.—But it only amounts to this; that he once thought the preference given to *Jacob* over *Esau*, was a *reward* to *Jacob's fidelity*, (which God foreknew); but afterwards, he thought the Scriptures represented that preference as purely a *favour*; and no *reward*.—For his change about *Grace*, see Art. x. Sect. vi.—He seems to have written to the Monks of *Adrumetum*<sup>q</sup> in defence of free-will, in some sense; that is, proving, that *neither* Grace was to supersede free-will, nor free-will Grace. He owns the subject to be very difficult.—His ideas of Predestination and Virtue seem to have been of the same fort;

<sup>o</sup> In the English, "Wretchlessness."—De Correptione et Gratiâ, cap. 13. He says we should *love all* men; we do not know who are the elect.

<sup>p</sup> Page 8. F—15—11. Camb. Hist. Art. Lamb. "neque tam sententiam se (Augustinum) tunc mutasse, quam loquendi genus."

<sup>q</sup> In the Byzacene, not far from Augustin's Diocese.—De Gratiâ et libero Arbitrio: the Letter prefixed to Valentinus, shews this plainly.

fort; *neither was to set aside<sup>r</sup> the other, though we could not reconcile them.* A method which I have commended before<sup>s</sup> repeatedly.

Fulgentius and Prosper supported Augustin.—The Greek fathers were never great Predestinarians. Their sending Petrus Diaconus<sup>t</sup> was as much upon our present subject, as on that of the tenth Article.

The principal question agitated in the Christian church was, did God elect men, and *make* them virtuous, &c.—or did he elect them *because* of their virtue? that is, because he *foresaw* they *would* be virtuous?—the former sort of election was called *absolute*, the latter, *conditional*<sup>u</sup>. And this seems always likely to be the principal question while there is any.—*Absolute* predestination, election, decree, would be conceived to be made for promoting the *Glory of God*; or, from his good *pleasure*: and it would be called the *cause* of Virtue; as virtue would be called the cause of *conditional* election.—It was also a question, whether the *number* of elect was limited: many seem to have been inclined to maintain some predestination to happiness, and none to misery. (Not unlike the compilers of our Article.)—Moreover, disputes arose about the *consequences* of the doctrine of Predestination, as to *God*, and as to *Man*; whether it proved God to be partial, unjust, cruel, &c. or *man* incapable of exhortation,

<sup>r</sup> Page 1. Rhemists on Rom. viii. 30. seem to hold this opinion.

<sup>s</sup> Art. x. Sect. xi. xlv. and Art. xvi. Sect. xxxiii.

<sup>t</sup> Art. x. Sect. vii.

<sup>u</sup> Whitby speaks of “a *conditional* election upon our Perseverance in a life of Holiness.” Five Points, page 36. And this is all the Election he allows: and this was once my idea of *conditional*: and then I called the kind of conditional mentioned above, *intermediate*; between absolute and Whitby’s conditional; and *media scientia* occurred to my mind.

exhortation, reproof, (*correction*), &c. and what rules of *prudence* and reserve should be commonly followed in *teaching* the doctrine.

The *Pelagians* seem to me not to have entered into the subject of Predestination; they declare indeed against any man's being forced to sin by *necessity*; but that declaration was made with respect to *Original sin*, and the possibility of keeping God's commandments: subjects already treated under our ninth and fifteenth Articles.—In Aug. de Predestinatione Sanctorum, you find it said what the *Pelagians* hold<sup>\*</sup>; but I think Augustin means by Pelagians, what we call *Semipelagians*; for that Book, and the following, De Dono Perseverantiæ (which has been called the *second* book de Prædestinatione Sanctorum) are both written to the *French* Prelates, Prosper and Hilary, in answer to reasonings which had been sent to Augustin (in Africa, I suppose,) by them: reasonings which were prevalent at *Marseilles*<sup>†</sup>, the mart of Semipelagians, and had spread into different parts of France.—I do not see anything about Predestination in Pelagius's Creed sent to Innocent; nor in that ascribed to *Julianus*<sup>‡</sup>.—The dispute about Predestination was *incidental*, as just now mentioned; and Augustin did not write his Book de Predestinatione Sanctorum, seemingly, till about twelve or thirteen years after the death of Innocent. Indeed Augustin seems to me to have said but *little* upon *Predestination*; considering how much noise his sayings have made: he considered it chiefly as the Christian dispensation viewed in  
the

<sup>\*</sup> Aug. de Prædest. Sanct. cap. 19. Opera Edit. Benedict. Tom. 10. page 539.

<sup>†</sup> Art. x. Sect. viii.

<sup>‡</sup> See 2d Appendix to 10th Vol. of Augustin's Works, Ed. Bened. page 64 and 74.

the foreknowledge and predetermination of God: he calls it *præparatio Gratiæ*.

VI. The *Semipelagians* seem to have thought just as Augustin did in the former part of his life, when he published his *Opuscula*; that is, that those, who were *elected* by God, were favoured on account of their good disposition, or *faith* and confidence in him. They thought moreover, that the *number* of the elect was *not limited*; and they had a notion, that such as died *Infants*<sup>a</sup> would be rewarded or punished in a future life, according to the conduct which they *would have* observed had they lived on to maturity<sup>b</sup>.

The *Mohammedans*<sup>c</sup> are reckoned great Fatalists; but

VII. We come next to the *ninth Century*. We spoke of poor *Gotescale*<sup>d</sup> under the tenth Article. The transactions most to our present purpose passed after he had been entirely subdued, and had recanted<sup>e</sup> his opinion. Then several churches in France with *Remi* (or Remigius) Bishop of *Lyons* at their head, undertook to defend his cause and his doctrine. They held *Councils*, and wrote *Epistles*. The Epistle of the Church of Lyons (*Ecclesia Lugdunensis*) is one of the principal defences of *Predestination*. It, amongst other things, tries to settle the difference between *Prescience* and Predestination;

<sup>a</sup> Art. ix. Sect. ix.

<sup>b</sup> For these notions, see Hilary's Letter to Augustin, which is sometimes prefixed to his Book *De Prædestinatione Sanctorum*. Vol. 10. p. 519. Ed. Bened. and de Prædest. Sanctorum, cap. 12.

<sup>c</sup> Art. x. Sect. ix.

<sup>d</sup> Art. x. Sect. ix.

<sup>e</sup> See in Usher's Book about him, his two confessions.—In Sirmond's *Opuscula*, Vol. 3, at the beginning, there are two *sentences* against him: one of them in the form of a Synodic Epistle.—In Mosheim, Cent. 9. 2. 3. 24, we see what a great deal has been written about this poor Monk, and the contests he occasioned.

Predestination; that is, between knowing what *would* happen, and determining what *should* happen.—The distinction was not then new; it is in Augustin<sup>f</sup>: predestinarians are glad to have recourse to it, as it helps them to defend themselves against the charge of making God the *Author of Sin*. They can, by means of such a distinction, allow his *foreknowing* sin, and deny his *causing* it.—There seems an inconsistency in several writers, in making the decrees of God *absolute*, and yet, at the same time, an exercise of the divine <sup>g</sup> *justice* in *punishing*.

VIII. If we looked into the writings of the *Schoolmen*, we should find, that, before the scholastic ages, and during them, the notions of Predestination had been growing stronger. The intricacies, which that doctrine brings into discussion, suited the Schoolmen. Bishop Burnet on this Article may furnish some instances. I could content myself with referring, as in the tenth Article, to one of Thomas Aquinas's Indexes<sup>h</sup>.—The same differences, which prevailed between the Thomists and Scotists, the Dominicans and Franciscans<sup>i</sup>, about Grace, prevailed also about Predestination.

IX. Let us then pass to the age of the *Reformation*: taking first the early Reformers, without regard to Country, and mentioning the Council of Trent, as composed of persons from different countries;

<sup>f</sup> De Præd. Sanct. cap. 10.

<sup>g</sup> See Fulke's Rhemish Testament, on parts of Rom. ix.—See also expressions of *Calvin* in Diss. on this Article.—*Barot* owns, or is made to own, that Sin is not the cause of Reprobation, but that “the reprobation of the *wicked* is from everlasting.”

<sup>h</sup> At Lecture I read two Heads out of the Index to the works of Thomas Aquinas; beginning, *Prædestinatio juvatur precibus sanctorum*, &c. and *Præscientia meritorum non est causa*, &c.

<sup>i</sup> Art. xi. Sect. x.

countries; and then, as in the tenth Article<sup>k</sup>, let us take accounts of our doctrine as professed in different *countries*, without keeping to one time.

At the beginning of the *Reformation*, the first opposition was to popish *good works*<sup>l</sup>. This occasioned great stress to be laid upon every part of *Divine Agency*. *Wickliffe* was a predestinarian<sup>m</sup>; and so were other able Reformers; *Zuingle*, *Calvin*, and at first, *Martin Luther*; though he afterwards softened<sup>n</sup>; but *Calvin* continued in his first rigour, and his follower *Beza* increased upon it. We might read *Calvin's definition*<sup>o</sup> of Predestination. —Dr. *Balguy* calls his system “*nonsense*,” and his religion, “a religion which seems to have rested on this execrable foundation, that God is a Tyrant. Why else did its teachers *delight* to represent him as governing by *Will* only, not by *wisdom*?” —The *Zuinglians* held, “For Predestination and Reprobation; that *man* doth nothing, but all is in the Will<sup>p</sup> of God.” But *Melancthon* wholly omitted the subject of Predestination in the Confession of *Augsburg*<sup>q</sup>. And the *Saxon*<sup>r</sup> confession declines it.

Before the Council of Trent, we are told, that the *Romanists* were inclined to what has since been called

<sup>k</sup> Art. x. Sect. XIII.

<sup>l</sup> Art. XI. Sect. VI.

<sup>m</sup> Hume's Hist. England.—Gilpin's Life of Wickliffe, page 80.

<sup>n</sup> Burnet Hist. Ref. Vol. 2. page 107, quoted in Oxford pamphlet, page 27.—I beg leave to call by that short name, or even the shorter one of *Oxf.* the *Dissertation on the Seventeenth Article* printed at Oxford in 1773, which I have heard was written by Dr. Winchester.

<sup>o</sup> Calvin's Institutes 3. 21. 5.

<sup>p</sup> Heylin Quinq. Hist. page 510.

<sup>q</sup> See his idea of the matter in the Aug. Conf. cap. 5. de Fide. quoted in Oxf. page 31.—Heylin, page 519.—Syntagma, page 21.

<sup>r</sup> Syntagma, page 84, (2d paging).

called *Calvinism*<sup>s</sup>: which, considering their veneration for Augustin and the Schoolmen, is very probable in itself; though different parties would fall into it in different *degrees*<sup>t</sup>.—At the Council of Trent, the Dominicans were for referring all to God, and laying down, that what relates to man, his conduct and his welfare, has been fixed and decided before all worlds. The Franciscans wished<sup>u</sup> to have it declared, that all is in the power of man: a third sort took a middle way, and would have some things declared to be fixed, others to be left to human choice and endeavours. —Luther and Melancthon passed uncensured in this matter. The result we find in the Canons and decrees of the Council. From the fifteenth and seventeenth Canons, and the twelfth Chapter of the Decree, we gather, as I should express it, that the Romanists did not deny the reality of Predestination, but condemned every thing, by which a man could apply it *to practice*; or to his own particular *case*.

The Rhemists on Rom. viii. and ix. follow Augustin, and are for unconditional predestination; but are not so decided, with regard to the motive of God, or with regard to reprobation, as their answerer Master Fulke

x. We now take a short view of Predestination in different *countries*; leaving our own for the last.

Of *Spain*<sup>\*</sup> and the Jesuit *Molina*, I seem to have nothing new to advance: he is said to have invented the *Media Scientia*, by which God sees whatsoever

<sup>s</sup> Dean Tucker's Letters to Dr. Kippis, page 81, &c. quoted Oxf. page 79.

<sup>t</sup> Art. XVI. Sect. VIII.

<sup>u</sup> See Heylin from Father Paul, page 510.

<sup>\*</sup> Art. X. Sect. XIV.



whatsoever would follow upon “such or such conditions<sup>y</sup>.”

xi. And, under the Head of *Holland and Flanders*, I have already<sup>z</sup> said all that is needful; only I may read the decrees of the Synod of *Dort* as far as they relate to Predestination. The *English* divines were ordered by King James the First to vote for universal redemption; but they were out-voted.

I have heard, I think, that Calvinism is now the ruling religion in Holland, but that Arminianism is tolerated. Limborch was an Arminian, but he read Divinity Lectures in public at Amsterdam, and his body of Divinity was published there: he died in 1712, aged 79.

xii. Of *Germany* I have said something under the tenth Article<sup>a</sup>. The Calvinists and Arminians are there mixed with Romanists; the different religions prevailing in different degrees in different places. The *Lutherans* do not, I believe, differ much from the Romanists, or from us, with regard to Predestination.

xiii. The disturbances in *France*<sup>b</sup> did not regard the doctrine of Grace only: the propositions condemned were *five*. The last is against<sup>c</sup> the universality of Redemption: and therefore favours, at least, the doctrine of Predestination.

xiv. We will take the early *Socinians* as belonging to *Poland*; as we did before<sup>d</sup>. In the Racovian Catechism, in the Chapter De libero Arbitrio, we have the Socinian definition of Predestination.

<sup>y</sup> Burnet on the Article, octavo, page 195.

<sup>z</sup> Art. x. Sect. xv.

<sup>a</sup> Art. x. Sect. xvi.

<sup>b</sup> Art. x. Sect. xvii.

<sup>c</sup> Mosheim, Cent. 17. 2. 1. 1. 43.

<sup>d</sup> Art. x. Sect. xvii. though there is a *Confessio Polonica* in the Syntagma; but the Socinians are called *Fratres Poloni*.

destination. — “Prædestinatio Dei in scripturis aliud nihil notat, quàm Dei, ante conditum mundum, de hominibus decretum ejusmodi; Quòd iis, qui in ipsum crederent, eique obedirent, daturus esset vitam æternam: eos verò qui in eum credere, et ei parere, recusarent, æternâ damnatione puni-  
 turus esset.”—Afterwards it is said, that *Election* sometimes means the same as *Vocation*, sometimes it implies farther, leading a Christian life.—The Socinians have been, I think sometimes said to deny the Divine *Prescience*; perhaps it might be thought, that they deny it in this passage; but I should rather say, they do not profess it; if God decrees to reward those, who should believe in him, he *may* foreknow who will believe in him, though that be not mentioned\*.

xv. *Geneva* used to be the principal mart of *Calvinism*; there Calvin flourished, and Beza taught.—The *Helvetic*<sup>f</sup> confession says, all those are *reprobate*, who are *not Christians*, though it *hopes well* of all, and takes pains to prevent *abuse*.—But I have been informed, that *Calvinism* is now a mere *form* at Geneva; and that Oftervald’s Catechism is chiefly taught. I believe Oftervald was a Lutheran. I have already, in the third<sup>g</sup> book, mentioned this change as an instance of a *tacit Reformation*.

The *Jesuits*<sup>h</sup> are reckoned Semi-Pelagians.

There is a comic dialogue called *Fur prædestinatus*, which exposes the principal predestinarian opinions down to the Synod of *Dort*.

xvi. I come lastly to *England*.—The Necessary Doctrine has<sup>i</sup> something very like our Article;  
 what

\* P. S. See Burnet on this Article, near the beginning, page 190, octavo.

<sup>f</sup> Corpus and Syntagma.

<sup>g</sup> Book III. Chap. iv. Sect. vi.    <sup>h</sup> Art. x. Sect. xiii.

<sup>i</sup> In the Article of Justification, about four pages from the end.

what one might call the *seeds* of it.—“ And here all phantastickall imaginacion, curious reasonyng, and vayn truste of predestinacion, is to be laied apart. And accordyng to the playne manner of speakyng and teachyng of scripture, in innumerable places, we oughte evermore to be in dread of our own frailtie and natural pronitie to fall to synne, and not to assure ourselfe, that we be elected any otherwyse, than by felyng of scriptural mocions in our herte, and by the tokens of good and vertuous lyvyng, in folowyng the grace of God, and perseveryng in the same to the ende.”

In the *Reformatio Legum*, predestination is the last subject of the part de Hæresibus; it mentions as a fact, that many did, at the time, use the plea of predestination, as an excuse for their immoral lives: but it does not seem to hint at any penalties for such abuse. It is more of a declaration or *memorial*, to prevent scandal and perversion, than a *Law*. No more need be said upon it at present, as it will be useful in our *explanation*.

In our *Homilies* I do not see the doctrine of Predestination\* treated; If I have not overlooked any passages concerning it, we might conclude, that our church did not think it a doctrine to be commonly taught to the *people*.

The principal *writers* at the time of the Reformation in England, Cranmer, Latimer, Hooper, Ridley, are extremely rational in treating our doctrine: specimens may be seen in Heylin's *Historia Quinquarticularis* and the Oxford Dissertation: my own opinion was formed and publicly delivered before I knew theirs; and I was happy to find the best and ablest men giving me the most support; and

\* From Heylin, *Quinq.* page 558 (2. 9. 7.) one would think that our *Homilies* *did* mention the doctrine; but the Italics denoting quotation are continued too long—That work of Heylin's is incorrectly printed.

and making my ideas seem most like those of the Church of England.

It seems clear to me, that our Church did not, at the time of the separation from the Church of Rome, properly intend to lay down *any doctrine* of Predestination; but only to declare *against abuses* actually prevailing. If it had not been for this, they would probably have followed the example of Melancthon, when he formed the confession of Augsburg. The opinions of *Erasmus* confirm this, as he was far from a rigorous Predestinarian; and yet they were considered as proper to help forward the Reformation in England. His paraphrase on the New Testament was placed by authority<sup>1</sup> in our churches; and the Clergy were put upon studying his *works*.—He died in 1536, aged 68.

<sup>1</sup> Introduction to Book IV. Sect. IV.

END OF THE THIRD VOLUME.



# E R R A T A.

Page	Page
7. l. 3 from bottom, for <i>re-</i> <i>lating</i> , read <i>making</i> .	187. lowest line, r. Sect. xvi. <i>of Introd. to Part II.</i>
9. l. 12. for Hebrews, r. <i>the</i> <i>Hebrews</i> .	201. l. 12. r. <i>speak</i> .
11. lowest line but one, for Is, r. <i>is</i> .	210. l. 5. for <i>fat</i> , r. <i>fat</i> .
13. l. 11 from bottom, for Epistles, r. <i>Epistle</i> .	211 & 218. r. <i>Appello</i> .
15. at top, put 15.	211. l. 23. for <i>tenet</i> , r. <i>tenets</i> .
16. l. 27. for <i>his</i> , r. <i>the</i> .	215. l. 4. for <i>practice</i> , r. <i>prac-</i> <i>tise</i> ; and <i>practised</i> , page 396, l. 1.
18. l. 3 from bottom, for <i>also</i> , r. <i>also</i> .	218. l. 3 from bottom, for <i>in</i> , r. <i>to</i> .
38. l. 9 from bottom, r. <i>cir-</i> <i>cumstances</i> .	231. l. 12 from bottom, r. <i>pha-</i> <i>risaical</i> .
50. l. 7 from bottom, for <i>aud</i> , r. <i>and</i> .	233. l. 23, r. <i>extend</i> .
56. l. 8 from bottom, r. <i>Whit-</i> <i>gift</i> .	255. 256. These numbers are printed twice.
60. l. 13. for Articles, r. <i>Article</i> .	262. l. 13 from bottom, for goods, r. <i>good</i> .
79. l. 8. from bottom, for <i>nor</i> , r. <i>or</i> .	295. l. 16. put out the second <i>a</i> .
80. l. 3. for <i>must</i> , r. <i>might</i> .	305. l. 7 from bottom, r. <i>right-</i> <i>eousness</i> .
94. l. 7. for <i>use</i> , r. <i>the use</i> .	364. l. 14. for <i>also</i> , we, r. <i>also</i> , <i>if we</i> .
100. l. 3 from bottom, r. <i>fimi-</i> <i>lité</i> .	369. l. 16. before <i>one</i> , insert <i>on</i> .
— l. 6 from bottom, r. <i>Au-</i> <i>gustini</i> .	373. lowest line, for <i>et</i> , r. <i>and</i> .
101. l. 8. for <i>unto</i> , r. <i>into</i> .	376. l. 23. r. <i>the</i> .
111. l. 7 for Articles, r. <i>Articles</i> .	377. l. 14. r. <i>connect</i> .
115. l. 3. r. <i>impracticable—</i> <i>desireable</i> .	379. l. 15. for <i>have</i> , r. <i>are</i> .
123. l. 19, 20, for <i>it is</i> , r. <i>they</i> <i>are</i> .	395. l. 25. r. <i>declarations</i> .
130. l. 8 from bottom, for within, r. <i>in</i> .	426. l. 4. r. <i>If I</i> .
145. l. 25. for <i>seems</i> , r. <i>seem</i> .	429. l. 7 from bottom, for <i>this</i> , r. <i>the</i> .
159. l. 7 from bottom, for they, r. <i>some</i> .	440. l. 8. for <i>sensible</i> , r. <i>sen-</i> <i>sible</i> .
161. l. 3. for <i>was</i> , r. <i>were</i> .	443. l. 7 from bottom, r. <i>prof-</i> <i>ternantur</i> .
163. l. 21. r. <i>opinion</i> .	449. l. 10 from bottom, for Peleg. r. <i>Pelag</i> .
169. l. 31. r. <i>individual</i> .	460. l. 8 from bottom, r. <i>Chris-</i> <i>tian</i> .
178. l. 14. for <i>this a</i> , r. <i>this is a</i> .	465. l. 11. r. <i>annulled</i> .
184. l. 8 from bottom, for xvii, r. xviii.	— l. 5 from bottom, r. Sect. xviii.

Some words end with *ll*, which should end with *l*, some *periods*  
are omitted, and some points over the letter *i*.











- Milton. 51. 252 490.  
Balguy. 79. 294. 262. 385.  
Gray. (note for!)



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